As Kazakhstan prepares to elect its new Kurultai, women are becoming increasingly visible in political institutions across Central Asia. Their presence, however, still falls sharply as offices acquire greater executive, territorial and economic authority.

Kazakhstan’s political parties have selected their candidates for the country’s first election to the new unicameral Kurultai, scheduled for 23 August. Seven parties submitted lists before nominations closed on 13 July, and the Central Election Commission has begun registering them ahead of the formal campaign.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s Next Elections: Between Reform and Managed Competition

The election will help determine the shape of Kazakhstan’s new political system following the entry into force of its new constitution. It also raises a more specific question: what place will women occupy in the redesigned parliament?

Kazakhstan requires at least 30 percent of candidates on each party list to belong collectively to three categories: women, people aged 35 or under, and persons with disabilities. The same combined threshold applies when seats are distributed. The quota therefore guarantees representation for the three categories together, but no fixed proportion specifically for women.

All seven parties say their submitted lists meet the legal requirement. But the combined nature of the quota makes the number of women selected – and their position within the lists – particularly important.

The question reaches beyond Kazakhstan. Across Central Asia, women are more visible in politics than they were a generation ago. Quotas and electoral reforms have increased their representation in parliament, while women now lead legislative chambers and hold prominent positions in governments and presidential administrations.

Yet the closer one moves towards executive command, territorial authority and control over strategic areas of government, the more rapidly women disappear.

Women may occupy a substantial share of parliamentary seats, work throughout public administrations and sit on local councils while remaining much rarer among governors, mayors, district heads, party leaders and the ministers responsible for finance, energy and security.

Central Asia has therefore made more progress in bringing women inside political institutions than in placing them at the head of those institutions.

Parliament is the easiest place to count

Parliamentary representation provides the clearest evidence of change.

Women currently hold 58 of the 148 filled seats in the lower house of Uzbekistan’s parliament, or 39.2 percent. In Kyrgyzstan, women occupy 30 of the 90 seats in the Jogorku Kenesh, exactly one third of the chamber. Tajikistan’s lower house includes 18 women among its 62 members, or 29 percent, while women hold 31 of the 122 currently filled seats in Turkmenistan’s Assembly, equivalent to 25.4 percent.

These figures compare favourably with the global average of 27.5 percent recorded at the beginning of 2026.

Kyrgyzstan offers the most striking recent example of how electoral rules can transform representation. Its November 2025 parliamentary election introduced a system under which each three-member constituency had to return at least one woman and at least one man. Women’s share of seats rose by 12.9 percentage points – the largest increase recorded in any country holding parliamentary elections in 2025.

The change is significant. It created a much larger group of female MPs and could eventually expand the pool of women with the experience and public profile required for ministerial, party and executive positions.

Read more on Novastan: The Vocabulary of Reform: Why Central Asia Is Reimagining Its Political Traditions

But the Kyrgyz election also illustrates the limits of using gender statistics in isolation. The vote took place amid restrictions on political competition and pressure on opposition figures and independent media. A parliament can become more gender-balanced without necessarily becoming more politically pluralistic.

The same caution applies elsewhere in the region. A large share of female parliamentarians is an important measure of inclusion, but it does not by itself reveal how independently MPs can operate, how candidates are selected or how effectively the legislature can scrutinise the executive.

Representation remains meaningful. It is simply not the same thing as power.

What quotas can – and cannot – change

Quotas matter because political recruitment rarely corrects its own inequalities.

Parties tend to select candidates from familiar professional, business and administrative networks. Across Central Asia, these networks remain heavily male, particularly at the senior levels from which candidates for powerful positions are drawn.

Women may also face unequal access to campaign financing, fewer opportunities to develop relationships with party leaders and local officials, and social expectations that continue to place a greater share of family responsibilities on them. Political life can expose women to forms of scrutiny and harassment that their male colleagues are less likely to encounter.

Well-designed quotas can interrupt this cycle. Kyrgyzstan’s experience shows that rules affecting actual election outcomes can produce rapid change. Candidate quotas alone are less reliable: parties may formally include women while placing them in weaker positions or giving them little influence over party decisions.

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Kazakhstan’s current system raises a different problem. By grouping women, young people and persons with disabilities within one 30 percent threshold, the law allows parties considerable flexibility in deciding how that quota is filled. A list can comply with the rule without allocating any predetermined share to women.

The first party list registered in the current campaign illustrates the limitation of the available statistics. Respublica’s list contains 75 candidates, of whom 38 – 50.7 percent – collectively belong to the three quota categories. The official figure does not say how many of those 38 candidates are women.

Quotas can open doors. They do not determine what happens after women enter the institution.

They cannot guarantee committee leadership, influence over legislation or access to senior party structures. Nor can they ensure that parliamentary experience becomes a route towards executive authority.

Women ministers – but in which ministries?

The number of women in government matters, but the portfolios they receive often reveal more than the total.

Across Central Asia, female ministers and senior officials are regularly associated with education, healthcare, culture, labour, social protection, family policy and women’s affairs. These are substantial fields of government, frequently involving large budgets and responsibilities that directly affect millions of citizens.

Yet women remain much less visible in defence, interior affairs, energy, finance, infrastructure and the institutions closest to presidential decision-making.

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This reflects a wider division in political life. Women are frequently considered appropriate leaders in sectors connected to education, care, families and social welfare, while coercive power, natural resources and macroeconomic management remain overwhelmingly associated with men.

The distinction should not be used to dismiss social-policy portfolios as unimportant. Education, healthcare and social protection are central functions of the state. The question is why women’s access to government so often remains concentrated within them.

Counting ministers without examining their responsibilities can therefore produce a flattering but incomplete picture. Five women managing social portfolios do not represent the same distribution of authority as women heading finance, energy, the interior ministry or a presidential administration.

The issue is not simply how many women sit around the cabinet table. It is which parts of the state they have been entrusted to direct.

Inside local government, but rarely at its head

The divide becomes even clearer at the local level.

International comparisons usually focus on women elected to local councils. But “local government” can describe several very different positions: councillors, municipal employees, deputy mayors, village leaders, district chiefs and regional governors.

Combining them under a single percentage obscures the difference between working within an administration and controlling it.

National and Russian-language sources across Central Asia show that women are far from absent from local political life. They serve in representative councils, work throughout municipal administrations and occupy deputy positions. In some countries, women are institutionally assigned responsibility for family or gender policy within local government.

But women’s representation falls substantially at the top of the territorial hierarchy.

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In Kazakhstan, women form a large part of the public administration and are represented in local maslikhats. Yet regional akim posts and the leadership of the country’s largest cities have remained overwhelmingly male. The gap between women’s presence inside local government and their access to the post of akim is much wider than parliamentary figures alone would suggest.

The distinction is particularly important because akims are not merely local administrators. They oversee budgets, land use, development projects, public services and the implementation of presidential policy across their territories.

Kazakhstan’s gradual introduction of direct elections for rural and some district-level akims may create new routes into executive office. The Central Election Commission publishes information on elections for villages, settlements, rural districts and district-level cities, making it possible to trace the number of female candidates and winners over time.

In Uzbekistan, women hold a significant proportion of seats in local Kengashes and are systematically represented within local executives through deputy hokim positions dealing with family and women’s affairs.

This arrangement guarantees women a place within regional, district and city administrations. But it also places them in a specifically gendered field of responsibility. A female deputy hokim dealing with family policy does not exercise the same authority as the hokim responsible for the administration as a whole.

The system therefore combines inclusion with occupational segregation: women are present, but their institutional role is often defined in advance.

Kyrgyzstan presents another striking contrast. Women now occupy one third of the national parliament, but they remain considerably less visible among mayors, district akims and the heads of rural administrations. Its parliamentary success has not yet been reproduced across the territorial executive.

Tajikistan also maintains substantial female participation within public institutions and local representative bodies, while women frequently serve as deputy chairs in regional, city and district administrations. Far fewer reach the post of chair, where general executive authority is concentrated.

In Turkmenistan, women hold around one quarter of parliamentary seats and the Assembly itself is chaired by a woman. But the leadership of the country’s regions, districts and principal cities remains heavily male. Official appointments can be traced through presidential decrees and reports of government meetings, although the information is rarely consolidated into a single accessible gender breakdown.

The regional pattern is therefore not that women are simply excluded from local government.

It is that they often enter as councillors, administrators or deputies while men continue to dominate the offices that command entire territories.

How political parties imagine women

Statistics reveal where women are. Political language can reveal what parties and governments expect them to do.

Across Central Asia, official programmes regularly discuss women in connection with maternal health, family welfare, employment, small businesses, poverty reduction and protection from violence. Female entrepreneurship has become an especially common theme, combining economic participation with an image of individual responsibility that rarely challenges the wider distribution of political power.

Women appear less frequently as a political constituency whose access to decision-making should be expanded across all policy areas.

The distinction is visible in the way political documents frame women. They may be presented as:

• mothers and carers;
• entrepreneurs and workers;
• vulnerable citizens requiring protection;
• guardians of family and national values;
• beneficiaries of social programmes;
• political leaders and autonomous decision-makers.

These categories are not mutually exclusive. Family policy, childcare and social protection directly influence women’s ability to enter politics and remain in public life.

The problem arises when women’s political legitimacy is explained primarily through their family role. A programme may speak extensively about “supporting women” while saying little about candidate recruitment, party leadership, campaign finance or access to executive office.

A genuine gender-mainstreaming approach would not confine women to a dedicated section on family or social affairs. It would examine how taxation, transport, regional development, agriculture, employment policy and state budgets affect women and men differently.

The manifestos submitted for Kazakhstan’s Kurultai election will offer an immediate test. Will parties discuss women primarily as families, workers and beneficiaries, or will they set out concrete proposals concerning women’s political careers and access to decision-making?

Prominent women – and different paths to influence

Central Asia has produced several highly visible female political figures, but their careers illustrate different forms of authority.

Roza Otunbayeva remains the region’s only woman to have served as head of state. She became Kyrgyzstan’s interim president following the 2010 uprising and oversaw a constitutional transition during an exceptionally turbulent period. Her career demonstrated that a woman could reach the highest office, but it did not establish a lasting regional pattern.

Tanzila Narbaeva, chair of Uzbekistan’s Senate, represents a different route to prominence. She has held senior state positions and has become closely associated with labour, social policy and women’s rights. Her role makes her one of the region’s most institutionally prominent female politicians.

Dunyagozel Gulmanova, the speaker of Turkmenistan’s Assembly, similarly occupies one of the country’s highest formal offices. Yet the limited autonomy of Turkmenistan’s parliament makes it difficult to equate formal rank with independent political influence.

Saida Mirziyoyeva has emerged as one of Uzbekistan’s most prominent public officials through senior roles connected to the presidential administration and her visibility in areas including communications, education, culture and social policy. As the daughter of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, she also holds a distinctive position within Uzbekistan’s highly centralised presidential system. Her profile reflects both the senior institutional responsibilities she has assumed and her proximity to the executive centre.

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Her case should not be reduced either to a celebratory story of female advancement or to family ties alone. It instead illustrates how access to the highest levels of political influence in Central Asia can depend on a combination of official position, presidential confidence and proximity to the centre of power.

The region’s most visible women have reached prominence through very different paths: elections, administrative careers, parliamentary leadership, political upheaval and close association with presidential institutions.

A list of “famous women” therefore tells readers little unless it also asks where their authority comes from, what they control and whether their careers create opportunities for other women.

Beyond counting seats

Sustainable Development Goal 5 calls for women’s “full and effective participation” and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making. The wording is useful because “effective” participation cannot be measured by presence alone.

A fuller assessment must ask whether women:

• lead political parties;
• influence candidate selection;
• chair powerful parliamentary committees;
• control economic and security portfolios;
• govern regions, districts and cities;
• have access to campaign financing;
• can criticise executive policy;
• receive serious rather than gendered media coverage;
• can participate without harassment or intimidation.

It must also take account of the political environment itself.

A tightly controlled state can appoint women to senior offices while limiting the autonomy of all political actors. A more competitive system can still expose female candidates to discrimination, abuse and unequal access to resources.

Gender representation is therefore neither meaningless symbolism nor a complete measure of political openness. It is one important part of a larger political picture.

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Across Central Asia, the progress is real. Women occupy more parliamentary seats, electoral rules are beginning to alter candidate selection, and female officials have reached positions that would have been exceptional a generation ago.

But the gains are distributed unevenly.

Women are more likely to sit in a legislature than to govern a region. They are more likely to work inside a city administration than to serve as mayor. They are more likely to manage education or social policy than finance, energy or security. They are frequently praised as mothers, carers and community figures, but less often treated as unrestricted contenders for executive power.

Kazakhstan’s new Kurultai election offers a timely opportunity to observe this distinction.

The proportion of women elected on 23 August will provide one visible measure of change. The more consequential test will come later: which committees they lead, how much influence they exercise within their parties, and whether parliamentary representation becomes a route towards the institutions that command budgets, territories and strategic areas of government.

Across Central Asia, women have increasingly entered political institutions. The next question is whether those institutions are prepared to share power with them.

Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English

The post More Women in Central Asian Politics – But Where Is the Power? appeared first on Novastan English.

As Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev prepares to travel to Minsk on 8-9 July, the visit is expected to produce another series of agreements on trade, industry and regional cooperation. At first glance, it may appear to be just another bilateral meeting between two post-Soviet states. In reality, it illustrates one of the most overlooked geopolitical developments in Eurasia.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Belarus has become increasingly isolated from Europe. Political dialogue with the European Union has largely frozen, Western sanctions have multiplied, and Minsk’s dependence on Moscow has deepened. Yet while much of Europe has turned away from Belarus, Central Asia has not. On the contrary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and especially Uzbekistan have continued to strengthen political dialogue, industrial cooperation, educational exchanges and trade with Minsk.

This apparent paradox reveals much about both Belarus and Central Asia. For Brussels, Belarus has become primarily a sanctions problem and Russia’s closest ally. For Tashkent, Astana or Dushanbe, however, Belarus remains something rather different: a producer of tractors, buses and mining equipment, an engineering partner, an educational destination and a familiar interlocutor with decades of technical expertise. That difference in perception lies at the heart of Belarus’s enduring relevance across the region.

The war that changed everything – but not everything

The war in Ukraine undoubtedly transformed Belarusian foreign policy.

Before 2022, Minsk balanced relations between Russia and the West while simultaneously cultivating long-standing ties across the former Soviet space. Afterwards, its room for manoeuvre narrowed dramatically. Unable to restore normal political relations with Europe in the foreseeable future, Belarus increasingly looked east.

If the first phase after 2022 was one of survival, the second has become one of adaptation.

Read more on Novastan: The Vocabulary of Reform: Why Central Asia Is Reimagining Its Political Traditions

Central Asia has emerged as one of the principal beneficiaries of this strategic reorientation. Unlike Europe, the five Central Asian republics never sought to isolate Belarus politically. None endorsed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and several – particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – carefully defended the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet they also chose not to sever relations with Minsk.

Instead, they compartmentalised them.

Political disagreements over Ukraine did not prevent cooperation in agriculture, heavy industry, transport, education or food security. This pragmatic approach reflects the increasingly confident multi-vector diplomacy that has characterised Central Asia over the past decade.

Belarus’s comparative advantage

Unlike China, Belarus cannot finance billion-dollar infrastructure projects.

Unlike Russia, it does not provide security guarantees.

Unlike the European Union, it does not offer grants, regulatory convergence or accession prospects.

Its comparative advantage lies elsewhere.

Belarus remains one of the few post-Soviet states that preserved much of its industrial base after 1991. Companies such as MTZ, MAZ, BelAZ, Gomselmash, Bobruiskagromash and Amkodor continue to manufacture tractors, buses, heavy trucks, harvesters, mining equipment and construction machinery that remain highly competitive across Eurasia.

For Central Asian governments seeking to modernise agriculture, develop mining industries or improve municipal transport, Belarus offers something few other partners can provide: reliable industrial technologies adapted to post-Soviet realities and available at competitive prices.

In that sense, Belarus has become Eurasia’s overlooked industrial power.

Uzbekistan: from friendly relations to strategic partnership

Nowhere has Belarus’s eastern strategy been more successful than in Uzbekistan.

The relationship began to accelerate after Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in 2016 and launched sweeping economic reforms. Successive presidential visits – including Alexander Lukashenko’s trips to Tashkent and Mirziyoyev’s visits to Minsk – have transformed bilateral relations from cordial political dialogue into an increasingly comprehensive economic partnership.

Trade has expanded dramatically, approaching one billion US dollars annually, while both governments openly discuss reaching two billion dollars over the coming years.

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More importantly, cooperation has moved beyond exports.

Belarusian and Uzbek partners are developing industrial projects valued at around 800 million dollars, spanning agricultural machinery, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals and food processing. Hundreds of enterprises involving Belarusian capital now operate in Uzbekistan, making the country Belarus’s fastest-growing economic partner in Central Asia.

Preparations for Mirziyoyev’s current visit have themselves demonstrated the depth of the relationship. Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Shuleiko and Uzbekistan’s Minister of Investment, Industry and Trade Laziz Kudratov have spent recent weeks coordinating the agenda, with discussions focusing not only on bilateral trade but also on investment projects and preparations for the next Forum of Regions.

Beyond presidential diplomacy

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Belarus-Uzbekistan relations is that they are no longer centred exclusively on presidents.

The Forum of Regions, launched in 2019, has become an institutional mechanism linking provinces, municipalities, universities, chambers of commerce and businesses. Belarusian regions now cooperate directly with counterparts in Samarkand, Bukhara, Fergana and Tashkent, creating relationships that continue independently of high-level political visits.

This gradual institutionalisation distinguishes Belarus from many other external partners in Central Asia. Rather than relying solely on summit diplomacy, Minsk has invested in long-term cooperation between local authorities, universities and companies.

Kazakhstan: industrial integration

Kazakhstan remains Belarus’s largest economic partner in Central Asia.

Bilateral trade reached approximately 1.1 billion dollars in 2024, while industrial integration has become increasingly sophisticated. Rather than merely exporting machinery, Belarus has helped establish fourteen joint industrial projects worth nearly 280 million dollars, eleven of which are already operational.

Assembly plants now manufacture MTZ tractors, MAZ trucks and Gomselmash agricultural equipment within Kazakhstan itself. More than one thousand enterprises involving Belarusian participation operate across the country, supported by around 170 official Belarusian dealers.

