Last April, Kyrgyzstan’s special forces carried out heavy-handed raids on two of Bishkek’s most popular electronic-music bars. Expecting a hotspot of drugs and illicit activity, officers found instead a young, diverse nightlife community carving out one of Bishkek’s few remaining safe spaces for self-expression. After a year marked by escalated repression and shrinking civil liberties in Central Asia’s “island of democracy,” Novastan sits down with two leading figures from the targeted venues to discuss how their communities endure as Kyrgyzstan slides deeper into authoritarianism.

Kyrgyzstan has long been seen beyond Central Asia as a rare abode of democratic values in a region dominated by post-Soviet authoritarianism. When Sadyr Japarov, the country’s current president, suddenly rose to power in the wake of the 2020 Kyrgyz Revolution, he swore to the nation from day one to protect the Kyrgyz people’s cherished liberty. Four years later, the president himself has emerged as the largest threat to Kyrgyzstan’s already fragile democracy.

Japarov’s governance in just the first two years of his rule landed Kyrgyzstan on the 2022 Freedom House Index’s list of “consolidated authoritarian regimes.” In 2024, Kyrgyzstan earned a position on the CIVICUS Monitor’s “watchlist of countries experiencing a rapid decline in civic freedoms.” At the heart of Japarov’s consolidation of power lies the systematic erosion of Kyrgyzstan’s already flimsy freedom of expression. Japarov has frequently deployed his power over state institutions to stifle dissent in both political and civic spheres. An unlikely casualty of the crackdown has been Bishkek’s emerging techno scene.

Japarov’s Techno Raids

On the night of 14 April 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s special forces, working alongside local police, raided Ailan Bar to conduct a search for illegal substance use at electronic music gatherings. In addition to heavy firearms and drugs tests, the police brought along a professional camera crew to document the raid for their social media page. The following night, another raid was done at PLUR, another of Bishkek’s techno institutions, in a similar fashion. Both bars are central to Bishkek’s electronic music scene and known throughout the city for providing above all else a “safe space” for all partygoers, regardless of background. 

In both instances, officers drew their weapons and forced the men present to lie on the floor with their hands behind their backs while they searched the venues. According to RFE/RL, police assaulted several people at Ailan Bar, striking one in the leg and another in the stomach.

In both raids, police were noted to be genuinely surprised with the minimal amount of illicit substances they were able to sniff out. At Ailan Bar, officers opened the raid with a lecture on “irresponsible drug use,” a message that fell flat when only three of the dozens present tested positive for cannabis use. The police statement regarding that night notes they were only able to find “a ready-made cigarette with narcotics” and a packet of a legal anti-epilepsy medication.

The lack of significant narcotics did not surprise Chyngyz, one of Ailan Bar’s directors and part-owners. “Our community is quite healthy in that sense,” he asserted. Chyngyz explained that like himself, the vast majority of those who enjoy techno music in Bishkek do not use illegal substances at their parties. “I think if people truly love electronic music, they don’t need drugs.”

Read More on Novastan: Inside Bishkek’s Metal Boom: Portrait of a Music Pioneer in Kyrgyzstan

Unlike most patrons to Bishkek’s techno venues, some of the police involved with the raid were later revealed to be engaging in illegal activities themselves. “In the fall, I read in the news that one of the investigators present at the raid got charged with corruption,” Chyngyz stated.

New Wave of Kyrgyz Populism Threatens Self-Expression

For both partygoers and staff, the raids were an unprecedented shock. Up to that point, both bars had been cooperative with local police and had never faced any prior incidents. Both the heavy-handed police tactics and the state’s post-raid messaging indicated that the operations were directed from the highest levels of government.

The raids aligned neatly with Japarov’s emerging populist agenda to enforce traditional Kyrgyz values. “In the government’s eyes, young people must study and start a family. There’s no room for alcohol and dancing,” Chyngyz states. 

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In addition to sensationalizing illegal drug usage in electronic music spaces, authorities have begun to frame Bishkek’s techno community as a conduit for LGBTQ+ influence, portraying it as a danger to Kyrgyz youth due to the bars’ inclusive policies. LGBTQ+ youth in Kyrgyzstan already face severe state and social repression, and to many, Bishkek’s electronic music parties are the only spaces where they are fully allowed to be their truest selves. This, to those running Bishkek’s techno institutions, is a red line they will not back down from. “Keeping our environment safe for all is our main responsibility,” Chyngyz states firmly.

Repression Necessitates Adaptation

After the raid, PLUR bar began adjusting its strategies to deal with the new wave of state repression. Constrained by resources and now under the state’s watchful eye, the bar’s operators refused to surrender to their opposition. “We hadn’t done a lot yet. We still hadn’t shown everybody what we really want to create,” says Innokentii, PLUR’s creative director. “No one has told us no yet.” 

Ailan Bar, too, remained committed to their vision to provide safety and a safe space for their community in the months following the raid. However, their brazen commitment to provide for and defend the LGBTQ+ community had to transition to more covert operations if it were to continue in the new repressive climate. Prior to the raids, Chyngyz used to host regular “queer nights” at Ailan Bar. He is firmly committed to continuing these events, but recognizes that Ailan Bar’s public advertising must now be more strategic. “It is all about being discreet. Queer people must know that they are welcome here, but also the wrong people must not know that queer people are welcome.”

Read More on Novastan: Queer life under pressure in Kyrgyzstan

Since the raid, Ailan Bar has closed its physical location and transitioned to a model where the organization pops up for one-time events across Kyrgyzstan. The bar’s organizers note that they feel safer in Kyrgyzstan’s more remote regions away from the state’s watch. 

PLUR has since taken on a new identity as QQ Bar and moved into a smaller space closer to the city center. Innokentii sees the move as an opportunity to learn from their past mistakes. “I want to make it stable enough to continue without me if I leave the country. I’m not from here—I don’t want to die here,” he says. Innokentii, like a large part of Bishkek’s contemporary techno community, came to Kyrgyzstan from Russia in recent years to flee war drafts. Helping to create spaces for electronic music in Bishkek helps him feel close to the subculture in his home country, a subculture that remains his central inspiration.

In order to ensure their subculture survives, Chyngyz has founded a DJ school within Ailan Collective to train and teach the next generation of Bishkek’s rebellious electronic music scene.

The Future for Bishkek Ravers

While law enforcement targeting youth subcultures is nothing new for Kyrgyzstan, those involved with Bishkek’s techno scene note that the current wave of repression feels different than those that have preceded it. “With the previous government, it is not right to categorize what we had as ‘freedom.’ We had negligence. We could only exist freely because the government didn’t care about us,” Chyngyz notes. “Now, authorities no longer turn a blind eye–they have a blueprint and they follow it. They’re populists, and populists have to show results in order to keep the people happy.”

After the raids, both bars saw their regular number of attendees dwindle. However, since the bars have implemented new strategies to prevent police altercations, they have largely been successful in fending off further government attacks. In just over a year and a half since the April raids, the crowds have largely returned. QQ Bar, even in their smaller venue, now sees over two hundred attendees at their most popular events. 

The techno community in Bishkek is as diverse as it is tight-knit. Chyngyz notes that he always finds it hard to describe the demographics of his crowd to others, as it spreads across every age group, profession, and walk of life. Innokentii, however, notes that there is one thread that unites all of their party participants. “Unlike techno scenes in larger cities, in Bishkek, everyone who comes is a character.”

With the survival of Bishkek’s techno institutions, the venues now serve as a cultural meeting point for the city’s other repressed creative communities. Innokentii notes that it is not an uncommon sight at QQ Bar to see people from Bishkek’s art industry, bar industry, rock scene, and rap underground all mixing freely.

Bishkek’s electronic music vanguard now sees their scene’s creativity and resilience as more than a local story. They have created something unique that they want to share with the world. While domestic challenges persist, few in Bishkek’s techno leadership appear ready to back down. “If you’re scared, you do it scared. So we do it scared,” Chyngyz remarked.

Chyngyz believes that the techno scene’s ability to adapt to evermounting challenges and unite diverse communities is not only what has led to the scene’s survival in Bishkek, but truly illuminates what the community is all about. “Techno is something that has the power to unite completely different people with completely unrelated backgrounds–people who maybe can’t even speak the same language. But they love techno, and enjoy the space it provides. Out of nothing, you create common ground.”

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Joseph Fisher for Novastan

The post “If You’re Scared, You do it Scared”: How Bishkek’s Techno Scene Survives State Repression appeared first on Novastan English.

