At Central Asian airports, remittances do not always look like money. They can look like taped cardboard boxes arriving from Istanbul, oversized suitcases from Moscow, bags of clothes bought in Turkish markets, phones, cosmetics, fabrics, spare parts, children’s shoes or household appliances carried across borders as luggage. In a village in southern Tajikistan, they can look like a half-finished house paid for by a son working in Russia. In Kyrgyzstan, they can arrive as a notification on a banking app. In Uzbekistan, they can help pay for a wedding, medical treatment, a sibling’s education or the first stock for a small shop.

Remittances are often described as a financial flow. In Central Asia, they are closer to an invisible welfare state. They pay for food, debt, construction, school fees, ceremonies, medicine and daily consumption. They keep families afloat, sustain rural economies and reduce pressure on governments that cannot create enough jobs at home. But they also reveal one of the region’s deepest vulnerabilities: millions of households depend on wages earned elsewhere.

The dependence is most visible in Tajikistan. For years, Tajikistan has ranked among the most remittance-dependent countries in the world. Money sent home by workers abroad has represented more than a third of GDP in recent years, and in some estimates even more. The numbers matter, but they do not fully capture the social reality. In parts of the country, especially poorer and rural regions, migration is not an exception but a stage of life. Young men leave after school, before marriage, after marriage, or when family debts accumulate. They go to Moscow, St Petersburg, regional Russian cities, construction sites, markets, warehouses and service jobs. Some return seasonally. Others stay away for years.

This absence has reshaped village life. In some Tajik communities, working-age men are missing for long stretches of the year. Women, grandparents and children manage daily routines, land, livestock, school, family ceremonies and household budgets. The money sent from Russia gives women responsibility, but not always authority. A wife may manage the household, but major decisions can still be made by an absent husband, his parents or the wider family. Migration can strengthen families by giving them income, but it can also strain marriages, delay return, create second households abroad or leave women carrying both economic and social burdens.

Also read on Novastan: In Paris, an Uzbekistani NGO’s fight against human trafficking recognised with the French Republic Human Rights Prize

Kyrgyzstan tells a related but slightly different story. Labour migration, especially to Russia and Kazakhstan, has long supported households across the south and in rural areas. Remittances once represented close to a third of GDP; more recently the share has fallen, partly because of economic diversification and changing migration patterns. Yet the money remains crucial. It pays for homes in Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken, supports families in villages, and helps households survive when local wages are low. Unlike Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan also benefits from membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, which gives its citizens easier access to the Russian labour market than Tajik or Uzbek migrants. But this advantage does not remove the underlying dependence on external work.

Uzbekistan is different again. Its economy is larger and more diversified, so remittances make up a lower share of GDP than in Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan. But in absolute terms, Uzbekistan is one of the region’s major remittance recipients because of its population size and the large number of citizens working abroad. Uzbek migrants work in Russia, Kazakhstan, Türkiye, South Korea, the Gulf and increasingly other destinations. The state has tried to regulate labour migration more actively, including through organised recruitment and agreements with foreign employers. Still, much of the system remains family-driven: someone leaves, sends money, returns, leaves again, or helps another relative migrate.

Kazakhstan occupies another position in this regional economy. It sends migrants abroad too, but it is also a destination. Workers from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan come to Kazakhstan for construction, agriculture, services, markets and domestic work. In this sense, Kazakhstan is not only part of the remittance map as a country of origin, but also as a regional labour hub. Turkmenistan, by contrast, is harder to include with precision. Migration exists, but reliable data is limited and the country’s closed political environment makes the scale of remittances more difficult to assess.

Also read on Novastan: The paradoxes of migration from Tajikistan to Russia: an interview with Dr Elena Borisova

How the money is sent has changed dramatically. In the 1990s and 2000s, many families associated remittances with money-transfer offices and familiar brands such as Western Union, MoneyGram, Zolotaya Korona, Unistream or Contact. A migrant would queue, send cash, and relatives would collect it in a bank branch or transfer office. That world has not disappeared, but it has been transformed by sanctions, banking restrictions, digitalisation and the spread of smartphones.

Today, remittances often move through mobile banking apps, card-to-card transfers, e-wallets, national payment systems and fintech platforms. A migrant in Moscow can send money from a Russian bank account to a relative’s card in Dushanbe, Osh, Samarkand or Namangan. In Tajikistan, fintech and banking services such as Alif, Dushanbe City, Eskhata or other local platforms have become part of everyday financial life. In Uzbekistan, digital payment ecosystems such as Click, Payme, Uzum Bank and bank apps allow money to move quickly into household budgets. In Kyrgyzstan, mobile banking and card systems have made transfers faster and more routine.

This technical shift matters. When remittances arrive instantly, migration becomes part of daily household management. Money is no longer only a monthly transfer collected in cash. It can pay for groceries, utilities, school supplies, medicine or construction materials almost in real time. The migrant is physically absent but financially present. A father in Russia can still pay a bill in Tajikistan. A brother in South Korea can send money for a wedding. A son in Kazakhstan can support his mother’s medical treatment. Digital transfers make separation easier to manage, but they also normalise it.

Yet not everything moves through banking apps. Central Asia also has a “box economy”. Shuttle traders, relatives and small entrepreneurs carry goods across borders, especially through routes linking the region with Türkiye, Russia, Dubai and China. Istanbul is particularly important. Flights between Istanbul and Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, Almaty and other cities carry not only tourists and business travellers, but also small traders moving textiles, clothes, shoes, cosmetics and household goods. Some items are gifts. Others are for resale. Many fall somewhere in between. The result is a blurred line between migration, remittances and trade.

This matters because goods sent or carried home can function like remittances. A migrant may not send cash, but may bring phones, clothes or equipment that can be sold. A woman may travel to Istanbul, buy merchandise, and return to sell it in a bazaar or through Instagram and Telegram. A relative abroad may send goods through cargo services rather than money through a bank. In household economies where cash is scarce and small trade is common, goods are another way of transferring value.

The comparison with elite mobility is revealing. Central Asian governments also promote a very different kind of movement: students, civil servants and professionals sent abroad through state-backed scholarship schemes. Kazakhstan’s Bolashak and Uzbekistan’s El-Yurt Umidi belong to this world. They are designed to bring skills, networks and prestige back home. But they highlight the contrast at the heart of Central Asian mobility. Some citizens leave as future administrators, engineers or specialists. Many more leave as builders, drivers, cleaners, carers, traders or seasonal workers whose earnings keep households afloat.

Also read on Novastan: “I only needed a passport” : In Ukraine, Central Asian prisoners of wars caught between loyalty and regret

Russia remains the centre of this system, but it has become a more uncertain centre. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has needed migrant labour more than ever, especially in construction, manufacturing, logistics and services. Labour shortages have increased the demand for Central Asian workers. At the same time, migrants face a harsher environment: police checks, nationalist rhetoric, bureaucratic uncertainty, military recruitment pressure and social hostility. After the Crocus City Hall attack near Moscow in March 2024, Tajik migrants in particular reported more raids, deportations and difficulties entering Russia. Tajikistan even summoned the Russian ambassador over the treatment of its citizens.

This has exposed the fragility of a model built on migration. For Russia, Central Asian workers are necessary but politically vulnerable. For Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, migration reduces unemployment and brings in money, but it also exports social problems rather than solving them. If Russia tightens rules, deports workers or becomes less attractive, households across Central Asia feel the shock. If the rouble weakens, remittances lose value. If migrants face discrimination, the cost is borne not only by them, but by families waiting at home.

Destinations are diversifying. South Korea attracts workers through more regulated labour schemes. Türkiye combines labour, trade and cultural proximity. The Gulf has become more visible. Kazakhstan remains a regional magnet. Europe is still more difficult to access, but increasingly present in aspirations and small migration networks. But diversification is uneven and often expensive. For many families, Russia remains the most accessible option because of language, networks, transport links and relatively low entry costs.

The central question is therefore not whether remittances are good or bad. For many families, they are indispensable. They reduce poverty, finance education, build homes and open small businesses. Without them, social hardship would be much deeper. But dependence on remittances also allows states to postpone harder questions: how to create jobs at home, how to raise rural incomes, how to protect migrants abroad, how to support women left in charge of households, and how to turn money sent home into productive investment rather than only consumption.

Also read on Novastan: In Kyrgyzstan, one in four families lives below the poverty line

Remittances are Central Asia’s invisible welfare state, but they are also a warning. They show the strength of family solidarity across borders, and the weakness of domestic labour markets. They connect Tajik villages, Kyrgyz towns and Uzbek neighbourhoods to Moscow, Istanbul, Almaty, Seoul and Dubai. They arrive as bank notifications, cash transfers, cargo parcels and taped cardboard boxes. They build houses and empty villages. They pay for weddings and prolong absence. They keep economies moving, but they also reveal how much of Central Asia’s future is still being financed by people who had to leave.

Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English

The post Money, boxes and absent men: the hidden economy reshaping Central Asia appeared first on Novastan English.

Central Asia is often described as the next frontier in the global race for rare earths. The reality is both more promising and more complicated. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and their neighbours do hold major reserves of critical raw materials, from uranium and copper to chromium, manganese, tungsten, antimony, graphite and rare earth elements. But much remains uncertain: some deposits are still under exploration, processing capacity is limited, and the most valuable parts of the supply chain remain outside the region.

What is already clear, however, is that governments, state mining companies and foreign investors are moving fast. The European Union has signed critical raw materials partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. American investors are looking at tungsten and rare earths. France is active in uranium. Development banks are financing graphite and mining governance. China remains the unavoidable reference point, because it dominates global refining and processing.

For Central Asia, the question is not only what lies underground. It is whether the region can avoid becoming simply another supplier of raw materials for richer industrial powers.

Why these minerals matter

Also read on Novastan: Carbon neutral by 2060? Kazakhstan’s green pledge faces a reality check

The term “critical raw materials” can sound technical, but the products they make possible are familiar. A smartphone contains copper, tungsten, rare earth elements and other metals. An electric vehicle depends on lithium, graphite, copper and sometimes cobalt. Wind turbines require steel, copper and powerful permanent magnets. Satellites, missiles, semiconductors and aircraft all need specialised metals.

Rare earths are only one part of the story. They include elements such as neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, cerium, lanthanum and yttrium. Some are used in permanent magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines, drones, missiles and electronic devices. Others are used in polishing, catalysts, lasers or specialised industrial applications.

But Central Asia’s strategic importance is wider than rare earths. Uranium is essential for nuclear power. Copper is needed for electrical grids, renewable energy infrastructure, electric vehicles and data centres. Graphite is used in battery anodes. Tungsten hardens steel and is used in cutting tools, aerospace and defence. Antimony is used in flame retardants, ammunition, batteries and semiconductors. Chromium and manganese are essential for steel. Titanium is used in aircraft, spacecraft and medical implants. Molybdenum strengthens steel used in pipelines, industry and defence. Gallium is important for semiconductors, radar systems and advanced electronics.

In other words, the issue is not only about “green energy”. It is also about industrial power, military technology, digital infrastructure and geopolitical dependency.

What is actually known

According to the OECD, Central Asia holds a significant share of global reserves of several critical raw materials. The region accounts for around 39% of global manganese ore reserves, 31% of chromium, 20% of lead, 13% of zinc, 9% of titanium, 6% of aluminium, and about 5% each of copper, cobalt and molybdenum.

Kazakhstan is the strongest player. It is already the world’s largest uranium producer and can export many of the materials included in the European Union’s critical raw materials list. Its known strengths include uranium, chromium, manganese, copper, titanium, tungsten, beryllium, gallium and rare earth potential.

Uzbekistan is also increasingly visible. The country has large copper resources, uranium, molybdenum, tungsten, gold-associated metals and rare metals. Its mining sector is dominated by national champions such as Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex, Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company and Navoiyuran.

Kyrgyzstan has a smaller mining sector, but it is important for antimony, gold and rare earth occurrences. Tajikistan is also relevant for antimony, silver and rare metals. Turkmenistan remains the least transparent case, with public information still much thinner than for the rest of the region.

Kazakhstan’s rare earth moment

The strongest recent rare earth story comes from Kazakhstan. In 2025, the Kazakhstani authorities announced the discovery of the Zhana Kazakhstan deposit, reportedly containing more than 20 million metric tons of rare earth metals. The deposit is said to include neodymium, cerium, lanthanum and yttrium, with an average content of about 700 grams per ton.

The announcement attracted attention because neodymium and related elements are central to permanent magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines and defence technologies. But it should be treated with caution. A deposit is not the same as a mine. A mine is not the same as a processing industry. And processing rare earths is technically difficult, expensive and environmentally sensitive.

This is one of the main problems in the global rare earth race. China does not dominate only because it has resources. It dominates because it controls refining, separation and manufacturing capacity. For Central Asia, the real challenge is therefore not only geological. It is industrial.

The companies entering the race

In Kazakhstan, several national and foreign actors are already positioning themselves.

Tau-Ken Samruk, the state mining company, is expected to play a central role in exploration and strategic mineral projects. Kazatomprom remains the key uranium actor, while Eurasian Resources Group is important for aluminium, copper, cobalt and gallium. ERG has announced plans to produce gallium in Kazakhstan, a metal used in semiconductors, radar systems and missile guidance.

American interest is also growing. Cove Capital has been linked to tungsten projects in Kazakhstan, including Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty, in partnership with Tau-Ken Samruk. Tungsten is strategically important because it is used in hard metals, defence and industrial tools, while Western countries are trying to reduce dependence on China.

Sarytogan Graphite, active in Kazakhstan’s Karaganda region, is another example. Graphite is essential for battery anodes, especially in electric vehicles. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development acquired a stake in the company in 2024, showing that development banks are also entering the critical minerals field.

In Uzbekistan, the main actors are domestic state companies. Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex is central for copper, molybdenum and other metals. Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company remains one of the country’s major mining giants. Navoiyuran, the Uzbekistani uranium company, has signed with France’s Orano to develop a new uranium mining venture.

These examples show that the critical minerals race is not only a matter of abstract geopolitics. It is already visible in company strategies, financing decisions and bilateral agreements.

Europe, China, Russia and the United States

For Europe, Central Asia is attractive because it offers potential diversification. The European Union signed a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan in 2022 on sustainable raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen value chains. In 2024, it signed a similar memorandum with Uzbekistan. The first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand in 2025 also placed critical raw materials within a broader agenda of trade, transport, energy and connectivity.

For the United States, Central Asian minerals are part of a larger attempt to reduce dependence on China in strategic supply chains. Interest in tungsten, rare earths, gallium and other materials fits into this broader competition.