These figures illustrate an important evolution. Belarus is no longer simply exporting products to Central Asia. Increasingly, it is participating directly in local manufacturing and industrial development.

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan: smaller economies, growing ambitions

Belarus’s engagement is no less significant in the region’s smaller economies.

In Tajikistan, cooperation has progressively shifted from trade towards manufacturing. In the Hisor district near Dushanbe, Belarusian companies assemble MTZ tractors, Gomselmash harvesters and Bobruiskagromash agricultural equipment, allowing Tajik farmers to access machinery adapted to local conditions while supporting domestic production. More than thirty Belarusian distribution companies now operate in the country, reflecting Minsk’s long-term commitment to the Tajik market.

Kyrgyzstan has likewise sought to deepen economic ties. Both governments have adopted ambitious roadmaps to increase bilateral trade, focusing on agriculture, food processing, machinery and logistics. As fellow members of the Eurasian Economic Union, Minsk and Bishkek also benefit from institutional frameworks that facilitate commercial cooperation.

Turkmenistan presents a somewhat different picture. While economic relations remain constrained by Ashgabat’s relatively closed economy, education has emerged as one of the strongest pillars of the bilateral relationship. Around 4,000 Turkmen students are estimated to study in Belarus, particularly in engineering, medicine and technical disciplines. These graduates often return home with professional networks that strengthen long-term cooperation between the two countries.

Soft power without ideology: Tradition as State Legitimacy

Unlike Russia, Türkiye or China, Belarus has never projected influence through grand geopolitical narratives.

Its soft power is considerably quieter.

It is found in universities rather than television channels, engineering schools rather than cultural institutes, and technical cooperation rather than ideological messaging.

Belarusian State University, Belarusian National Technical University and Belarusian State Medical University continue to attract students from across Central Asia, offering Russian-language education, recognised technical qualifications and comparatively affordable tuition.

For many Central Asian families, Belarus represents a practical alternative. It offers a familiar academic environment outside Russia, while maintaining close links with industries that remain highly relevant to Central Asian development.

Education therefore performs several functions simultaneously. It generates revenue for Belarusian universities, strengthens professional networks and creates generations of engineers, doctors and public officials familiar with Belarusian institutions and technologies.

This represents a distinctly Belarusian model of soft power: practical, technocratic and long-term.

Beyond tractors: exporting institutions

Tajikistan follows a different path.

Belarus is also seeking to export institutions alongside industrial products.

One telling example is the growing role of the Belarusian Universal Commodity Exchange (BUCE). In 2025, BUCE signed a cooperation agreement with Kazakhstan’s Caspiy Commodity Exchange, aiming to improve commodity trading, develop electronic trading platforms and facilitate commercial exchanges between Belarus and Central Asia.

While less visible than presidential summits, such initiatives illustrate Minsk’s efforts to integrate itself into the region’s economic architecture.

Belarus has also promoted specialised business forums, including the Belarus-Central Asia Economic Forum held in Brest in 2026, bringing together companies interested in expanding into Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

Such initiatives demonstrate that Belarus’s eastern engagement is becoming increasingly institutionalised rather than remaining dependent upon political goodwill alone.

A different understanding of Eurasia

Ultimately, however, this story is not simply about Belarus.

It is about Central Asia.

For more than three decades, the region has refined what is often described as a multi-vector foreign policy. Rather than aligning exclusively with one geopolitical centre, Central Asian governments seek productive relations with multiple partners simultaneously.

Russia remains indispensable in security matters.

Read more on Novastan: “I only needed a passport” : In Ukraine, Central Asian prisoners of wars caught between loyalty and regret

China has become the region’s principal economic partner and infrastructure investor.

Türkiye has significantly expanded its cultural, educational and political presence.

The European Union offers investment, regulatory cooperation and connectivity through initiatives such as the Global Gateway.

Japan and South Korea remain valued partners in technology and industrial development.

Belarus occupies a different niche.

It neither competes with these actors nor seeks to replace them. Instead, it provides industrial expertise, engineering education, agricultural technology and manufacturing partnerships that complement rather than challenge Central Asia’s broader foreign policy strategy.

This helps explain why relations have continued to deepen despite the war in Ukraine.

Central Asian governments have not ignored Belarus’s international isolation. They have simply concluded that practical cooperation remains in their national interest.

Looking east

As Shavkat Mirziyoyev arrives in Minsk, observers will understandably focus on the agreements signed, the trade figures announced and the diplomatic symbolism of the visit.

Yet its broader significance lies elsewhere.

The visit reflects the emergence of a Eurasia whose political geography no longer corresponds neatly to the map of sanctions.

While Europe has largely distanced itself from Belarus, Central Asia has continued to engage it through industry, education, agriculture, regional diplomacy and technical cooperation.

This does not mean that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan or their neighbours have chosen Belarus over Europe, or Russia over the West. Quite the opposite. Their continued engagement with Minsk illustrates the essence of multi-vector diplomacy: the refusal to view international relations as a zero-sum choice between competing blocs.

Read more on Novastan: Money, boxes and absent men: the hidden economy reshaping Central Asia

For Belarus, Central Asia has become an increasingly important diplomatic and economic outlet at a time when options elsewhere have narrowed. For Central Asia, Belarus remains a useful partner whose industrial capabilities, educational institutions and technical expertise continue to meet concrete national needs.

The geography of sanctions, it turns out, is not the geography of diplomacy.

Belarus did not escape isolation after 2022. But it has worked to avoid irrelevance. By looking east, Minsk has found not a substitute for Europe, but a region willing to judge it less by geopolitical alignment than by practical cooperation. And in an increasingly fragmented international order, that may prove to be one of the most consequential shifts in Eurasian diplomacy that few outside the region have noticed.

Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English

The post Minsk’s Eastern Bet: Why Central Asia Matters More Than Ever appeared first on Novastan English.

From Kazakhstan’s Kurultai to Uzbekistan’s Mahalla, governments across Central Asia are increasingly framing political reform through institutions rooted in local history rather than imported political models.

For much of the three decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, discussions about political reform in Central Asia were conducted using a familiar international vocabulary. Elections, constitutions, political parties, decentralisation, civil society and good governance became the dominant language through which both governments and international organisations described political development.

Also read on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s Next Elections: Between Reform and Managed Competition

Increasingly, however, another vocabulary is emerging.

Across the region, governments are reviving concepts such as the Kurultai, the Mahalla, the Halk Maslahaty and councils of elders. These institutions are rarely presented as alternatives to constitutional government. Rather, they are increasingly portrayed as ways of making governance more legitimate, more participatory and more deeply rooted in national history.

This raises an important question. Are Central Asian governments simply giving traditional names to modern institutions? Or are they gradually developing a distinct political vocabulary through which reform itself is imagined?

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Political reform is not only about changing institutions. It is also about changing the language through which those institutions are understood and legitimised.

Beyond Imported Models

All political systems derive legitimacy from history as much as from law. France invokes the Revolution and the Republic. Britain draws upon Parliament and Magna Carta. The United States continues to frame politics through the language of its Founding Fathers.

Central Asia is increasingly doing the same.

Rather than presenting reform exclusively through concepts inherited from the Soviet period or borrowed from international governance discourse, governments across the region increasingly anchor their legitimacy in historical narratives that resonate more directly with domestic political traditions.

This does not necessarily represent a rejection of constitutionalism or modern statehood. Instead, it reflects an attempt to reconcile contemporary governance with locally meaningful historical references.

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Kazakhstan: The Kurultai and the Listening State

Kazakhstan perhaps best illustrates this evolution.

Since the January 2022 events, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has promoted the idea of a “Listening State”, constitutional reform and the National Kurultai as central elements of the “New Kazakhstan”. Alongside referendums, electoral reform and strengthened consultative mechanisms, the Kurultai has become part of a broader effort to redefine how political authority is presented.

The Kurultai is neither a parliament nor an opposition forum. Rather, it functions as a consultative platform bringing together selected representatives of public life, academics, experts and civil society to deliberate on questions of national identity, reform and long-term development.

Whether viewed as meaningful consultation or carefully managed participation, the Kurultai illustrates an important point. It seeks legitimacy not only through elections or representative institutions, but also through an institution whose historical roots reach back to the political culture of the Eurasian steppe.

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Uzbekistan: The Mahalla Between Community and State

Uzbekistan offers a different but equally important example through the Mahalla.

Often translated simply as a neighbourhood community, the Mahalla is in practice much more than a local tradition. It plays a role in social assistance to families in need, neighbourhood mediation, community mobilisation, welfare delivery and the administrative interface between citizens and the state, including in sensitive areas such as the registration and monitoring of religious communities.

It also intervenes in family life, including disputes concerning marriage, divorce and domestic violence. In many cases, Mahalla-level mediation provides rapid community support. Yet it has also been criticised for encouraging reconciliation in situations of gender-based violence, discouraging divorce or prioritising family cohesion over the protection and autonomy of women experiencing abuse.

Under the banner of the “New Uzbekistan”, the Mahalla has been presented not as a relic of the past but as a cornerstone of modern governance. Its strength lies precisely in this dual nature: deeply embedded in everyday community life while simultaneously serving as an important interface between society and the state.

Kyrgyzstan: Contesting the Meaning of the Kurultai

If Kazakhstan presents the Kurultai as a consultative institution, Kyrgyzstan illustrates how the same historical concept can become an object of democratic contestation.

Successive debates over the People’s Kurultai have revolved around fundamental constitutional questions. Should it merely advise elected institutions? Should it exercise oversight? Does it strengthen democratic participation or risk creating a parallel source of political legitimacy?

Rather than providing definitive answers, Kyrgyzstan demonstrates that historical institutions themselves become arenas of political debate when adapted to modern constitutional systems.

Turkmenistan: Tradition as State Legitimacy

Turkmenistan represents perhaps the most institutionalised version of this regional tendency.

The Halk Maslahaty, together with councils of elders and the symbolic authority of aksakals, presents political authority through the language of continuity, wisdom and national consensus. These institutions are not designed as arenas of political competition. Instead, they frame presidential authority within narratives of collective consultation and historical legitimacy.

Their significance therefore lies less in electoral politics than in the symbolic vocabulary through which political authority is justified.

Tajikistan: Statehood, Unity and the Persianate Legacy

Tajikistan follows a different path.

Its political vocabulary is less centred on Turkic or nomadic traditions than on national unity, statehood and the Persianate cultural heritage. References to the Samanid dynasty, the Tajik language and the country’s civil war increasingly serve to anchor contemporary political authority within a narrative of historical continuity and national resilience.

At the local level, elders and community mediation continue to play important social roles. While these traditions are not usually presented as formal instruments of political reform, they nevertheless perform a similar function: linking governance to ideas of continuity, cohesion and collective identity.

A Region Reimagining Its Past

Taken together, these examples suggest a broader regional phenomenon.

Central Asia is not abandoning elections, constitutions or representative institutions. Nor is it simply returning to pre-modern forms of governance.

Instead, governments are increasingly combining modern constitutional structures with institutions, concepts and symbols drawn from selectively reinterpreted historical traditions. The result is neither a rejection of international governance norms nor a simple revival of the past. It is a process of institutional hybridisation.

Also read on Novastan: Dead in the Water: Has the Common Turkic Alphabet Failed to Boost Turkish Influence in Central Asia?

This trend also intersects with a wider romanticisation of Turkic, steppe and nomadic heritage. Institutions such as the Kurultai or the authority of aksakals are often presented as evidence of an ancient political culture rooted in consultation, consensus and collective wisdom. Such narratives can offer valuable alternatives to the assumption that political modernity must always be expressed through imported institutional models. Yet they also carry risks. Complex historical realities can be simplified into reassuring myths, while diverse and sometimes hierarchical political traditions become reimagined as timeless expressions of participatory governance.

Türkiye’s recent decision to replace “Central Asia” with “Turkestan” in parts of its school curriculum reflects this wider intellectual shift. Increasingly, the region is being described through historical and cultural concepts associated with the Turkic world rather than Soviet-era geography or externally imposed terminology. Whether one views this as decolonisation, cultural revival or geopolitical symbolism, it illustrates the growing importance of historical narratives in shaping contemporary political identities.

More Than Words

The emergence of this vocabulary reflects deeper transformations.

A generation with little or no memory of the Soviet Union has reached adulthood. Nation-building has entered a more mature phase. Governments increasingly seek legitimacy not only through economic development or institutional reform but also through narratives that resonate with national history and collective identity.

This does not mean these institutions necessarily produce more accountable governance. Traditional concepts can broaden participation, but they may also reinforce hierarchy, exclude dissenting voices or provide new symbolic foundations for existing power structures.

The question facing Central Asia is therefore not whether it is returning to its past. It is not. Nor is it simply reproducing Western constitutional models. Increasingly, the region appears to be constructing something in between: modern states that seek legitimacy through institutions inspired as much by their own historical narratives as by international governance norms.

Whether these hybrid models ultimately strengthen accountability, broaden participation or merely repackage existing political authority remains an open question. What is already clear, however, is that Central Asia is no longer only reforming its institutions. It is also reinventing the language through which political legitimacy itself is imagined.

Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English

The post The Vocabulary of Reform: Why Central Asia Is Reimagining Its Political Traditions appeared first on Novastan English.

Kazakhstan’s next parliamentary elections are unlikely to determine who governs the country. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s political dominance is not seriously in question. Yet the vote matters because it will test something arguably more significant: whether the “New Kazakhstan” launched after the January 2022 crisis is gradually producing a more representative political system, or merely refining the mechanisms through which political participation is organised and managed.

The elections should therefore not be viewed in isolation. They are the latest stage in a broader political sequence that has included the 2022 constitutional referendum, early presidential and parliamentary elections, the institutionalisation of the National Kurultai, the expansion of direct local elections, and the 2024 referendum on the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant.

Taken together, these developments illustrate Tokayev’s attempt to redefine the political rules of the “New Kazakhstan”: more consultation, broader participation and renewed institutional legitimacy, but without embracing unconstrained political competition. Rather than dismantling the existing political model, the reforms seek to recalibrate it.

Also read on Novastan: Tokayev’s new term: Central Election Commission announces final results of Kazakh presidential election

The constitutional referendum of June 2022 marked the beginning of this new political cycle. It reduced elements of the institutional legacy associated with former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, restored the Constitutional Court, modified the electoral system for the Mazhilis and reintroduced a mixed electoral model combining proportional representation with single-member constituencies. The electoral threshold for parliamentary representation was lowered from seven to five percent, while party lists became subject to quotas requiring the inclusion of women, young people and persons with disabilities.

These reforms gave the 2023 parliamentary elections a more pluralistic appearance than previous contests. Six parties entered the Mazhilis: Amanat, Auyl, Respublica, Aq Jol, the People’s Party of Kazakhstan and the National Social Democratic Party. Baytaq, a newly registered environmental party, also participated but failed to cross the electoral threshold. The return of single-member constituencies enabled independent candidates and locally known figures to compete, reintroducing a territorial and personal dimension that had largely disappeared under the previous fully proportional system.

Each of these parties also illustrates a different facet of Kazakhstan’s evolving political landscape. Amanat remains the country’s dominant political force, while Aq Jol continues to position itself as a business-oriented party. Auyl focuses primarily on rural development and agricultural interests, Respublica has sought to appeal to younger entrepreneurs and business circles, and the National Social Democratic Party remains the closest actor to a traditional parliamentary opposition. Baytaq’s participation, despite failing to enter parliament, reflected the growing visibility of environmental issues within Kazakhstan’s public debate.

Also read on Novastan: Kazakhstan: The Blurred Record of the January 2022 Unrest

Yet the political playing field remained highly asymmetrical. Amanat retained a commanding majority, while newer and smaller parties continued to operate within an institutional environment shaped by presidential authority, administrative resources and limited opposition capacity. The central question was therefore not whether Kazakhstan had become a fully competitive democracy, but whether the reforms had genuinely widened the space for political representation.

The National Kurultai is perhaps the clearest illustration of Tokayev’s broader political philosophy. Neither a parliament, nor an opposition forum, nor a conventional civil society assembly, it serves as a consultative platform bringing together selected public figures, academics, experts and representatives of society to discuss questions of national identity, reform, social cohesion and long-term development.

Supporters view the Kurultai as an attempt to broaden consultation and strengthen dialogue between state and society. Critics argue that its participants, agenda and political boundaries remain largely determined from above. Yet its significance lies less in the decisions it produces than in what it reveals about the model of governance that is emerging. Rather than encouraging adversarial politics, the Kurultai reflects a preference for structured consultation within institutions designed and convened by the presidency itself.

Political participation has also expanded below the national level. The gradual introduction of direct elections for district and rural akims, alongside efforts to strengthen local representative bodies, has created new arenas of political competition and accountability. Although these reforms remain limited and continue to operate within a highly centralised political system, they nevertheless provide opportunities for greater citizen engagement and have contributed to a more diverse local political landscape.

The October 2024 referendum on the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant reinforced many of these dynamics. Formally, citizens were asked to decide whether the world’s largest producer of uranium should embark upon a new stage in its energy strategy. The official result – a clear majority in favour – strengthened the government’s mandate for the project. At the same time, the campaign revived familiar debates concerning unequal access to media, pressure on critics and the limited capacity of organised opposition to compete on equal terms. The referendum illustrated Tokayev’s willingness to seek public legitimacy for major strategic decisions while maintaining firm control over the broader political environment.

Civil society has also evolved since 2022. Although important restrictions remain, Kazakhstan today possesses a more diverse ecosystem of public councils, expert communities, civic initiatives and domestic election observers than a decade ago. Online debate has become more visible, and specialised organisations increasingly contribute to discussions on public policy, governance and social issues. The extent to which these actors can influence decision-making remains contested, but they form part of the broader institutional landscape that will shape the forthcoming elections.

Also read on Novastan: What lies beneath Central Asia? Rare earths, critical minerals and the new race for resources

These domestic reforms also have an international dimension. As Kazakhstan continues to pursue its multi-vector foreign policy while deepening cooperation with partners including the European Union, China, Türkiye and the Gulf states, demonstrating gradual political modernisation has become part of the country’s diplomatic positioning. Electoral reform is therefore not only a domestic governance issue, but also an element of Kazakhstan’s international image as a stable, reform-oriented middle power.