Two years into the war in Gaza – which has killed over 68,000 Palestinians – Kazakhstan has volunteered to join Trump’s Abraham Accords initiative to forge closer ties with Israel. While Tokayev’s gamble is far from groundbreaking due to the country’s pre-existing relations with Israel, the manoeuvre does signal a new, American direction emerging for Kazakhstan’s international orientation.

Ahead of the much anticipated C5+1 Summit in Washington D.C., US President Donald Trump announced on 7 November that Kazakhstan would soon join the US-led Abraham Accords, an initiative spearheaded by Trump to encourage resistant Muslim-majority nations to forge closer ties with Israel. With Kazakhstan’s entry, the Central Asian state will become the first country to join the accords since war in Gaza began in 2023. 

Unlike all past Abraham Accords members who had refused to recognise Israel before joining the agreement, Kazakhstan has maintained formal relations with Israel since 1992. Experts have been quick to describe Kazakh President Qassym-Jomart Tokayev’s move as a symbolic gesture aimed at currying favor with Washington, doubting that it will significantly alter Kazakhstan’s existing relations with Israel.

Kazakhstan’s Geopolitical Pivot

To Tokayev, the move is clearly a signal to Washington it is open to further strategic cooperation. Just hours before Kazakhstan’s Abraham Accords announcement, Kazakhstan and the United States signed a lucrative cooperation deal over rare earth minerals the United States deems as critical to its national security.  By the time Tokayev had left Washington, he had signed 29 deals with the United States amounting to $17 billion in new investments, per the Astana Times. 

Read more on Novastan: China in Central Asia: Fact-checking and myth-busting

Beyond minerals, the United States sees political potential to draw Kazakhstan out of China’s orbit and into its own, severing a key link in China’s emerging Belt and Road Initiative trade corridor across the Asian continent. Kazakhstan, hoping to balance its international agreements among the global heavyweights, hopes close partnership with the United States will limit the state’s dependence on China and Russia.

A Much Needed Win for the Trump Administration

With the country’s proposed accession to the Abraham Accords, Kazakhstan offered Trump a diplomatic victory he greatly desired: a Muslim-majority country willing to forge close ties with post-war Israel. In his first term, Trump surprised the world by successfully negotiating for four Arab, Muslim-majority states—Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco, and Sudan— to establish formal relations with Israel through the framework of the Abraham Accords. In 2023, Saudi Arabia was set to become the next and most influential state to formally recognise Israel, a move the United States hoped would inspire a number of other Arab states to follow. However, largely due to public pressure once Israel began its ground invasion of Gaza in October of 2023, Saudi Arabia halted all momentum towards the recognition of an Israeli state. 

When Trump returned to office in January 2025, he conceded that Israel, a key regional ally of the United States, was becoming increasingly isolated on the world stage. Backlash stemmed from global outrage over alleged war crimes committed by its army in Gaza. On September 16, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory issued a report concluding that Israel “has committed genocide” in the Gaza Strip. Due to overwhelming condemnation of Israel’s actions in war across the Arab and Muslim world, no state in the region since the beginning of the war in Gaza has moved to recognise Israel. 

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Trump still believes in the Abraham Accords as the solution to break the regional isolation of post-war Israel. With Kazakhstan’s participation, Trump claims the gesture is a pivotal revitalisation of the Abraham Accords, spurring future membership from more consequential regional powers. Notably, Kazakhstan’s announcement came twelve days before Saudi prince Mohammed bin Salman is planned to visit Washington D.C.. Trump is expected to use Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords to put political pressure on Saudi Arabia to restart efforts to normalise ties with Israel.

The Future of Kazakh-American Cooperation

During the November 2025 C5+1 summit, Trump hinted he may soon make a presidential visit to Astana. All indications suggest Trump has grown fond of Tokayev’s government. Its readiness to secure US access to critical minerals and to breathe life into Trump’s stalled Middle East peace project has not gone unnoticed in Washington. While Tokayev believes he is able to maintain Kazakh sovereignty by juggling agreements between Russia, China and the United States, it is unclear if further cooperation with Trump’s America will bring Kazakhstan the independence it so desires. 

Read more on Novastan: Central Asia and Russia: an ever-changing relationship

Qatar, a regional neighbor long eager to balance diplomacy and defense, found itself punished for its alignment with Washington and peace efforts. In the past year alone, it was bombed twice – once by Iran and once by Israel, America’s closest regional ally. Not too far away from Kazakhstan in the Caucasus, Trump recently showed the world with his Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Deal his administration’s eagerness to use diplomacy to cement America’s own economic hegemony in far away regions.

Time will tell if Tokayev’s gamble for further integration with the United States will yield the result his government desires. By joining the Abraham Accords at a critical moment for the initiative’s survival, Kazakhstan has successfully proven its diplomatic usefulness to Washington. However, as Trump aims to expand American influence over the Asian continent, Kazakhstan now risks becoming a pawn in America’s mounting competition for dominance with China engulfing the Central Asian region.

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

Joseph Fisher for Novastan

The post Kazakhstan to become an Unusual Addition to the Abraham Accords: Will this Diplomatic Gesture for Washington Pay Off? appeared first on Novastan English.

It has been one year since the Organization of Turkic States approved the implementation of a common Turkic alphabet, designed for uniform use in all member states. Under the guise of bolstering Turkic unity, Ankara has spearheaded the initiative with the aim to draw the Central Asian states into its political orbit. However, due to limited funds, lack of political incentives, and preexisting linguistic policy, the Central Asian states have largely chosen to ignore the common alphabet entirely. 

In September 2024, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) announced to the world the creation of a 34-letter common Turkic alphabet based on the Latin script, approved on paper by all member states. The initiative, spearheaded by Türkiye, has been in the works since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Now one year since the common alphabet’s announcement, the manoeuvre has yet to make the large waves in the Central Asian information space that Türkiye had initially hoped for.

The proposed common alphabet exists within the larger regional debate surrounding the political futures of the Central Asian languages. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the newly independent republics began the process of transitioning their languages from a Cyrillic to a Latin-based script. However, in Central Asia, the decision of switching to a Latin script remains a fierce debate across the region even three decades later. 

Türkiye, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s expansionist foreign policy, has offered a guiding hand by leading the OTS initiative to create a common Turkic alphabet. Türkiye first adopted the Latin script in 1928 as a part of its early independence-era modernisation reforms. By encouraging the Central Asian states to undergo a similar process, Türkiye also aims to cement its position as the dominant centre of the Turkic world.

So far, Erdoğan’s plan has not cultivated many strong allies in Central Asia’s political elite. Most states in the region remain embroiled within national debates over the post-Soviet future of their titular languages, making Central Asian governments particularly resistant to carry out such a monumental linguistic shift at the international level.

Competition for “Middle Power” Status

In the year since the OTS announcement, regional heavyweights Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain resistant in adopting the common Turkic alphabet within their borders. According to Nargiza Muratalieva, a Bishkek-based political scientist, “Kazakhstan is not ready to share its leadership in Central Asia, given its attempts to promote itself as a middle power.” Kazakhstan has spent the post-Soviet decades centralizing Central Asian political power within its own borders, with the goal to secure a respected “middle power” status to both the region and the international community at large. Uzbekistan, the largest Central Asian country by population and second largest in terms of GDP, shares similar ambitions. Both countries view the Turkish-led OTS alphabet as an attempt by Türkiye to cement itself as the dominant power in the region, and thus, a threat to their respective national directives.

Read more on Novastan: The Lexicon of Kazakh Decolonisation

While both nations have yet to consider the implementation of the common Turkic alphabet, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have independently embarked on national plans to switch the script of their titular languages from Cyrillic to Latin. In both cases, the political leadership has underestimated the difficulty of this task, leading to much longer timelines for the initiative than initially expected. Currently, both states are stuck in a transitional state where both scripts are used interchangeably. Critics complain that the current linguistic paralysis in the countries is both confusing for citizens and financially taxing for administrations. The Diplomat reports that the 2018 budgetary estimate for Kazakhstan’s Latinization program sat at US$664 million, equivalent to roughly 39% of Kazakhstan’s GDP for that year.

The challenges Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have faced implementing a Latin script have meant that neither government seems willing to invest in the OTS alphabet as a third system for their citizens to learn and their country to switch to. Even Turkmenistan — a state which successfully phased out Cyrillic usage in the 1990s — remains resistant to the OTS plan to change their national standard. Largely closed off from the outside world and averse to foreign influence, the common Turkic alphabet offers few advantages to Ashgabat.