Also read on Novastan: L’héritage de Tabochar : l’extraction d’uranium au Tadjikistan et ses conséquences

China remains the central actor, even when it is not directly mentioned. It is the world’s dominant processor of rare earths and many other critical minerals. Any Western strategy on Central Asian resources is therefore, implicitly or explicitly, about reducing China’s leverage.

Russia still matters through legacy infrastructure, Soviet-era geological knowledge, uranium links and regional influence. But Moscow is no longer the only external actor able to shape Central Asia’s mineral future. This is one reason why the topic is becoming politically sensitive.

The real bottleneck: processing

The most important part of the story is not extraction. It is processing.

A country can have uranium, copper, tungsten or rare earth deposits and still capture only a small part of the value. The highest profits and strategic leverage often come from refining, separation, metallurgy, battery components, magnets and advanced manufacturing.

This is where Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are trying to change the model. Both countries want more local value creation, not only raw exports. Uzbekistan is promoting mining reform and industrial processing. Kazakhstan is trying to position itself as a partner for value chains rather than just a supplier of ore.

Also read on Novastan: En Ouzbékistan, la percée saoudienne dans le secteur de l’énergie

The risk is obvious. Central Asia has already experienced extractive economic models: cotton, oil, gas, uranium and metals have often generated revenue without creating diversified, high-value economies. Critical minerals could reproduce the same pattern under a greener label.

Environmental and social risks

Critical minerals are often presented as tools of the green transition, but their extraction can be environmentally damaging. Mining requires water, energy, chemicals and waste management. Rare earth processing can be particularly polluting if not properly regulated. In a region already facing water stress, desertification and fragile ecosystems, this matters.

There are also governance questions. Who benefits from new mining projects? How transparent are contracts? Are local communities consulted? Are environmental standards enforced? Do projects create skilled employment, or mainly export raw materials?

Also read on Novastan: En Asie centrale, le marché des véhicules électriques fait ses débuts

For Central Asian governments, the opportunity is real. But so is the danger of a “green resource curse”, where global demand for clean technologies reinforces old patterns of dependency, opacity and environmental damage.

A starter pack for readers

The simplest way to understand the issue is this:

• Rare earths such as neodymium and dysprosium are used in magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines and defence technologies.
• Uranium is used for nuclear power.
• Copper is used in electrical grids, renewable energy, electric vehicles and data centres.
• Graphite is used in battery anodes.
• Lithium is used in rechargeable batteries, though Central Asia is not yet a major global lithium centre.
• Cobalt is used in batteries and aerospace alloys.
• Tungsten is used in hard metals, cutting tools, aerospace and military equipment.
• Antimony is used in flame retardants, ammunition, batteries and semiconductors.
• Chromium and manganese are used in steelmaking.
• Titanium is used in aircraft, spacecraft and medical implants.
• Molybdenum is used in high-strength steel.
• Gallium is used in semiconductors, radar and advanced electronics.
• Beryllium is used in aerospace, satellites, telecommunications and defence systems.

This is why Central Asia’s mineral base is suddenly being watched so closely. The region is not only sitting on obscure metals. It may hold some of the materials needed for the energy transition, digital technologies and modern defence industries.

More than a mine?

The coming years will show whether Central Asia can turn critical minerals into a development opportunity. The region has the resources. It has growing diplomatic attention. It has national mining companies and foreign investors willing to engage.

But the decisive question is whether Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and their neighbours can move beyond extraction. Without processing, transparency, environmental standards and local value creation, the new critical minerals boom could simply repeat older patterns of dependency.

Also read on Novastan: Le Kazakhstan renforce son emprise sur son uranium face à une demande mondiale croissante

Central Asia is not yet the next rare earth superpower. But it is becoming an important region in the global competition for critical raw materials. For the region itself, the challenge is to ensure that what lies beneath the ground helps build something above it.

Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English

The post What lies beneath Central Asia? Rare earths, critical minerals and the new race for resources appeared first on Novastan English.

It has been one year since the Organization of Turkic States approved the implementation of a common Turkic alphabet, designed for uniform use in all member states. Under the guise of bolstering Turkic unity, Ankara has spearheaded the initiative with the aim to draw the Central Asian states into its political orbit. However, due to limited funds, lack of political incentives, and preexisting linguistic policy, the Central Asian states have largely chosen to ignore the common alphabet entirely. 

In September 2024, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) announced to the world the creation of a 34-letter common Turkic alphabet based on the Latin script, approved on paper by all member states. The initiative, spearheaded by Türkiye, has been in the works since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Now one year since the common alphabet’s announcement, the manoeuvre has yet to make the large waves in the Central Asian information space that Türkiye had initially hoped for.

The proposed common alphabet exists within the larger regional debate surrounding the political futures of the Central Asian languages. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the newly independent republics began the process of transitioning their languages from a Cyrillic to a Latin-based script. However, in Central Asia, the decision of switching to a Latin script remains a fierce debate across the region even three decades later. 

Türkiye, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s expansionist foreign policy, has offered a guiding hand by leading the OTS initiative to create a common Turkic alphabet. Türkiye first adopted the Latin script in 1928 as a part of its early independence-era modernisation reforms. By encouraging the Central Asian states to undergo a similar process, Türkiye also aims to cement its position as the dominant centre of the Turkic world.

So far, Erdoğan’s plan has not cultivated many strong allies in Central Asia’s political elite. Most states in the region remain embroiled within national debates over the post-Soviet future of their titular languages, making Central Asian governments particularly resistant to carry out such a monumental linguistic shift at the international level.

Competition for “Middle Power” Status

In the year since the OTS announcement, regional heavyweights Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain resistant in adopting the common Turkic alphabet within their borders. According to Nargiza Muratalieva, a Bishkek-based political scientist, “Kazakhstan is not ready to share its leadership in Central Asia, given its attempts to promote itself as a middle power.” Kazakhstan has spent the post-Soviet decades centralizing Central Asian political power within its own borders, with the goal to secure a respected “middle power” status to both the region and the international community at large. Uzbekistan, the largest Central Asian country by population and second largest in terms of GDP, shares similar ambitions. Both countries view the Turkish-led OTS alphabet as an attempt by Türkiye to cement itself as the dominant power in the region, and thus, a threat to their respective national directives.

Read more on Novastan: The Lexicon of Kazakh Decolonisation

While both nations have yet to consider the implementation of the common Turkic alphabet, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have independently embarked on national plans to switch the script of their titular languages from Cyrillic to Latin. In both cases, the political leadership has underestimated the difficulty of this task, leading to much longer timelines for the initiative than initially expected. Currently, both states are stuck in a transitional state where both scripts are used interchangeably. Critics complain that the current linguistic paralysis in the countries is both confusing for citizens and financially taxing for administrations. The Diplomat reports that the 2018 budgetary estimate for Kazakhstan’s Latinization program sat at US$664 million, equivalent to roughly 39% of Kazakhstan’s GDP for that year.

The challenges Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have faced implementing a Latin script have meant that neither government seems willing to invest in the OTS alphabet as a third system for their citizens to learn and their country to switch to. Even Turkmenistan — a state which successfully phased out Cyrillic usage in the 1990s — remains resistant to the OTS plan to change their national standard. Largely closed off from the outside world and averse to foreign influence, the common Turkic alphabet offers few advantages to Ashgabat.

Kyrgyzstan: The Cyrillic Exception

At the unveiling ceremony of the common Turkic alphabet, all eyes were on Kyrgyzstan. To mark the alphabet’s adoption, Erdoğan gifted each represented nation a copy of two books translated into the new alphabet. One of the books was a novel written by Chinghiz Aitmatov, a regionally renowned author hailing from Kyrgyzstan. Erdoğan’s choice was hardly coincidental. Kyrgyzstan today is the only Turkic state to not even attempt to switch the national script away from Cyrillic.

Western analysts attribute Kyrgyzstan’s continued use of Cyrillic to the close relationship with Russia the country has maintained through its post-Soviet independence. Russia largely views increased Turkish influence in Central Asia as a threat to its foothold in the region, and acts to mitigate the country’s power in states like Kyrgyzstan where it still holds considerable influence. However, in the case of Kyrgyzstan’s refusal to adopt the OTS Latin-based alphabet, Muratalieva believes the reasons are more pragmatic than political. “The simplest explanation is the lack of financial resources to accept and to introduce this alphabet on a national level,” Muratalieva explains. While Türkiye has spearheaded the alphabet initiative on paper, the country has remained resistant to supplying funds to OTS member states interested in making the national switch. The lack of available funds severely limits the capacity of financially-limited states like Kyrgyzstan, the smallest economy of the OTS bloc.

When Sadyr Japarov, the president of Kyrgyzstan, was asked about his opinion on the linguistic future of the Kyrgyz language, he stated that “it is too early to talk about transitioning the Kyrgyz language to the Latin alphabet”, RFE/RL reports. Muratalieva believes Japarov’s strategy is to watch and wait how its larger regional neighbours Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan fare in their respective transitions to a Latin-based script. “If one of them succeeds, Kyrgyzstan will follow,” she theorizes.

Azerbaijan as a Potential Model

Not all hope is lost for Turkish power in Central Asia. Azerbaijan, while outside the region, provides a model for the post-Soviet Turkic states open to cooperation with Türkiye, showing how partnership with the state can lead to successful development. Türkiye and Azerbaijan have been close allies ever since the country gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. This strategic partnership has allowed for Azerbaijan to largely chart its own path, both economically and politically distant from Russia. 

One of the first directives Azerbaijan embarked on after independence was the complete transition of its national language from Cyrillic to Latin, a goal it achieved by the turn of the century. The Azerbaijani Latin-based script in its modern form is now very closely related to both the Turkish standard script and the newly proposed OTS alphabet. Such linguistic integration between the two nations has opened many new doors for transnational partnership, successes closely monitored by the Central Asian states.

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Since the beginning of the Russo-Ukraine War, Central Asian states have become increasingly hesitant of close partnership with Russia. Regional leadership fears Russia’s close geographic proximity to their borders may lead to future military conflict. Türkiye, attempting to offer an alternative to Russian partnership in the region, markets its distance from Central Asia as a compelling security guarantee. While maintaining territorial distance from potential Central Asian partners, Türkiye benefits from cultural and religious closeness to the region’s common Turkic heritage. The common Turkic alphabet is only one of many pathways the country is intent to forge with Central Asia through the leverage of common Turkic traditions. Turkish soft power in Central Asia, while currently marginal, is steadily increasing with time.

Türkiye has made it clear that it is willing to take on administrative and economic sacrifices to implement the new alphabet within its own borders, but has maintained its reluctance to take on the financial burdens necessary to implement the script in the Central Asian Turkic states. Combined with Türkiye’s unwillingness to meddle in preexisting linguistic turmoil in Central Asia or directly confront Russia’s lingering cultural influence over the region, has enough time passed to call the OTS common alphabet project a failure? Likely so. 

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

Joseph Fisher for Novastan

The post Dead in the Water: Has the Common Turkic Alphabet Failed to Boost Turkish Influence in Central Asia? appeared first on Novastan English.

Almost every year, countries in Central Asia are placed at the bottom of NGO Reporters Without Borders’, annual ranking for the freedom of press. Every country has dropped in ranking, compared to the previous year.

The position of media coverage in Central Asia has never been renowned for its freedom. However, it seems that this year marks a turning point. 

In the NGO Reporters Without Borders’, new report as published on the 3^rd May 2023, it is noted that if ‘the Russian invasion in Ukraine and the deployment of the Kremlin’s propaganda […] has darkened the whole region [of Eastern Europe]’, Central Asian countries have also seen a sharp decline in their freedom of press since last year.

In a ranking of 180 countries, the nations that are in theory the most liberal in the region, such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, are regressing. Kyrgyzstan is undergoing the most substantial evolution by dropping fifty rankings from 72^nd place to 122^nd place. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan fell twelve lines and is now positioned 134^th. Uzbekistan fell by four points (now at 137^th) due to the rise of attacks against the media.

The Remarkable Fall of Kyrgyzstan 

The deterioration of the freedom of press in Kyrgyzstan is evidenced by multiple attacks against journalists since 2022, as well as the promulgation of the law against false information in summer 2021. Under the scope of this law, the Kyrgyz government is intensifying the campaign against Kyrgyz service of the Radio Free Europe, known locally as Azattyk, in demanding the withdrawal of its licence on the 27^th April. At the end of October 2022, the Ministry of Culture blocked Azattyk as it refused to remove a video addressing the confrontations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, at their border. 

Amnesty International asserts that this decision was a ‘blow to media freedom’, whilst the Committee to Protect Journalists has called it ‘a deeply chilling message.’ Reporters Without Borders speaks of ‘increasingly severe censorship’ in Kyrgyzstan.

Read more on Novastan: Closure of Radio Azattyk sparks discontent from civil society and international human rights activists

Last January, the independent media service Kloop found itself in a similar situation. The Ministry of Culture had threatened to block Kloop’s website if the editors refuse to withdraw an article on the inflating of construction costs by a state agency.

Last November, the journalist Bolot Temirov was extradited to Russia following a politically motivated trial, after he had denounced cases of corruption on his YouTube channel, Temirov Live.

Kazakhstan and Online Censorship

In Kazakhstan, media censorship is issued more discretely by blocking websites that might unsettle power. A report by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) indicates that authorities are obstructing access to the Azattyq website, the Kazakh service of Radio Free Europe.

Read more on Novastan: “An escalating manifestation of Russophobia” – Kazakhstan at the epicentre of an information war

From the snap presidential election of November last year till this January the access to the websites of Radio Azattyq and Current Time, another branch of Radio Free Europe, was blocked.

Kazakhstan has also promulgated a law ‘on the mass media’, a pretext to regulate, or even censor, the information that is available on the internet and particularly the information spreading in social media.

Pressure on Journalists in Uzbekistan

As in the previous year, Reporters Without Borders notes that in Uzbekistan, ‘the situation for the media has only slightly improved since the death of President Islam Karimov in 2016, and criticism of the government remains difficult.’ Nevertheless, Uzbekistan has gained twenty-four points in 2022.

Notably, the report indicates that the Uzbek authorities have ‘extensive’ control of the media and that many bloggers have close ties to the government. The country enforces ‘repressive’ laws on the media and ‘widespread surveillance, censorship and auto-censorship’, reports Gazeta.uz.

Read more on Novastan: Pressure from Russia increases on Central Asian media outlets

‘The large and medium media platforms, as well as bloggers with an audience of over 5,000 people, are subjected to intense pressures and censorship,’ as reported to Novastan by an Uzbek blogger with a small audience. ‘However, there are exceptions, with some channels having less than 1,000 to 2,000 subscribers who are also now facing pressure’, he continues.

Another Uzbek journalist with a critical stance on the government tells Novastan about the recent pressure imposed by the authorities upon journalists and bloggers, ahead of the constitutional referendum of the 30^th April 2023. ‘I know of at least three examples where managers of Telegram channels and journalists have been summoned to the State Security Service for a conversation’, he testifies.