This is the central paradox of Kazakhstan’s current political evolution. The state has undeniably expanded the repertoire of participation through constitutional reform, referendums, direct local elections, single-member constituencies, public consultation mechanisms and the National Kurultai. Yet participation remains carefully channelled, institutionally managed and politically bounded.

That is why the next parliamentary elections matter. Not because they are likely to produce a dramatic alternation of power, but because they will provide another indication of how this evolving political model functions in practice. Will single-member constituencies produce genuinely accountable local representatives? Can parties such as Respublica, Aq Jol, Auyl or the National Social Democratic Party develop into authentic vehicles for social interests rather than primarily institutional actors? Will new political movements, including those focused on environmental, regional or generational concerns, establish a more durable presence within Kazakhstan’s political system?

Equally important will be the quality of the electoral process itself: candidate registration, campaign conditions, access to the media, the work of election commissions, complaints and appeals procedures, domestic election observation and the ability of civil society to participate freely in public debate.

Also read on Novastan: In Kazakhstan, the futuristic city of “Alatau” reaches a new milestone with special status

Kazakhstan has undoubtedly changed since January 2022. The political system inherited from the Nazarbayev era has evolved, introducing new institutions and expanding opportunities for participation. Yet the “New Kazakhstan” remains an unfinished political project, balancing reform with continuity, consultation with control, stability with accountability.

Whether this trajectory ultimately produces a genuinely more competitive political system remains uncertain. What is already clear, however, is that Kazakhstan is no longer seeking legitimacy solely through promises of stability and economic development. Increasingly, it also seeks legitimacy through institutional reform, managed political participation and structured consultation. The next parliamentary elections will therefore be less a verdict on the government than another measure of how far the “New Kazakhstan” can evolve while preserving the political model on which it continues to rest.

Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English

The post Kazakhstan’s Next Elections: Between Reform and Managed Competition appeared first on Novastan English.

Few works of literature are as politically alive as the Kyrgyz epic Manas. It is not simply an old poem, nor only a heroic tale recited by specialists. In Kyrgyzstan, Manas is a national reference point, a school subject, a monument, an airport name, a political symbol and a language of identity. It tells the story of a people gathering around a hero, but it also helps explain how modern Kyrgyzstan imagines itself: independent, mountainous, resilient, threatened from outside, and always searching for unity.

A story too large to stay in the past

The origins of Manas are difficult to date precisely because the epic was transmitted orally for centuries before being written down. Kyrgyz tradition often presents it as a very ancient work, sometimes linked to events of the ninth or tenth century; Western scholarship has been more cautious, pointing out that the earliest references are much later and that parts of the plot may reflect political realities from later centuries. In 1995, four years after independence, Kyrgyzstan turned Manas into a state-building event: the UN General Assembly formally recognized the year as the millennium commemoration of the Kyrgyz national epic.

What is certain is that Manas belongs to a living oral tradition. It was performed by manaschi, epic reciters who chant the story without musical accompaniment and who are respected not just as performers, but as carriers of memory. UNESCO describes the trilogy of Manas, Semetey and Seytek as a work that expresses the historical memory of the Kyrgyz people and tells of the unification of scattered tribes into one nation.

What the epic is about

At its core, Manas is a heroic epic about unity, warfare, migration, leadership and survival. The central figure, Manas, is a warrior who gathers and defends the Kyrgyz people against powerful enemies. The wider trilogy continues through his son Semetey and grandson Seytek, turning the story into a multi-generational saga of struggle, succession, loyalty, betrayal and renewal. The trilogy is a narrative about Manas’ uniting the forty scattered Kyrgyz tribes against attacks by powerful neighbours and leading his people through the Altai and toward the Alai region.

Also read on Novastan: « Manastchy » : l’âme kirghize dans toute sa poésie

The epic is enormous, but its political grammar is clear: a people survive when they unite; a leader is legitimate when he protects the community; enemies are both external and internal; and identity is forged through memory, sacrifice and struggle. This is why Manas is not read merely as literature. It is often treated as a national code.

Why Manas matters so much to Kyrgyz people

For Kyrgyz people, Manas is important because it offers a deep narrative of origins and continuity. It links modern Kyrgyz identity to a heroic past, to nomadic culture, to the mountains, to clan memory and to the idea of unity among the “forty tribes”, a motif also echoed in the forty rays of the Kyrgyz flag. This matters especially because Kyrgyzstan, like other post-Soviet states, had to build a national story after 1991. Manas offered something older than the Soviet Union and broader than a modern state border. It gave independent Kyrgyzstan a heroic genealogy, a cultural anchor and a language of sovereignty. In a young state marked by regional divisions, political upheaval and economic vulnerability, the epic’s promise of unity has remained attractive.

Manas in school and education

Yes, Manas is studied in Kyrgyzstan. It appears in school education and in higher education through literature, cultural history and “Manas studies” or Manasovedenie. In schools with the Kyrgyz-language teaching Manas is studied in eighth grade, in schools with the Russian-language teaching – in ninth grades and the eleventh grade in courses on Manas studies.

The epic is also used more broadly as a source of moral and civic education. Research on Kyrgyz education links Manas to the upbringing of schoolchildren and youth, especially through themes of cultural heritage, wisdom, moral values and national identity. At university level, the University of Central Asia has offered a “Manas Studies” course examining the epic’s role in the formation and development of Kyrgyz society and national identity.

Also read on Novastan: Le président kirghiz a signé le décret pour renommer Djalal-Abad en Manas

This educational presence is important politically. Teaching Manas is not just about preserving folklore. It is about shaping citizens through a national story.

Manas in everyday life

In Kyrgyzstan, Manas is everywhere. It appears in statues, street names, school lessons, cultural festivals, public ceremonies, tourism branding, official speeches and national iconography. Performances by manaschi remain part of social gatherings, celebrations and ceremonies. Traditional Manas performances take place at social gatherings, community celebrations and ceremonies, preserving the practice as a living form rather than a museum object.

The epic is also physically present in Bishkek. The statue of Manas on Ala-Too Square places the hero at the symbolic centre of the capital. Streets, institutions and cultural initiatives carry his name. Bishkek’s main airport was named “Manas” at the suggestion of Chinghiz Aitmatov, in honour of the hero of the Kyrgyz national epic. Manas functions as the country’s most recognisable national symbol. Even people who have never read or heard the full epic know Manas as the emblem of Kyrgyz strength, unity and sovereignty.

The political uses of Manas

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Manas acquired a new political function. Kyrgyzstan was no longer a Soviet republic but an independent state, and nation-building had to reconcile two potentially competing ideas: Kyrgyz ethnic identity and citizenship in a multi-ethnic country. For ethnic Kyrgyz, independence meant becoming the titular people of a sovereign state. For many Russians, Uzbeks, Germans, Jews and other minorities, it could also create a sense of sudden displacement within a country they had long considered home.

President Askar Akayev therefore used Manas carefully. He presented the epic as a unifying source of national values, but avoided turning it into an openly exclusionary ethnic ideology. This was politically important after the Kyrgyz-Uzbek clashes in the Ferghana Valley and amid fears that Russians, Germans and Jews would leave the country in large numbers. Drawing on the Soviet-era recognition of Manas as cultural heritage, Akayev promoted seven principles inspired by the epic as a basis for independent Kyrgyzstan’s national ideology. These principles softened the epic’s more divisive themes, including ethnic conflict, religious antagonism and hostility toward China, and instead emphasised ethnic pride, friendship among nationalities, hard work, respect for nature, humanism, nobility and forgiveness.

Also read on Novastan: L’épopée de « Manas » : encyclopédie de l’histoire et des mœurs kirghizes

This political use has continued in different forms. After 2010, the promotion of Manas intensified partly because of heritage politics, including concern over China’s 2009 UNESCO inscription of the Manas tradition associated with Kyrgyz communities in China. More recently, Manas has returned as a tool of state symbolism under President Sadyr Japarov. In September 2025, Japarov signed a law renaming Jalal-Abad, Kyrgyzstan’s third-largest city, as Manas. 

This is where the epic becomes current affairs. Invoking Manas allows political leaders to wrap infrastructure, centralisation, regional development, sovereignty and national unity in heroic language. It can inspire cohesion, but it can also serve as political theatre: a way to claim legitimacy by presenting contemporary decisions as continuations of an ancient national mission.

A national epic, but also a political risk

The political power of Manas lies in its flexibility. It can be used to promote unity in a divided country, cultural pride in a globalised world, and sovereignty in a region shaped by Russian, Chinese and broader geopolitical influence. But the same flexibility can also narrow public debate.

When leaders invoke Manas, they borrow the authority of the nation’s deepest cultural symbol. That can make ordinary political choices appear sacred or inevitable. A city renaming, a state-building project, a moral campaign or a geopolitical message can be presented not merely as policy, but as loyalty to ancestral memory.

Also read on Novastan: Un conteur récite l’épopée de Manas pendant plus de 14 heures pour battre le record du monde

This is the double edge of Manas. As an epic, it preserves a people’s imagination. As a political symbol, it can elevate power above criticism.

Why Manas still matters today

Manas remains valid today because Kyrgyzstan still faces many of the questions the epic dramatises: how to hold a diverse society together, how to defend sovereignty between larger powers, how to balance regional identities, how to define leadership, and how to transform memory into a future rather than a museum.

Also read on Novastan: Manas, de la tradition orale au jeu vidéo

The epic’s message of unity is still powerful, especially in a country with strong regional identities and a history of political upheaval. Its warnings are also still relevant. Manas shows that unity cannot be reduced to slogans. It depends on justice, loyalty, wise leadership and the ability to hold a community together without erasing its differences.

That is why Manas should be read not only as a monument of Kyrgyz culture, but as a living political text. It is the story Kyrgyzstan tells about where it comes from. It is also one of the languages through which power in Kyrgyzstan still explains where the country should go.

Maya Ivanova for Novastan

The post Manas and the Making of Kyrgyzstan appeared first on Novastan English.

On 10 February, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov dismissed Kamchybek Tashiev, head of the State Committee for National Security, or GKNB, and a central figure in power for several years. His removal, followed by dismissals targeting those close to him in several institutions, brings an end to an alliance that had structured Kyrgyzstan’s political-security apparatus.

The ruling tandem that had dominated Kyrgyzstan for more than five years has finally cracked. On 10 February, by dismissing Kamchybek Tashiev, head of the State Committee for National Security, by decree, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov did not merely end a long-standing collaboration with his closest ally. He also regained control of the coercive apparatus that had until then been one of the pillars of the system established since he came to power in 2020.

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For more than five years, Kamchybek Tashiev had been the most powerful man in Kyrgyzstan after the president, overseeing the main anti-corruption investigations. He appeared publicly during spectacular arrests and embodied an increasingly omnipresent security apparatus. A co-founder of the Mekentchil party and a key actor in the political upheavals that brought the tandem to the top of the state, he had gradually turned the security services into a pillar of the regime. In a political system marked by the personalisation of power, his influence extended far beyond the institutional framework of his position.

Under his leadership, the GKNB became one of the nerve centres of the state. Its prerogatives expanded, its resources increased and its visibility grew. Internal promotions, the allocation of housing to officers, nepotism and direct interventions in the management of sensitive economic cases: Kamchybek Tashiev had gradually built a network of authority and loyalty that structured the regime’s balance.

Kamchybek Tashiev, security architect of Sadyr Japarov’s regime

Kamchybek Tashiev began his political career in 2007 as minister of emergency situations. After disagreements with former Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov, he left his post in 2009, before siding with the opposition during the Kyrgyz revolution of 2010. These events enabled him to found his party, Ata-Zhurt, in 2006, and to win the early parliamentary elections of 10 October 2010 with 15.89% of the vote and 28 seats.

He thus returned to political life as a member of Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council from 2010 to 2013. In 2014, Ata-Jurt merged with Respublika in an attempt to win the 2015 parliamentary elections, but this merger displeased Kamchybek Tashiev, who left the party and joined Mekenchil, which he had co-founded with Sadyr Japarov on 16 June 2010 and which brought together many members of Ata-Jurt.

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The parliamentary elections of 4 October 2020 once again turned into a conflict extending beyond the political sphere, with major demonstrations from 5 to 15 October 2020. Amid this new socio-political chaos, former Prime Minister Sadyr Japarov and his supporters, including Kamchybek Tashiev, increased pressure on former President Sooronbay Jeenbekov, who resigned on 15 October 2020. As a result, Sadyr Japarov became acting president and appointed Kamchybek Tashiev head of the GKNB on 16 October that year.

Also read on Novastan : Condamnation d’Almazbek Atambaïev : retour sur le parcours mouvementé des anciens présidents du Kirghizstan

His influence was also visible during the border clashes with Tajikistan in April 2021 and September 2022. As head of the GKNB, the body overseeing the border guards, Kamchybek Tashiev played a central role in managing operations and ceasefire negotiations. These crises strengthened his image as a strongman guaranteeing Kyrgyzstan’s territorial integrity.

Dismantling extended to several institutions

Tashiev’s departure has been accompanied by a wider reorganisation. Within the GKNB itself, his deputies for state security were removed, and a new acting head was appointed without delay.

President Japarov then stated that an Investigative Committee would be created and would report directly to the president, while the GKNB’s area of competence would be reduced. The agency will henceforth focus on intelligence, counterintelligence, counterterrorism and organised crime, Radio Azattyq noted. “It is necessary to depoliticise the State Committee for National Security and free it from the influence of political parties, ideologies and various stakeholders,” assured Jumgalbek Shabdanbekov, the new GKNB chief appointed on 19 February, in an interview with the local newspaper Vecherny Bishkek.

But the reshuffle goes far beyond the security apparatus alone. The minister of natural resources, ecology and technical supervision, Meder Mashiev, as well as his deputy minister, Bolot Jusupbekov, were dismissed. In the south of the country, considered Tashiev’s electoral stronghold, mayors, notably in Osh and Manas, are being replaced.

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Even more significantly, people directly close to Kamchybek Tashiev have been targeted. While the parliamentary mandate of his brother, Shaiyrbek Tashiev, has not so far been called into question despite rumours of dismissal, the head of the transport prosecutor’s office, Nurgazy Matisakov, who is Tashiev’s nephew, has been removed. These decisions reflect a desire to neutralise not only one figure, but an entire family and political network.

A shift ahead of the presidential election

This rupture comes one year before the 2027 presidential election, in a climate marked by criticism of the economic and energy situation, as well as by a petition calling for an early vote.

Also read on Novastan : Le Kirghizstan s’inquiète d’une crise énergétique majeure cet hiver

Presidential statements, however, have sought to ease tensions. On 13 February, the head of state told the state news agency Kabar that there was no division between his supporters and those of his former ally, assuring that his “friendship with Kamchybek Tashiev will continue”. A few days later, he added: “We remain friends. But he will not resume public office. He needs to rest and focus on his health.”

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The end of the tandem between Sadyr Japarov and Kamchybek Tashiev thus marks a phase of increased concentration of power in the hands of the presidency. It remains to be seen whether this centralisation will durably strengthen the stability of Kyrgyzstan’s system, or whether it will reveal new fault lines within the political elites.

Lenny Cabrol Noto
Contributor for Novastan

Thank you for reading this article! If you have time, we would appreciate your feedback, either through this anonymous form or by email at editorial@novastan.org. Thank you very much!

The post In Kyrgyzstan, after the dismissal of the GKNB chief, the political-security apparatus is reshuffled appeared first on Novastan English.

The visit to Bishkek on 26 February by EU sanctions envoy David O’Sullivan reflects the European Union’s tougher stance on the circumvention of sanctions targeting Russia in the region. Kyrgyzstan could thus become the first country targeted by heavy counter-sanctions from Brussels.

Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Central Asia has become a strategic link in parallel trade flows allowing Russia to keep its economy afloat. Faced with this situation, the European Union is sharply toughening its tone, placing Kyrgyzstan on the front line of its new pressure strategy.

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Bishkek’s role as a re-export platform is now documented. Analyses show a surge in Kyrgyz imports from China, notably trucks, components and industrial parts, which are then re-exported to the Russian market.

According to internal European Commission documents cited by Kazakh media outlet Kursiv, imports of so-called “priority” goods, often dual-use civilian and military products, from the European Union to Kyrgyzstan have increased by around 800% since 2022. Over the same period, Kyrgyz exports to Russia have jumped by around 1,200%, fuelling suspicions of re-export to the Russian market.

This circuit allows Moscow to bypass Western restrictions, while undermining international rules on trade transparency.

Activation of the “anti-circumvention” tool

For the first time, Brussels is considering deploying its most coercive instrument: the sanctions anti-circumvention tool. This mechanism, which would be part of a twentieth sanctions package – delayed by Hungary’s veto – would make it possible to ban the export of certain products to a third country without having to provide irrefutable proof of their re-export, as reported by Reuters.

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The targeted measures could include export bans on industrial machine tools, including CNC machines, and radio equipment, as well as action against the financial sector. A Kyrgyz cryptocurrency company is reportedly under scrutiny for allegedly supporting financial interests linked to Russia.

Discussions are focused instead on targeted measures, Radio Free Europe explains, such as listing Kyrgyz companies or financial institutions if they facilitate the circumvention of restrictions against Moscow.

A major diplomatic crisis

This Western pressure is considerably straining relations between the EU and Bishkek, at a time when the country is also trying to move closer to the United States. David O’Sullivan, the EU’s special envoy for sanctions, personally urged the local authorities to change their policy.

“We are not asking Kyrgyzstan not to have trade relations with Russia. We are only asking that this trade relationship not involve the deliberate circumvention of our sanctions,” he stressed during his visit to Bishkek on 26 February.

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Kyrgyzstan’s response has so far been direct, according to sources quoted by the British daily Financial Times: the country reportedly threatened to take the European Union to international courts if such sanctions were imposed. These allegations were immediately denied by the Kyrgyz government, local media outlet 24.kg reported in early March.

Roman Fuster
Contributor for Novastan

Thank you for reading this article! If you have time, we would appreciate your feedback, either through this anonymous form or by email at editorial@novastan.org. Thank you very much!

The post Kyrgyzstan in the EU’s sights for the twentieth sanctions package against Russia appeared first on Novastan English.

A recent report by a UN group reveals that the Taliban have sharply reduced the number of their security forces, disproportionately so in the region bordering Tajikistan. These budget cuts coincide with a resurgence of attacks along the border between the two countries. These developments are helping to reshape the previously strained relations between Kabul and Dushanbe.