Kyrgyzstan: The Cyrillic Exception

At the unveiling ceremony of the common Turkic alphabet, all eyes were on Kyrgyzstan. To mark the alphabet’s adoption, Erdoğan gifted each represented nation a copy of two books translated into the new alphabet. One of the books was a novel written by Chinghiz Aitmatov, a regionally renowned author hailing from Kyrgyzstan. Erdoğan’s choice was hardly coincidental. Kyrgyzstan today is the only Turkic state to not even attempt to switch the national script away from Cyrillic.

Western analysts attribute Kyrgyzstan’s continued use of Cyrillic to the close relationship with Russia the country has maintained through its post-Soviet independence. Russia largely views increased Turkish influence in Central Asia as a threat to its foothold in the region, and acts to mitigate the country’s power in states like Kyrgyzstan where it still holds considerable influence. However, in the case of Kyrgyzstan’s refusal to adopt the OTS Latin-based alphabet, Muratalieva believes the reasons are more pragmatic than political. “The simplest explanation is the lack of financial resources to accept and to introduce this alphabet on a national level,” Muratalieva explains. While Türkiye has spearheaded the alphabet initiative on paper, the country has remained resistant to supplying funds to OTS member states interested in making the national switch. The lack of available funds severely limits the capacity of financially-limited states like Kyrgyzstan, the smallest economy of the OTS bloc.

When Sadyr Japarov, the president of Kyrgyzstan, was asked about his opinion on the linguistic future of the Kyrgyz language, he stated that “it is too early to talk about transitioning the Kyrgyz language to the Latin alphabet”, RFE/RL reports. Muratalieva believes Japarov’s strategy is to watch and wait how its larger regional neighbours Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan fare in their respective transitions to a Latin-based script. “If one of them succeeds, Kyrgyzstan will follow,” she theorizes.

Azerbaijan as a Potential Model

Not all hope is lost for Turkish power in Central Asia. Azerbaijan, while outside the region, provides a model for the post-Soviet Turkic states open to cooperation with Türkiye, showing how partnership with the state can lead to successful development. Türkiye and Azerbaijan have been close allies ever since the country gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. This strategic partnership has allowed for Azerbaijan to largely chart its own path, both economically and politically distant from Russia. 

One of the first directives Azerbaijan embarked on after independence was the complete transition of its national language from Cyrillic to Latin, a goal it achieved by the turn of the century. The Azerbaijani Latin-based script in its modern form is now very closely related to both the Turkish standard script and the newly proposed OTS alphabet. Such linguistic integration between the two nations has opened many new doors for transnational partnership, successes closely monitored by the Central Asian states.

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Since the beginning of the Russo-Ukraine War, Central Asian states have become increasingly hesitant of close partnership with Russia. Regional leadership fears Russia’s close geographic proximity to their borders may lead to future military conflict. Türkiye, attempting to offer an alternative to Russian partnership in the region, markets its distance from Central Asia as a compelling security guarantee. While maintaining territorial distance from potential Central Asian partners, Türkiye benefits from cultural and religious closeness to the region’s common Turkic heritage. The common Turkic alphabet is only one of many pathways the country is intent to forge with Central Asia through the leverage of common Turkic traditions. Turkish soft power in Central Asia, while currently marginal, is steadily increasing with time.

Türkiye has made it clear that it is willing to take on administrative and economic sacrifices to implement the new alphabet within its own borders, but has maintained its reluctance to take on the financial burdens necessary to implement the script in the Central Asian Turkic states. Combined with Türkiye’s unwillingness to meddle in preexisting linguistic turmoil in Central Asia or directly confront Russia’s lingering cultural influence over the region, has enough time passed to call the OTS common alphabet project a failure? Likely so. 

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Joseph Fisher for Novastan

The post Dead in the Water: Has the Common Turkic Alphabet Failed to Boost Turkish Influence in Central Asia? appeared first on Novastan English.

On the night of May 17 to May 18, an angry crowd turned against South Asian students and workers in Bishkek. The attack occurred after a video was published on social media of an incident between Kyrgyz men and several foreigners, that took place several days earlier.

Foreigners, particularly from South Asia, were attacked in Bishkek on the night of May 17 to May 18. According to the Kyrgyz media outlet Kloop, the attack was the result of outrage caused by a clip on social media. This footage, that was published anonymously, shows several men beating up a Kyrgyz man in the courtyard of a hostel on May 13. At the time, the men were identified as South Asian students.

The video, which went viral, sparked outrage among some Kyrgyz, who saw the incident as a “humiliation for their nation”, as reported by Eurasianet.

Kloop reports that various social media began to report the death of a participant in the brawl. These claims were denied by the police.

Later, on May 20, a statement from the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry provided much needed context to the footage: after being harassed outside, the foreign students returned to the hostel where they were staying. The assailants followed them and began ransacking the residence, stealing some of their belongings. As the Kyrgyz men entered the female dormitories, the foreign residents retaliated and hit the attackers in turn.

Riots get out of hand

However, the images had already been interpreted differently. Around one hundred people gathered near the hostel to voice their discontent about the incident on May 17, demanding justice.

To calm the crowd, the police arrested the three foreign nationals involved in the scuffle and opened an investigation into hooliganism. The Ministry of the Interior even published a video showing the men in question – Egyptians, not South Asians – apologising to the Kyrgyz people and promising to accept their share of responsibility for the violence.

But their detention did not lessen the crowd’s discontent. Instead, people started to block the road in response to attempts by the police to disperse the crowd. Despite the arrest of ten protesters, the demonstration did not disperse and several hundreds more joined. Later, around fifty people were arrested. At around 1 a.m., stones were thrown at the student dormitories and several foreign students were beaten up.

The crowd dispersed at dawn

The police have not only started a case against the three detainees involved in the incident that was recorded several days earlier, but also against some of the demonstrators – for hooliganism as well.

The rioters, mainly young men, used social media throughout the night to encourage others to join. By 3 a.m., around 1,000 people had gathered in the city centre, according to the Kyrgyz media outlet Kaktus Media.

The police addressed the demonstrators and promised that all those responsible would be brought to justice. The demonstrators finally began to disperse at around five in the morning after multiple warnings by the police, and with the help of a popular influencer who convinced the crowd to leave.

Radio Free Europe described the unrest as the worst seen in Bishkek since the elections of 2020 that brought current president Sadyr Japarov to power. The police’s inability to maintain order has also caused concern.

Around forty injured

Eurasianet reported that a total of 41 foreigners sought medical assistance following the attack on May 17, 11 of whom were still in Bishkek hospitals on May 20.

The Pakistani embassy in Kyrgyzstan reported that 14 Pakistani students were injured on the night of the riots, Kloop added. The diplomatic mission denied reports of the deaths of Pakistani citizens.

The victims received a visit from the Health Minister, Alymkadyr Beïchenaliev. According to the minister, foreign students will be treated free of charge at the request of the President of Kyrgyzstan.

Demands in the face of immigration

While the demonstrators were demanding that the foreigners involved in the incident filmed on May 13 would be prosecuted, they were also calling for an end to labour migration from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, explains Radio Free Europe.

In recent years, thousands of nationals from these countries have come to study or work in Kyrgyzstan, while at the same time hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyz are leaving the country in search of work.

Also read on Novastan: Moscow attacks highlight Tajikistan’s radicalisation problem

“It’s a new phenomenon. These migrants are just about everywhere. In taxi services, in car washes, as couriers in food delivery services. They are prepared to work and live for 300 dollars”, said Edil Baïsalov, Deputy Minister of Social Affairs in an interview with The Insider. “Of course, we expel those who violate the law and the visa regime […] Above all, we want to create jobs for our citizens”.

The head of Kyrgyzstan’s intelligence services, Kamtchybek Tachiev, said that the protesters’ demands were “to a certain extent correct”. Referring to official statistics, he said that the main violators of the migration law were Pakistani and Bangladeshi citizens. According to him, there are a total of around 5,000 illegal migrants in Kyrgyzstan, including 1,360 Pakistanis and 1,300 Bangladeshis.

An already complicated situation for foreign workers

The recent violence was a rare outburst of xenophobia. Two days before these events, the police had announced that delivery services employing 400 foreign students, most of them from Pakistan, had been shut down on grounds of road safety problems.

On the same day, Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security arrested 28 Pakistani nationals for “illegally working” in a sewing workshop in Bishkek.

Foreigners repatriated

By the morning of May 21, more than 1,200 nationals had already returned to Pakistan on chartered flights, reports Radio Free Europe: planes took off from Bishkek for the Pakistani cities of Islamabad, Lahore and Peshawar. The Pakistani and Indian embassies have advised their citizens not to leave the country unless necessary.