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, Always Bottom of the Ranking

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, whose political regimes are the most repressive, remain at the bottom of the ranking. Compared to last year, Tajikistan drops one position on the list, now ranking 153^rd place. According to the NGO, the country has transitioned from a ‘difficult’ to a ‘very difficult’ position with regard to its freedom of press. The report notes that more and more journalists are choosing to exile.

Over the past year, repression has intensified against all forms of opposition, particularly in the Gorno-Badakhshan region and against the Pamiris ethnic minority. Certain activists for the community, who have been exiled, have been extradited to their countries of origin and sentenced to long-term prison sentences.

Read more on Novastan: Human rights in Tajikistan: Interview with the UN Special Rapporteur

Turkmenistan ranks 176^th place and remains among the five worst-ranked countries. Reporters Without Borders notes that censorship in Turkmenistan increased after Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow’s son, Serdar Berdimuhamedow, rose to power in March 2022.

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The post In Central Asia, the Freedom of Press is in Decline appeared first on Novastan English.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has issued a strong statement condemning the presence of Central Asian presidents at the May 9 parade held in Moscow to commemorate Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War. The parade saw the participation of the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, along with the Prime Minister of Armenia.

In its official statement, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs underscored that Russian President Vladimir Putin, who led the parade, is currently wanted internationally for committing war crimes due to the Russian military’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

“The participation of foreign leaders in a public event alongside a war criminal, who proudly instigated a war in Europe on an unprecedented scale since World War II, is viewed as an immoral and unfriendly act towards Ukraine. It demonstrates a disregard for the Ukrainian people who are fighting for their survival and freedom,” stated the ministry.

Moreover, the ministry emphasized the invaluable contributions made by the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus to the victory over Nazism 78 years ago. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly believes that these nations should not be exploited by the Kremlin for participating in an event that lacks any connection to the heroic acts of the victorious nations over Nazism.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan: commemorating Victory Day without military parade

Russia initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which was met with condemnation from countries within the European Union and the United States. As a response, these nations implemented unprecedented economic sanctions against Russia.

In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Putin, specifically for war crimes committed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Despite the arrest warrant and warnings from Western countries, including the European Union, President Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan extended an invitation to Putin for an official visit to Bishkek, which Putin accepted.

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The post Ukraine criticizes Central Asian presidents’ participation in Moscow’s May 9 parade appeared first on Novastan English.

Russian president Vladimir Putin has invited his counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to attend the annual Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 9. The occasion marks the first time the Central Asian presidents will meet Putin after the latter’s indictment by the International Criminal Court.

On April 25, the office of the Kyrgyz president issued a press release stating that Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov would attend the annual military parade on Red Square on May 9 as a “guest of honour”. Several days later, on May 5, Putin also invited Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon to Moscow.

The day before the parade, on May 8, a rapid fire of invitations sent the presidents of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan all flying to Russia. It will be the first time in years that all five Central Asian presidents will take part in the Victory Day celebrations.

Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has paid significantly more attention to Central Asia. In 2022 alone, Putin visited all five countries in the region – something that had not happened in a long time. While the Russian president is increasingly cornered internationally, Moscow clearly holds on tight to its few remaining allies.

Yet, this will be the first time for Central Asian leaders that they share the stage with the Russian president after he was charged with war crimes.

A wanted man

Recently, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president on allegations relating to the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied areas to Russia.

Last week, South African authorities warned that Putin risks being arrested during the upcoming BRICS summit in August, should the Russian president decide to make an appearance. South Africa has ratified the founding treaty of the ICC and hence obligated to act should Putin set foot in the country.

In Central Asia, Tajikistan is the only state party to the treaty and thus – in theory – bound to cooperate with the Court. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan both signed the treaty some twenty years ago, but have so far failed to ratify it. By contrast, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are non-signatory states. Hence, should the Russian president decide to visit the region, as he did so often last year, chances of Central Asian authorities refusing Putin entry because of the arrest warrant are slim.

An offer one can’t refuse

In many ways, Central Asia still is highly dependent on Russia. According to political analyst Arkady Dubnov, who was interviewed by Kyrgyz news outlet Kloop about the Kremlin’s invitation to Japarov, Bishkek had no choice but to accept.

Kyrgyzstan still has deep economic ties with Russia. Although China is making significant inroads in Central Asia as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, Russia remains incredibly important in terms of trade and remittances.

Read more on Novastan: Effects of sanctions on Russia strongly felt in Dushanbe

The most recent data from the World Bank show that over 30 percent of Kyrgyz GDP consists of remittances. 97 percent of these remittances are sent by Kyrgyz migrants working in Russia. Hence, it is safe to say that economic ties with Russia are highly asymmetrical and Moscow is well aware of this.

In the case of Tajikistan, economic dependence on Russia is just as significant. As Tajik news media Asia Plus reported that last year, remittances from Russia reached a record high. Russian authorities also registered a post-pandemic spike in migrant inflow. In 2022, nearly one million people from Tajikistan travelled to Russia for work.

Central Asia as a sanctions loophole

The war in Ukraine, however, has somewhat tilted the balance in favour of Central Asian economies. Countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have transformed into important hubs for reexporting goods to Russia.

Radio Azattyk, the Kyrgyz service of Radio Liberty that was recently forced to shut down, interviewed Temir Shabdanaliev, head of a Kyrgyz lobbying group, about this trend. He explained: “If goods from Europe were previously sent to Russia, now they are registered as deliveries to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. But as soon as they are unloaded here, they are immediately taken to Russia.“

As a result, trade to and from Central Asia has boomed since the start of western sanctions. In Kyrgyzstan, there has been a remarkable uptick in trade of “shampoo, toothpicks, soap, and car parts”, according to RFE/RL.

Read more on Novastan: Turkey continues exporting drones to Central Asia

Relevant authorities in Tajikistan also signalled an increase in trade with Russia. Last year Tajik authorities were even accused of supplying Moscow with Iranian-designed drones for its war in Ukraine. These accusations were based on a recent deal Dushanbe signed with Tehran to produce drones under license in Tajikistan. However, US-based magazine The Diplomat found no visual evidence to support claims that Tajik-manufactured drones were roaming Ukrainian skies.

Risky business

But there is a certain risk in reexporting goods to Russia. The EU has warned the Central Asian republics that it could impose secondary sanctions on businesses helping Russia dodge sanctions.

For countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, there is little room for manoeuvre. Economic dependence on Russia often outweighs western pressure. However, the invasion of Ukraine has made many in Central Asia aware of existing neo-colonial power relations.

Several weeks ago, Eurasianet reported about a Russian ban on the import of Kyrgyz dairy products after Bishkek moved to adopt a law to promote the Kyrgyz language. The Kremlin sees this development as an attempt to curb its cultural influence in Central Asia.

Patronage to Putin

May 9 is yet another important reminder of the region’s colonial past. That is why over the past decades, most Central Asian countries have gradually said goodbye to Soviet-imposed Victory Day. 

In Kazakhstan, military parades have been scrapped “to maintain the required level of combat readiness”, press agency Kazinform reported. In Turkmenistan, May 9 has not been a public holiday since 2018. Victory Day in Uzbekistan has been transformed into a ‘Day of Remembrance and Honour,’ emphasizing commemoration over military pomp.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan: commemorating Victory Day without military parade

Although Victory Day in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan still bears significant resemblance to the Soviet era, times are changing there as well. In many places, celebrations are scaled down or rescheduled to both countries’ respective independence days. Owing to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this process will likely accelerate.

Yet, nation-building and symbolism remain subject to real-world constraints. As long as economic dependence continues, regional leaders have no option but to pay patronage to where the money comes from: Putin’s Russia.

Correction: in an earlier version of this article it was stated that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are parties to the ICC. Although the two countries have signed the founding treaty of the ICC, both have failed to ratify it as of yet. Hence, neither Tashkent nor Bishkek is legally obligated to cooperate with the Court.

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

Written by Julian Postulart

The post Central Asian presidents invited to attend Russian Victory Day Parade appeared first on Novastan English.

A dancing mountain goat, a flowering garden of embroidery, a trickster’s tales, a silken thread spun from a worm’s cocoon – these are the diverse array of Central Asian cultural practices recently recognised by UNESCO as part of humanity’s intangible cultural heritage. Novastan takes a look at these four vibrant traditions, as well as considering where the List has its limits in truly celebrating the cultural diversity of Central Asia. Every year, a UNESCO committee inscribes cultural practices from around the globe into a List designed to showcase and safeguard traditions seen as universally significant. Intangible cultural heritage, according to UNESCO’s 2003 Convention, encompasses the practices, expressions, knowledge, and spaces which play an important part in a community’s cultural identity.

UNESCO’s List has long featured a rich variety of cultural practices from across the Central Asian countries, including Nowruz (New Year) celebrations, Tajik Chakan embroidery, and Turkmen carpet making. Among the eclectic group of traditions newly featured on the List this year – from Cuban rum mastery to the French baguette – are four cultural practices from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Orteke

A new entry on the list for Kazakhstan, Orteke is an indigenous performing art which brings a wooden puppet of a tauteke, or mountain goat, to life as it dances along to music. The tauteke puppet is attached to the surface of a drum by a metal rod, extending to a cord connected to the fingers of a musician playing a traditional two-stringed instrument, the dombyra.

As the player strums the strings, the tauteke puppet becomes animated, appearing to gallop along to the lively rhythms of the dombyra. However, true mastery of Orteke involves not only dictating the energetic pace of the tauteke’s dance, but also making the puppet move with grace – a feat some experts can achieve with as many as four puppets at a time. As playful as it is fascinating, Orteke appeals to adults and children alike and remains a core element of Kazakh folk heritage and intergenerational communication, maintained by the traditional Ustaz-Shakird (master-apprentice) teaching system and supported by educational institutions and competitions.

Turkmen-style needlework art

Described in Turkmen state news as capable of transforming anything into “flowering gardens and meadows” with merely a needle and thread, Turkmen-style needlework art is an elaborate type of embroidery popular across Turkmenistan and some regions of Iran. It is a defining feature of national dress for people of all genders and ages, used for occasions including weddings and Nowruz celebrations, as well as everyday items.

To begin the needlework, three thin silk threads are twisted together to form one shinier, sturdier thread. The needleworker then pierces the fabric with a thin needle and creates a series of loops with the silk, forming a distinctive pattern by holding the last loop with the thumb of the other hand before sewing the next. With colourful designs often showcasing needleworkers’ regional identities, the art form continues to be passed down within families and communities through generations of women needleworkers, while also remaining important in cultural and educational institutions.

Telling Tradition of Nasreddin Hodja/Molla Nesreddin/Molla Ependi/Apendi/Afendi Kozhanasyr

Centred around the telling of witty anecdotes associated with the wiseman and trickster Nasreddin, this variously named oral folklore tradition spans a vast region encompassing all Central Asian countries, as well as Turkey and Azerbaijan. The anecdotes are known for their shrewd commentaries on social norms and daily life, characterised by their punchy combination of wisdom, witticism, and surprise. In one anecdote, a shopkeeper angrily confronts Nasreddin for failing to pay his debt of 75 piastres. Nasreddin incredulously replies: “Now, now, you must know that I intend to pay you 35 piastres tomorrow, and next month another 35. That means I owe you only five piastres. Are you not ashamed of yourself for accosting me so loudly in public for a debt of only five piastres?” Read more on Novastan: “I want our theatre to be the new face of Tajik theatre”: Khurshed Mustafoev on the future of Dushanbe’s Russian theatre The anecdotes are drawn upon in daily conversation in communities across Central Asia, used for their instructive and entertaining qualities to strengthen arguments or enliven explanations.

Sericulture and traditional production of silk for weaving

Silk culture – encompassing an entire process from sericulture to the end silk products – is a major tradition of Central Asia, spanning centuries and giving the Silk Road its name. Inscribed in the UNESCO List as a practice of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (alongside Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey), sericulture and traditional production of silk for weaving comprises multiple stages of the process for creating colourful fabrics and carpets. Farmers grow mulberry trees and feed the leaves to silkworms, from which the worms form cocoons of silken fibres. The fibres are reeled from the cocoons and spun into silk thread, before being cleaned, dyed, and woven into bright fabrics commonly seen at weddings and family occasions. Read more on Novastan: Tajikistan: Nine new sites on tentative World Heritage list Sericulture and silk production is still largely carried out by villagers and small private farms, also benefitting from government support in Turkmenistan and specialist teaching and research at higher education institutions in Uzbekistan.

Where UNESCO falls short: Uyghur culture

As is clear from this diverse group of Central Asian traditions, the UNESCO List raises awareness and mobilises much-needed support for diverse, often endangered, cultural practices. However, the List has faced criticism as a tool for obscuring the very cultural diversity that UNESCO purportedly seeks to celebrate. The inscription of Uyghur traditions in the List as practises of China is a case in point. Among the repressive actions by the Chinese government against Uyghurs is the destruction of the community’s culture – from banning the Uyghur language in schools to destroying religious sites. Attempts to erase Uyghur heritage have been reinforced by the UNESCO List’s inclusion of two Uyghur traditions – Meshrep, a rich event combining song, dance, and entertainment, and the Muqam song and dance tradition – via nominations by China. What has followed is the co-opting of the traditions by the Chinese government. As ethnomusicologist Rachel Harris explains, grassroots gatherings are banned in favour of “sanitised, commodified and secularised” renditions of the practises devoid of key religious and community aspects.

The UNESCO List showcases many Central Asian traditions in all their splendour. However, the manner of involvement allowed from China currently means that support for Uyghur cultural heritage is overshadowed by silence on its erasure.

Written by Emma Bain

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The post Four Central Asian cultural practices newly inscribed on UNESCO’s Intangible Cultural Heritage List appeared first on Novastan English.

DECODING: President Xi Jinping made an official visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan during the last SCO summit, his first trip since the pandemic. It’s a strategic destination for Pekin, which would seem to benefit from regaining influence in Central Asia, as the Central Asian states reinforce their bilateral relationships with China.  An official visit from the Chinese president comes at a pivotal moment for Russia, which has been losing regional influence since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. The traditional competition between Pekin and Moscow in Central Asia seems to have resulted in a decisive victory for China, unless the Kremlin reacts. Decoding the political upheaval in the Russian “near-abroad”.  This article was originally published by Novastan’s French website on 26 September 2022. It’s Xi Jinping’s first trip abroad for more than two years. On 14 September, the Chinese president visited Kazakhstan, before attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) forum, taking place in Samarkand, Uzbekistan on 15 and 16 September. The heads of state of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, India, Iran and Russia were all present. Although this visit for the SCO summit has been planned for a long time, it came at an opportune moment for China due to the scepticism of Central Asian states towards Russia. The war in Ukraine has forced the heads of state in Central Asian countries to distance themselves from Vladimir Putin.