Haibatullah Akhundzada, Afghanistan’s de facto leader, has ordered a 20% reduction in the number of security forces in response to budgetary constraints. This is according to a report by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, submitted to the UN Security Council Committee last December.

However, these staff reductions are disproportionate near the border with Tajikistan. According to the document, out of more than 4,000 commanders and officers dismissed nationwide, around 1,000 were in Badakhshan province, which borders Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region.

Takhar, another province bordering Tajikistan’s Khatlon region, is also among the three other provinces most affected by the measure. These security force cuts, ordered last April, coincided with a resurgence of armed clashes linked to drug trafficking at the border in late 2025. On 26 and 30 November, five Chinese workers were killed and the same number injured on Tajikistani soil in attacks launched from Afghanistan, while two Tajik officers and three attackers were killed on 23 December, according to media outlet Asia-Plus.

A resurgence of border clashes in late 2025

Since then, Taliban representatives have issued several statements of support, accusing “ill-intentioned circles” or “enemies” of seeking to undermine Afghanistan’s relations with Tajikistan and China. Indeed, it is certain that these attacks were not carried out by the Taliban. They have even said they arrested suspects in the border region, without providing details, according to Afghan media outlet Tolo News.

Also read on Novastan : Au Tadjikistan, la mort de cinq Chinois relance les inquiétudes sur l’instabilité à la frontière avec l’Afghanistan

The motives of those behind the attacks are difficult to determine. In the case of the most recent attack, which killed Tajik officers, Afghan media outlet Hasht-e Subh claims that the attackers were members of Jamaat Ansarullah, a terrorist group based in Afghanistan, hostile to the Tajik government and mainly made up of Tajik citizens.

In the case of the attacks against Chinese workers, uncertainty remains. For researcher Mélanie Sadozaï, affiliated with the University of Regensburg’s Department of Interdisciplinary and Multiscalar Area Studies, whose research focuses on the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border, it is impossible to accuse any specific armed group with certainty. Interviewed by Novastan, she suggests that the attacks may have been retaliation by “drug traffickers who do not want China to be present, as this could disrupt their activities”.

“One cannot rule out either that these were ordinary people rejecting China’s activities in the region, as China extracts mineral resources under bilateral agreements with Tajikistan and Afghanistan,” Mélanie Sadozaï continues. “People are well aware that Chinese companies come to ‘plunder’ their resources without redistributing them. It could also be an act of revenge, but again, it is difficult to say,” she adds.

A new forced cooperation

In this context, a reduction in Taliban personnel responsible for maintaining order at the border can only be viewed negatively on the Tajikistani side, as relations between the two countries have taken a new turn in recent months.

After the Taliban seized power in 2021, Tajikistan positioned itself as Afghanistan’s only neighbour openly hostile to Kabul’s new rulers. While other neighbouring countries quickly adopted a pragmatic stance and, without officially recognising the Taliban, maintained ties with them for economic reasons, Tajikistan has continued to stand apart.

Also read on Novastan : L’Afghanistan taliban, un faisceau de menaces sur les pays d’Asie centrale

But open hostility is now turning into forced cooperation. Barely two weeks before the attacks against the Chinese workers, a Tajikistani delegation visited Kabul to meet its counterparts and discuss counterterrorism cooperation, the fight against drug trafficking and the porous shared border, Tolo News reported. Similarly, the governors of Afghanistan’s Balkh and Badakhshan provinces had travelled respectively to the Tajikistani capital, Dushanbe, and to Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan region, although these visits were not publicised.

The latest attacks have accelerated this rapprochement at the highest level: for the first time since 2021, the foreign ministers of Tajikistan and Afghanistan held phone calls, with two taking place in December, Asia-Plus reported.

The political impossibility of recognising the Taliban

The Tajikistani authorities delayed this moment for as long as they could, and are now trying to find a way out of this diplomatic impasse. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has long presented himself as a bulwark against religious extremism: real diplomatic contact with the Taliban would be difficult to legitimise, both within Tajikistan and abroad.

Emomali Rahmon’s clear stance against the Taliban and his support for the Afghan opposition in exile earned him invitations to the European Parliament and to France shortly after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, helping to ensure the continuation of international financial assistance on which Tajikistan heavily depends. Openly collaborating with the Taliban is therefore not an option if it risks jeopardising such important funding.

Domestically, Dushanbe also wants to present itself as the protector of ethnic Tajiks, portraying them as oppressed by the Pashtun Taliban. During the Taliban’s first period in power from 1996 to 2001, the Tajikistani president supported Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Afghan resistance, who visited Tajikistan several times. That support is now extended to his son, who is also effectively based in Tajikistan, and, to some extent, to the Afghan embassy, which has become a stronghold of the former regime.

This animosity is mutual: the Taliban appear to maintain cordial relations with Sharofiddin Gadoev, one of the exiled leaders of the opposition to the Tajikistani regime. He was invited to take part in discussions in Afghanistan last May.

Economic and security emergencies

In reality, economic realities had already forced the hand of the Tajikistani authorities. Electricity exports to Afghanistan have not stopped, showing that discussions, even if purely economic, have taken place between the two sides, Eurasianet reported. Other large-scale projects suggest that completely cutting off communication between the two countries was never truly conceivable, notably the CASA-1000 electricity export project.

But it is the security situation that is genuinely accelerating diplomatic contact. Bruce Pannier, a fellow with the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, notes that it was the launch of a missile towards Tajikistan in May 2022 that prompted the first formal contact between the Taliban and the Tajikistani authorities.

Moreover, ironically, it is the fight against extremism that has pushed Emomali Rahmon to open dialogue with the Taliban. After the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, carried out by Tajikistani citizens recruited by the Islamic State Khorasan Province, or ISKP, it became necessary to combat the involvement of Tajikistani citizens in international terrorism, both for obvious security reasons and for Tajikistan’s international image.

Also read on Novastan : Après l’attentat en Russie, les Tadjiks face à une xénophobie massive

Yet the fight against terrorism requires deeper cooperation with the Taliban, for whom these groups also represent a threat. Tajikistani citizens are sometimes actively recruited from Afghan territory, notably by ISKP.

Following Russia

Finally, Tajikistan’s uncompromising rejection of the Taliban was beginning to entail a level of isolation difficult for a small country to manage. Dushanbe’s gradual shift could be attributed to Moscow’s official recognition of the Taliban last July. Russia may expect an ally that still largely depends on it to follow its lead by also treating the Taliban as acceptable interlocutors.

Tajikistan is thus caught between the importance of Western funding and its relationship with Russia, which it cannot risk weakening. The country is one of the most remittance-dependent in the world: remittances accounted for more than 45% of GDP in 2024, mainly coming from migrant workers in Russia. A deterioration in relations with Moscow would therefore raise fears of even worse conditions for Tajik migrants, followed by catastrophic repercussions for the country’s economy.

A rapprochement with limits

However, Mélanie Sadozaï stresses that this rapprochement has limits. “Although we are beginning to see a few photographs of official meetings between the Taliban and Tajikistani authorities, all of this is taking place in the framework of trade, energy and economic cooperation, but really in the security sphere. It is very likely that this is the maximum Tajikistan can do,” she says.

As for transferring the Afghan embassy into Taliban hands, this remains highly unlikely. Here too, Mélanie Sadozaï believes that “support for the opposition is in fact fairly discreet and was mostly rhetorical. I imagine Tajikistan has no reason to stop supporting it or to expel Mohammad Zahir Aghbar,” the ambassador of the former regime, who remains in office, “and I think it can very well play both sides: maintain its current relations with the resistance while dealing with the Taliban. The two are not incompatible.”

Also read on Novastan : Le Tadjikistan reconnaît une vaste opération d’expulsion d’Afghans

Moreover, while media reports have stated that the Afghan consulate in Khorog, in Gorno-Badakhshan, had passed into Taliban hands, creating a dual authority with the embassy loyal to the former regime, Mélanie Sadozaï says she has always found the Taliban consulate closed and inaccessible since it was damaged by an avalanche in February 2023.

A worrying situation for Tajikistan and its relations with China

The fact remains that the lack of resources on the Afghan side and the latest attacks are a problem for all parties, whether they are directed against the Tajik government or against Chinese workers. A deterioration in relations with China would be extremely problematic for Tajikistan: the country’s infrastructure relies on partnerships or loans linked to China, loans that Dushanbe is struggling to repay.

China has taken the situation very seriously, calling on Tajikistan to shed light on these events and guarantee the safety of Chinese citizens on its territory. In a rare move, the Chinese embassy in Dushanbe asked its citizens to leave border areas and remain cautious.

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“If the Chinese workers who were targeted are indeed employees of road construction companies, this creates an obvious problem for Tajikistan: the possibility that, in the long term, China might end up leaving and not finishing the projects it has started,” Mélanie Sadozaï says.

It is therefore possible that Dushanbe will seek to further protect its border, although no official announcement has been made on the matter. With the war in Ukraine, it seems unlikely that Russia will once again invest resources in the border, which Tajikistan has protected alone since 2004. “As for China, its army does not patrol along the border, but one possibility is that security will be reinforced around Chinese infrastructure, which is now very numerous along the border,” the researcher concludes.

Judith Robert
Author for Novastan

Proofread by Anaïs Boulard

The post Lack of resources in Afghanistan undermines security on the border with Tajikistan appeared first on Novastan English.

Presented as a future major technological and economic hub, the city of Alatau in Kazakhstan is entering a new phase of institutional structuring after obtaining special status, amid persistent uncertainties about its development.

On 27 March, Kazakhstan’s Parliament adopted a law establishing a special legal regime for the city of Alatau, located a few dozen kilometres from Almaty. This status as a “territory of accelerated development”, with specific economic, administrative and legal rules, is intended to attract investment and foster innovation. The decision marks an important step in the evolution of a project that has been presented for several years as a future technological showcase for the country.

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Until recently, however, Alatau remained largely associated with political announcements and ambitious projections, without any real implementation on the ground. The adoption of this special status therefore reflects the Kazakhstani authorities’ desire to structure the project and give it an operational dimension. It remains to be seen whether this institutional advance will make it possible to turn a futuristic vision into a tangible reality.

A project revived by the adoption of a special legal regime

According to the municipality, the city will now benefit from a distinct governance system, with an organisation designed to speed up decision-making and facilitate the establishment of economic actors. The project notably provides for the creation of a strategic authority, the Alatau City Authority, responsible for defining development priorities, as well as an operational body dedicated to the day-to-day management of the project.

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The city will therefore be placed under the supervision of a council chaired by Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov, in order to ensure direct coordination at the highest level of the state. At the same time, traditional local institutions, such as akimats and maslikhats, will retain their powers in urban management and public social services.

Also read on Novastan : Almaty, une ville en quête de cyclabilité

Beyond governance, this status comes with a specific regulatory framework, including tax incentives, simplified administrative procedures and rules adapted to innovative sectors. This development allows the project to move beyond the announcement stage and enter a concrete institutional framework, marking a new phase in its development.

An economic and regulatory framework designed to attract investment

Launched in the early years of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s mandate in the 2020s, Alatau is intended to become a hub capable of attracting international investment and supporting the country’s economic diversification, notably through its integration into a special economic zone.

The city, which has more than 50,000 inhabitants, is also intended to become a hub for digital technologies, digital assets and innovative financial services. In May 2025, President Tokayev announced the creation of a pilot zone called “CryptoCity” in Alatau, where cryptocurrencies could be legally used to pay for goods and services. This direction is part of a broader strategy aimed at positioning Kazakhstan as an emerging player in high value-added sectors.

Also read on Novastan : Le Kazakhstan envisage l’utilisation de cartes de paiement cryptographiques

Several concrete initiatives illustrate this ambition. As reported by Alatau City, discussions have been held with South Korea under the Economic Innovation Partnership Program, or EIPP, for the development of the city’s infrastructure. In addition, a branch of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, or KAIST, one of South Korea’s leading technological universities, is set to be established in Alatau, strengthening its academic and scientific positioning.

Financial ambitions are also significant. According to the Kazakh authorities, planned investment in the project could reach 10.4 trillion tenge, or around €20 billion. At the same time, the municipality has announced the upcoming start of construction on a landmark architectural complex called “Iconic Towers”. Work is due to begin in May 2026, with completion expected by 2029, at an estimated cost of $800 million, or around €680 million. These elements reflect a desire to give Alatau an economic, technological and symbolic dimension.

Between stated ambitions and persistent uncertainties

Despite these advances, several factors call for caution regarding the project’s immediate impact. In particular, a lack of clarity remains around the tax and legal rules applicable to Alatau, raising questions about the coherence and effective implementation of the system. These uncertainties reflect the difficulties inherent in creating an entirely new regulatory framework.

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Above all, the situation on the ground remains limited at this stage. In March 2026, Kazakh influencer Alimbek Ulan visited the Alatau site and observed the start of excavation work on the outskirts of the area concerned. However, no major structural progress was visible, confirming that the project remains largely in a preparatory phase.

Also read on Novastan : Au Kazakhstan, la privatisation d’une partie du parc national d’Ile-Alatau fait polémique

This gap between stated ambitions and concrete progress has fuelled criticism from some observers, who point to the risk of Alatau remaining a primarily symbolic project. The year 2026 therefore appears to be a decisive moment: with the announced launch of construction work, the authorities will have to demonstrate their ability to turn announcements into reality and begin a genuine construction phase.

Lenny Cabrol Noto
Author for Novastan

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The post In Kazakhstan, the futuristic city of “Alatau” reaches a new milestone with special status appeared first on Novastan English.

Relations between Kazakhstan and China are deepening fast. As a linchpin in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, Astana hopes to pluck the fruits of this global infrastructure development strategy, which aims to boost overland trade connections between East and West. However, China’s treatment of ethnic Kazakhs in the Xinjiang province, the region’s second-largest Turkic community after the Uyghurs, remains a sensitive subject that is complicating further rapprochement between the two countries.

This text was originally published on 20 October 2025 by our partner media outlet Lossi 36.

On a cold winter’s day in February 1997, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of the city of Yining, known to locals as Ghulja, in China’s Xinjiang province to protest against growing ethnic discrimination and religious repression. As the demonstration grew in strength, people started chanting “God is great!” and “Independence for Xinjiang!”. Chinese security forces soon mobilised and cracked down on the crowd, killing dozens and arresting hundreds. The exact casualty figures of the massacre remain unknown. The 1997 Ghulja incident is now looked upon as a precursor to the brutality against the predominantly Muslim population in China’s westernmost region.

Nearly three decades later, tensions are still palpable in Yining. Travelling through the city, there is a distinct presence of CCTV cameras and police patrols on the streets. Important intersections in the downtown area are overseen by well-equipped Chinese soldiers next to armoured vehicles with mounted machine guns. They appear suspicious of people taking pictures of the local street life and seem uncomfortable with foreigners freely roaming about a region where, according to most observers, China is perpetrating grave crimes against humanity. Several countries have also accused Beijing of committing genocide, though some human rights groups contend that there is insufficient evidence to support this qualification.

One of the targeted communities are the Xinjiang Kazakhs, the region’s second-largest ethnic minority after the Uyghurs. Because of their mostly Turkic-Muslim background, the Chinese authorities see them as a threat to the state ideal of creating a homogeneous nation, united under the red banner of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In accordance with a policy of “preventative repression”, Beijing has sought to dilute the province’s demographic makeup through the state-sponsored in-migration of Han Chinese and has invested heavily in surveillance technology and infrastructure while building an enormous network of so-called re-education camps. 

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A short history of repression

After the takeover of Xinjiang by the CCP in the waning days of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the position of the Kazakhs in the region steadily grew worse. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Mao Zedong implemented his Great Leap Forward, which caused tens of thousands of local Uyghurs and Kazakhs to defect to Soviet Central Asia. 

The exodus coincided with a gradual deterioration of relations between Moscow and Beijing. The Soviets launched a propaganda offensive against China, promoting the migration of minority groups while trying to destabilise Chinese authority over Xinjiang by appealing to separatist movements. The local Soviet consulate enabled the emigration of ethnic minorities by issuing passports. 

When Beijing found out, they stopped distributing exit visas, which sparked fears among local Kazakhs and other minorities of being cut off from their kin in the USSR. A resulting demonstration was brutally put down, encouraging thousands of others to flee as well. Eventually, in 1962, the Sino-Soviet border was closed after between 60 and 100 thousand had left, and remained so for most of the Cold War.

Read more on Novastan: 70 years of Xinjiang: Beijing celebrates and enacts new political doctrine

Isolated from the outside world, the economic situation in Xinjiang worsened, while elsewhere the “Chinese economic miracle” was just gaining steam. Uneven regional development, combined with interethnic tensions due to the continued inflow of Han Chinese settlers, eventually resulted in a wave of separatist terrorism in the 1990s and 2000s, followed by a ruthless clampdown on the region by Chinese authorities. This eventually culminated in the ongoing Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism, which started in 2014.

Atajurt Eriktileri (Homeland Volunteers), a Kazakhstan-based human rights organisation in the forefront of advocating for the release of ethnic kin in Xinjiang, has documented thousands of cases of ethnic Kazakhs who have been incarcerated in China without a trial. Although the number of imprisoned Kazakhs is much smaller than the several hundred thousand Uyghurs currently detained in prison camps, Atajurt has done most to highlight the plight of all ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.

Yet, as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) brings a surge of investment into Kazakhstan, deepening ties between the two countries place Astana in a delicate position amid domestic concerns over the repression of the Xinjiang Kazakhs.

Crossroads Khorgos

About a hundred kilometres by road to the northwest of Yining, on the Chinese side of the Sino-Kazakh border, lies Khorgos. This newly planned town with a skyline that, from a distance, rivals that of any major European city, is part of a recently created special economic zone. It includes a massive area full of highways, warehouses, manufacturing sites, residential areas for workers and their families, and a duty-free shopping zone.

Khorgos is key to Beijing’s BRI. This multi-billion infrastructure development strategy, colloquially known as the New Silk Road, aims to expand China’s economic and political influence around the globe by boosting trade connections between East and West. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as well as heightened instability in the wider Middle East, the route passing through Khorgos – the shortest overland transport route to Europe – has rapidly grown in importance. 