On the same day, Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry said that Pakistani Foreign Minister Muhammad Ishaq Dar would visit Kyrgyzstan and meet with Kyrgyz officials to discuss the situation of Pakistani students in Bishkek.

Fears for Kyrgyzstan’s reputation

The Kyrgyz authorities are trying to defuse tensions and reassure foreign students. President Sadyr Japarov gave a speech on May 20 in which he declared that “all those responsible for the attacks on foreign students will be punished. We have succeeded in building a state based on the rule of law. That is why we will support order”.

Edil Baïsalov visited the dormitory that had been attacked, apologising and offering students a guarantee of safety. “Your parents and relatives should know that there is no threat to you in Kyrgyzstan and that the authorities bear full responsibility for your well-being. The events of one night do not reflect the attitude of our people towards you”, said the deputy minister.

However, like others, journalist Chris Rickleton recalls the arrest of publicist Oljobai Shakir, sentenced to five years in prison in May after criticising the Kyrgyz authorities for transferring several spa centres near Issyk Kul Lake to the Uzbek government. He was convicted of “inciting riots”. There is no guarantee that the young people who actually called for riots on the night of May 18 will receive such a harsh sentence.

Zoé Toulouse
Editor for Novastan

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The post Violence against foreign students in Bishkek appeared first on Novastan English.

Almost every year, countries in Central Asia are placed at the bottom of NGO Reporters Without Borders’, annual ranking for the freedom of press. Every country has dropped in ranking, compared to the previous year.

The position of media coverage in Central Asia has never been renowned for its freedom. However, it seems that this year marks a turning point. 

In the NGO Reporters Without Borders’, new report as published on the 3^rd May 2023, it is noted that if ‘the Russian invasion in Ukraine and the deployment of the Kremlin’s propaganda […] has darkened the whole region [of Eastern Europe]’, Central Asian countries have also seen a sharp decline in their freedom of press since last year.

In a ranking of 180 countries, the nations that are in theory the most liberal in the region, such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, are regressing. Kyrgyzstan is undergoing the most substantial evolution by dropping fifty rankings from 72^nd place to 122^nd place. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan fell twelve lines and is now positioned 134^th. Uzbekistan fell by four points (now at 137^th) due to the rise of attacks against the media.

The Remarkable Fall of Kyrgyzstan 

The deterioration of the freedom of press in Kyrgyzstan is evidenced by multiple attacks against journalists since 2022, as well as the promulgation of the law against false information in summer 2021. Under the scope of this law, the Kyrgyz government is intensifying the campaign against Kyrgyz service of the Radio Free Europe, known locally as Azattyk, in demanding the withdrawal of its licence on the 27^th April. At the end of October 2022, the Ministry of Culture blocked Azattyk as it refused to remove a video addressing the confrontations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, at their border. 

Amnesty International asserts that this decision was a ‘blow to media freedom’, whilst the Committee to Protect Journalists has called it ‘a deeply chilling message.’ Reporters Without Borders speaks of ‘increasingly severe censorship’ in Kyrgyzstan.

Read more on Novastan: Closure of Radio Azattyk sparks discontent from civil society and international human rights activists

Last January, the independent media service Kloop found itself in a similar situation. The Ministry of Culture had threatened to block Kloop’s website if the editors refuse to withdraw an article on the inflating of construction costs by a state agency.

Last November, the journalist Bolot Temirov was extradited to Russia following a politically motivated trial, after he had denounced cases of corruption on his YouTube channel, Temirov Live.

Kazakhstan and Online Censorship

In Kazakhstan, media censorship is issued more discretely by blocking websites that might unsettle power. A report by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) indicates that authorities are obstructing access to the Azattyq website, the Kazakh service of Radio Free Europe.

Read more on Novastan: “An escalating manifestation of Russophobia” – Kazakhstan at the epicentre of an information war

From the snap presidential election of November last year till this January the access to the websites of Radio Azattyq and Current Time, another branch of Radio Free Europe, was blocked.

Kazakhstan has also promulgated a law ‘on the mass media’, a pretext to regulate, or even censor, the information that is available on the internet and particularly the information spreading in social media.

Pressure on Journalists in Uzbekistan

As in the previous year, Reporters Without Borders notes that in Uzbekistan, ‘the situation for the media has only slightly improved since the death of President Islam Karimov in 2016, and criticism of the government remains difficult.’ Nevertheless, Uzbekistan has gained twenty-four points in 2022.

Notably, the report indicates that the Uzbek authorities have ‘extensive’ control of the media and that many bloggers have close ties to the government. The country enforces ‘repressive’ laws on the media and ‘widespread surveillance, censorship and auto-censorship’, reports Gazeta.uz.

Read more on Novastan: Pressure from Russia increases on Central Asian media outlets

‘The large and medium media platforms, as well as bloggers with an audience of over 5,000 people, are subjected to intense pressures and censorship,’ as reported to Novastan by an Uzbek blogger with a small audience. ‘However, there are exceptions, with some channels having less than 1,000 to 2,000 subscribers who are also now facing pressure’, he continues.

Another Uzbek journalist with a critical stance on the government tells Novastan about the recent pressure imposed by the authorities upon journalists and bloggers, ahead of the constitutional referendum of the 30^th April 2023. ‘I know of at least three examples where managers of Telegram channels and journalists have been summoned to the State Security Service for a conversation’, he testifies.

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, Always Bottom of the Ranking

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, whose political regimes are the most repressive, remain at the bottom of the ranking. Compared to last year, Tajikistan drops one position on the list, now ranking 153^rd place. According to the NGO, the country has transitioned from a ‘difficult’ to a ‘very difficult’ position with regard to its freedom of press. The report notes that more and more journalists are choosing to exile.

Over the past year, repression has intensified against all forms of opposition, particularly in the Gorno-Badakhshan region and against the Pamiris ethnic minority. Certain activists for the community, who have been exiled, have been extradited to their countries of origin and sentenced to long-term prison sentences.

Read more on Novastan: Human rights in Tajikistan: Interview with the UN Special Rapporteur

Turkmenistan ranks 176^th place and remains among the five worst-ranked countries. Reporters Without Borders notes that censorship in Turkmenistan increased after Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow’s son, Serdar Berdimuhamedow, rose to power in March 2022.

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post In Central Asia, the Freedom of Press is in Decline appeared first on Novastan English.

Out on the Kazakh steppe, in the early days of Soviet rule, so-called red yurts tried to bring the USSR and its communist ideals to those that were most inaccessible to the party and the state. These “islands of Soviet power on the steppes” are an often forgotten yet important chapter in the emancipation of women. Novastan publishes this translated article with friendly permission from the redaction of Masa Media.

‘Red yurts’ and the Sovietisation of Kazakhstan

In 1928, with the beginning of the first five-year plan, the Soviet government was faced with the fact that most people in Kazakhstan retained a nomadic lifestyle. In order to integrate nomads into the Soviet economy, many were forced into sedentism and agriculture. Although the 1920s saw an increase in sedentary agriculture, especially when compared to the beginning of the 20th century, nomads were still the majority. By1928, 65% of Kazakhs still practised seasonal nomadism – and even by 1932, 7% kept a fully nomadic lifestyle.

In the eyes of party apparatchiks, the nomadic arrangement of the Kazakhs was a useless waste of land better suited for growing bread. Marxist-Leninist ideology, in turn, regarded nomadism as an “inferior” form of economic development; the Soviet authorities considered it important to propagate communist values and promote sedentism among those who had retained their nomadic ways. It was for this purpose that the government of the USSR organised ‘red yurt’ expeditions.

Below is a brief history on how the ‘red yurts’ were established.

Special thanks to the historian Ivan Sokolovsky for his help with fact-checking and the literature review.

What is a ‘red yurt’?

Red yurts were created to politically agitate those strate of Kazakh society – the steppe nomads – that were most inaccessible to the Party and the state. In 1928, Soviet newspapers referred to the red yurts as “islands of Soviet power on the steppes”.

The members of the red yurt expeditions, making good on this name, transformed ordinary Kazakh yurts into headquarters for agitprop, often topped with a red flag. The red yurt staff consisted of health workers and illiteracy eradication workers as well as legal workers, whose aim was to explain to nomads, especially women, their new rights.

“For each ‘yurt’ in our district we have three staff members each – a yurt manager (who was also the illiteracy eradicator), a paramedic-cum-midwife and a cleaner” – explains Borisova, a Red Yurt activist who was cited in Antonina Nuhrat’s book about the expeditions.