Is an ever greater asymmetry developing between Russia and China in Central Asia? “It used to be said that Russia looked after security, and China after the economy,” explains Thierry Keller, a lecturer of political science at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB). “However, nowadays, China is looking to be more present in security matters.”

Kazakhstan, a thorn in the Russo-Chinese relations

During his visit to Nur-Sultan, the Chinese president made it clear that a ‘red line’ of Russian politics exists in Central Asia. As reported by the Kazakh media Vlast, the president declared that, “regardless of the evolving international situation, we will continue to resolutely support Kazakhstan by protecting its independence, its sovereignty and its territorial integrity”. Given the context of the war in Ukraine, this message was addressed directly to Vladimir Putin, warning him that his expansionist inclinations should not extend to Central Asia. Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia Some consider this indicative of a weakening in the Sino-Russian partnership. For Timur Dadabayev, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Special program for Eurasian Studies at the University of Tsukuba in Japan, this declaration should be understood as a ‘pragmatic’ act by China. He reminds that Pekin has supported Russian positions towards the West and has shared the same rhetoric as the Kremlin in its anti-Western discourse. He adds that, “to a large extent, any weakening of the Russian position in its face-off would also imply the potential defeat of Chinese positions in disputes with the US, the EU or elsewhere.” The partnership between Russia and China is thus still persevering, as long as Russia does not threaten the security, economic or commercial interests of Central Asia, explains Thierry Kellner. In this sense, the position adopted by China with regard to the defence of Kazakhstan’s sovereignty does not necessarily negate the Sino-Russian partnership.

Shift towards China

Central Asian states, fearing the inconsistency of Russian foreign policy, are turning instead towards Pekin. Following the SCO summit, the roadmap including China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan has been relaunched by the signing of an agreement, which could serve to indirectly bypass Russian transport infrastructure, explains the American Media Eurasianet. In addition to abstaining from Russia, states are revealing themselves to be conciliatory towards China. Before the arrival of the Chinese president in Kazakhstan, Kazakh activists protested in Almaty on 5 September, demanding to be reunited with their loved ones in Xinjiang. Two of the activists have been arrested by the Kazakh police. The president Kassym-Jomart Tokaeyev is attempting to turn a blind eye to the Kazakhs in Xinjiang so as to not offend China and lose the guarantee of security, explains Temur Umarov in an interview for Radio Azattyq, the Kazakh branch of the American media Radio Free Europe.

The Growing Isolation of Russia

 At this time, Russia is finding itself to be more and more isolated. During the last summit in Samarkand, “the welcome of Xi Jinping and that of Putin were radically different. The Chinese president was given a warm welcome, folklore performances… things that were not replicated at the arrival of the Russian President,” says Thierry Kellner. This element is significant for understanding the diminished position of Russia in Central Asia, because the SCO forum is above all a space of declaratory diplomacy where symbolism counts a lot, − explains the Belgian specialist. Other messages of this kind have also been noted, such as the images of Vladimir Putin waiting for the Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, whereas it is usually the opposite case. The visit of Xi Jinping to Central Asia therefore reveals the unprecedented isolation in which Russia finds itself with its closest neighbours, the countries of the CIS. It explains why Russia is seeking to find a ‘new frontier’ in Central Asia, persisting in developing its influence in education, the media and business, concludes Timur Dadabayev.  

Written by Emma Collet

Translated from French by Chloe Henshaw

Edited by Maya Ivanova and Anna Wilhelmi

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The post In Central Asia, China is taking advantage of Russia’s isolation at war appeared first on Novastan English.

Many Central Asian migrants have joined the Russian army since partial mobilisation was announced in Russia.  They are being pulled into Russia’s war in Ukraine against the advice of their countries’ consular organs.This article was oroginally published on Novastan’s French website on 19 October 2022.

On 21 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the mobilisation of 300 000 reservists, called up from a pool of 25 million potential fighters.  Some of these are seasonal workers and precariously employed migrants from Central Asia. Russia amended their federal law “On Conscription and Military Service” in 2013 so that every young person with Russian citizenship is required to perform mandatory military service, even when they have already served it in their land of origin.  According to reports by the Kyrgyz news portal Kaktus, recruitment of Central Asian migrants has taken place in the Sakharovo migration center in Moscow since 21 September. This marks a turning point in the war, as the government is no longer hiding their desire to recruit foreigners to expand the ranks of their army. There are no official figures for how many Central Asian citizens have been recruited to fight in Ukraine.  According to Radio Azattyq, the Kazakh branch of Radio Free Europe, the overwhelming majority of Central Asian migrants come from three countries: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

High salaries and Russian passports as bait

Russian recruitment authorities want to mobilise migrants from Central Asia and do so by promising high salaries and Russian citizenship.  In some cases, the authorities use subterfuge.  “They told us that there was a lot of construction happening in Kherson and that we have to go there.  And that we could expect salaries of 220 000 rubles (£3065.94),” one witness told Eurasianet.  “Some from our group went but it turned out they had been taken along to fight.” The lure of profit and citizenship is an effective mode of manipulation. The use of migrants and refugees in war is, according to an article in the American journal Foreign Affairs, a widespread phenomenon. Their lives are used like chess pieces in the game of war. The Russian human rights activist Valentina Chupik spoke with Central Asian media agency CABAR about her experiences with Tajik migrants in an interview. According to Chupik, many have said that they have received anonymous calls from law enforcement officials with offers to join the Russian army and receive Russian citizenship within three months. Furthermore, one of the Tajik migrants questioned said that some of his friends and relatives had decided to serve in the army in order to earn more money to send home to their families. Even before partial mobilisation was announced, people with a Central Asian background or nationality were recruited. In fact, an investigation by MediaHub discovered that in Uzbekistan, certain online platforms advertising security-related jobs in Russia actually sent workers directly to a military base controlled by the private Wagner Group.  This Russian mercenary group is used in wars worldwide, including in Ukraine.  Ukrainian intelligence agencies say that “Central Asian recruitment campaigns for mercenaries” have been in operation since the beginning of the war.

The embassies react

The embassies from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have called on their citizens not to involve themselves in the war in Ukraine. They claim that involvement is a criminal offense according to the domestic laws of their respective countries. The risk of being sucked into the war is particularly high for young men from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan who have already acquired Russian citizenship. With a diaspora of 650 000 Kazakhstanis, 1.9 million Uzbekistanis, and 104 000 Kyrgyzstanis (numbers from 2002), able-bodied men from these groups could be subjected to forced recruitment. For Turkmen, Tajik, and Uzbek citizens, participation in a foreign conflict can lead to imprisonment upon returning home.  Particularly affected by this are the 1.2 million Tajik migrant workers (number from 2021) in Russia.  

Originally written in French by Matthieu Petrov 

Translated into German from French by Robin Roth 

Translated from German into English by Mari Paine 

Edited by Maya Ivanova

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The post How Russia is recruiting Central Asian soldiers for its war in Ukraine appeared first on Novastan English.

The Turkmen authorities have announced the launch of an instant messaging and email platform developed by domestic companies. These new applications will provide the Turkmen people  with alternatives to Western websites − the majority of which are blocked in Turkmenistan – but it also risks facilitating mass surveillance of internet users. This article was first published on Novastan’s French website on 29 March 2021. On 12 November, the official Turkmen government news agency reported that on the previous day, the Deputy Prime Minister for Transport, Communications and Trade, Bairamgeldi Ovezov, had presented the two new digital innovation projects to President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow. According to US media outlet Eurasianet, Tmchat is an instant messaging service for creating group chats, making video calls and sending files. It is a local equivalent to WhatsApp or Telegram. The free Android application was developed by the Turkmen telephone operator Altyn Assar. According to Eurasianet, the second project, Sanly.tm, is a standard email service with a storage volume of 1GB. It was developed by the country’s leading internet service provider, Türkmentelekom. Local media outlet Business Turkmenistan reported that the two applications were presented to the general public in early December by Türkmenaragatnaşyk − the government agency in charge of promoting new technologies in the country − on the 25th anniversary of Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality policy.

This launch campaign, however, does not reflect the country’s digital infrastructure. According to the NGO Freedom House, Turkmen internet remains one of the slowest and most expensive in the world. The government also employs mass surveillance on the few foreign platforms still authorized in the country. In reality, there is a paradoxical relationship between the Turkmen authorities and new technologies, which over the past few years have sparked uncertainties for the public and opportunities for the authorities.

With forced digitalization come contradictions

Tmchat and Sanly.tm are not the Turkmen government’s first attempts to develop internal digital services: since 2018, Ashgabat has announced the launch of nearly ten applications, social networks and messaging services created by Turkmen companies. And for a good reason; Turkmenistan’s digitization is considered a strategic priority for its President, asserts Eurasianet. Last December, he publicly demanded that the country’s engineers master “innovative technologies” such as 5G and Big Data as quickly as possible. Read more on Novastan: In Tajikistan, government control still slows down internet After Arzuw, Yashlyk and Iminami − copies of Facebook or its Russian equivalent VKontakte − failed to gain popularity, at the end of 2018, Turkmenistan launched its first messaging company called BizBärde, and more recently a video hosting site called Belet. The official Turkmen Portal then presented this YouTube replica as a platform for online access to major local and international channels, including the BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera, as well as most Russian media. However, the cost of using this platform is 10 manats (2.3 euros) per month, a significant amount in a country where the average salary was no higher than 200 euros (170 GBP) per month in 2020. This frantic search for alternatives is mainly due to the fact that Western and Russian platforms are all but impossible to access in Turkmenistan. The specialized site Coda Story reminds readers that the most popular social networks (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube), messaging services (Messenger, Telegram), and also IT development sites like Github are theoretically inaccessible from Turkmenistan. The government is indeed projecting its political isolationism into the digital sphere, drastically limiting access to foreign and independent sources of information, as well as access to platforms where anti-regime protests could be organized. The latest victim of this censorship is Wikipedia: according to the NGO International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR), the online encyclopedia was blocked last March after comments criticizing the President of Turkmenistan were made by the American Embassy. These comments were published several years ago by WikiLeaks, and had been posted on Berdimuhamedow’s Wikipedia page in Russian. This presents a contradiction that does not work in the favour of locally developed services, such as BizBärde, Belet, and soon perhaps Tmchat and Sanly.tm. The Turkmen people are increasingly wary of government-sponsored platforms, which therefore remain largely unused by the population. According to Turkmen Portal, the app’s developers have announced that they will wait until they reach 10,000 users before expanding to the iOS platform, which remains too expensive for the time being. Altyn Assar, probably aware of internet users’ hesitation, hastened to praise the security of his messaging service: in addition to the possible setting of a two-factor authentication (2FA), all the data would be stored on servers − reliable and inaccessible to third parties − in other words, to law enforcement agencies.

Content blocked, malicious codes, and wide-spread or targeted surveillance

This public mistrust is the product of numerous surveillance scandals and arrests of opposition members, who have spoken out on platforms still accessible in Turkmenistan. Eurasianet recalls that the government tightly controls the online activity of journalists, bloggers, students and key activists within its territory. Several opposition members, once exiled in Russia, have reportedly returned to Turkmenistan with the help of Russian domestic intelligence, as reported by independent Turkmen news outlet Chronicles of Turkmenistan. The population has long relied on VPNs to access foreign resources and partially hide their identity when using the internet, but soon after the establishment of a new government cybersecurity service in September 2019, these applications started to be targeted by authorities, reports the NGO IPHR. The only messaging service still tolerated in the country is IMO, a subsidiary of the Chinese company Joyy. Read more on Novastan:Turkmenistan: according to the authorities, there are no restrictions on the use of the Internet Today, the Turkmen government controls the digital sector, which relies on offensive technologies acquired from foreign companies. The Canadian Citizen Lab and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) have revealed that the Ministry of Communications and the Turkmenistan Secret Police (MNB) are using malware sold by European companies, including FinFisher, sold by the German-British company Gamma Group for wiretapping, de-anonymization and remote control of computers. According to the American media outlet Radio Free Europe, the Turkmen government has more recently held talks with the German company Rohde & Schwartz about the acquisition of technologies that would allow certain sites to be blocked or make eavesdropping possible. 2020 and the global pandemic have only accentuated this struggle for internet control. Radio Free Europe states that VPN users are being targeted and more online resources have been blocked, while Ashgabat continued to proclaim that no cases of Covid-19 have been identified in the country.

Is digital technology serving the diversification of the Turkmen economy?

The “made in Turkmenistan” stamp used in the branding of these applications is another step towards full control of the digital space by the regime of Gourbanguly Berdimuhamedow. By eliminating Western, Russian or Chinese platforms and then replacing them with national services, Ashgabat consolidates its ability to block content that it deems unfavourable, track down opponents under their true identity and spread official discourse without obstacles. In short, it is a shift from offensive and costly methods to techniques that are certainly “softer” , but cruelly more effective as Turkmen internet users sign up to online platforms for “free” . Defining Tmchat and Sanly.tm as just a way for the ruling party to gain social control would risk masking the government’s second ambition in the field. In a period of economic crisis worsened by the Covid-19 pandemic, Turkmenistan is banking on the creation of a digital industry capable of attracting foreign investors who look to outsource in low-cost labour markets, following Belarus’ example. Ashgabat hopes that this policy of “digital development of the economy” will eventually make it possible to generate a new source of foreign income, in particular by boosting its tourism sector and increasing hotel bookings, bus services, and other forms of transportation, says Chronicle of Turkmenistan. However, the government is still struggling to create the right conditions for this political project to grow. The country undoubtedly lacks qualified specialists in programming, system and network administration, and even cybersecurity. Blocking resources that are useful to computer science students − in particular Github and other digital libraries − considerably reduces the likelihood of progress in the field. It is also difficult to go abroad to study, and the few people who decide to return to Turkmenistan, cannot have their degrees recognized as equivalent. Little hope remains that Turkmenistan will become the new El Dorado for digital companies in the near future. Despite a general drop in internet prices, announced on February 8 by Business Turkmenistan, a fixed and unlimited connection at Türkmentelekom still amounts to 170 manats, around 40 euros, a month. This sum does not guarantee speed: according to Speedtest‘s measurements, the country ranks 175 (out of 175) for the speed of fixed internet lines, with only 2.77 megabits per second (Mbit/s) in download going down in February 2021, compared to 53 Mbit/s in Kazakhstan and 82 Mbit/s in Russia.  