That strategic relevance is also visible on the Kazakh side of the border. Here, Khorgos transforms from a geopolitical pivot into a logistical hub. The importance of Khorgos lies in the fact that the Chinese operate with a different track gauge, so any rail transport making its way to Europe has to change trains here. This happens just inside Kazakhstan, on a vast asphalted harbour-like complex, surrounded by barbed wire fence and dense with brightly-coloured shipping containers, towering cranes, and a warren of railway tracks. 

This infrastructure, together with additional roads and railways for onward transport, has been financed with Chinese loans. Critics of the BRI have voiced concerns about what they call “debt-trap diplomacy”. This alleged strategy, however, has been repeatedly disproven by experts. In the case of Kazakhstan, Nargiza Muratalieva, associate professor at the American University of Central Asia, states that “[s]trong institutions, public understanding, a diversified loan portfolio, and sustainable projects” allow Kazakhstan to effectively manage its debt.

That is not to say there are no risks to deepening economic ties with China. China is facing considerable economic challenges, as it struggles with deflation and an ageing population. These internal problems could easily spillover into BRI countries. Should Kazakhstan continue to take on BRI-related investments in the long term, infrastructure projects like Khorgos might become a liability. 

Views on China

China has come to recognise growing unease over its expanding economic footprint in Kazakhstan. Beijing has responded by promoting soft power initiatives, especially through boosting educational and cultural exchanges and increasing the production of Kazakh language content through Chinese media outlets. These efforts are aimed at moving beyond the elite-level political and economic ties China previously depended upon.

So far, this strategy has not been very successful. Apart from economic concerns, the (mis)treatment of ethnic kin in Xinjiang continues to influence public opinion on China in Kazakhstan. Over the past few years, several demonstrations have been organised to protest against China’s Xinjiang policy.

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s government under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has been mostly silent on this issue. Although the resettlement of several thousand ethnic kin from China has given the impression that Astana is trying to address the situation with Beijing, the country’s political leadership carefully avoids direct criticism. Tragic but true, the pursuit of economic interests undercuts any meaningful response to human rights abuses on the other side of the border. 

Read more on Novastan: China in Central Asia: Fact-checking and myth-busting

The awarded reportage Kazakhstan-Xinjiang, the Border of Tears describes how many Kazakh survivors, upon their return to Kazakhstan, face indifference with regard to their experiences in China: “All the violence they have endured is not recognised, and seems to exist only in their private lives: denied by the Kazakh authorities, generally ignored by civil society, invisible to the medical community.”

In recent years, Astana has tried to actively thwart activists and grassroots organisations concerned with the suffering of Xinjiang Kazakhs. Most notably, in 2019, Atajurt Eriktileri’s founder and frontman Serikzhan Bilash was charged for inciting inter-ethnic hatred and arrested. When he was released after seven months of detention, he was forced to leave Kazakhstan. Attempts by his organisation to enter national politics were obstructed by the authorities, and little has been heard about these efforts. 

The BRI paradox

To pre-empt domestic unrest linked to China’s Xinjiang policy, Kazakhstan’s government is committed to making the BRI work. The latest Central Asia Barometer shows a correlation between the current boom in trade between China and Kazakhstan and more favourable views on China, especially among the youth. This finding reveals a striking paradox. Kazakhstan’s growing economic dependence on China could be softening Sinophobic sentiment – even as the BRI facilitates the repression of Muslims in Xinjiang, a cause that has provoked outrage among Kazakhs. 

In China, BRI projects have gone hand-in-hand with a sharpening of security measures. The new highway connecting Khorgos with Yining, for example, is strewn with police checkpoints, and at airports and train stations throughout Xinjiang security controls are strict and time-consuming. The Chinese government has long perceived the expression of minority identity as an obstacle to regional development and worked to pacify separatist resistance.

Scholars have argued that the economic benefits of BRI-related infrastructure development befall disproportionately upon the non-local Han Chinese population, while the ethnic minorities of Xinjiang have played a significant role in the workforce behind BRI projects — possibly under conditions that amount to forced labour. If true, these findings would suggest that the promise of the BRI would sooner increase than diminish regional inequalities. 

Ultimately, managing the fine line between fostering economic development and addressing human rights issues leaves Kazakhstan in a tricky situation. The ongoing struggles of ethnic Kazakhs in China highlight the significant tensions that form a major obstacle for further rapprochement between Kazakhstan and China.

Julian Postulart for Lossi 36

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The post The story of the Xinjiang Kazakhs: silent suffering along the Belt and Road appeared first on Novastan English.

Two years into the war in Gaza – which has killed over 68,000 Palestinians – Kazakhstan has volunteered to join Trump’s Abraham Accords initiative to forge closer ties with Israel. While Tokayev’s gamble is far from groundbreaking due to the country’s pre-existing relations with Israel, the manoeuvre does signal a new, American direction emerging for Kazakhstan’s international orientation.

Ahead of the much anticipated C5+1 Summit in Washington D.C., US President Donald Trump announced on 7 November that Kazakhstan would soon join the US-led Abraham Accords, an initiative spearheaded by Trump to encourage resistant Muslim-majority nations to forge closer ties with Israel. With Kazakhstan’s entry, the Central Asian state will become the first country to join the accords since war in Gaza began in 2023. 

Unlike all past Abraham Accords members who had refused to recognise Israel before joining the agreement, Kazakhstan has maintained formal relations with Israel since 1992. Experts have been quick to describe Kazakh President Qassym-Jomart Tokayev’s move as a symbolic gesture aimed at currying favor with Washington, doubting that it will significantly alter Kazakhstan’s existing relations with Israel.

Kazakhstan’s Geopolitical Pivot

To Tokayev, the move is clearly a signal to Washington it is open to further strategic cooperation. Just hours before Kazakhstan’s Abraham Accords announcement, Kazakhstan and the United States signed a lucrative cooperation deal over rare earth minerals the United States deems as critical to its national security.  By the time Tokayev had left Washington, he had signed 29 deals with the United States amounting to $17 billion in new investments, per the Astana Times. 

Read more on Novastan: China in Central Asia: Fact-checking and myth-busting

Beyond minerals, the United States sees political potential to draw Kazakhstan out of China’s orbit and into its own, severing a key link in China’s emerging Belt and Road Initiative trade corridor across the Asian continent. Kazakhstan, hoping to balance its international agreements among the global heavyweights, hopes close partnership with the United States will limit the state’s dependence on China and Russia.

A Much Needed Win for the Trump Administration

With the country’s proposed accession to the Abraham Accords, Kazakhstan offered Trump a diplomatic victory he greatly desired: a Muslim-majority country willing to forge close ties with post-war Israel. In his first term, Trump surprised the world by successfully negotiating for four Arab, Muslim-majority states—Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco, and Sudan— to establish formal relations with Israel through the framework of the Abraham Accords. In 2023, Saudi Arabia was set to become the next and most influential state to formally recognise Israel, a move the United States hoped would inspire a number of other Arab states to follow. However, largely due to public pressure once Israel began its ground invasion of Gaza in October of 2023, Saudi Arabia halted all momentum towards the recognition of an Israeli state. 

When Trump returned to office in January 2025, he conceded that Israel, a key regional ally of the United States, was becoming increasingly isolated on the world stage. Backlash stemmed from global outrage over alleged war crimes committed by its army in Gaza. On September 16, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory issued a report concluding that Israel “has committed genocide” in the Gaza Strip. Due to overwhelming condemnation of Israel’s actions in war across the Arab and Muslim world, no state in the region since the beginning of the war in Gaza has moved to recognise Israel. 

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Trump still believes in the Abraham Accords as the solution to break the regional isolation of post-war Israel. With Kazakhstan’s participation, Trump claims the gesture is a pivotal revitalisation of the Abraham Accords, spurring future membership from more consequential regional powers. Notably, Kazakhstan’s announcement came twelve days before Saudi prince Mohammed bin Salman is planned to visit Washington D.C.. Trump is expected to use Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords to put political pressure on Saudi Arabia to restart efforts to normalise ties with Israel.

The Future of Kazakh-American Cooperation

During the November 2025 C5+1 summit, Trump hinted he may soon make a presidential visit to Astana. All indications suggest Trump has grown fond of Tokayev’s government. Its readiness to secure US access to critical minerals and to breathe life into Trump’s stalled Middle East peace project has not gone unnoticed in Washington. While Tokayev believes he is able to maintain Kazakh sovereignty by juggling agreements between Russia, China and the United States, it is unclear if further cooperation with Trump’s America will bring Kazakhstan the independence it so desires. 

Read more on Novastan: Central Asia and Russia: an ever-changing relationship

Qatar, a regional neighbor long eager to balance diplomacy and defense, found itself punished for its alignment with Washington and peace efforts. In the past year alone, it was bombed twice – once by Iran and once by Israel, America’s closest regional ally. Not too far away from Kazakhstan in the Caucasus, Trump recently showed the world with his Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Deal his administration’s eagerness to use diplomacy to cement America’s own economic hegemony in far away regions.

Time will tell if Tokayev’s gamble for further integration with the United States will yield the result his government desires. By joining the Abraham Accords at a critical moment for the initiative’s survival, Kazakhstan has successfully proven its diplomatic usefulness to Washington. However, as Trump aims to expand American influence over the Asian continent, Kazakhstan now risks becoming a pawn in America’s mounting competition for dominance with China engulfing the Central Asian region.

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Joseph Fisher for Novastan

The post Kazakhstan to become an Unusual Addition to the Abraham Accords: Will this Diplomatic Gesture for Washington Pay Off? appeared first on Novastan English.

It has been one year since the Organization of Turkic States approved the implementation of a common Turkic alphabet, designed for uniform use in all member states. Under the guise of bolstering Turkic unity, Ankara has spearheaded the initiative with the aim to draw the Central Asian states into its political orbit. However, due to limited funds, lack of political incentives, and preexisting linguistic policy, the Central Asian states have largely chosen to ignore the common alphabet entirely. 

In September 2024, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) announced to the world the creation of a 34-letter common Turkic alphabet based on the Latin script, approved on paper by all member states. The initiative, spearheaded by Türkiye, has been in the works since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Now one year since the common alphabet’s announcement, the manoeuvre has yet to make the large waves in the Central Asian information space that Türkiye had initially hoped for.

The proposed common alphabet exists within the larger regional debate surrounding the political futures of the Central Asian languages. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the newly independent republics began the process of transitioning their languages from a Cyrillic to a Latin-based script. However, in Central Asia, the decision of switching to a Latin script remains a fierce debate across the region even three decades later. 

Türkiye, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s expansionist foreign policy, has offered a guiding hand by leading the OTS initiative to create a common Turkic alphabet. Türkiye first adopted the Latin script in 1928 as a part of its early independence-era modernisation reforms. By encouraging the Central Asian states to undergo a similar process, Türkiye also aims to cement its position as the dominant centre of the Turkic world.

So far, Erdoğan’s plan has not cultivated many strong allies in Central Asia’s political elite. Most states in the region remain embroiled within national debates over the post-Soviet future of their titular languages, making Central Asian governments particularly resistant to carry out such a monumental linguistic shift at the international level.

Competition for “Middle Power” Status

In the year since the OTS announcement, regional heavyweights Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain resistant in adopting the common Turkic alphabet within their borders. According to Nargiza Muratalieva, a Bishkek-based political scientist, “Kazakhstan is not ready to share its leadership in Central Asia, given its attempts to promote itself as a middle power.” Kazakhstan has spent the post-Soviet decades centralizing Central Asian political power within its own borders, with the goal to secure a respected “middle power” status to both the region and the international community at large. Uzbekistan, the largest Central Asian country by population and second largest in terms of GDP, shares similar ambitions. Both countries view the Turkish-led OTS alphabet as an attempt by Türkiye to cement itself as the dominant power in the region, and thus, a threat to their respective national directives.

Read more on Novastan: The Lexicon of Kazakh Decolonisation

While both nations have yet to consider the implementation of the common Turkic alphabet, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have independently embarked on national plans to switch the script of their titular languages from Cyrillic to Latin. In both cases, the political leadership has underestimated the difficulty of this task, leading to much longer timelines for the initiative than initially expected. Currently, both states are stuck in a transitional state where both scripts are used interchangeably. Critics complain that the current linguistic paralysis in the countries is both confusing for citizens and financially taxing for administrations. The Diplomat reports that the 2018 budgetary estimate for Kazakhstan’s Latinization program sat at US$664 million, equivalent to roughly 39% of Kazakhstan’s GDP for that year.

The challenges Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have faced implementing a Latin script have meant that neither government seems willing to invest in the OTS alphabet as a third system for their citizens to learn and their country to switch to. Even Turkmenistan — a state which successfully phased out Cyrillic usage in the 1990s — remains resistant to the OTS plan to change their national standard. Largely closed off from the outside world and averse to foreign influence, the common Turkic alphabet offers few advantages to Ashgabat.

Kyrgyzstan: The Cyrillic Exception

At the unveiling ceremony of the common Turkic alphabet, all eyes were on Kyrgyzstan. To mark the alphabet’s adoption, Erdoğan gifted each represented nation a copy of two books translated into the new alphabet. One of the books was a novel written by Chinghiz Aitmatov, a regionally renowned author hailing from Kyrgyzstan. Erdoğan’s choice was hardly coincidental. Kyrgyzstan today is the only Turkic state to not even attempt to switch the national script away from Cyrillic.

Western analysts attribute Kyrgyzstan’s continued use of Cyrillic to the close relationship with Russia the country has maintained through its post-Soviet independence. Russia largely views increased Turkish influence in Central Asia as a threat to its foothold in the region, and acts to mitigate the country’s power in states like Kyrgyzstan where it still holds considerable influence. However, in the case of Kyrgyzstan’s refusal to adopt the OTS Latin-based alphabet, Muratalieva believes the reasons are more pragmatic than political. “The simplest explanation is the lack of financial resources to accept and to introduce this alphabet on a national level,” Muratalieva explains. While Türkiye has spearheaded the alphabet initiative on paper, the country has remained resistant to supplying funds to OTS member states interested in making the national switch. The lack of available funds severely limits the capacity of financially-limited states like Kyrgyzstan, the smallest economy of the OTS bloc.

When Sadyr Japarov, the president of Kyrgyzstan, was asked about his opinion on the linguistic future of the Kyrgyz language, he stated that “it is too early to talk about transitioning the Kyrgyz language to the Latin alphabet”, RFE/RL reports. Muratalieva believes Japarov’s strategy is to watch and wait how its larger regional neighbours Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan fare in their respective transitions to a Latin-based script. “If one of them succeeds, Kyrgyzstan will follow,” she theorizes.

Azerbaijan as a Potential Model

Not all hope is lost for Turkish power in Central Asia. Azerbaijan, while outside the region, provides a model for the post-Soviet Turkic states open to cooperation with Türkiye, showing how partnership with the state can lead to successful development. Türkiye and Azerbaijan have been close allies ever since the country gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. This strategic partnership has allowed for Azerbaijan to largely chart its own path, both economically and politically distant from Russia. 

One of the first directives Azerbaijan embarked on after independence was the complete transition of its national language from Cyrillic to Latin, a goal it achieved by the turn of the century. The Azerbaijani Latin-based script in its modern form is now very closely related to both the Turkish standard script and the newly proposed OTS alphabet. Such linguistic integration between the two nations has opened many new doors for transnational partnership, successes closely monitored by the Central Asian states.

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Since the beginning of the Russo-Ukraine War, Central Asian states have become increasingly hesitant of close partnership with Russia. Regional leadership fears Russia’s close geographic proximity to their borders may lead to future military conflict. Türkiye, attempting to offer an alternative to Russian partnership in the region, markets its distance from Central Asia as a compelling security guarantee. While maintaining territorial distance from potential Central Asian partners, Türkiye benefits from cultural and religious closeness to the region’s common Turkic heritage. The common Turkic alphabet is only one of many pathways the country is intent to forge with Central Asia through the leverage of common Turkic traditions. Turkish soft power in Central Asia, while currently marginal, is steadily increasing with time.

Türkiye has made it clear that it is willing to take on administrative and economic sacrifices to implement the new alphabet within its own borders, but has maintained its reluctance to take on the financial burdens necessary to implement the script in the Central Asian Turkic states. Combined with Türkiye’s unwillingness to meddle in preexisting linguistic turmoil in Central Asia or directly confront Russia’s lingering cultural influence over the region, has enough time passed to call the OTS common alphabet project a failure? Likely so. 

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Joseph Fisher for Novastan

The post Dead in the Water: Has the Common Turkic Alphabet Failed to Boost Turkish Influence in Central Asia? appeared first on Novastan English.

The 70th anniversary of Xinjiang, China’s Uyghur region, was celebrated with great fanfare in Ürümqi. The ceremony was marked by the presence of Xi Jinping, the first Chinese president to attend this event.

From September 23 to 25, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region celebrated its 70th anniversary with a gala. Among those present were Chinese President Xi Jinping and members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, Wang Huning and Cai Qi. Officially established in 1955, this region, which is central to the development of China’s “New Silk Road,” has been the focus of tensions between Beijing and the Uyghur minority for decades.

The gala, titled “Beautiful Xinjiang,” served as a tool for internal and external communication, conveying political themes and thus going beyond the purely artistic. Xi Jinping gave a short speech in which he repeatedly addressed the issues of security and stability in Xinjiang.

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“Ensuring social stability and lasting peace”

Xi’s speech to local authorities focused on social control as well as security. The president emphasized the comprehensive efforts to maintain social stability in Xinjiang and to raise public awareness of the fight against terrorism. According to the official Xinhua news agency, Xi said it was imperative to promote a strong awareness of the Chinese nation as a community in Xinjiang and to advance the development of this community.

The emphasis on security serves to justify the continued existence of an extensive security apparatus. It accompanies the publication of the “Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Guidelines for Governing Xinjiang in the New Era: Practices and Achievements” by the State Council Information Office, the CCP’s new doctrine for the future of the region.

In the 42-page document, Beijing proclaims a “historic success” in the fight against terrorism and points out that there have been no violent attacks for several years; the last one dates back to May 22, 2014. To justify maintaining the reinforced security apparatus, Beijing denounces “Panturkism” and “Pan-Islamism” as existential threats and implicitly cites the Al Qaeda-affiliated “Islamic Party of Turkestan” (IPT), which now cooperates with the Syrian Ministry of Defense.

Read also on Novastan: Total surveillance, segregation, and internment in Xinjiang: a discreet report on the daily life of the Uyghurs

The text also justifies surveillance, re-education, and religious control policies as legal and preventive measures, while rejecting Western accusations of “genocide” and “forced labor.”