Red yurts were supported by many Soviet-administrative structures in Kazakhstan – but the People’s Commissariats of Education and Health were particularly reliant on them.

The red yurts also enjoyed tremendous support from women’s emancipation organisations, such as the Directorate of Workers and Peasant Women and the Committee for the Improvement of Women’s Working and Living Conditions. Only the Red Yurts could reach women from nomadic Kazakh families otherwise untouched by these organisations.

However, as there were virtually no basic health authorities in the nomadic regions, most of the red yurts’ resources were spent on health services for nomadic Kazakhs.

The relationship between the red yurts and the authorities

The central and regional authorities of the USSR deferred to local party activists and regional administrative bodies when it came to matters concerning the Red Yurts. The administrative councils in even the most remote auls (villages) provided all possible assistance to the expeditions, up to providing them with horses and carts for their regular relocations. Upon arrival in the district center, the heads of the yurts would report to the district executive committees, the highest local authorities in the USSR at the time.

Borisova, the red yurt activist, noted that their yurt also had its own council.

“The council of the yurt is something between a women’s club board and an official commission. The yurt council consists of the head of the yurt, a medical officer, the secretary of the local cell of the All-Union Communist Party [later known as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – editor’s note], the chairman of the aul council, the secretary of the local Komsomol cell, a representative of the Koshchi organisation (an organisation for the settled farmers of Turkestan), and from the cooperative, a court officer, an agronomist or veterinarian, a local teacher, a female delegate or council member, [and] a pioneer worker” – Borisova explained.

Assessments of the cooperation between the party organisations and the red yurts vary – some complain of difficulties in coordinating and obtaining support from the authorities, even charging that they were abandoned to their own fates, while others praise the support of party structures. Such contradictions may be indicative of strong regional differences in apparatchik attitudes toward the red yurts.

Red yurts and the rights of women

In 1928, the red yurts launched their activities based on the Infant and Maternity Protection Organisation – other organisations had organised their own ‘yurts’ up to four years before that. In the same year, the Central Executive Committee recommended that the red yurts should focus their activities on disseminating hygienic and medical information among nomadic and semi-nomadic Kazakh women.

Women from the ‘Workers’ and Peasants’ Administration, the so-called ‘Women’s Department’, were active in the initiatives of the red yurts. It was the ‘women’s departments’ which sponsored yurt activities together with the People’s Commissariat for Health. They continued to operate as part of the red yurts in Kazakhstan until the end of the 1930s, even after expeditions were no longer organised at state level.

One activist said that “women’s red yurts served as the epicenter of all cultural-educational work” in Kazakhstan. Women’s activists and others declared their task as “fighting against an uncultured everyday life.” This expression was in fact a euphemism for combating Islamic culture and its local variations (adat) – including polygamy, dowry and marriage to minors.

The work concerning women’s reproductive health was particularly demanding. The yurt’s duties included the provision of qualified obstetric care, prevention of pregnancy complications and gynecological examinations. During these examinations, Kazakh women were asked standard questions, for example about when they started menstruating or when they had their first sexual intercourse. The red yurts also tried to educate them about contraception.

Surveys were also used to, for example, gather information about how women were treated by their husbands and whether they could read. Such questions were perceived as shameful and unacceptable and made the work of the ‘yurt’ extremely difficult.

In its activities, the Soviet authorities relied strictly on Marxist-Leninist ideology – hence the policy of the red yurts was based on the idea of ‘class struggle‘. Its services were not available to ‘class enemies’.

“The first paragraph of the instruction on the work of the ‘red yurts’ states that the wives and daughters of the bai (wealthy man) are not allowed to work [in the yurt]. At the opening of the yurts, it is also specifically announced that the ‘red yurt’ will work among farmhands, poor women, middle-class women, [and] all those nomadic women who are not disenfranchised” said Borisova.

This policy, according to those who worked in the red yurts, caused the yurts to get a bad reputation among some.

“And the women themselves [who worked at the yurts] even warned the wives of bais – ‘don’t go to the kzyl-otau’ [red yurt in Kazakh – editor’s note],” they gloated.

The work of the red yurts also included an educational programme called likbez (likvidatsiya bezgramotnosti, the elimination of illiteracy) – this initiative promoted Soviet legal norms, medical knowledge and involved women in cooperatives, teaching them skills such as sewing and tailoring. Legal norms in the ‘yurts’ were promoted through ad hoc judicial committees. Placard newspapers were published nine times per year.

Everyday life in the red yurt

From the outside, the red yurt was an ordinary Kazakh dwelling with a red flag on top. It was covered with koumacha [a bright red cloth – editor’s note] depicting slogans in Kazakh-Arabic script. The interior was divided into two separate zones by a curtain.

The literacy zone was a miniature school with a small hanging blackboard, a bench and a few tables. On the walls often hung bookshelves with educational literature and propaganda posters in Russian, Kazakh and Tatar, mostly concerned with maternity and hygiene. The space functioned as an ‘after-work club’.

The other half of the yurt was designed for medical activities – there paramedical and midwifery equipment was kept. There were white benches and stools as well as tables and cupboards with medical supplies and instruments.

Some yurts were equipped with space for needlework and handicrafts. The kitchen was outside, as was typical for yurts. Having been assigned a particular aul, the red yurt would visit the community up to several times a month.

How extensive was the initiative?

The actual number of ‘red yurts’ – as well as the number of territories and people covered by them – is difficult to determine. Some of them continued to operate even after collectivisation, up until their complete disbandment in 1939.

In 1926, the authorities planned to establish two red yurts for each district. An article in 1927, however, states that only 13 yurts operated in all of Kazakhstan – reaching just 534 women. Another article in the same year states that 13 yurts for ‘women’s departments’ and 59 yurts for ‘political education’ were in operation.

Soviet researcher Kapira Sadvakasova found that in 1928 there were about 80 ‘red yurts’ operating – while Paula Michaels gives a figure of 69. Michaels also notes that by 1929, of the some 130 ‘red yurts’ operating in Kazakhstan, 100 were exclusively female.

In any case, by the beginning of mass collectivisation, the Soviet leadership had lost interest in the red yurts. Collectivisation implied the destruction of the nomadic way of life as such – and the replacement of auls with collective farms. This approach rendered the red yurts useless.

Regardless, various researchers agree that the red yurts had little impact on the ‘Sovietisation’ of the steppe as a whole – there were too few of them for such a task.

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

Sources Used:

1. Paula A. Michaels Curative Powers. Medicine and Empire in Stalin’s Central Asia
2. Нухрат А. Юрты кочевки: К работе женских красных юрт. М., 1929
3. Rebekah Ramsay Nomadic Hearths of Soviet Culture: ‘Women’s Red Yurt’ Campaigns in Kazakhstan, 1925–1935

Written by Ilyas Beybarsov

Translated by Abigail Scripka and Graeme McGuire

The post “Islands of Soviet power on the steppes” appeared first on Novastan English.

In Central Asia, the beginning of spring is traditionally marked by Nowruz, also known as ‘Persian New Year.’ Typical holiday celebrations include horse games, family visits, and large feasts. But Nowruz is not only fun and games. As political leaders seek to break with their countries’ colonial past, Nowruz remains a popular tool in the quest for regional identity.

A faint smell of grass in the air, blue skies yet barren trees. In the outskirts of Bishkek, hundreds of supporters cheer as twenty-some men on horseback compete over a goat carcass. The date is March 21, and it is the first day of spring, an occasion that is marked by a region-wide holiday known as Nowruz. But not all Nowruz celebrations are as spectacular as the traditional polo-like horse game Kok Boru played at the Bishkek hippodrome.

The lead up to Nowruz is possibly just as important as the holiday itself. Regional differences aside, most people in Central Asia start preparing for Nowruz with a spring cleaning of their homes. Others repay their debts or reconcile with enemies to start the new year with a clean slate. On Nowruz itself, the day of the spring equinox, people dress up and spend time with family, friends or neighbours. Food and drinks are especially important and, in most countries, a centuries-old tradition prescribes that ‘sumalak’ is made. This incredibly sweet dessert is made from sprouted wheat.

The Zoroastrian roots of Nowruz

But enough with the customs and traditions – Nowruz is not only fun and games. This holiday has a political element to it as well. In the past, different rulers and colonisers have tried to suppress Nowruz. To explore the modern-day politics of Nowruz, it is essential to delve deeper into its history. Nowruz is also called ‘Persian New Year,’ a name that reveals this holiday’s Iranian roots. Although the exact origin story of Nowruz remains shrouded in mystery, most historians agree that Zoroastrianism was the driving force behind it.