Written by Vadim Alinov

Translated from French by Alice Coveney

Edited by Maya Ivanova

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Isolated on the international scene and weakened domestically, Turkey seeks support. Turkish powers have chosen a proactive foreign policy in Central Asia and enjoy good relations with countries of the region.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 13 April 2021. As Turkey is increasingly breaking away from its European and American allies, the country seeks to strengthen its partnership and alliance networks. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu met each of his five Central Asian counterparts in March. After visiting Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic from 5-10 March, the Turkish head of diplomacy hosted his Kazakh counterpart, Mukhtar Tileuberdi, in Ankara on 17 March. Afterwards, he went to Tajikistan from 28-30 March. Each of these were opportunities to signal to the world that Turkey must be taken into account in Central Asia.

The challenge of transportation

Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s Central Asian agenda is indeed political but also commercial and economic. The Turkish lira has dropped and the economy of the country is not performing well. The Turks seek to develop trade in Central Asia by creating outlets for their businesses and ease the transit of goods coming from China through the “Middle Corridor” fulfilment. On 5 March, the Turkish chief of diplomacy chose Ashgabat, with its immaculate white marble, to begin his diplomatic Central Asia tour. According to the Anadolu agency (AA), the priority for the Turkish delegation dealt with logistics and transport in Turkmenistan. Turkish trucks will be allowed to transit during a time in which they would otherwise be banned due to the Covid-19 pandemic – provided that drivers take a test prior to their arrival at Turkmenbashi port near the Caspian Sea shore, explains Anadolu.

Diversifying Turkey’s energy supply

Transportation is an important topic for Turkey because it may enable access to more energy resources. Bayram Balci, the director of the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, said in an interview with Novastan that “Turkey is an industrial country which only produces 3% of its energy needs.” Turkmenistan, possessing the fourth largest natural gas reserves in the world, could become a key player for Turkey if Turkmen gas could be pumped into the country. Read more on Novastan: Turkmenistan became China’s number one gas supplier Therefore, the joint project between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding the exploration and use of hydrocarbon deposits in the Dostluk field in the Caspian Sea is a topic of interest to Turkish leaders. It is estimated that this hydrocarbon field may hold natural gas and up to 59 million tons of oil, reported Anadolu. Turkey considers this project as an opportunity to diversify its energy intake and desires to involve its public businesses.

A Turkish general consulate in Samarkand

After his visit to Turkmenistan, Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu spent three days in Uzbekistan. He visited Samarkand to underline the significance of Turkish-Uzbek relations before continuing to Tashkent. Çavuşoğlu and his Uzbek counterpart Abdulaziz Kamilov inaugurated the new Turkish general consulate on 7 March. This marks an improvement in Turkish-Uzbek relations since 2016, when Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev came into office. Unlike his predecessor, Islam Karimov, the current Uzbek president champions an open foreign policy which is friendly towards Turkey and its Central Asian neighbours.

In Uzbekistan, Çavuşoğlu underlined the symbolic importance of diplomatic representation opening in what is considered to be the birthplace of Turkish civilisation. While he was paying tribute to the transformation in Samarkand, he recalled that Turkey had been the first country to establish an embassy in Uzbekistan in 1991. As the historical heart of the Silk Road, Turkey did not hesitate to consider its touristic potential.  The Anadolu agency (AA) reports that since March 2018, Turkish Airlines has offered direct flights between Istanbul and Samarkand.

The renewal of educational foreign aid service in Kyrgyzstan

For his last stop in Kyrgyzstan on 10 March, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs chose to visit Manas University, a contemporary building situated in Bishkek’s city centre. Founded in 1995 through an agreement between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan, it educates more than 5000 students from 14 different countries. The university courses are free of charge and are taught in Turkish and Kyrgyz, with classes in English and Russian also offered. Besides being a symbol of Turkish soft power, Ankara desires to influence Kyrgyz educational policy as in 2018. Anadolu reports that the Turkish diplomatic chief reminded his counterpart that ”FETO” – Fethullah Gülen’s organisation – was a threat to Turkey and its allies since it is regarded as terrorist group by Turkish authorities. Gülenist networks were once conduits of Turkish soft power in Central Asia via their schools. Fethullah Gülen is in open conflict with Turkish authorities since being accused of plotting a coup in July 2016. Consequently, the authorities requested all partners to close Gülenist schools. Kyrgyzstan denied that request in 2018 due to sovereignty issues and “attachment to these schools which train Kyrgyzstan’s upper class,” an analyst at the Institute of Applied Geopolitics Studies, Magomed Beltouev, explained to Novastan. The Kyrgyz government focused on increasing its power over these schools by changing their status, according to the researcher in this article. The Turks have not seemed to come to terms with this choice. However, the Kyrgyz government has consented to the establishment of a new Turkish organisation, Maarif. Founded by the Turkish state, this new organisation is intended to take over activities previously led by Gülenist schools. Maarif schools, ranging from nursery schools to high schools, should open soon, says the Anadolu Agency (AA).

The premise of a defense cooperation with Kazakhstan

The progress of regional integration with Turkey allows Central Asian republics to diversify partnerships and display to their great neighbouring countries – Russia and China – that they can develop other connections and agreements, declares Balci. However, a Turkish defense cooperation has never materialised, as Russia finds it difficult to accept interference by external actors in what it considers its “near abroad.” Nevertheless, Turkey seems to have new ambitions in Central Asia, bolstered by its success in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turks have provided combat drones of their own making to their ally Azerbaijan, which have been key to Azerbaijani military superiority. Discussions with Kazakhstan have taken place in order to begin cooperation with the Turkish defense industry, as reported by the Anadolu Agency (AA) in February. Furthermore, Daily Sabah reported the testing of combat vehicles and weapons systems made by two Turkish firms – Otokar and Aseldam – in the Karadanga region in March. Official communications also announced that a defense collaboration has been discussed between Turkey and Uzbekistan. This first step between the two countries resulted in the signing of a military financial cooperation agreement in October 2020. During his tour stop, the Kazakh Minister of Foreign Affairs Mukhtar Tileuberdi had a discussion with his Turkish counterpart and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 17 March. They jointly discussed the “high investment potential” of Turkey but also opportunities to extend cooperation into various fields such as medicine, information technology and energy.

The great ambitions of the past

More broadly, Turkish ambitions in Central Asia have evolved considerably; they are shaped as much by the interests of other states as by the means available to achieve its goals. The five Central Asian republics declared their independence and initiated relations with other sovereign states after the fall of Soviet Union in 1991. Balci explains that Western powers dreaded the possibility of these predominantly Muslim societies yielding to the influence of Iran or Saudi Arabia. “Therefore we thought that Turkey, inspired by a European model, should be a model for these countries as they open up internationally,” adds the researcher. At the same time Pan-Turkism, an ethnic movement advocating the cohesion of nations with Turkic culture and language, was well received by the Turkish elite according to Beltouev. Initially, Central Asian republics agreed to the principle of a Turkish leadership but the Turkey of 1991 is not the same as Turkey today, explains Balci. Less wealthy and less powerful, it proved unable to offer protection and economic opportunities expected by some Central Asian leaders.

A modest cooperation

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia looked unfavourably on foreign incursions into its sphere of influence. The country quickly created regional institutions in order to reaffirm its ascendency over the new Central Asian republics. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) first saw the light of the day in 1991, while the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) was founded in 2000, which became the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2014. Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia Turkish leaders had to lower their ambitions; Turkey could not become a protective power in Central Asia. As a result, Turkic solidarity developed mostly around cultural, educational and linguistic cooperation. Aware of the need to respect the cultural and political features of each of their partners, the Turks have focused on the development of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, Turkey has pursued its Turkic integration project. The International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) began in 1993 in Almaty, the then capital of Kazakhstan. Many years later, the Turkic Council, initiated in an informal manner in 1992, was officially established in 2009. This intergovernmental forum now includes all Turkic-speaking states except for Turkmenistan, which is strongly attached to its neutrality policy.

A desire to carry regional influence

For Balci, the institutionalisation of the Turkic Council is an ongoing process. The accession of Uzbekistan to the council in 2019 was made possible only thanks to warming relations after the passing of Islam Karimov in 2016. At this point, the only Turkic country not represented in the council is Turkmenistan. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared his desire to see Turkmenistan become a member “as soon as possible” in December 2020,says Anadolu. The myth of Turkic unity remains strong even today. The Turkic Council held a videoconference on 31 March, where various leaders discussed a roadmap for the future called “2040 Turkish world vision.” Baghdad Amreyev, the general secretary of the Turkic Council, discussed this roadmap with the Anadolu Agency (AA). The document aims to establish “better coordination in terms of foreign policy, cooperation in the field of security, free-trade agreements, open borders for transit, as well as the reinforcement of linguistic and alphabet cooperation,” explains Amreyev. He also underlines that it is the “first summit of Turkic leaders after the Azerbaijani victory in Nagorno-Karabakh” in November 2020. It is also a victory for Turkey which seeks to extend its reach beyond the Caucasus. According to Balci, “Turkey’s approach to the Karabakh war has been closely observed by Central Asian states.” Besides the desire to see its power recognized by Russia and the West, Turkey has also “displayed its capacity to militarily support its partners,” adds the researcher. In addition, Turkey desires to play a part in the Afghan issue. The Tadjik capital, Dushanbe, hosted the ninth ministerial meeting of the Istanbul process in late March; it is the fruit of a 2011 Turkish initiative aimed at creating a regional dialogue to support the economic development of Afghanistan. A summit meeting devoted to the Afghan peace process between the Kabul government and the rebels will take place in Istanbul on 16 April, describes the American media The Diplomat. Russia, China, Pakistan and the United States will be present according to the Anadolu Agency (AA).

Beyond talk, few concrete actions

Diplomats and official media tend to highlight Turkey’s good relations with its Central Asian “brothers.” The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs also emphasizes the assistance Turkey has been providing to its Central Asian partners during the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic.  For instance, Anadolu claims that Turkey is providing Tajikistan with the third highest amount of aid. In a seemingly favourable regional context, Turkey desires to increase its presence in Central Asia. However, Beltouev encourages a nuanced approach. “The economic importance of these countries for Turkey is marginal,” he says. The link with Asia is, more than anything else, symbolic. “Speeches about Turkish brotherhood and Silk Roads are always grandiloquent but there is a clear difference between the discussions which take place and their subsequent translation into bilateral agreements, which are not very ambitious,” concludes the general secretary of the Turkic Council.  

Written by Guillaume Gérard

Translated from French by Emma Bekrine

Edited by Mari Paine

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Hundreds of dead seals were discovered in Turkmenistan, with the cause of their death unclear.  Government officials seem to want to conceal the mass deaths of the Caspian seal, which is listed as an endangered species.This article was originally published on Novastan’s German website on 17 March 2021. The Caspian Sea has been the site of an ecological tragedy, the cause of which is not yet known. Radio Azatlyk, the Turkmen service of Radio Free Europe, reported that on 4 February, hundreds of seal corpses and thousands of dead fish were found along the Turkmen coast. The Caspian seal is classified as an endangered species by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). According to an eyewitness account last December, the corpses washed ashore on a stretch of coast near the harbour city of Türkmenbaşy. “Members of the naval forces recovered many dead seals in January. There were hundreds. In addition, there are many dead fish and birds on the coast […] our superiors require us to stay silent. Scientists from Ashgabat are trying to find out the seals’ cause of death, whether it might be a virus or waste dumped by local factories,” a Turkmen border guard interviewed by Radio Azatlyk explained.

The journalists of Radio Azatlyk were not able to obtain a comment from the Turkmen Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection. However, there are indications that the cause of death was natural. At about the same time, numerous dead seals were discovered on the opposite coast of the Caspian Sea.

Parallels with Dagestan

The Moscow Times reported on 12 December 2020 that hundreds of seal carcasses were washed onto land in the Russian Republic of Dagestan in the days preceding the announcement. The Russian authorities started investigations, but had not been able to determine the cause until now. Initial investigations indicated that the seals may have died of natural causes. “The condition of the seals’ inner organs does not corroborate the hypothesis of poisoning by heavy metals or pesticides,” said biologist Vyacheslav Bisikov, who was involved in the investigations, according to the Russian news agency Interfax. The scientists were also able to rule out the possibility that the seals were collateral damage of fishing activities. On 26 January, the Russian news agency TASS reported that one of the possible causes of death could be the release of natural gas, according to Scientists from the Institute of Ecology and Evolution of the Russian Academy of Sciences. “Similar changes in the tissues of internal organs were found in all the pathologically examined seals. […] These changes may develop as a result of hypoxia and they indicate death by asphyxiation,” TASS quotes from a statement by the scientists. The researchers name the release of gases from seismic tremors or mud volcanoes at the bottom of the Caspian Sea as the most likely cause. The researchers furthermore succeeded in establishing that the seals died one to six weeks before they were discovered, meaning that they had died in November. Considering the prevailing winds and the surface currents, it is assumed that the animals died out in open water. Furthermore, 40 seismic tremors were registered in November alone. “Under calm wind conditions, local methane emissions above the sea surface can form gaseous air bubbles, which are unsuitable for respiration. This could very likely have led to the mass deaths of the Caspian seals, which were migrating north along the coast of Dagestan to their breeding grounds at the time,” the scientists conclude.

An endangered species

The Caspian seal is the only mammal in the Caspian Sea. The IUCN granted it the status of an endangered species in 2008. Since 2020 the seal is registered in Russia’s Red Book. The number of seals, whose colonies are spread out over Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia, is contested. “The last aerial count – a type of population census – was conducted in 2005. About 10,000 animals were registered at the time,” the Kazakh biologist Assel Baimukanova explained in September 2018. According to Interfax, Vyacheslav Bisikov assumes that “the populations of Caspian seals […] encompass 270,000 to 300,000 individuals”. On the Russian channel TV Rain, zoologist Ilya Gomiranov estimates that the population has decreased from a million to between 40,000-60,000 seals. According to Assel Baimukanova, the reasons for the population reduction are varied, including the decrease of ice cover due to global warming, and the pollution of the Caspian Sea with toxins and illegal fishing. Mass deaths of seals occur time and again. In 2000, for instance, more than 10,000 Caspian Seals died of a viral infection. Read more on Novastan:Troubled waters: Turkmenistan’s environmental policy As Interfax reports, hundreds of dead seals washed ashore on the Dagestani coast in 2012 and 2016 after severe autumn storms. The precise cause of death could not be established, Russian fishing authorities said. Last October, mass animal deaths occurred not far from the Kamchatka peninsula in eastern Russia.  According to official reports, the causes were natural. The investigations in Dagestan suggest that the animals which washed ashore in Turkmenistan died of the same causes. Nevertheless, the Turkmen authorities would do well to investigate the cause of death of the endangered animals instead of covering it up.  