The CCP also welcomes the region’s economic development: regional GDP is expected to grow from 750 billion yuan (€90.8 billion) in 2012 to more than 2 trillion yuan (€242.1 billion) in 2024. Beijing highlights poverty reduction, rapid urbanization, and the creation of the Xinjiang pilot free trade zone in 2023, which is part of the Eurasian “New Silk Roads” corridor, an international logistics and transport infrastructure network announced in 2013.

Erasure and appropriation of Uyghur culture

No explicit mention was made of the repression and internment camps imposed on the Uyghur population since 2014, which have been regularly denounced by the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP). A UHRP report dated April 25, 2024, states that one in 26 individuals in Xinjiang, mainly Uyghurs or non-Han Chinese, were imprisoned in 2024, representing nearly one-third of China’s total prison population. Yet these same populations represent only 1% of the national population.

Although there are no comprehensive official data on the exact number of internment camps in the Xinjiang region, NGOs such as the UHRP estimate that at least 578,500 people were incarcerated between 2017 and 2022, not counting those still detained in the camps. The Uyghur region has the highest incarceration rate in the world, with 2,234 prisoners per 100,000 individuals. A study by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) think tank has identified approximately 380 detention centers in operation since 2017 using satellite imagery.

Read also on Novastan: Escape from Xinjiang – Stories of those who escaped the camps

But current Chinese doctrine now emphasizes the concept of the “Chinese nation community.” This involves actively promoting standard Mandarin in education, encouraging cultural and urban fusion, and strengthening control over religious institutions so that Islam and other religions are “compatible with socialism.”

In addition, the CCP promotes selective preservation of local heritage (sites in Kucha, Turfan, Kashi, and Kashgar), integrated into a Chinese historical narrative, as well as the predominance of Han culture in education and public life.

Rewriting history

The document presents Xinjiang’s policy as a model of national governance, combining security, cultural assimilation, economic development, and ideological control. It seeks to legitimize the CCP’s actions in the face of international criticism by framing the region’s governance within the logic of “Chinese-style modernization,” similar to the situation in Tibet, where Beijing has exercised military domination and implemented policies of assimilation of the population for 75 years.

Between the CCP’s centralizing tendencies and persistent jihadist threats, Xinjiang remains a flashpoint for tensions, caught between security and repression.

Lenny Cabrol Noto for Novastan

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Kyrgyzstan is sliding down to full blown autocracy. The country has traditionally stood out for offering greater protections for free speech, political parties, and NGOs than any other Central Asian nation. However, this began to change after President Sadyr Japarov came to power, reshaping the nation’s political landscape. Today, the once-free press is no longer truly free.

On October 28, 2025, the Oktyabrsky District Court in Bishkek declared three independent media outlets – Kloop Media Foundation, TemirovLive, and Ait Ait Dese (TemirovLive’s Kyrgyz-language sister channel) – as extremist organisations. In Kyrgyzstan, anyone who now shares materials produced by these outlets can face criminal charges. This move marks yet another step in the ongoing repression of independent media in the country.

Just a month ago, on September 17, 2025, two video makers from the Kloop, Alexander Alexandrov and Joomart Duulatov, were sentenced to a penal colony for five years. Both were charged for involvement in the production of videos for TemirovLive, that would allegedly have incited public unrest. The lack of evidence was striking throughout the trial. No connection could be proven between the work of Alexandrov and Duulatov with TemirovLive, or between Kloop and TemirovLive. On top of that, even the prosecutors themselves admitted that the videos concerned contained no direct incitements to civil unrest.

These accusations came after eight (former) Kloop employees were arrested in late May 2025, and held for questioning by the security forces, the GKNB. None were initially allowed to see their lawyers. The next few days, all suspects were released except for Alexandrov, Duulatov and two accountants. The GKNB subsequently published videos in which the (former) employees confessed to inciting civil unrest. These videos were likely taken under duress, as Alexandrov seemed to indicate himself. All four were taken to court, where the two journalists retracted their confessions. The accountants denied their involvement in the case. While shocking, the sentencing comes as no surprise.

The crackdown on Kloop and TemirovLive is the latest example of tightening repression under the regime of President Sadyr Japarov.

Read more on Novastan: Leaving the Island – Japarov’s campaign to silence independent media

The TemirovLive link

Kloop and TemirovLive have, for many years, been strongholds of independent journalism in Kyrgyzstan. Apart from this, the alleged link between Kloop and TemirovLive seems to come mostly from both outlets’ reporting on corruption. Resultingly the two organisations, as well as their founders and staff, have been repeatedly pressed with legal charges in the past.

Most infamous is the case of Bolot Temirov, the founder of TemirovLive, who was arrested on January 22, 2022, for the possession of drugs, which he claims were placed on him. This happened two days after he and his platform TemirovLive published a new investigation, accusing the head of the GKNB, Kamchybek Tashiev, of corruption.

Kloop and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), a US NGO supporting investigative journalism on organised crime and corruption, subsequently discovered that TemirovLive and Temirov himself were monitored long before the publication. In May 2022, Temirov was stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship, after which he was acquitted on practically all charges laid against him later that year, in September 2022, because the investigation against him had been prejudiced. Still the harassment did not stop: Temirov was forcibly exiled to Russia in November 2022 in just a few hours’ time. His lawyers, friends and family did initially not know what had happened to him.

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New laws and the beginning of the end for free media

Japarov has taken numerous steps to restrict free journalism since coming to power following the 2020 October Revolution. First, on July 28, 2021, he implemented a law that would allow an “authorised state body” – whatever that may be – to block websites that publish so-deemed “false or inaccurate information”. To date, the Ministry of Culture has been its principal executor, as it has been actively persecuting free media under this new law.

In April 2024, the Kyrgyz parliament also passed a foreign agent law, akin to the one in Russia, which further limits the possibilities of NGOs and media that receive funds from abroad. The rationale for passing the foreign agent law is clear: to silence dissenting voices. Under the previous administration, numerous articles were published exposing large scale corruption, particularly in the Matraimov case, where a large politically connected corruption scheme was exposed in the Kyrgyz customs agency, stealing several million dollars.

Furthermore, Kloop’s election observation missions documented blatant violations during the 2020 and subsequent elections, prompting a partial recount and rerun of the 2021 parliamentary elections. These findings, along with Kloop’s daily reporting, underscore the vital role that that independent media has played in Kyrgyzstan, even in the face of mounting repression.

Read more on Novastan: In Central Asia, the Freedom of Press is in Decline

The autocrat’s way: closing publications and arresting critics

Kloop is not the first to meet the ire of Kyrgyzstan’s government. Over the past years, the authorities have adopted two main tactics for targeting media. One involves targeting key figures within organizations, through arrests, exile, intimidation or constant surveillance by security forces. The other focuses on restricting media outlets, including forced closures and the blocking of their websites.

In January 2024, eleven journalists from TemirovLive and Ait Ait Dese were arrested, even after Temirov himself had been exiled. During the same time, their offices (and that of 24.kg, another independent media outlet) were raided by the GKNB. Three journalists were eventually sentenced to long prison terms for calling for civil disobedience. According to Kyrgyz law it is illegal to call “for active disobedience to legitimate demands of the representatives of the authorities (…)”. Those found guilty of violating this law can face a minimum sentence of five years imprisonment.” The law’s ambiguous phrasing makes it easy to target journalists and other government critics.

The first victim of the earlier-mentioned disinformation law from July 2021 was the local branch of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), known as Azattyk. In October 2022, Azattyk was forced to close down over materials published about the September 2022 border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which became a highly sensitive political issue. The Ministry of Culture argued that the materials published contained false information. The website remained blocked until July the next year, when Azattyk and the Ministry of Culture reached a settlement. For their part, Azattyk had to delete a video they had made about the conflict. In return they were allowed again to operate in Kyrgyzstan.

The laws on civil disobedience and disinformation have been used repeatedly against free media all across Kyrgyzstan, for instance against 24.kg, Kaktus media, Next TV, and Aprel TV. Most recently, in August this year, a new law was passed restricting foreign ownership in media organisations to 35%.

Read more on Novastan: Closure of Radio Azattyk sparks discontent from civil society and international human rights activists

The repression of Kloop

The recent arrests are not the first time that Kloop was targeted. On August 28, 2023, Kloop was taken to court over allegedly failing to name all media activities it was engaged in, as per its foundational charter, and not registering as a mass media outlet. The next month, its website was blocked.

During the court case, more allegations were levelled against Kloop: their alleged criticism would spur people on to protest against the government and lead to their reader’s ‘zombification’. The brunt of the lawsuit focused on the alleged ‘negativity’ of Kloop’s reporting. According to the prosecutors, this negativity could also lead to sexual anomalies or “chemical (…) addictions.”

In the end, Kloop was formally liquidated. It tried to go to the Supreme Court over the case, but the Court denied the request without informing the defendant within one month – as is legally required. Afterwards, Kloop continued its work under the legal entity of Koomar Media. Despite the blocking and outlawing of the Kloop legal entity, the Kloop journalists continued their investigations. This included an investigative piece on the president and his close associate Kamchybek Tashiev, head of the GKNB. The eki dos (two friends), as they are commonly called, would be involved in various corruption schemes.

The sentencing of Alexanderov and Dulaatov served as yet another stark warning that Kyrgyzstan’s democracy is in retreat. At best, those engaged in anti-corruption journalism must now fear for their freedom; at worst, it signals that no journalist is safe. With the declaration of TemirovLive, Kloop, and Ait Ait Dese as extremist organisations, the threat extends beyond journalists. Anyone who reads or shares independent media content can now face prosecution, even if they are not directly involved in journalism. The future of Kyrgyzstan’s independent press remains uncertain – but one thing is clear: the outlook is bleak.

Written by Stijn van der Veen

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The post Kyrgyzstan’s march to smother the free press appeared first on Novastan English.

As Kazakhstan officially starts the construction of its new nuclear plant, the region is overwhelmed with an extreme heat wave. The climate change is especially noticeable in the continental climate: in the land where summer temperature peak at 49 degrees Celcius is even the slightest upgrade dangerous. But the efforts to become climate neutral country prove to meet some complications. 

The temperatures in Kazakhstan – as anywhere in the world – are rising. The winter of 2024/2025 has been classified as ‘anomalously’ warm, as temperatures exceeded the norm by 2 to 6 degrees. Spring and summer have been way too hot as well: monthly reports show temperature records. Over the last 75 years, the average yearly temperature in Kazakhstan has risen by 6 degrees.

The efforts to counteract climate change, or at least to slow it down, are extremely relevant in this context. But the current starting point makes the green future look rather distant.

Fuel dependence in the background 

In 2023, Kazakhstan’s president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed the ambitious Strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Achieving Carbon Neutrality by 2060. Nevertheless, in a country where the economy is deeply reliant on the fossil fuel industry, the shift toward renewable energy poses considerable difficulties.

Since Kazakhstan’s independence (now well over three decades ago), subsequent governments were betting on the extraction of fuel for continued economic growth, as well as securing investments through selling the exploration and recovery rights to fossil giants like British Petroleum, Exxon and Shell. Petroleum currently makes up 52,5% of Kazakhstan’s export, which earns the country up to 34,8 billion GBP annually. Whilst Russia is subjected to sanctions as a result of its war against Ukraine, western countries are looking for alternative suppliers. And Kazakhstan has proven to be an interesting partner in that regard – a fact reflected in the signing of new contracts, primarily for oil exports to Europe.

The fossil fuel industry remains far too profitable to scale back, let alone to significantly reduce oil production. Yet such a decline seems inevitable: if not driven by environmental imperatives, then by sheer necessity. Current forecasts suggest that known oil reserves could be exhausted within just 30 years at present production rates. While this projection may align with broader climate objectives, governments continue to pursue new exploration efforts in regions considered geologically promising.

The main problem: coal

Oil is only part of the problem. The energy sector in general is Kazakhstan’s number one source of greenhouse gas emissions. Although energy demand from industry accounts for just over a fifth of final energy consumption, more than a third is spent on the building sector. This is where coal processing comes in.

Kazakhstan possesses vast coal reserves, though extraction remains costly. The country’s largest deposits are relatively shallow but consist of exceptionally thick seams, making mining operations less efficient. In 2023, a tonne of coal could be purchased directly from mines for around 9,000 tenge – approximately £15.75 at the prevailing exchange rate – well below global market prices. For domestic consumers, transportation costs can nearly double that price, yet coal remains the most affordable source of energy production. However, its widespread use is responsible for more than half of Kazakhstan’s greenhouse gas emissions.

Most of Kazakhstan’s coal is consumed domestically, primarily to supply the country’s thermal power plants. Coal accounts for 99% of heat generation and more than half of total electricity production. However, many of these power stations are outdated and, in some cases, in disrepair. Most were built during the Soviet era and have long exceeded their intended operational lifespan.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan stops investment agreement with ArcelorMittal after deadly explosion in Kostenko mine takes 46 lives

The government does not seem particularly willing to completely abandon coal. News outlet zakon.kz cites Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy Yerlan Akkenzhenov: ‘We live on wealth. Coal-fired power generation is considered the cheapest option. In addition, the construction of combined heat and power plants also allows us to control the heat supply. As you know, all our cities are supplied by combined heat and power plants and a central heat supply. We must continue to pursue this approach […]’

As an alternative, the minister has proposed equipping the power plants with modern boilers that enable coal to be burned ‘without residue’. By 2035, ‘every combined heat and power plant will be gradually converted exactly to clean coal technology’.

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In a country with very cold winters, less than half of households are connected to a central heating network. In single-family detached homes, coal is frequently used as the main energy source for heating, which in turn contributes to the already high levels of smog produced by thermal power plants in big cities like Almaty. Taking into consideration the state of Kazakhstan’s housing stock, a considerable amount of energy gets wasted due to insufficient insulation or outdated heating systems. Ironically, even with the energy wasted, heating is still cheaper in the long term than investing in renovations.

Read more on Novastan: Breathing space: air quality and energy transition in Kazakhstan

Slow decarbonization in transport

A similar situation can be observed in the transport sector, the country’s second-largest energy consumer. The UN, in its roadmap for achieving the 7th sustainable development goal (‘Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’), recommends that Kazakhstan decarbonize 15% of its passenger cars by 2050. Currently there are 6.17 million cars registered in the country, of which electric cars account for only 0.003%.

A quarter of a century is a long time – after all, 25 years ago, electric cars as we know them today did not even exist. However, the timeframe proposed by the UN seems optimistic for Kazakhstan: almost half of the cars in the country are at least 20 years old, and a significant proportion of these are cars would no longer pass vehicle safety tests, or would be banned from towns and cities for not meeting environmental standards. Although the government is planning to impose fines on car owners whose vehicles exceed emission standards, there are no plans to use the revenue to directly fund environmental initiatives. Many drivers only replace their cars when they are no longer roadworthy, and even then, they tend to turn to secondary and tertiary markets when looking for a replacement.

Switching to an electric car is not easy in Kazakhstan: all charging stations are located within the three largest cities – Astana, Almaty and Shymkent – and even there, their availability is limited. Due to the risk of fire, for example, it is prohibited to install charging stations in apartment parking areas. Electric car owners are hence dependent on public charging stations in large car parks and near shopping centres – which often do not supply green electricity.

According to internal research of a car manufacturer in the region, more than half of car owners do not consider electric cars as a purchase option when thinking about their next buy. After the boom in 2022/2023, when cheap electric cars were imported en masse from China, excitement has subsided. The urban population with above-average incomes who wanted and could afford an electric car, have already purchased it; for the rest these cars are just too expensive, far too impractical, far too unfamiliar. Car dealers are now focusing on hybrid models instead, which could serve as a transitional solution. Yet even these are no option for the majority of the population, given the current state of infrastructure in Kazakhstan.

Clean energy: only a fraction in the market

It is not that Kazakhstan produces no clean energy at all.

Hydroelectric power plants, however, play only a minor role in the country’s energy mix — for understandable reasons. Most of them were built in the same era as the aging thermal power plants. Moreover, water resources are steadily dwindling, raising doubts about whether there will be enough water to sustain hydroelectric production in the coming years.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan: Residents suffer from lack of water

Despite Kazakhstan’s favorable geographic conditions, solar and wind energy remain surprisingly underused. As of 2024, the country operated just 59 wind farms and 46 solar parks — a modest number given its vast, sparsely populated steppes that are ideally suited for renewable energy generation. The southern regions enjoy between 2,200 and 3,000 hours of sunshine per year — two to three times more than the United Kingdom. Kazakhstan also has excellent wind potential: average wind speeds of 5–6 m/s are common across most of the country, reaching up to 8.27 m/s in certain areas. Experts estimate Kazakhstan’s total wind energy potential at around 920 billion kWh per year.

Yet, this immense potential remains largely untapped. The main reason is economic. At current price levels, the clean energy sector is unattractive to private investors. Equipment must be imported at high cost, while the electricity produced can be sold for no more than seven pence per kilowatt hour, VAT included. For most households, retail prices are roughly half that. As a result, revenues barely cover maintenance, and the payback period for new projects is so long that, by the time investors see a return, much of the infrastructure is already outdated and in need of further investment.

It has long been evident that energy prices in Kazakhstan will have to rise to finance sector modernization and accelerate the shift toward green energy. The controversial new nuclear power plant will not be profitable otherwise: experts estimate that the price of nuclear power will be 12.5 pence per kilowatt hour in the first 15 years. Ultimately, however, it is sustainable energy that must take the lead. Sergei Agafonov, chairman of the Kazakh Association of Energy Suppliers, envisions an optimal energy mix in which renewables provide at least half of the demand, while nuclear power accounts for roughly the global average – projected to reach 12% by 2040. ‘Yes, renewable energies will have to dominate our energy balance over all other types of energy generation. The main thing is that we carry out this change carefully [..]’, said Agafonov in an interview with Orda.kz.

New turning point

The strategy for achieving carbon neutrality in 2060 contains neither an implementation plan, nor success indicators, nor any sanctions for failing to achieve the set targets. In 2017, it was already announced at the EXPO in Astana that the share of renewables should increase to 30% by 2030. As things stand, the quota is only 6.2%. This still shows a 4% increase over the last seven years, but the growth estimate was clearly far too optimistic. Just four years after the EXPO, the target value has been halved.