Zoroastrianism is the world’s oldest monotheistic religion and is based on the teachings of Zoroaster, an Iranian prophet. Central to this religion is the battle between Good and Evil, often framed in terms of light and darkness. In this regard, it is clear to see why Nowruz is so important to Zoroastrians, as the arrival of spring generally brings warmer weather and longer days. The Zoroastrian roots of Nowruz also explain the holiday’s popularity in Central Asia. Many experts claim that Zoroaster, the religion’s founder, was a native speaker of Avestan. This Persian dialect was predominant in an area stretching from eastern Iran to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In short, Zoroastrianism, with all its customs and traditions, has ancient roots in Central Asia and might even have originated there.

A quintessential Central Asian holiday

Yet, contemporary Nowruz celebrations in Central Asia are not the same as they were thousands of years ago. They have been shaped by the unique geography of the region, as well as the peoples that came to inhabit Central Asia as the result of migration, invasion and (forced) assimilation. Historically, Nowruz has been associated with Greater Iran. Since antiquity, cities like Samarkand and Bukhara had been important centres of Persian culture and language. Until this day, a majority of the people living in these two cities still speak the Tajik dialect of the Persian language. But with the Muslim conquest of Central Asia and the influx of Turkic and Mongol tribes from the north, this Persian cultural dominance started to wane.

Read more on Novastan: Four Central Asian cultural practices newly inscribed on UNESCO’s Intangible Cultural Heritage List

With new rulers came new cultural influences. Some of these conquerors initially tried to suppress local customs and traditions like Nowruz. But neither Muslim leaders nor Turco-Mongol warlords such as Timur succeeded in abolishing ‘Persian New Year’. Instead, they embarked on a more successful approach of co-adaptation by integrating some of their own folklore into already existing cultural practices. That is why today, Nowruz in Central Asia is characterised by both nomadic traditions, such as Kok Boru, and Persian influences like the drinking of sumalak.

Colonisation and suppression

When the Russian imperial armies came to colonise Central Asia in the late 19th century, however, things changed. In modern-day Uzbekistan, the Russians had left the Emir of Bukhara as a local figurehead. To save face and strengthen his political legitimacy, the annual Nowruz celebrations were an excellent opportunity to show off. The emir even invited circus artists from European Russia to perform. But among the local population, popularity of Nowruz decreased. When the Soviets took over and annexed Central Asia after the Russian civil war, this trend continued. In the cities, Soviet engineers and urban planners redesigned public space, destroying centuries-old neighbourhoods in the process. This severely affected the social fabric of towns and cities throughout the region, hampering holiday preparations.

Read more on Novastan: “Hymns of Blood” – Tajik short stories from Perestroika

Moreover, during Soviet times, Nowruz was banned for years as it was seen as a religious holiday. Only after Soviet orientalists and ethnologists reframed it as pre-Islamic, celebrations were allowed once again. Especially since the collapse of the USSR, the popularity of Nowruz has increased spectacularly.

Nowruz as a political tool

Historically, Nowruz in Central Asia has always been subject to the political whims of local rulers. In the present day, this is no different. Nowruz encapsulates Central Asian histories, cultures, and geography. Hence, holidays like these can be instrumentalised by politicians and others who seek to break with the legacy of the Soviet-colonial past in a quest for regional and national identity. During the rule of late president Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, for example, some government officials favoured Nowruz over Gregorian New Year. They even “issued instructions to stop holding end-of-year parties.” Holidays other than Nowruz were deemed “contrary to Uzbek culture.” Only after Karimov died and his successor President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took over in 2016, bans and constraints on celebrating Western-style New Year were relaxed.

Read more on Novastan: Central Asia and Russia: an ever-changing relationship

In Kazakhstan too, political leadership has rediscovered Nowruz as a way to strengthen legitimacy. In a move reminiscent of the Emir of Bukhara, current president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has proposed several reforms with regard to Nowruz. These reforms include extending the national holiday to a whopping ten days instead of the usual four, as well as a proposal to deepen Nowruz’s spiritual and moral meaning. In 2022, Tokayev was re-elected president amid hopes and promises of political and societal reform. Some analysts argue that his plans are an attempt to break with the legacy of Tokayev’s predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev. But the low turnout of the recent parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, just before Nowruz, illustrate that initial enthusiasm about reforms has somewhat subsided.

With deep historical roots in Central Asia, however, Nowruz is likely to remain a popular tool for identity politics as national leaders seek to navigate the future by cherry-picking from the region’s pre-colonial past.

Written by Julian Postulart

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Beyond fun and games – the politics of Nowruz appeared first on Novastan English.

Since the invasion, Kazakhstan has taken a position of neutrality towards Russia’s war in Ukraine. Yet, Astana has not hindered volunteers from organising humanitarian aid to send to Ukraine. Furious remarks from Russia about this ambiguity have placed Kazakhstan at the epicentre of a targeted (dis)information campaign. The following article appeared 20 August, 2022 in Fergana News. We have translated it with friendly permission from the editors. Recently three ambulances arrived in Ukraine from Kazakhstan. The Telegram channel “Ateo Breaking” reported that the vehicles were sent by authorities from the Central Asian country to help Ukraine, where Russia is conducting a “special military operation.” But in fact, the Kazakh government had nothing to do with this aid package. The vehicles were financed by Kazakh businesspeople, according to information shared by the Ukrainian Ministry of Health and the Ukrainian Embassy in Kazakhstan. Transport to Ukraine was organised by the NGOs “Ukrainian American House,” “Initiative E+,” and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation.

Solidarity with Ukraine from below

From the beginning of the “special operation,” Kazakh authorities distanced themselves from any involvement in the conflict. The acting Minister of Defence Sultan Kamaletdinov made clear remarks in this regard: “We do not support any side. There can be no questions about this.” However, not all Kazakhs agree with his point of view. Since the beginning of the war, hundreds of volunteers and those sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause have sent humanitarian aid to areas in need via the Ukrainian Embassy in Kazakhstan and collected donations for victims. What is important to emphasise is that these are citizens’ initiatives that are not supported by the government. Reception centres for Ukrainian refugees are currently active in 11 cities: Karaganda, Oral, Semei,Oskemen, Aktau, Turkistan, Atyrau, Ekibastuz, Aktobe, Almaty and Astana.

At the beginning of June, Kazakhs sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine via several planes and 11 trucks. The total volume of this delivery was over 200 tons and included toiletries, food, medicine, and more. Within Kazakhstan itself, charity concerts in support of Ukraine have been organised. But since these have unsettled local authorities, gaining permission for such initiatives is difficult. During a charity run on 24 August 2022, money was collected to rebuild schools in Chernihiv Oblast. Officially, Astana has not involved itself in such activities. In spring last year, the Kazakh authorities only sent three cargo planes to Ukraine with medicine, food, and bedding. So far, the government’s policy of neutrality has resulted in a ban on rallies in support of Ukraine, while prosecuting people who display Z or V stickers (letters which are signs of support for the “special operation”). Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia The longer the “special operation” continues, the harder maintaining such balance will be. The “big neighbour” is making it increasingly clear that it expects a different, preferably more supportive stance from Kazakhstan with regard to the military conflict. In spring 2022, well-known media personalities accused Astana of Russophobic policies and treason. Now dozens of popular Telegram channels have become involved in fuelling anti-Russian sentiment by publishing either outright lies or distorted information on the daily, that are picked up by Russian media without any fact-checking. For example, the story about the ambulances mentioned above was run by the state-run online newspaper Gazeta.ru. They even stated on Twitter that the vehicles were sent by Kazakh authorities for use by the Ukrainian armed forces.

Purported weapons’ sales

Another news article claimed that Kazakhstan was selling weapons to the United Kingdom, for them to be subsequently shipped to Ukraine. Documents related to this story were published at the beginning of August by the pro-Russian hacker group Beregini. The deal was supposedly carried out thanks to the mediation of the company “Technoexport”. First this “news” was picked up by Russian Telegram channels, after which mainstream media started publishing about it. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry and Development of Infrastructure denied the accusations immediately and shared that neither “Technoexport” nor any other company had been licensed for the export of weapons to the UK. The permit necessary for the re-export of weapons was also not issued by the ministry. The Russian Telegram channel “Rybar”, however, described the ministry’s statement as “unfounded” and after “digging” through the Technoexport documents, discovered that the company – contrary to the Kazakh rebuttal – was indeed in the possession of the licenses and permits required for export to the UK. Read more on Novastan: The war in Ukraine and its consequences for Central Asia“It does not matter if the official representatives of the Kazakh government are defending themselves by saying that they could not export Soviet weapons without the producer’s – that is, Russia’s – permission. They are doing it all behind closed doors,” wrote the authors of the Telegram channel, which boasts over a million followers. In other words, the Kazakh authorities were being accused of lying not by Russian law enforcement agencies, neither by government leaders, nor by popular media, but instead by a Telegram channel whose anonymous editors know that they will not be prosecuted for their allegations.