Written by Robin Roth

Translated from German by Nora Neinonen

Edited by Mari Paine

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DECODING. According to the last report from the intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC), Central Asia is one of the rarest regions in the world where both droughts and excessive rainfall in large quantities are observed. The average temperatures of these countries in the region have already crossed the 2 degrees Celsius threshold since 1990.However, there is no time for panic: Central Asia is already used to the harsh climate, where the temperature difference can sometimes differ as much as 80 degrees Celsius over the course of a year. Simultaneously, the researchers of IPCC are faced with a lack of more detailed data regarding Central Asia, which makes modelling difficult. How will the climate in Central Asia change? Novastan tries to make sense of it. This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on September 13, 2021. In recent years, the extreme climatic events in Central Asia are becoming more and more visible: more frequent heat waves, flooding, low rainfall, etc. The region, like the rest of the world, is not immune to what appears to be an accelerating climate change. On 9 August, the intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC) published the first part of their report describing the state of the world’s climate. The nearly 4000 pages report focuses on the known physical change. Central Asia is squeezed between the two paragraphs, as an illustration of its position in today’s information flows.

Extreme Rainfall and Drought

“The vast regions of Central and Eastern Asia have been drying up at the start of the 2000s due to hotter temperatures, lower humidity, declining soil moisture (Wei and Wang, 2013: Li et al., 2017d; Hessl and coll.,2018)’’, described the IPCC scientists. “The Himalayan glaciers supply ten of the most important river systems in the world and are critical water sources for almost two billion people (Wester et al., 2019). However, they are part of the most vulnerable “water towers” (Immerzeel et al., 2020) which are expected to experience volume losses of around 30% to 100% by 2100, according to global emission scenarios (Marzeion et al., 2020). According to the global emission scenarios, the glaciers of this region should reach their maximum run-off between 2020 and 2040 (Marzeion et al., 2020)”, went on the panel. Read more on Novastan: Aralsk: Pictures Of The Vanished Aral Sea On a wider level, Central Asia is one of the few regions in the world which receives both the most extreme rainfall and experiences hot weather episodes, or even droughts, describes the IPCC. According to Alisher Mirzabaev, a researcher on climate change at the University of Bonn, this situation is due to the fact that the region is subject to a large variety of climates. “Most of the cultivated land of Kazakhstan receives rainwater, while other countries irrigate their land mainly with water coming from the glaciers”, explains the Uzbek researcher, contacted by Novastan. This distinction between the origin of water appears essential for the years to come.

A Change of the Origin of Water

“The north of Kazakhstan generally experiences a drought every three to four years. With climate change, this area may experience heavy rains in certain years while in some other years there will be much greater droughts”, wrote Alisher Mirzabaev. “This situation leads to more variability for the grain harvests. In the mountainous regions, especially of Tajikistan and of Kyrgyzstan, strong rainfall episodes will lead to a higher risk of floods leading to a landslide”, explains the Uzbek specialist. Read more on Novastan: Life By The River: The Naryn In Kyrgyzstan“Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are likely to receive more precipitation during winter, but less in summer. It is problematic because there are neither crops in winter, nor irrigation. Water will accumulate in the reservoirs, which are fortunately numerous. However, the mountainous zones are going to face challenges due to more flooding”, estimated the researcher. What is most problematic is the shift in water supply, when the areas used to receive it through the snowmelt get it from the rain instead. This change may explain how Central Asia have both more rain and more drought, since the water received by the rain may not be accumulated in mountainous areas. However, this change does not seem to overly worry Alisher Mirzabaev. “Solutions do exist, particularly [the problem can be solved] by the construction of reservoirs or through better coordination between countries upstream and downstream. There is no need to panic at this stage, these solutions must simply be explored and implemented on a larger scale,’’ estimated the Uzbek researcher.

A Sharp Rise in Temperature

Beyond the water, one of the most evocative points of the report about Central Asia is the changing temperature of the region. “Aridity in eastern and western Central Asia is likely to increase, especially after the second half of the 21^st century, with an average 2 degrees rise of temperatures worldwide”, describe the IPCC researchers. It is regularly reported that the temperature in Central Asia has already exceeded the 2°C increase and the region is warming twice as fast as elsewhere in the world.

“These days, when we talk about global temperatures, it is about the surface average between the temperature of the land and the ocean. But the land is getting warmer much faster than the ocean. The temperature on the land is already above 1.5°C in most parts of the world”, says Alisher Mirzabaev. “Due to the continental location of Central Asia, this twice as fast increase is not as dramatic as it would seem”, relativizes the researcher. Alisher Mirzabaev also points out that the region has a very high degree of temperature variability, particularly in certain regions of Kazakhstan where the thermometer can show -40°C in winter and +40°C in summer. “The key issues for Central Asia are extreme weather events such as heatwaves, droughts or sudden snow and spring frost”, estimates Alisher Mirzabaev. In this respect, the increase in temperature variability could be the real danger, says the Uzbek researcher.

A lack of Accurate Data in Central Asia

More broadly, however, accurate data for effective modelling seems to be lacking in Central Asia. Weather data do not make up for nearly 400 weather stations in the region and a dense network when it comes to climate change. “To be more precise, you must have information regarding the evolution of glaciers, sand and dust storms… There are so many parameters. Usually, this type of information is better in Central Asia than the developing countries but is much poorer than the level of developed countries”, described Alisher Mirzabaev. Collected information also seems difficult to access, which may prevent the publication of scientific articles on the topic, which will then be used in IPCC reports. “The modelling skills are missing. We should have more studies bringing global modelling at a local level’’, added the Uzbek researcher. On the specific point of IPCC, Alisher Mirzabaev is the only Central Asian researcher who has directly been involved in writing reports or editing them. Read more on Novastan: Troubled Waters: Turkmenistan’s Environmental Policy This situation could change in the future, with the integration of the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia (Carec) as an IPCC Partner in May 2020. This centre based in Almaty, Kazakhstan, is one of the best in the region. For the seventh IPCC report, planned in 2028, Alisher Mirzabaev wants to believe that he will not be the only person to bring a more local point of view. Meanwhile, the second and third part of the IPCC report, on the impact and adaptation of climate change as well as the ways of fighting against climate change should be published by spring 2022. This makes a more and more concrete climate threat, in which human responsibility is unambiguously asserted.  

Etienne Combier Editor-in-chief of Novastan

Translated from French by Susan Higgins

Edited by Emma Bekrine

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DECODING. Turkmenistan ranks fifth in methane emissions in the world, after Russia and the United States. This does not come as good news for Central Asia’s most secretive country – and is also out of all proportion for the country with such a small population.These emissions derive mostly from gas extraction, Turkmenistan’s primary source of wealth. The culture of secrecy and outdated infrastructure leave them to be observed through satellite. With COP26 in full swing, the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkmenistan has promised to reduce methane emissions, which are 28 times more polluting than CO2 emissions. Here is an explanation of this delicate Turkmenistan situation.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 8 November 2021. The International Energy Agency’s report does not cast a positive light on Turkmenistan, the fifth-largest emitter of methane in the world. In its Methane Tracker, the IEA makes it clear that Turkmenistan emits more methane than China. As Glasgow hosts the COP26 until November 12, this is an unenviable position.

Ashgabat’s poor ranking was highlighted by the Bloomberg agency on 19 October. The article named Turkmenistan as the world’s third-highest methane emitter, right after Russia and the United States. Since then, this ranking was updated, although it was officially published in January 2021. Novastan requested a comment from the agency, but Bloomberg did not respond. Whether it be third or fifth, Turkmenistan emits slightly more methane than China (with its 1.4 billion people), despite having only 2.7 million inhabitants – or 6.2 million according to official statistics. Methane is especially harmful to the environment, as it fuels global warming 28 times faster than CO2.

Ageing gas infrastructure

To explain this phenomenon, one must turn to the gas industry. Turkmenistan possesses the fourth-largest reserves of blue gold in the world. It extracts next to 60 billion cubic meters per year, with China as its main buyer. As Turkmenistan’s main resource, gas is intensively exploited. The problem is that “most of the equipment is dilapidated, and leaks occur on a regular basis in the networks and deposits,” a reliable source states. “The government focuses on new developments, but companies lack skills”. Massive methane leaks from these infrastructures have been detected over the past few years. In 2019, 2020 and February 2021, companies specialized in satellite data analysis warned of these leaks. “What is certain is that these emissions do not stem from the ‘regular’ gas or oil production process. Methane leaks can be avoided”, says Antoine Halff, lead analyst at Kayrros, a French company that participated in revealing the problem.

General lack of transparency

“Generally speaking, large emissions can be caused by two things: either lax attitude towards industrial practices, bolstered by loose regulations, which means methane is intentionally released into the atmosphere during maintenance operations on pipelines, or equipment problems, such as poor or unsuitable infrastructure that leaks a lot of gas” Antoine Halff further explains. The second option probably applies to the Turkmen case. Read more: Troubled waters: Turkmenistan’s environmental policy Information from Turkmenistan is scarce, making it hard to say for sure. The authorities have never reacted to the leaks detected by Karryos or GHGSat, a Canadian firm also specializing in this sector. “It takes a lot of effort to determine the causes for Turkmenistan’s emissions, and whether they are intentional. Few public documents give information about the regulation of the hydrocarbon sector, and it is virtually impossible to know whether reports of incidents or leaks have been filed – at least, from a foreign perspective”, says Itziar Irakulis Loitxate, a scientist specializing in remote detection at the Polytechnic University of Valencia (Spain).

Satellites come to the rescue

In the face of this silence, satellite observation, among a few other things, can help determine the amount of methane emitted into atmosphere – and thereby make it possible for the IEA to rank countries. “The so-called ‘monitoring’ satellites make it possible to capture large emissions, which are occasional and therefore cannot be observed by sporadic checks”,  Antoine Halff says. “Furthermore, such observations are totally independent, do not require operators’ approval, and can better quantify large leaks than any other technology, especially ground-based sensors”. “On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that satellites can only see large emissions provided that the weather is not cloudy”, Itziar Irakulis Loitxate states. “Huge progress is being made in pushing the limits of emission detection. Several promising satellite missions are expected in the next few years, specializing in the precise detection of greenhouse gases”.

Turkmen authorities promise to reduce methane emissions

As it turns out, the Turkmen authorities have reacted to Bloomberg’s article. On November 4, Deputy Prime Minister – and President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s son – Serdar Berdimuhamedov said he was paying great attention to reducing methane emissions, the official press agency TDH says. Independent media Turkmen.news reports that he also flew to Glasgow in order to make sure his position was heard by the members of the COP26. Serdar Berdimuhamedov seems to get ready to follow his father’s steps, which makes it a loaded statement. “Once identified, large methane emissions can be avoided easily.  The technology already exists, and its costs are negligible, if not negative, considering the benefits”, Antoine Halff claims. “Turkmenistan will have to work on upgrading old facilities and improving the skills and the sense of responsibility of technicians”, a local source tells Novastan. According to Itziar Irakulis Loitxate, “Turkmenistan can drastically reduce its emissions, but in order for that to happen, money should be invested in maintenance and stricter control over infrastructure”. In her opinion, Turkmenistan has the means to do so – “only time will tell how fast [it will be implemented]”.  

Etienne Combier Editor-in-Chief of Novastan

Translated from French by Andreï Fedorovsky

Edited by Anna Wilhelmi

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China’s involvement in the race for vaccinations in Central Asia confirms its aim to increase relations with neighbouring countries, primed for over a decade with the New Silk Road project. However, resistance among citizens continues to slow Chinese ambitions. This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 1st of March 2021. While the development of Coronavirus vaccinations takes a strategic turn, China plays its hand in Central Asia. According to the Chinese press agency Xinhue, Beijing pledged to provide doses of the Chinese Sinopharm vaccines to Kyrgyzstan on the 5^th of February 2021, the first case of such an offer worldwide. At the same time, Uzbekistan began testing of another Chinese vaccination, developed by Anhui Zhifei Longcom. The trials launched in November 2020 and are set to continue until May 2021. Radio Ozodlik, the Uzbek branch of the American media Radio Free Europe, confirmed that Tashkent could even share co-authorship of the Chinese vaccine as they plan to produce it. Read More on Novastan : Mass Vaccination Programme Starts in Uzbekistan Diplomacy surrounding vaccinations is particularly delicate in Central Asia, where Russia and China both try to promote their respective vaccinations as a part of their competition for regional dominance. The Russian vaccination Sputnik V has been chosen by the Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz authorities for their mass vaccination programs. Read More on Novastan: Covid-19: Kazakhstan Starts Rollout of its QazVac jab The race to deliver vaccinations is not, however, the only outcome of the current health crisis: the economic situation in Central Asian countries is rapidly deteriorating due to the shrinking global economy. This is particularly true for Turkmenistan, a country that depends almost entirely on oil exports, China being their main buyer. However, China’s decreased oil demand, which is linked to the pandemic, has destabilised this unique source of foreign income for Turkmenistan. The country’s difficulty of exporting oil has paradoxically led to closer relations between the two countries, as Ashgabat depends more than ever on Chinese imports.

The New Silk Road

The new strategy is only the latest in a long list. In an interview with French media Le Monde, researcher Niva Yau describes China’s strategy in Central Asia, which has long favoured importation of mineral and energy sources from Central Asian countries to meet the extremely high demands of the Chinese economic system. Certain Central Asian countries have therefore adapted their production to satisfy Chinese demand, especially oil production. Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are an example of this, two countries whose oil exportation is largely dependent on Chinese demand.

The New Silk Road project, launched in 2013 in Astana, aims to create rail links between China and Europe, as well as seeks to promote cooperation within Eurasia. According to Niva Yau, China intends to work towards strengthening oil infrastructure in Turkmenistan and gas infrastructure in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, China’s strategy is not limited to simply building new infrastructure. In 2013, China launched a program to outsource their industrial capacities, aiming to share industry expertise with the countries of Central Asia. What’s more, several Central Asian cities use Chinese ‘smart city’ technology, developed by Huawei, which aims to control populations with security cameras. In the Tajik capital Dushanbe, for example, there are over 800 of these cameras in operation. American media Eurasianet reported that other than outsourcing industrial expertise, China aims to gradually open its market to the countries of Central Asia, thus demonstrating new interest in this area. Indeed, since 2019, Beijing has signed numerous agreements relating to agrochemical standards, approving importation of food items, and even encouraging Central Asia businesses to enter the Chinese market. Kazakh media Astana Times reported that in September 2019, Kazakhstan’s president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev promised a three-time increase in wheat exports to China as a response to China’s gestures. Similarly, in September 2020, Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev promised a fivefold increase in food exports. However, two hurdles remain before entering the Chinese market, according to Eurasianet: while China is an ultra-competitive market, the Central Asian countries would have to improve their border infrastructure and logistical systems in order to transport their goods to China at a low cost.