A scenario in which Kazakhstan fails to meet its 2060 targets remains entirely plausible. The Climate Action Tracker has voiced similar concerns, rating the country’s climate policies as ‘insufficient,’ noting that ‘emissions will continue to rise until at least 2035 under current policies.‘ The lack of genuine political will to tackle the issue is perhaps best illustrated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s abrupt change of stance. Speaking at a forum of the National Council for Science and Technology on September 26, Tokayev underscored the continued importance of coal and made a striking remark about climate change:

‘frankly, everything that is happening looks like a large-scale fraud.’

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The post Carbon neutral by 2060? Kazakhstan’s green pledge faces a reality check appeared first on Novastan English.

Traffic congestion is a major problem in urban centres around the world, as vehicle emissions pollute air quality and cause significant environmental and health issues. Central Asian governments have been slow to adapt to this reality. Although local authorities in several major cities are trying to turn the tide by investing in prestigious rail projects, including light rail and metro, urban transit options remain limited overall. A Novastan review of urban public transport developments in Central Asia.

Twice a day during peak hours, Dushanbe, the capital city of Tajikistan, grinds to a halt as its broad Soviet-era boulevards are clogged with traffic. The city faces significant congestion issues, exacerbated by a population that has doubled since gaining independence from the USSR in 1991. Car ownership has increased even faster, doubling over the past decade. Existing infrastructure is unable to keep up with this rapid growth and resulting environmental problems caused by vehicle emissions have severely impacted air quality in Dushanbe.

To deal with the challenges of rapid urbanisation, city authorities are exploring options to build a metro system. Domestic know-how on building this infrastructure is virtually non-existent, which is why the government has reached out to South Korea. In 2022, Tajikistan’s transport ministry signed a memorandum of understanding with the South Korean National Railway Corporation to assess the feasibility of the project. Novastan reported earlier that the ministry expects to start detailed planning for the construction of what would be Dushanbe’s first metro line in mid-2025.

Urban rail has clear benefits over, for example, buses or trolleybuses, in that trams and metros are more effective in reducing traffic congestion and air pollution, and have a much higher capacity than most other modes of transport. Moreover, they are a sign of progress, which is why many urban rail developments are often also prestige projects. However, a metro system cannot replace city buses and other less flashy forms of public transportation, particularly in areas where building urban rail is not economically viable.

Trolleybuses – an endangered species?

In Naryn, a provincial capital in central Kyrgyzstan, for example, local lawmakers recently decided to dismantle their city’s trolleybus system. Located at an altitude of just over two thousand meters, Naryn boasted the highest trolleybus network in the world. Hence it was a source of local pride and a tourist attraction among public transport aficionados. However, due to the deteriorating condition of the infrastructure, as well as high maintenance costs, the city council voted to discontinue service. As a replacement, there are plans to purchase ten diesel buses, which will obviously contribute to air pollution. 

The decision to abandon the Naryn trolleybus system follows last year’s announcement that Bishkek would do away with its large trolleybus fleet. A recent longread by the Kazakh media outlet Vlast highlights that this decision faced significant backlash, as Kyrgyzstan’s government had received long-term financial support from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to upgrade the network. For reasons unclear, the local authorities opted to replace the fleet with new electric buses, a transition co-financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). To prevent violating the credit agreement with the EBRD, “Bishkek’s mayor’s office said it paid off the EBRD loan, essentially making the city pay two loans for one mode of public transport since the trolleybuses were halted on November 8.” 

Read more on Novastan: Last stop – Bishkeks trolleybuses on the brink of extinction (in German)

Authorities decided to transfer most of the old trolleybus fleet to other cities in Kyrgyzstan, a move many critics have called “a distraction for the inadequacy of the whole project.” Vlast already reported that the transfer of these buses “greatly exceeds the local demand and the capacity for local infrastructure to absorb them.” Still, around one hundred trolleybuses were transported to Osh, the country’s second-largest city, which now operates the country’s only remaining trolleybus network. There was also talk of moving buses and infrastructure, such as electrical substations, to Batken, Kara-Balta, and Tokmok – none of which have any active trolleybus lines. Naryn also received six trolleybuses, even though these proved no longer needed after the recent city council decision to permanently abandon the system. In the end, most vehicles will likely end up rusting away in local storages. Meanwhile, Bishkek activists have launched a legal effort to preserve the city’s trolleybus network from total dismantling.

A UN commission estimated that trolleybuses cost cities forty percent less than operating electric buses. Yet, local governments in Central Asia are forced to improvise if they wish to take back control over public transport in their cities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, funding for municipal transportations systems virtually evaporated. The decline of public transit gave rise to privately-owned alternatives such as informally-operated minibuses, commonly known as marshrutkas. These minibuses largely followed well-established bus routes, but have the additional advantage of being able to navigate narrow and bumpier roads in city suburbs and other outlying neighbourhoods, something which trolleybuses obviously cannot. In short, the marshrutkas offer far better service that people are willing to pay for.

Read more on Novastan: Change through mobility – the marshrutka project (in German)

Another challenge to urban public transport in Central Asia is the rise of ride-hailing apps, such as YandexGo. In comparison to other intra-city transit options, ridesharing apps generally offer greater convenience and comfort. An article by The Diplomat explains how in cities and towns not yet serviced by YandexGo, taxi services which charge fares based on a standardised meter have grown in popularity. “To utilize these services, customers have to phone a call center, where they are connected to an operator who asks where they are currently located, where they want to go, and other logistical questions like number of passengers or luggage needs. The operator then connects the caller directly to a driver, who asks many of the same questions but with more detail, and usually will give an estimated wait time.”

The return of the tram

But not only trolleybuses have fallen victim to the erosion of public transit in Central Asia. Trams have also grown increasingly rare. Tashkent, for example, had one of the biggest tram networks in the former Soviet Union until it was gradually dismantled in the early 21st century. The last route closed down in 2016 and most trams were transported to Samarkand, where one year later – in 2017 – a ‘new’ tram system opened using much of the old Tashkent tram infrastructure. Meanwhile, in Tashkent, the authorities already seem to regret their decision to dismantle their once great tram network. According to the Uzbek news outlet Kun.uz, a plan for bringing back tram service in Tashkent was agreed upon during President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s recent visit to France on March 12, with the French firm Alstom reportedly set to construct a nearly ten kilometre long tram line.

There are only a handful of active tram networks left in Central Asia, most of which are in dire need of maintenance. In Öskemen, formerly known as Ust-Kamenogorsk, the unofficial capital of eastern Kazakhstan, tram operations were suspended in 2018 as the operator went bankrupt. Yet, with the help of the regional government, operations could be resumed later that year, after a number of old Almaty trams were transferred to Öskemen. Infrastructure repair works have since begun, and, in 2022, an order was placed for additional rolling stock at a Belarussian firm. 

Up north, the city of Pavlodar boasts the largest tram system in Kazakhstan. The city successfully navigated the post-Soviet collapse of public transport in Central Asia, and authorities are even exploring options to expand the network. In doing so, the EBRD announced in 2024 that it would provide a loan to the Pavlodar tram management company to fund the purchase of battery-powered trams capable of operating without overhead catenary lines, thereby lowering infrastructure maintenance costs. 

Also in the city of Temirtau, home to the largest steel factory in Kazakhstan, new Chinese-made trams were recently commissioned into service after a brief suspension of operations following a series of overhead line thefts. The city’s single tram line is now operated by JSC Qarmet, the owner of the steel plant, and mainly serves to transport employees to and from the factory. However, the new trams may not meet with approval from everyone. In an interview with a local news website, users complained about poor visibility from the windows. A director of one of the companies involved in the recommissioning of the Temirtau tramline wittingly replied that “Temirtau is beautiful in its own way in the dark, so it’s better not to look at it” – a joke referring to the city’s notorious reputation as one of the ugliest and most polluted cities in Kazakhstan. 

Visions of modernity: light rail & metro

All jokes aside, public investments in the region’s few remaining tram networks are rare. Instead, city authorities across Central Asia have abandoned existing systems without providing proper alternatives, forcing people into overcrowded city buses or privately-owned marshrutkas. But now that urban rail seems to gain traction in Central Asia, regional governments appear to prefer light rail and metro options, both of which are generally more expensive and more complex to construct, operate, and maintain than trams.

Currently, only Tashkent and Almaty have metro systems. In Tashkent, construction of the first line started in 1972, six years after a devastating earthquake had leveled most of the city. Since then, the network has expanded to four lines, around fifty stations and an annual ridership of several hundred million. There are a couple of plans for further expansion, and the construction of an important circle line is currently ongoing. For those passionate about urban rail, the Tashkent metro is an absolute must-see. It is the archetype of urban rail in Central Asia. Most Soviet-era stations are lavishly designed and decorated, with the architecture and decor of each station reflecting its name. 

By contrast, the Almaty metro consists of a single line. Although construction started in the late 1980s, the newly independent government of Kazakhstan was unable to finish the project after funds from Moscow dried up following the collapse of the USSR. Construction resumed in the 2000s, and most of the Almaty tram network was disassembled in anticipation of the metro’s opening in 2011. In retrospect, a strange decision considering the fact that the tram lines followed different routes than the new metro line, had way more stops, and hence would have been a great supplement to the metro system. Similar to Tashkent, there are ambitious plans to revive the Almaty tram – albeit now as a light rail.  

This year, the region will also see the long-awaited opening of the Astana light rail, or light metro, connecting the city’s airport with the main train station. Construction of this system started back in 2011, but was put on hold multiple times because of problems with funding and a corruption scandal, in which “officials and Astana LRT [light rail transit] executives had inflated contracts and embezzled the difference, which a court later heard ran to 5.8 billion tenge ($13 million at current exchange rates).” For many years, a series of massive concrete pillars stood as silent reminders of the unfinished project, until in 2023, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev ordered it to be completed. Meanwhile, the Kazakh news outlet Orda.kz reports that the search for those involved in the embezzlement of public funds is still ongoing.

The crucial role of regional governments

In short, most problems related to public transportation in Central Asia are the result of poor planning and haphazard decision-making. Regional governments have largely failed to take back control over public transit in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although in some major cities, such as Dushanbe, there is discussion about developing modern light rail and metro systems, basic public transport options, such as (trolley)buses, remain inadequate. In fact, in many cities, big and small, these services are still being whittled away. 

Apart from such infrastructure-related issues, a World Bank specialist concluded that the poor state of public transit in Central Asian cities is also in large part “due to regulated fixed fares (which are insufficient to meet operating expenses), a high number of fare exemptions for multiple categories of people, and the inability to provide state subsidies on a stable basis.” As such, local authorities are not only part of the problem – they also hold the key to improving urban mobility. 

Text and photos by Julian Postulart

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Navigating the gridlock: Central Asia’s struggle with urban public transit appeared first on Novastan English.

Over thirty years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, colonial influences persist in Kazakhstan. Russian remains widely spoken and serves as the primary language for interethnic communication. As language is a vital symbol of national identity, the enduring linguistic prominence of Russian poses a significant challenge to fully decolonising Kazakh identity. However, the invasion of Ukraine has spurred a young, urban middle class to confront these imperial remnants by reclaiming their native language.

Russia’s colonial war against Ukraine has sent shockwaves throughout Central Asia. Moscow’s emphasis on historical, cultural and linguistic connections makes other former Soviet republics feel increasingly uncomfortable. 

Especially in Kazakhstan, home to a sizable ethnic Russian population, many fear that their country could be next on the Kremlin’s list. These concerns are not unfounded. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russian propagandists have repeatedly voiced thin-veiled threats about annexing parts of their southern neighbour. 

Moreover, after partial mobilisation was announced in Russia in September 2022, hundreds of thousands of predominantly young men fled across the border into Kazakhstan. Their arrival has exacerbated existing concerns, and magnified domestic tensions between social groups that identify themselves differently.  

Although over the past three decades, Kazakhstan’s government has attempted to forge a new national identity, Russian influence remains. Since the conquest of the Kazakh steppe in the 19th century by tsarist forces, the lands and the people inhabiting the territory of modern-day Kazakhstan were shaped by imperial rule. First by the Russian Empire, then by the Soviet Union. 

In the 20th century, forced collectivisation uprooted traditional lifestyles and led to famine. Countless people flocked to towns and cities in a desperate search for food and work, places which themselves were colonial spaces, dominated by imperial infrastructure and buildings. Rapid urbanisation and industrialisation have scarred the landscape and still cause pollution and environmental and health problems to this very day. 

Russia’s linguistic legacy

But apart from these more abstract, postcolonial realities, there is the pertinent yet controversial issue of language. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many have grown painfully aware of the influence Russia still exerts over Kazakhstan through language. 

Over thirty years after independence, Russian remains the country’s main interethnic language. Political scientist Dossym Satpayev, in a piece for Chatham House, writes that Russification policies in the colonial era suppressed the Kazakh language so thoroughly that most forgot how to speak their native tongue. As the de facto official language of the USSR, speaking Russian was key to social mobility. 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the benefits of learning the Kazakh language remained negligible. Although Kazakh is the state language, and Russian a mere ‘official’ language, in reality, Russian-speakers still enjoyed significant privileges and advantages. Until recently, insufficient knowledge of spoken Kazakh was hardly considered a problem, as Russian proficiency was enough to live a comfortable life, especially in the north and in the cities, where most of Kazakhstan’s Russian-speaking population is concentrated.

In education, Russian has been more advantageous for increasing the possibilities to study at renowned schools and universities in Russia, partly because of the availability of a broader range of academic resources. Similarly, career-wise, Russian speakers have traditionally had more job opportunities. By contrast, Kazakh was viewed as backward and inferior, as sociologist Azamat Junisbai remembers how, while growing up, he associated the Kazakh language exclusively as rural, uncultured and of low status.

Read more on Novastan: “Alaqan” – Aida Adilbek’s decolonial documentary cinema

Fear for antagonising Moscow

Initially, Kazakhstan’s government made little effort to support the elevation of the Kazakh language. Policymakers were concerned that such a stance would feed into rising Kazakh nationalism, which in turn could endanger the country’s inter-ethnic stability. 

So, from the 1990s onwards, it chose to counter early national-patriotic movements by prioritising the development of a Kazakhstani civic identity. This civic identity, epitomised by the slogan ‘unity in diversity,’ sought to rally all people of Kazakhstan around the flag of the newly independent republic, regardless of ethnicity. 

However, the main threat to inter-ethnic stability did not emanate from Kazakh nationalism, nor from the country’s sizable Russian minority. As a matter of fact, Astana’s stance on the issue was long guided by the fear that, should it have followed a more ethno-national course, Kazakhstan would have risked antagonising its northern neighbour. 

Demographics driving change

Meanwhile, it was increasingly difficult for the government to balance the national interest against grassroots calls for the strengthening of Kazakh ethnic identity. After independence, millions of Russians left Kazakhstan, dramatically changing the country’s demographic make-up. Kazakhs now form a clear majority. They are the country’s fastest–growing ethnic group, and their proportion of the total population is only expected to increase. 

Satpayev, in his contribution for Chatham House, argues that the strengthening of national-patriotic sentiments and movements is occurring organically. Based on demographic trends, support for a Kazakh ethnic identity will continue to grow, while the use of the Russian language is expected to decline.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine catalysed societal developments resulting from these demographic developments, which are shaping current and future political preferences. Not so long ago, the debate on national identity was quite marginal, predominantly talked about among small-circles of Kazakh-speaking intellectual elites. The war has caused this discussion to spillover into public domain, with an ever-increasing number of people rediscovering what it means to be Kazakh in the context of persistent colonial legacies.

Language as a decolonial tool

Language possibly is the most enduring bastion of Russian influence in Kazakhstan. In an episode of RFE/RL’s Majlis Podcast, sociologist Junisbai discusses how older generations primarily engage with Russian media, which makes them more susceptible to Russian propaganda. Consequently, the idea of so-called benevolent colonialism still is widespread among the elderly. Many believe that Kazakhstan owes much to foreign rule, such as industrialisation and modernisation. 

Read more on Novastan: Pressure from Russia increases on Central Asian media outlets

This sentiment is not shared with younger generations. They have no living memory of the Soviet Union, and seek to undo the final vestiges of Russian and Soviet colonialism in pursuit of a new Kazakh identity. For them, language is a tool for decolonisation. On the streets, for example, this is reflected in the growing popularity of fashion brand Qazaq Republic. This company, famous for its trendy clothing and other merchandise with patriotic Kazakh and English language slogans, owes much of its success to ongoing societal developments.

In an article by media outlet The Diplomat, Biybaris Seitak — founder of a popular Kazakh language Instagram channel Kazakh Bubble — says that the Russian invasion of Ukraine made many Kazakhs realise “that speaking Kazakh was a matter of national security.” The war has made them feel uncomfortable talking about decolonisation in the language of the former coloniser. 

Hence, Russia’s invasion caused many to put words into deeds. The popularity of Kazakh language schools and clubs has exploded, and Kazakhstan’s government has jumped the bandwagon by introducing new plans promoting the Kazakh language.

Even though President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has stated that the proposed alphabet reform, which would see the transition of written Kazakh from Cyrcillic to a Latin-based script, should not be ‘rushed’, he has introduced several other plans for a more independent language policy. These include a mandatory Kazakh language test for people wanting to obtain citizenship, a draft plan for a new media law to increase the use of the Kazakh language, and education reforms aimed at boosting Kazakh proficiency. 

An unstoppable development

Yet, fears of backlash remain. The growing importance of Kazakh could alienate the non-Kazakh speaking population, such as the country’s still significant Russian minority. Satpayev, in his work for Chatham House, described that these people could feel ‘trapped’ or even discriminated against. A conflict of identities looms, heightening the risk of radicalisation and pro-Russian separatism which could trigger a response from Moscow.

Read more on Novastan: “An escalating manifestation of Russophobia” – Kazakhstan at the epicentre of an information war

Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia used the perceived infringement of Russians’ rights abroad to intervene in neighbouring countries, either diplomatically, economically or militarily. However, chances of Russia invading Kazakhstan for the promotion of the Kazakh language are slim. Moscow is preoccupied on other fronts and, more importantly, it needs Kazakhstan for economic reasons, including for the import of dual-use goods that help Russia sustain its war effort against Ukraine. 