“Wild Mambets”

A painful story of child abuse in Kazakhstan developed along similar lines. A group of teenagers in Almaty abused two brothers, aged four and nine, by forcing them to perform oral sex. The mother of the boys turned to the foundation NeMolchi.kz and journalists to receive help, in addition to filing a report with the police. Later, however, a video of the mother appeared on the Telegram channel “Mnogonational” under the title “In Kazakhstan wild Mambets [editor’s note: Mambet is derogatory slang for an uncultivated, uneducated person of Central Asian heritage] forced small Russian children […] to perform oral sex on the playground and recorded it with a camera.”  The story was taken up by Russian TV station Tsargrad, which announced it was “another case of the escalating manifestation of Russophobia in Kazakhstan. This time Russia-haters took their dirty deeds to the limit – Russian children have suffered.” The twisted story was broadcasted on the station and later similarly referenced to by other Russian media outlets. Read more on Novastan: Mambet – The Central Asian N-word: Where it comes from and what it means Then the mother of the victims stepped forward with a counterstatement. The woman called the publication and broadcast a provocation. “All of those involved in the incident were of European ethnicity, but you cannot give this any interethnic stain. I have lived in Kazakhstan since birth and have many friends of other ethnicities. We all live in peace,” she said. Who is responsible for the provocation remains unclear, since the Telegram channel “Mnogonational,” which first spoke of “wild Mambets,” is anonymous. The authors of the channel claimed multiple times that the mother of the children was forced to make a counterstatement. Of course, they did not provide any proof for this claim.

The hot topic of language

The government-friendly Russian public has seized upon yet another hot topic in the relationship between the two countries: language. Messages started circulating on social media stating that Russian-language instruction in Kazakhstan’s schools would disappear in the next six to seven years. Media outlets such as Glas.ru and Tsargrad reported about this as well. As it turned out, these messages were based on a wrong interpretation of a two-year-old report from the Kazakh Channel 31. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Education denounced the fake news, but several days later the problem of Russian language in schools resurfaced. After a statement from Minister of Education Ashat Aimagambetov on 16 August, social media and Telegram channels spread the news that starting in 2022, Kazakh pupils in first grade would not be taught Russian, while learning Kazakh remained obligatory. In fact, the minister only referred to schools with Kazakh as the language of instruction. This important detail was deliberately left out by a number of media outlets. Large Russian media agencies, such as TASS, published about the correct version of the announcement, but the fake story had already received considerable media attention. Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s slow yet determined transition to the Latin alphabet Furthermore, in an interview with Nur.kz in early June, Minister Aimagambetov reemphasized that starting with trilingual classes in the first grade might be too difficult for pupils. Therefore, he added, was decided to introduce the different languages at Kazakh-language primary schools one at a time. “We made a decision on this issue and are already working to ensure that a child in a school with Kazakh as the language of instruction is only learning one language in first grade: Kazakh. That means they learn to read and write in their native language. In second grade, Russian is introduced, and in third grade, English,” explained the minister. This important nuance was omitted in Russian media.

A (dis)information campaign

There are many more examples of Russian disinformation in Kazakhstan, but these stories stand out with regard to the amount of media attention they have received. There was also a deleted post on the social media site Vkontakte by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who currently is deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia. In this post, he claimed that Kazakhstan was an “artificial state,” whose authorities pursue a policy of “Russian genocide.” (The post was deleted 10 minutes after publication and was said to be the result of a hack, as stated by the press service of Vkontakte and Medvedev himself.) There is a lot of disinformation floating on Telegram channels and Russian news websites, such as the story about the alleged murder of a Russian boy in Astana by Kazakh children. The article was accompanied by a video of a fight from last year in which no one was killed. The amount of fake news has grown exponentially in recent months. Hence, it is best to speak of a planned (dis)information campaign. Russian officials reject such accusations outright. President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly referred to Kazakhstan as a “strategic partner” and his press secretary called the country a “friendly state.” On 19 August, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met Vladimir Putin in Sochi. At the meeting, the two presidents hugged. Later Tokayev said that he was satisfied with the development of cooperation between the two countries. Tokayev was quoted saying: “We are bound by the entire border – the longest fully demarcated land border in the world.We cannot allow any pessimistic prognoses over the future of our cooperation! As President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, I am personally dedicated to giving additional impetus to our bilateral cooperation in all areas.”

Fergana News

 Translated from Russian into German by Robin Roth

 Translated from German into English by Mari Paine

 Edited by Julian Postulart

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post “An escalating manifestation of Russophobia” – Kazakhstan at the epicentre of an information war appeared first on Novastan English.

Isolated on the international scene and weakened domestically, Turkey seeks support. Turkish powers have chosen a proactive foreign policy in Central Asia and enjoy good relations with countries of the region.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 13 April 2021. As Turkey is increasingly breaking away from its European and American allies, the country seeks to strengthen its partnership and alliance networks. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu met each of his five Central Asian counterparts in March. After visiting Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic from 5-10 March, the Turkish head of diplomacy hosted his Kazakh counterpart, Mukhtar Tileuberdi, in Ankara on 17 March. Afterwards, he went to Tajikistan from 28-30 March. Each of these were opportunities to signal to the world that Turkey must be taken into account in Central Asia.

The challenge of transportation

Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s Central Asian agenda is indeed political but also commercial and economic. The Turkish lira has dropped and the economy of the country is not performing well. The Turks seek to develop trade in Central Asia by creating outlets for their businesses and ease the transit of goods coming from China through the “Middle Corridor” fulfilment. On 5 March, the Turkish chief of diplomacy chose Ashgabat, with its immaculate white marble, to begin his diplomatic Central Asia tour. According to the Anadolu agency (AA), the priority for the Turkish delegation dealt with logistics and transport in Turkmenistan. Turkish trucks will be allowed to transit during a time in which they would otherwise be banned due to the Covid-19 pandemic – provided that drivers take a test prior to their arrival at Turkmenbashi port near the Caspian Sea shore, explains Anadolu.

Diversifying Turkey’s energy supply

Transportation is an important topic for Turkey because it may enable access to more energy resources. Bayram Balci, the director of the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, said in an interview with Novastan that “Turkey is an industrial country which only produces 3% of its energy needs.” Turkmenistan, possessing the fourth largest natural gas reserves in the world, could become a key player for Turkey if Turkmen gas could be pumped into the country. Read more on Novastan: Turkmenistan became China’s number one gas supplier Therefore, the joint project between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding the exploration and use of hydrocarbon deposits in the Dostluk field in the Caspian Sea is a topic of interest to Turkish leaders. It is estimated that this hydrocarbon field may hold natural gas and up to 59 million tons of oil, reported Anadolu. Turkey considers this project as an opportunity to diversify its energy intake and desires to involve its public businesses.

A Turkish general consulate in Samarkand

After his visit to Turkmenistan, Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu spent three days in Uzbekistan. He visited Samarkand to underline the significance of Turkish-Uzbek relations before continuing to Tashkent. Çavuşoğlu and his Uzbek counterpart Abdulaziz Kamilov inaugurated the new Turkish general consulate on 7 March. This marks an improvement in Turkish-Uzbek relations since 2016, when Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev came into office. Unlike his predecessor, Islam Karimov, the current Uzbek president champions an open foreign policy which is friendly towards Turkey and its Central Asian neighbours.

In Uzbekistan, Çavuşoğlu underlined the symbolic importance of diplomatic representation opening in what is considered to be the birthplace of Turkish civilisation. While he was paying tribute to the transformation in Samarkand, he recalled that Turkey had been the first country to establish an embassy in Uzbekistan in 1991. As the historical heart of the Silk Road, Turkey did not hesitate to consider its touristic potential.  The Anadolu agency (AA) reports that since March 2018, Turkish Airlines has offered direct flights between Istanbul and Samarkand.