China’s Presence in Central Asia is Highly Contested

Opinions in Central Asia remain divided when it comes to China’s increased presence. Researcher Niva Yau states that several anti-Chinese protests have taken place, particularly over the past few years. Le Monde reminds readers that Kyrgyzstan in particular has been the stage of anti-Chinese sentiment, exemplified by the cancellation of a project to create a Chinese logistical centre in At Bashy in February 2020. In February 2019, several demonstrations organized by Kyrk Shoro, a nationalist movement, undermined local Kyrgyz authorities. Sinophobia is equally present in Kazakhstan, a Central Asian country heavily implicated in the New Silk Road project with Khorgos, their free trade zone. These movements are obstacles to China’s strategy, which needs full cooperation and loyal allies in the long term. Niva Yau notes that Central Asians are generally opposed to Chinese projects on their territory because of the policies linked to Chinese investment. These policies benefit local governments but leave local communities behind because of the total absence of redistribution of wealth by the ruling elite. In this regard, the diplomatic push for vaccines is unlikely to have any effect.

Corentin Goupil Editor of Novastan

Translated from French by Alice Coveney

Edited by Dagmar Nared

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Being far ahead of the other regional gas suppliers, Turkmenistan became the first energy partner of China in late January 2021, ahead of Russia. In the context of generally rising gas prices at the beginning of 2021, the roles seem to be redistributed in the world of gas producers.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on the 29th of March 2021.

Turkmenistan, a country with gas wealth in no need to prove, is the leader in gas supply on the Chinese energy market since the beginning of 2021, according to the Turkmen media Orient. In January 2021, a total of 2,786 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas were delivered to China, out of the 4,685 billion cubic meters imported by the Chinese authorities. For the first months of the year, almost 60% of the Chinese gas is supplied by Turkmenistan, according to the Russian agency Interfax.

Turkmenistan is thus ahead of Russia, which supplied only 916 million cubic meters of gas to China through the “Power of Siberia” pipeline. Apart from Russia and Turkmenistan, China gets its resources from other Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which export 319 million cubic meters and 307 million cubic meters accordingly.

Turkmen gas prices at their highest

The official figures of Turkmenistan’s exportations are difficult to find: president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov is usually very discreet about the country’s economic performance, so it is hard to obtain them.

Yet the data of the General Administration of Customs (GAC) of China reveals the price of Turkmen gas which appears to be one of the most expensive on the Chinese energy market. Indeed, the price of a thousand cubic meters comes to 187 dollars (£138), whereas Kazakh price is up to 162 dollars (£119.5), and Uzbek price is up to 151 dollars (£111).

Blue gold prices on the rise

The high price of Turkmen gas can be explained by the rise of gas prices on international markets. Indeed, in North-East Asia, a cold wave led to the high demand for liquefied gas. The cooling in the region had for consequences a rapid increase of gas prices on the international market: the maximum value of JKM Platts, which measures the price of liquefied gas in Asia, jumped to 1 160 dollars (£856) for a thousand cubic meters at the beginning of January 2021, according to Interfax.

The rise of energy’s value is also to be seen in Europe where the average price of gas is up to 257 dollars (£190) for a thousand cubic meters in late January, according to the Interfax agency.

Turkmenistan’s dependence on gas exportations

The fourth exporter of gas in the world strengthens its commercial relationship with China, which remains the first trade partner for Turkmenistan. In 2019, according to data furnished by the Observatory of Economic Complexity, China accounted for 82% of Turkmen exports, far ahead of Uzbekistan (4%). Regarding importations, China is second with 14,3% behind Turkey (24,7%).

This new position also strengthens Turkmenistan’s dependence on exportation. Close to being a windfall economy, the state’s incomes are based on hydrocarbon sales. According to the specialized website Oilcapital.ru, 15% of consumed gas in China was Turkmen in 2020. Although economic repercussions are satisfactory nowadays, as soon as the price and foreign demand will decrease, the Turkmen economy will drop as was the case at the beginning of the pandemic. Indeed, while China’s gas suppliers are diversified, Turkmenistan’s customers are not: the country mainly exports to China and Russia.

Read more on Novastan: Agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan paves the way for Trans-Caspian Pipeline

Nevertheless, some projects are underway to diversify exportations: the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (TAPI), which has been stalled since 2015, should be relaunched soon. Besides, with the rapprochement of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, the project of the Trans-Caspian pipeline is about to become reality, which means Turkmen gas will reach the European market.

Emma Collet Writer for Novastan

Translated from French by Flavie Deschamps

Edited by Anna Wilhelmi

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In a book focusing on Central Asia’s relationship to Russia, researcher Michaël Levystone provides a careful insight into ties whose nature keep on changing. As they perform a balancing act between historical closeness and desire for independence, Central Asian countries strive to tip the scales in their favor in regards to their relationship to the “Russian older brother”.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 22nd September 2021.

A specialist in political, economic and cultural relations between Russia and Central Asia, Michaël Levystone has published in May 2021 “Russia and Central Asia at a crossroads”, a book which tackles the stakes concerning Central Asia vis-à-vis neighboring world powers Russia and China.

Michaël Levystone is working as a researcher at the Russian / CIS center within the French institute for International relations (Institut français des relations internationales). In the past, he worked at the French embassy in Kazakhstan and at the French Russian observatory of Moscow. His latest book provides analysis of an area which remains largely uncharted territory. His desire to develop knowledge of this region came from the years he spent studying at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques), when he wrote a dissertation on bilateral relations between Russia and Kazakhstan.

Military, political and cultural Russian influence on shaky ground

Michaël Levystone’s book offers a better understanding of economic, political and cultural relations which link Russia and the five Central Asian countries. Not only does it highlight the way these countries stand in relation to Russia, it also deals with the strategic role they play regarding China.

Answering Novastan’s questions, Michaël Levystone states that his book, although focusing on Russia’s both economic and security-related role in Central Asia, “could not exclude China from the realm of analysis, given its all-pervasive influence. A lot is at stake when it comes to Beijing.”

Read more on Novastan: More Russian passports, fewer labour migrants: Central Asian migration to Russia in 2020

The takeaway here is the fact that Russia has been relentlessly trying to maintain control and influence over those countries ever since they gained independence in 1991. It has notably been aiming to remain their major partner in energy and military issues. Further into the book, Michaël Levystone however emphasizes Central Asians’ late attempts not to be overpowered by their age-old Russian inquisitor.

Read more on Novastan: Russia tries new diplomatic approach with “Central Asia + Russia” format

However intense this desire can be in a given country, it is bound to be faced with Russian diplomacy’s unwillingness to relinquish such power. As a matter of fact, all of these actors participated in a video conference which took place on 15th October 2020 about a joint declaration “on the strategic directions taken by cooperation”.

Therefore, Central Asian countries try to further their independence from Soviet patterns, especially on the cultural level, as they uphold use of local languages over use of Russian, or as they gradually close down schools that were opened under Soviet rule.

Long-lasting fidelity put to the test

Central Asian countries are also challenging their historical ally by turning towards the Asian market, in particular towards Beijing and what it has to offer. This could lead to rising tensions between China and Russia. However, the book makes it clear that both countries have come to a “tacit agreement”, albeit still fragile.

Although Moscow seems less and less reluctant to let China achieve economic leadership in Central Asia, notably through the advent of the Belt and Road Initiative, Russia keeps on wielding “hard power” when it comes to weaponry and military matters. Its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as its arms supplies at a preferential rate through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) are a testament to this.

China as an actor that can no longer be dismissed

This distinction appears not to be so clear-cut as it used to be. “Nowadays, Chinese influence is gradually but undeniably taking over. Chinese military presence is rising, as shown by their unofficial military base in Tajikistan, but also by strong synergies regarding security”, the author writes. Simultaneously, Beijing is each Central Asian country’s number one economic partner.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan: Huawei to launch 5G network in 2021

China’s growing influence over Central Asia is not a myth. It partakes of Russia’s decline, which is military as well as industrial.

What makes this book fascinating lies in the chapters which explain the nature of different organizations in the region: the CSTO, the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union). Michaël Levystone therein points out that Russian supremacy was fueled by the creation of these institutions which all aim at maintaining control over independent yet formerly Soviet countries.

Read more on Novastan: Russia commits to railroad corridor China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan

Whether such domination be economic or cultural, Moscow’s attempts to keep a tight grip on those five countries – through culture, energy, the economy or military affairs – are clearly put into light in these passages.

Europe and America are nowhere to be seen

Although this may come as a surprise to the reader, the United States and most European countries lack interest towards Central Asia, in spite of this region’s growing challenges. While some effort has been put into developing presence there in the past few years, it remains quite limited.

Read more on Novastan: Uzbek products obtain privileged access to the European Union

Being at a crossroads between two continents which each have strong ambitions makes it a new economic hub. It also makes it vulnerable to threats posed by some neighboring countries’ extremist, if not terrorist aspirations. There is more to Central Asia’s role in diplomatic relations than meets the eye.

Read more on Novastan: Hardening Positions on Afghanistan following Summit in Dushanbe

To put it simply, Michaël Levystone’s book delves into the ties between Russia and Central Asia while pointing out growing indifference towards the former on the latter’s part, for the Russian neighbor regularly and considerably infringes on domestic affairs and capacity for self-determination. Today, this region is of great importance as it is at a crossroads between Europe and Asia.

While it wishes to get rid of the enduring Soviet yoke, Central Asia is no less coveted by China, which brings about new opportunities for those countries, although some fear that they might mean trading subjugation to one world power for subjugation to another.

Michaël Levystone’s book Russie et Asie Centrale à la croisée des chemins (not translated into English yet) was published by L’Harmattan (Paris 2021, 176 pages, €18.50(£15.82)).

Written by Emma Parisien

Translated from French by Andreï Fedorovsky

Edited by Emma Bekrine

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Dr Jade McGlynn has published an article for The Diplomat discussing the modernisation of Britain’s Central Asian Trade Strategy, based on her report for the Henry Jackson Society, entitled ‘A Steppe Change: Should Britain Be Bolder In Central Asia?’. In it, she states the UK “needs to think more ambitiously and coherently about its business aims with Central Asia”. In developing relations with the Central Asian states, the UK could balance trade with human rights and developmental assistance. So far, the UK has failed to develop such a strategy, and efforts remain focused on trading opportunities. McGlynn wants the UK to take head of the political realities of these states and ensure it champions and actively encourages democracy and greater human rights while simultaneously organising and developing trade agreements. Novastan spoke to Dr McGlynn to find out more about her strategy. An example of where the UK has failed to do as much is their increasing arms deals with Turkmenistan, considered by human rights groups as one of the world’s most repressive and authoritarian regimes. In comparison, the UK’s assistance to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has benefitted both nations and given the UK considerable soft power through showing commitment to the region beyond trade. The emerging signs of democratisation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s two largest economies and nations, show the region to be making a gradual change from what has long been considered an authoritarian area of the world. The landslide election of Sadyr Japarov in Kyrgyzstan should be cautiously championed for implementing democracy. By providing vocal support for Kyrgyzstan, the UK reminds the other nations that its trade, investment and support are connection to Kyrgyzstan’s continued democratic style of governance. This in turn could increase the likelihood for democratisation in the neighbouring states. The UK should take inspiration from the Obama administration’s C5+1 initiative and build on its positive reputation gained from development work in the region. This would then allow the UK to maintain channels with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and shows they are open to trade should they ever move towards democratisation. The UK has not paid enough attention to Central Asia. When it has, only specific countries or aspects, for example trade with Kazakhstan, have been made the point of focus. A region-focused approach instead would benefit both Britain and countries where regional cooperation has not always been strong. Human rights must remain a priority As much as increased trade negotiations with these countries should be encouraged, she maintains that the UK cannot sign deals at the expense of human rights and jeopardization of a free and fair society. The UK’s current arms deals with Turkmenistan are a shocking example of sacrificing ethics in order to bolster trade. The lack of pressure on the UK to halter these deals is due to a lack of knowledge and media coverage of the area. Too often the mainstream, generalised media focuses on the bizarre rules put in place by President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, shining the country in a comedic, ridiculous light. The reality of the brutal human rights abuses and widespread poverty despite the wealth of natural resources in the country is forgotten. Larger organisations rather than just specialised areas should give the country more attention in order to increase knowledge of Turkmenistan, something which would elevate pressure to stop these morally and ethically entirely unacceptable arms deals. These deals undermine the UK’s pronounced championship of human rights and should be stopped. Elsewhere, little has been done to improve the state of human rights for the citizens of Central Asia: despite claims by the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as to the development of human rights, little evidence of this has yet been shown. Recent human rights abuses include censorship of journalists and oppression of the LGBTQ+ community. While democratic, the election of Sadyr Japarov in Kyrgyzstan and imprisonment of the most outspoken critic and presidential hopeful, Omurbek Tekebayev, puts the country as risk of returning to the populist authoritarianism overturned in 2010. It would be hypocritical of the UK to adopt a trade policy with such countries after public anti-authoritarian efforts in China and Russia and could demoralise activists in these countries who need the UK’s support. Implementing a human rights checklist backed up by independent NGOs from the region in order to assess milestones in terms of achieving greater democracy and freedom could encourage increased democratisation. This would enable the UK to measure economic engagement against human rights and democratisation milestones. Goals could be set for countries like Uzbekistan that claim to be installing more democratic milestones such as free access for election observers, the establishment of NGOs and funds to support independent media. Once reached, the country could continue to the next stage in economic relations. Putting a permanent representative in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, would symbolise the UK’s commitment to supporting the democratic potential of the region. Kyrgyzstan is currently the most democratic country and would demonstrate the UK’s hope that they should stay on this path. It would also reward and prioritise the most democratic country and encourage Sadyr Japarov, President of Kyrgyzstan, to continue this work. The UK alone would have enough power to rely on their influence to speed up democratisation in Central Asia. However, the European interest, particularly from countries who keep human rights as a core component of their foreign policy, namely Scandinavian countries, and desires in Washington for the Biden administration to continue with Obama’s policy, allow for a combined effort which ups the pressure for Central Asian nations. Background of Central Asia The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and subsequent independence for Central Asian countries led to a long-term struggle for democracy. Many of these countries contain deeply embedded ethnic tensions dating back to Stalin’s policies, for example in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan. These countries have had to deal with civil wars, widespread humans rights abuses and as a result their economies have struggled to achieve their full potential. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan still rely heavily on remittances. However, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have seen a near doubling in per capita income in purchasing power parity since independence and political conflicts have not deterred interest from abroad in trade and investment. These countries are rich in natural resources, which constitute 65 per cent of exports in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as over 90 per cent in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The UK has now left the EU and thus has the freedom to pursue its own trade deal. Economic, security and geopolitical considerations make Central Asia a good trade partner, including the appetite for British goods in countries such as Kazakhstan and the pre-established trade and diplomatic presence of the UK in each of the nations. The Department of International Trade has put in effort to build on existing standing especially in Kazakhstan, where UK cultural, service and educational exports are popular. For example, 4,000 Kazakh students are currently studying in the UK and more visas are issues to Kazakh students than Australians. With two established UK trade offices in Kazakhstan, a comparatively large economy and a consistently open approach to free trade, McGlynn deems the country a promising contender for UK export growth. In comparison, Uzbekistan also has potential since the United Kingdom-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 2019 enabled the two to grant each other the most favoured nation (MFN) treatment. This is important because Uzbekistan does not belong in the World Trade Organisation. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have less ample economic opportunities due to widespread poverty, a relatively low GDP of $8.09 and $7.52 billion respectively, although it is still important to include them. The UK accounts for almost half of all Kyrgyzstan’s export, mainly gold, which provides leverage to promote democratisation. Trade between the UK and Turkmenistan has flourished under the auspices of the Turkmen-British Trade and Economic Council, even if it allows for a growth in controversial arms deals. The UK is not alone in the rush to take advantage of such lucrative deals: Italy has established a business forum with Central Asian countries, signing arms deals with Turkmenistan. The USA has just launched the Central Asia Investment Partnership and the Scandinavian nations have recently held the Kazakhstan Northern European Investment Forum. McGlynn advises the UK to hurry in these countries’ footsteps but paying heed not to lose sight of their moral and democratic values. Impact on other countries

Economic investment can also improve security interests, namely in helping to stabilise the countries. With a combined population of 75million, the average age of a Central Asian citizen is 27.6, highlighting the need for economic opportunities for young people. Without such opportunities, the likelihood for young people to become radicalised or turn to extremist groups is far greater. The UK’s trade influence can be used as a positive counter example to major geopolitical players in that region- Russia and China. The UK has condemned China’s campaign against the Uyghur people in Xinjiang, a campaign which has also targeted ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, the Kazakhs being the second largest Turkic-speaking indigenous community in the region after the Uyghurs. It also contains many ethnic Kyrgyz. The UK’s economic approach must take into account these people, support them and help refugees.