In short, neither Astana nor Moscow is in the position to stop the growing importance of the Kazakh language in Kazakhstan, even if they wanted to. The war in Ukraine and tensions with the West are currently constraining any meaningful Russian response. In parallel, demography is pushing Tokayev’s government ever-closer towards embracing a more ethno-centric national identity. What the future holds remains to be seen. Yet, as long as this geopolitical reality persists, the decolonisation of Kazakhstan is expected to continue. 

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post The Lexicon of Kazakh Decolonisation appeared first on Novastan English.

Temirlan Yensebek, creator and author of “Qaznews24,” an agency of satirical news, has been detained on Saturday in Almaty. He is expected to stand trial under accusations of incitement of hatred. The court placed Yensebek in custody for the duration of the preliminary investigation. If convicted, he is facing up to 7 years in prison.

Civil activist and blogger Temirlan Yensebek, author of satirical media account Qaznews24, which masks as a news agency, was apprehended on Saturday afternoon at this home during a search. The same evening he stood a preliminary hearing and left the courthouse in handcuffs. The activist remains in custody for the next two months, until the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

Yensebek’s lawyer Zhanar Balgabaeva told journalists that the reason for the arrest was the comic song “Yo, orystar” (“Yo, Russians”), which Yensebek added to a satirical post about Russian TV presenter Tina Kandelaki. A representative of the public prosecutor’s office filed a complaint about the post, which set events in motion.

Read more on Novastan: Pressure from Russia increases on Central Asian media outlets

Satire under scrutiny

Qaznews24 can be seen as a Kazakh analog of “The Onion” – a popular instagram page which publishes satirical pieces and perky comments on current affairs and social issues. Since its founding in 2021, Qaznews24 has featured dozens of posts about poverty, corruption, nepotism, and idolization of the powerful, laughing out conspiracy theorists, moralising hypocrits and sycophants in politics.

Although the page openly states its satirical orientation in every post, its content frequently causes confusion as the reports are being mistaken for real news. In 2021, Yensebek was accused of spreading misinformation and, after a search in his house, brought to the police office for questioning. Police issued a statement that Qaznews24 content was “disinforming the population and misleading the citizens,” labeling Yensebek as a fake news creator.

Yensebek’s colleagues then started a campaign called “Satire is not a crime,” demanding to stop the prosecution and ensure freedom of speech, which is guaranteed in the Kazakhstan Constitution. The campaign was supported by international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch. After linguistic experts showed that humoristic content cannot be qualified as knowingly false information, the case was closed.

However, as recent events have shown, the authorities were not finished with Qaznews24 just yet.

“New Kazakhstan,” old methods

On Saturday, 18 January 2025, Yensebek’s house was searched again – this time under the pretext of Temirlan “inciting ethnic hatred.” He was then brought to the police station and faced a short evening trial. The judge mandated his detention for two months pending completion of a preliminary investigation. This is the harshest option provided by law.

After two months of investigation, Yesenbek will likely await another trial. If found guilty, he could be facing a penalty varying from a fine to restriction of freedom for a period of 2 to 7 years, to imprisonment for the same period.

Sunday, January 19, saw a new development to the story. Journalist and ex-editor-in-chief of art and culture web-portal Art of Her, Rus Biketov, went out on a solitary picket in support of Yensebek in Almaty. He was immediately apprehended by the police. On the same day, Biketov was sentenced to 15 days detention for violating the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the procedure for organizing and holding peaceful assemblies.

No laughing matter

Historically, Kazakhstan has never scored high on ratings measuring freedom of expression and freedom of the press. According to Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net report, Kazakhstan has a score of 34 out of 100, placing it in the “not free” category. RSF World Press Freedom Index puts Kazakhstan on place 142 out of 180, falling from place 134 in 2023. Global Expression Report defines Kazakhstan as “highly restricted.”

A slight improvement on the Freedom of Expression index from V-Dem Project does not really change the overall picture. This index shows the “[b]est estimate of the extent to which people can discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, the press, and media are free and can present different political perspectives, and the freedom of academic and cultural expression,” and Kazakhstan’s score of 0,43/1 can be described as mediocre at best.

Read more on Novastan: In Central Asia, the Freedom of Press is in Decline

The prosecution of dissidents is not new either. Indeed, Kazakh authorities have shown a considerable lack of humor – and mostly, inability to take valid criticism – on various occasions already. One might wonder how in a country where police uses torture against protesters and organized crime is on the rise, a satirical account poses the greatest threat. Yet, in reality, this crackdown on satire is all but inconsequential. The idea is not to fight the greatest evil, but to target those who dared to speak up about it.

While the situation with Temirlan Yensebek might look absurd, his detention illustrates a concerning development in restricting freedom of the speech. More importantly, it aims to send a clear warning to civil society. As Factcheck.kz editor Adil Jalilov writes in his column, “the expected result of the arrest and criminal case against QazNews24 author Temirlan Yensebek . . . [is], [o]bviously, an increased self-censorship in the entire media community.”

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post When Freedom of Speech Is a Joke: Author of a Satirical News Outlet Detained in Kazakhstan appeared first on Novastan English.

For many years, relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have been fraught with tension. Some analysts even dubbed the ties between the two countries a Central Asian ‘cold war’. But luckily, things are slowly improving. The return of the Tashkent-Dushanbe night train is a testament to this bilateral thaw. The new rail service connecting both capitals is, in many ways, a miniature of the past, present, and future of Uzbek-Tajik relations. 

“Your phone, please”, one officer demands. As the only man in the kupe, a train compartment, the border guards summoned me into the corridor. Reluctantly I let the officer scroll through the pictures I took during my brief visit to Uzbekistan. Pornography, photos of government buildings, military installations – whatever he is looking for, the man finds none. 

As he returns my phone, some of his colleagues enter the train to look for contraband and other prohibited items. Luggage is thoroughly searched, as well as the train’s interior. Some ceiling panels are removed and part of the flooring is opened up to examine if anything is hidden underneath. 

Despite Uzbek authorities having relaxed customs procedures over the past years, the border crossings with Tajikistan remain an uncomfortable exception. But relations between the two countries have improved significantly over the past few years. Travelling aboard the direct Tashkent-Dushanbe night train shows the slow fruition of this regional detente.

15:47 – Tashkent

Some thirteen hours earlier, my travel companion and I boarded the train at Tashkent’s central station. It was mid-May and with temperatures well over thirty degrees Celsius, our kupe was unbearably hot. Although the ticket agent had promised us air-conditioning, the one in our wagon was not working this afternoon. With sweat dripping down my back, a young Tajik mother asked if I could help her store her large suitcase. 

Nodira and her toddler son would be our cabin companions for the night, travellig to Dushanbe for a family visit. Although Tajik by birth, Nodira often pendles between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Her husband owns a suitcase shop in Tashkent, yet she prefers the tranquil mountains of native Tajikistan over the hustle and bustle of the Uzbek capital. For a time, Nodira thought of running her own business as a professional make-up artist on Instagram, though it was no longer acceptable after becoming a married woman, she tells us. 

Ever since, Nodira has embraced a more conservative lifestyle, focusing on religion, her three children, and running the household. Tajik society is deeply patriarchal and gender roles remain traditional. However, for Nodira, social media has an important emancipatory function. It helps her learn a little English and connect with the outside world through her followers, mostly in Russian. In fact, she has become quite the influencer since our meeting on the sweltering night train. Thousands of people watch her videos in which she prepares classic Central Asian recipes in her kitchen. 

20:40 – Samarkand

Just after sunset, we made a brief call at Samarkand. The city’s magnificent architecture still reflects its historical significance as a leading centre of Persian civilisation. But Samarkand’s legacy is also highly contentious.

For centuries, the Tajik language – a variety of modern Persian – has been Samarkand’s lingua franca. However, this position has come under increasing pressure since Uzbekistan’s independence. Eurasianet writes that former President Islam Karimov seemed intent on erasing the city’s Tajik roots. 

Many in Tajikistan, however, still see Samarkand as inextricably linked to their ethnic and cultural identity. The issue of Samarkand dates back to the 1920s when the city was made part of the Uzbek SSR under the Soviets’ policy of national delimitation. In 2009, Tajik President Imomali Rahmon told journalists that in a brawl with Karimov, he had threatened to take back Samarkand by force. 

Interestingly, a significant number of Tajik speakers in Uzbekistan hold more nuanced views about their ethnicity. Research about this topic found that “many people speak a language as their vernacular language while identifying themselves with the ‘other’ ethnic group in daily life.” In the same study, Persian-speaking respondents from Samarkand primarily see themselves as Samarkandi, rather than Tajik. 

On the other hand, for people like Nodira who are multilingual and have mixed families, local, national, and ethnic identities overlap. The new rail connection also has a significant symbolic function as a token of regional interconnectedness. In many ways, the hard border between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan was a historical anomaly, in that it divided a continuous cultural and linguistic space.

05:53 – Border 

After the Uzbek border guard returns my phone and the customs officials exit the train, we ride into no-man’s land. As we accelerate, I notice that at some point during the night, we have traded our silent, electric locomotive for a noisy diesel enginge. A gust of black smoke occasionally enters through the open windows – an unfortunate tradeoff for ventilation against the heat.  

As the train pulls out of the Uzbek customs zone, we pass high walls and concrete barriers, manned guard towers, and barbed wire. Suddenly, this militarised border zone gives way to green fields, off-roading Ladas, and even some rice paddies. Despite the early hour, whole families are out working the land. Some wave to the passing train.

Indeed, a passenger train on these tracks remains a rare sight. Since independence, ordinary Uzbeks and Tajiks have been caught in the crosshairs of bilateral tensions. Lengthy examinations and searches, considerable red tape and frequent border closures had a significant impact on travel and trade. Relations between the two countries were mired in suspicion and distrust.

Uzbekistan even had parts of the border area mined, allegedly to prevent militant Islamist groups from entering the country. Hundreds of people, mostly local farmers, were killed or injured in landmine explosions. After Shavkat Mirziyoyev succeeded Karimov in 2016 as president of Uzbekistan, clearing the minefields was a top priority in his pursuit of better ties with Tajikistan.

Read more on Novastan: Moscow attacks highlight Tajikistan’s radicalisation problem

With most of the obstacles removed, the task remains to rebuild the political, economic, and cultural ties that were virtually destroyed over the past 30 years. The return of the Tashkent-Dushanbe night train, as the first passenger rail connection between the two capitals since the collapse of the Soviet Union, is a testament to this ambition.

09:41 – Dushanbe

On April 18 this year, Mirziyoyev and Rahmon signed a ‘Treaty on Allied Relations’ in Dushanbe. The treaty consists of 28 documents covering various areas of cooperation, ranging from cross-border trade to food safety, and from fostering intercultural exchange to transport and communication. 

In a statement, the President of Uzbekistan declared that bilateral relations between the countries had “risen to an unprecedented level”. Uzbek news website Darya.uz wrote that developing new transit corridors was among the leaders’ priorities. The Diplomat previously reported that, since coming to power, Mirziyoyev has pushed for new rail projects to bolster regional integration.

Read more on Novastan: Railway between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to be electrified

But it might take some time before this treaty will bear fruit. For now, Dushanbe is all but a regional transport hub. The railway station of Tajikistan’s capital city has the allure of that of a provincial town. Aside from the Tashkent-Dushanbe night train, the only other international connection that departs from here is the weekly ride to Volgograd – often packed with Tajik migrant workers heading to Russia. 

On the platform, we part ways with Nodira. Although we thoroughly enjoyed the journey, she is of a different opinion. With a small child, the train ride is much more comfortable than the shorter but mountainous route by road. However, the train takes twice as long to travel between the two capitals. Regional transport links still have a long way to go. Nodira concludes that she might as well take the car next time. 

Written by Julian Postulart, editor of Novastan English

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The post Night train to Dushanbe – a travelogue of Uzbek-Tajik relations appeared first on Novastan English.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Kyrgyz Republic has been considered an island of democracy in a largely autocratic region. However, the latest administration has spent the last two years reshaping the country into a populist ethno-state. 

This text was originally published on 18 October 2023 by our partner media outlet Lossi36.

One of the first groups targeted by the country’s current president Sadyr Japarov in his nationalistic agenda was the media. This is a common tactic by those with dreams of total control and has provided Japarov with the foundation to pass a series of deleterious legislation for the once proud democratic stronghold. As more independent media outlets continue to become targets, the prospects of preventing this backsliding become increasingly grim. 

Weaponizing legislation

In August 2021, the “On Protection from Inaccurate (False) Information” law was passed in the Kyrgyz Republic. This legislation, part of Japarov’s larger “spiritual-moral development” agenda, gave Kyrgyz officials the authority to suspend the activity of any online portal that shares false information or that “defames the honour, dignity and business reputation of another person.” The vagueness of the law allows nearly anyone who disagrees with a publication to bring a case against the publisher. 

The implications of the legislation are extremely dangerous as government officials could easily use this law to bring claims against whistleblowers of corruption and prevent them from speaking out. Unfortunately, this is only one of a slew of laws that breach the right to freedom of the press in the Kyrgyz Republic. 

Among these laws was a new directive to impose fines on those who distribute “harmful information” in an effort to protect children. Much like previous laws, the wording of the legislation is extremely vague, employing language such as “denying family values” or “justifying violence,” concepts open to a number of interpretations, making it a perfect tool for targeted censorship.

In the fall of 2022, Japarov’s administration went a step further in attacking the freedom of press through targeted amendments to the “Law on Mass Media.” Among the proposed reforms were penalties for “abuse of freedom of speech” and a prohibition on foreign nationals from opening media outlets in the Kyrgyz Republic. This law is still under discussion and many drafts of the law have been scrapped following public discussion. However, many in the media sphere are already preparing for the worst, especially those who have already been shut down through the law on inaccurate information.

Guilty of stating the facts

Expectedly, the writers of this legislation have been quick to employ it to shut down their perceived enemies within the media sphere. Member of Parliament Nadira Narmatova, who has also proposed punishing organisers of women’s marches and banning TikTok, has been a particularly staunch advocate for this crackdown on media freedoms. In October 2023, Narmatova launched a petition calling for the closure of Azattyk, Kloop, and Kaktus.Media. Since then, the majority of them have been temporarily blocked in the country. 

Read more on Novastan: Closure of Radio Azattyk sparks discontent from civil society and international human rights activists

In November 2022, Azattyk became the first victim to have its bank accounts frozen and access to its site blocked. Azattyk was shut down using the inaccurate information law with the claim that one of their videos was inciting “ethnic hatred.” The video in question covered the armed conflict on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, which many Kyrgyz government officials believed to be more sympathetic to Tajikistan. The government later blocked Azattyk’s bank account in early 2023 utilising the loose phrasing of the  law “On countering the financing of terrorist activities and the legalisation (laundering) of criminal proceeds.” While the decision to close down Azattyk was ultimately annulled in July 2023, the use of this law to at least temporarily shut down a reputable news site set a new precedent. 

The next major independent media outlet targeted was Kloop, which was presented with a lawsuit in August 2023 for engaging in journalism despite being registered as an NGO. Among other unsubstantiated claims, Kloop was also tried for encouraging “sexual deviancy” and suicidal ideation by increasing stress levels in its readers. In actuality, Kloop regularly posts fact-checked articles that reveal cases of corruption among government officials and businessmen in the Kyrygz Republic. Many of these articles target the president, who has also publicly stated his distaste for the organisation. 

Read more on Novastan: In Central Asia, the Freedom of Press is in Decline

Kloop was eventually shut down on 13 September by the Kyrgyz Republic’s Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports and Youth Policy after refusing to pull the offending articles. Despite the shutdown, Kloop remained steadfast in their position, posting a defiant response to their website stating, “We, in turn, will not stop our work for a minute, no matter how much pressure the Kyrgyz authorities put on us. We will continue to inform you about everything important that is happening in our country, no matter how uncomfortable it may be for those in power.” Kloop also provided links for their followers on other platforms still reachable in the Kyrgyz Republic. 

Established news sites have not been the only victims of this campaign against the freedom of the press. In the last two years, over 30 bloggers, journalists, and activists have been jailed for speaking out against the government. Notable were the arrests of 27 members of the “Kempir-Abad Defence Committee” who were detained for just meeting to discuss their opposition to the Kempir-Abad negotiations in October 2022. Earlier that year, another well-known blogger and human rights activist, Bolot Temirov, was detained and stripped of his citizenship after posting videos to his YouTube channel investigating cases of corruption in the government under murky suspicions of fraud. 

Cultivating troll farms 

Not surprising, amidst this crackdown, the amount of pro-government misinformation has increased precipitously. One of the main offenders has been the Kyrgyz National Television and Radio Corporation (NTRC), which has reportedly created a number of bot accounts that have attacked opposition leaders. There also appears to be several troll farms functioning to post content solely propping up the current administration, including the Telegram channel za.sadyr.zhaparov which regularly posts about all of the ways Japarov is improving the country. The government has also arranged staged press conferences to drum up support for more controversial legislation. 

Read more on Novastan: Kyrgyzstan: Journalists complain about attempts to hack their accounts

While the international community calls for the Kyrgyz Republic to stop breaching the freedoms of their citizens, Kyrgyz officials have continued to sharpen their sticks. Soon new legislation will be passed that will give Japarov carte blanche to overturn any decision of the Constitutional Court that he deems immoral. Given the lengths that Japarov has already gone to silence those who oppose him, he will undoubtedly make full use of this new power once granted. As the situation in the country continues to deteriorate, one of the few forms of recourse that remains is to somehow find a way to reach his base in the rural regions of the Kyrgyz Republic and show them how this legislation can affect them as well. 

Sydney Millar for Lossi36

Novastan update:

During the plenary session on March 14, 2024, the deputies of the Kyrgyz Parliament Zhogorku Kengesh adopted in the third reading the bill “On Foreign Representatives”, which amends the Law “On Non-Profit Organizations”.

According to the bill, non-profit organizations that receive funds from abroad and carry out so-called “political” activities will be recorded in a special register as “foreign representatives”. These non-profit organizations (18,500 in the country in total) must submit additional reports every six months on their activities and the members of their governing bodies. They must also provide a description of the content they produce and/or distribute, indicating where it comes from and where it is intended to be sent or distributed.

The law gives authorities broad surveillance powers and poses an additional challenge for many independent media outlets, which rely on donations, grant funding, and financial support from international media foundations. The bill was criticized by the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR), the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and media and civil society representatives, but to no avail.

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The post Leaving the island: Japarov’s campaign to silence independent media appeared first on Novastan English.