 Lily Shanagher Edited by Tommy Hodgson

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Turkmenistan celebrates 30 years of independence in 2021. But what does its past and current environmental policy look like, and what does it reveal about the country?

In an article published on the Turkmen news site Orient.tm on 16 February 2021, the journalist Gozel Sahatova praised Turkmenistan’s recognition of the world’s fight against global warming. She reported that, to mark the occasion, 30 million seedlings will be planted across the country during the year. According to the article, this contribution to the wellbeing of Turkmenistan and its inhabitants and indeed the wider world comes alongside many other contributions.

The modernisation of key sectors of the economy (oil and gas, agriculture, industrial) is mentioned, as is the meeting of international environmental safety standards. An emphasis is also placed on the introduction of water- and energy-saving technologies and the value of the Turkmen experience for international practice.

The article also points towards Turkmen ratification of international agreements on climate change: the 1991 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The Central Asian state also included new goals related to the Paris Agreement in its 2019 National Strategy. Finally, the author highlights Turkmen initiatives on the environment, such as a multilateral cooperation mechanism in the Caspian Sea. 

Precise data on Turkmenistan can be difficult to acquire and analyse due to its being closed off to significant international relations with foreign countries under a policy of neutrality. With that in mind, it’s worth asking whether the country’s environmental record is as clean as it seems.

A question of prestige

Independent Turkmenistan has had various environmental issues that weaken Orient.tm’s claims. The introduction of water-saving technologies, for example, seems overshadowed by the failure of the huge Golden Age Lake project, a plan for a 800-kilometre network of canals across the desert to bring water into the Karashor depression. 

This project was conceived under the former president Saparmyrat Nyýazow and continued under his successor Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, in spite of expert warnings of the difficulty of accumulating water due to evaporation in an arid region. 

Yet the Golden Age Lake fitted into the wider idea of a Turkmen Golden Age. At the completion of the first stage of the project in 2009, Berdimuhamedow proclaimed that the “most daring plans are made a reality”. The completion of the first stage of the project was thus a “truly historic event”. However, evaporation issues were compounded by poor construction and a lack of consideration of meteorological factors such as wind drift affecting the canal course, causing, according to one Turkmen expert, a ticking time bomb for the country’s already troubled environmental situation.

In this light, the project may seem more questionable. In an interview with Novastan, Filippo Menga, an associate professor in geography at the University of Bergamo whose research focuses on water politics, points out the discrepancy between “the government’s triumphant narrative and the concerns raised by the scientific and international community”. However, he explained, the contradictions are understandable: “The aim seems to be the end in itself – with the end being launching a self-referential project that fits with and reinforces the Altyn Asyr, or Golden Age, rhetoric.”

Rather than strictly being about water, then, it is more a question of “projecting domestic power and reinforcing the image of Berdimuhamedow as a visionary and benevolent leader who goes to great lengths to improve living conditions in Turkmenistan,” Menga said. More recently, the project “seems to have gone off the radar in the political agenda of the government” due to the “apparent insuccess of the venture”. Indeed, as of 2021, the Karashor depression is almost empty.

Beyond the Golden Age Lake

At a 19 February 2021 conference on the state of agriculture in the country, Berdimuhamedow suggested the cleaning and dredging of Turkmen rivers and the maintenance of dams to ensure water supply for irrigation. International organisations have also recognised the importance of environmental action in Turkmenistan: USAID, for instance, has recently financed the dredging of the Murgab river for around $170,000 (approximately £120,000).

In addition to the Golden Age Lake project, the Turkmen activist Farid Tukhbatullin has highlighted wider problems of water governance in the country in an article for The Third Pole, an online magazine dedicated to the issue of water in Asia. Tukhbatullin mentions the lack of a uniform post-independence strategy, water-intensive cotton and wheat crops, and the expansion of irrigation. This is intensified by soil salinisation caused by poor maintenance of water collection systems, leaving a snow-looking layer of salt which greatly reduces crop yield in Turkmenistan and even in neighbouring Uzbekistan. 

Read more: The Aral Sea artemia: small shrimp, high stakes

In his article, Tukhbatullin also mentions that localised actions, though helpful and well-intentioned, address symptoms rather than root causes, and thus cannot be a major driver of change. Menga similarly states that what is more necessary is a “coordinated regional action driven by a strong and genuine political will to cooperate.”

And indeed, the knock-on effects of Turkmenistan’s lack of water collection system maintenance for Uzbekistan show the interconnectedness of the region. As Menga told Novastan: “Central Asia, as a region, stands out as one marked by inextricable interconnections and interdependencies, and low or limited cooperation on regional issues is not beneficial to anyone, and in particular the peoples of Central Asia, who will be most severely affected by environmental degradation and unequal distribution of resources.” 

“Lack of maintenance of shared regional infrastructure has been an issue in Central Asia since the 1990s, and the lack of a coordinated approach and long-term agreement to deal with this issue is likely to trigger tensions and conflicts in the future,” he added. 

Gas and oil

Furthermore, Turkmenistan is a country rich in oil and natural gas, and with the recent signing of a memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan, may soon have the possibility to export to Europe and reduce its dependency on China and Russia, especially in the global post-corona virus economic resurgence which will see increased production, according to a 2021 IEA report on methane emissions. The country is dependent on hydrocarbon revenue, and the steep decline in price from 2014 has intensified food shortages.

Read more: Agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan paves the way for Trans-Caspian Pipeline

The country aims to stabilise or reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, though a 19% increase is expected. These targets may be complicated by multiple significant methane leaks detected since 2019. The latest, in February 2021, amounted to an equivalent of 10 tons of methane per hour being released for multiple hours into the atmosphere. This was equivalent to the emissions of 250,000 cars. The French energy data analytics firm Kayrros suggested the leak was the result of budget cuts related to a slow-down in the hydrocarbon industry due to the coronavirus pandemic.

The rise of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow’s son Serdar to the post of deputy prime minister for digitisation and innovative technologies is a signal of a future transfer of power from father to son. Though it is difficult to speculate on what his environmental and political stance may be, existing issues and a lack of comprehensive solutions mean that if he comes to power, Serdar Berdimuhamedow will inherit a fragile environment that will echo the predicament of the entire region.

Cameron Evans
Novastan.org

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On 6 February 2021, a delegation from the Taliban visited the Turkmen capital, Ashgabat. The meeting, held with Turkmenistan’s foreign affairs minister Raşit Meredow, related to the construction of the TAPI pipeline, which aims to connect several countries within the region. 

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 24 February 2021.

Visits of this kind don’t happen every day: on 6 February, Taliban leaders held talks with Turkmenistan’s minister of foreign affairs Raşit Meredow. During the talks, both parties emphasised the importance of ensuring stability and peace in Afghanistan. In addition, they discussed the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline.

Turkmenistan has never ceased to support this initiative, which dates back to a memorandum signed in 1995. This pipeline would allow Turkmenistan to be less dependent on the Chinese market and diversify gas exportation routes to reach South-Asia countries. The TAPI pipeline project would pass through Afghanistan, Pakistan then India, a route which seems to attract endless complications. 

The Taliban (once again) vouches for the security of the pipeline

Following this meeting, the Taliban declared their support for the pipeline project, which they believe would contribute to development and prosperity in Afghanistan. In this respect, they reiterated intentions they had already expressed in 2016. The declaration included a pledge not to jeopardise the constructions of facilities and infrastructure that could benefit their country. The statement came not long after an attack on regional electric power infrastructure, connecting various Central Asia countries to the Afghan territory. 

Read more: Agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan paves the way for Trans-Caspian Pipeline

This declaration was made after negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, which had started in September 2020 in Qatar, resumed in January. Their objective is finding a compromise to ensure the country’s stability. This northward expansion is an opportunity to gain legitimacy from the rest of the world and to be seen as consistent and essential contributors to the peace-making process. However, even if peace were achieved, it may not guarantee the construction of the pipeline. 

As the American media Eurasianet notes, given the dominant role that the Taliban play in the region’s security, Turkmenistan is directly affected by events that take place in Afghanistan.

In a RFE/RL analysis relating to the visit, the journalist and regional specialist Bruce Pannier evokes many details, including the Taliban’s practices over the past months. Contrary to what they had promised at the end of 2016, the Taliban destroyed strategic regional infrastructure, including electrical. So with this precedent of going back on pledges, it is difficult to see the Taliban as a partner reliable and consistent enough to ensure the success of the pipeline project. 

No US facilitation

One year after signing an agreement with the Taliban, the USA decided not to interfere in the talks between Turkmenistan and the Taliban. In a statement to the American magazine Newsweek on 19 February, the Department of State denied facilitating the recent meeting: “The United States played no role in the Taliban’s visit to Turkmenistan and has no position to share on those discussions.”

“The United States has long supported efforts by Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors to strengthen their connectivity, boost economic coordination, and improve regional transportation infrastructure, including energy infrastructure,” the statement added. Similarly, in October 2020, in a joint statement with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, the American government said it continued to support energy infrastructure in the region. 

It is possible that this meeting between the Taliban and Turkmenistan will succeed in pushing forward a project that has been stopped and started so many times. The decision to welcome the Afghan Taliban allows Turkmenistan to pursue a stable project and to reassure investors, including private Afghan, Pakistani and Indian companies, as well as the Islamic Development Bank. 

TAPI’s phantom construction

In effect, for practical reasons, construction has not progressed quickly, if at all. During the meeting on 6 February, Turkmenistan did not release an official date or any information regarding the financing of the project. The Afghan news outlet Tolonews explained that, as of January 2020, construction had not started in Afghanistan. The Diplomat reported that this was enough to curb the optimism of certain countries who, in 2016, hoped for completion by 2018.

In 2015, Turkmenistan organised a ceremony lavishly celebrating the start of construction of the Turkmen section of the pipeline. Now, many experts question whether this section has actually been completed, when it was supposed to be ready by 2019. Endlessly pushed back, the TAPI project could quite possibly never reach completion. 

Many factors cast doubt on the viability of this project, making former optimism seem outdated. In an April 2019 article, RFE/RL noted that Turkmenistan had ordered additional pipes to construction sites despite stating construction on its territory had already been completed. This led the American media to conclude that, taking into account the volume of material purchased, the installation was far from being finished. In this context, it is difficult to imagine how the Afghan construction could have started, as no prior preparation had been completed. 

Other obstacles

Even presuming that the Turkmen section has been completed, that doesn’t at all guarantee the certainty of the project on the other side of the border. From a political standpoint, the support coming from Pakistan and India has been dependent on Turkmenistan’s pledge to decrease the price of the natural gas it exports. 

Accordingly, Pakistan has explicitly said that its participation in this project depended on a reduction in gas prices. Last June, Islamabad expressed its intent to revise certain terms of the contract that tied it to Turkmenistan, especially the clauses concerning the responsibility of repair in the case of an accident that might take part on the Afghan territory. The German news source Deutsche Welle published an in-depth analysis on this subject, which suggested that Pakistan’s demands have not been observed for the moment and remain an obstacle, delaying completion of the pipeline. Many of the experts interviewed in the piece asserted that the meeting on 6 February could be used as leverage by the Pakistani government in upcoming negotiations.

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Finally, from a legal standpoint, The Diplomat reported that an Afghan law, voted into effect in 2019, delayed the start of construction. Whether the problems arise for security, legal or political reasons, the project seems to remain uncertain, facing both internal and external hurdles. While the meeting between Turkmenistan and the Taliban remained an attempt to prove commitment towards the project, the project is substantial in serving Turkmenistan’s interests. 

A crucial project for Turkmenistan 

The country, boasting some of the greatest natural gas reserves in the world, depends almost entirely on the sale of this commodity to uphold its economy. This situation becomes all the more problematic for Ashgabat which has, for the moment, only one major client, China. According to the American Trade Administration, in 2019, an overwhelming percentage of Turkmen oil was exported to the Chinese market via the Central Asian pipeline, shared with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The price of this oil was particularly low in 2016, after China negotiated a lower rate in exchange for investments in pipeline construction.  

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Even though Turkmenistan relaunched oil exportation to the Russian market in 2019, Gazprom remains just a minor contributor to the Turkmen economy. 

As such, the Turkmen government has every interest in ensuring greater security for its Afghan neighbour. For the Central Asian state, it would ensure that construction go ahead unhindered and, in the long term, secure the two countries’ shared energy infrastructure. This project has become even more critical as China has decreased Turkmen oil importation to favour their neighbours, as the Foreign Policy Institute, a US-based think tank, analyses in a 2020 report.

Zenon Bekdouche
Novastan.org

Translated from French by Alice Coveney

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