The renewal of educational foreign aid service in Kyrgyzstan

For his last stop in Kyrgyzstan on 10 March, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs chose to visit Manas University, a contemporary building situated in Bishkek’s city centre. Founded in 1995 through an agreement between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan, it educates more than 5000 students from 14 different countries. The university courses are free of charge and are taught in Turkish and Kyrgyz, with classes in English and Russian also offered. Besides being a symbol of Turkish soft power, Ankara desires to influence Kyrgyz educational policy as in 2018. Anadolu reports that the Turkish diplomatic chief reminded his counterpart that ”FETO” – Fethullah Gülen’s organisation – was a threat to Turkey and its allies since it is regarded as terrorist group by Turkish authorities. Gülenist networks were once conduits of Turkish soft power in Central Asia via their schools. Fethullah Gülen is in open conflict with Turkish authorities since being accused of plotting a coup in July 2016. Consequently, the authorities requested all partners to close Gülenist schools. Kyrgyzstan denied that request in 2018 due to sovereignty issues and “attachment to these schools which train Kyrgyzstan’s upper class,” an analyst at the Institute of Applied Geopolitics Studies, Magomed Beltouev, explained to Novastan. The Kyrgyz government focused on increasing its power over these schools by changing their status, according to the researcher in this article. The Turks have not seemed to come to terms with this choice. However, the Kyrgyz government has consented to the establishment of a new Turkish organisation, Maarif. Founded by the Turkish state, this new organisation is intended to take over activities previously led by Gülenist schools. Maarif schools, ranging from nursery schools to high schools, should open soon, says the Anadolu Agency (AA).

The premise of a defense cooperation with Kazakhstan

The progress of regional integration with Turkey allows Central Asian republics to diversify partnerships and display to their great neighbouring countries – Russia and China – that they can develop other connections and agreements, declares Balci. However, a Turkish defense cooperation has never materialised, as Russia finds it difficult to accept interference by external actors in what it considers its “near abroad.” Nevertheless, Turkey seems to have new ambitions in Central Asia, bolstered by its success in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turks have provided combat drones of their own making to their ally Azerbaijan, which have been key to Azerbaijani military superiority. Discussions with Kazakhstan have taken place in order to begin cooperation with the Turkish defense industry, as reported by the Anadolu Agency (AA) in February. Furthermore, Daily Sabah reported the testing of combat vehicles and weapons systems made by two Turkish firms – Otokar and Aseldam – in the Karadanga region in March. Official communications also announced that a defense collaboration has been discussed between Turkey and Uzbekistan. This first step between the two countries resulted in the signing of a military financial cooperation agreement in October 2020. During his tour stop, the Kazakh Minister of Foreign Affairs Mukhtar Tileuberdi had a discussion with his Turkish counterpart and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 17 March. They jointly discussed the “high investment potential” of Turkey but also opportunities to extend cooperation into various fields such as medicine, information technology and energy.

The great ambitions of the past

More broadly, Turkish ambitions in Central Asia have evolved considerably; they are shaped as much by the interests of other states as by the means available to achieve its goals. The five Central Asian republics declared their independence and initiated relations with other sovereign states after the fall of Soviet Union in 1991. Balci explains that Western powers dreaded the possibility of these predominantly Muslim societies yielding to the influence of Iran or Saudi Arabia. “Therefore we thought that Turkey, inspired by a European model, should be a model for these countries as they open up internationally,” adds the researcher. At the same time Pan-Turkism, an ethnic movement advocating the cohesion of nations with Turkic culture and language, was well received by the Turkish elite according to Beltouev. Initially, Central Asian republics agreed to the principle of a Turkish leadership but the Turkey of 1991 is not the same as Turkey today, explains Balci. Less wealthy and less powerful, it proved unable to offer protection and economic opportunities expected by some Central Asian leaders.

A modest cooperation

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia looked unfavourably on foreign incursions into its sphere of influence. The country quickly created regional institutions in order to reaffirm its ascendency over the new Central Asian republics. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) first saw the light of the day in 1991, while the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) was founded in 2000, which became the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2014. Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia Turkish leaders had to lower their ambitions; Turkey could not become a protective power in Central Asia. As a result, Turkic solidarity developed mostly around cultural, educational and linguistic cooperation. Aware of the need to respect the cultural and political features of each of their partners, the Turks have focused on the development of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, Turkey has pursued its Turkic integration project. The International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) began in 1993 in Almaty, the then capital of Kazakhstan. Many years later, the Turkic Council, initiated in an informal manner in 1992, was officially established in 2009. This intergovernmental forum now includes all Turkic-speaking states except for Turkmenistan, which is strongly attached to its neutrality policy.

A desire to carry regional influence

For Balci, the institutionalisation of the Turkic Council is an ongoing process. The accession of Uzbekistan to the council in 2019 was made possible only thanks to warming relations after the passing of Islam Karimov in 2016. At this point, the only Turkic country not represented in the council is Turkmenistan. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared his desire to see Turkmenistan become a member “as soon as possible” in December 2020,says Anadolu. The myth of Turkic unity remains strong even today. The Turkic Council held a videoconference on 31 March, where various leaders discussed a roadmap for the future called “2040 Turkish world vision.” Baghdad Amreyev, the general secretary of the Turkic Council, discussed this roadmap with the Anadolu Agency (AA). The document aims to establish “better coordination in terms of foreign policy, cooperation in the field of security, free-trade agreements, open borders for transit, as well as the reinforcement of linguistic and alphabet cooperation,” explains Amreyev. He also underlines that it is the “first summit of Turkic leaders after the Azerbaijani victory in Nagorno-Karabakh” in November 2020. It is also a victory for Turkey which seeks to extend its reach beyond the Caucasus. According to Balci, “Turkey’s approach to the Karabakh war has been closely observed by Central Asian states.” Besides the desire to see its power recognized by Russia and the West, Turkey has also “displayed its capacity to militarily support its partners,” adds the researcher. In addition, Turkey desires to play a part in the Afghan issue. The Tadjik capital, Dushanbe, hosted the ninth ministerial meeting of the Istanbul process in late March; it is the fruit of a 2011 Turkish initiative aimed at creating a regional dialogue to support the economic development of Afghanistan. A summit meeting devoted to the Afghan peace process between the Kabul government and the rebels will take place in Istanbul on 16 April, describes the American media The Diplomat. Russia, China, Pakistan and the United States will be present according to the Anadolu Agency (AA).

Beyond talk, few concrete actions

Diplomats and official media tend to highlight Turkey’s good relations with its Central Asian “brothers.” The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs also emphasizes the assistance Turkey has been providing to its Central Asian partners during the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic.  For instance, Anadolu claims that Turkey is providing Tajikistan with the third highest amount of aid. In a seemingly favourable regional context, Turkey desires to increase its presence in Central Asia. However, Beltouev encourages a nuanced approach. “The economic importance of these countries for Turkey is marginal,” he says. The link with Asia is, more than anything else, symbolic. “Speeches about Turkish brotherhood and Silk Roads are always grandiloquent but there is a clear difference between the discussions which take place and their subsequent translation into bilateral agreements, which are not very ambitious,” concludes the general secretary of the Turkic Council.  

Written by Guillaume Gérard

Translated from French by Emma Bekrine

Edited by Mari Paine

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DECRYPTION. In January 2022, Kazakhstan was able to count on the support of Russia, through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), to put an end to the demonstrations which shook several cities in the country. But since the start of the war in Ukraine, Moscow’s best Central Asian ally has been trying to gradually distance itself from this embarrassing and uncertain neighbour.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on October 4, 2022. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev never supported the Russian invasion of Donbass. This behaviour clearly did not sit well with Vladimir Putin, who counted on the support of his strongest “near stranger”. How far can Kazakhstan get away from Russia? Deciphering the manoeuvres of a country that tries to distance itself from the Kremlin, without attracting its wrath. “We do not recognize Taiwan, Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In all likelihood, this principle will be applied to quasi-state entities[…]Luhansk and Donetsk”. In these words spoken at the St. Petersburg economic forum on June 15, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev laid his cards on the table to Vladimir Putin: no, he will not clearly support the war in Ukraine, unlike his Chinese and Belarusian allies.

Nevertheless, this did not prevent the Kazakh President from continuing to maintain his relations with his Russian counterpart: on August 19, the two Presidents met in Sochi to discuss their economic relations. The two parties displayed a cordial understanding and affirmed their desire to strengthen the Russian-Kazakh partnership, notes the Kazakh media Astana Times. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Vladimir Putin then met at the last summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). As far as military affairs are concerned, Kazakh troops participated in the Military Games organized by Russia in August, recalls the English language media The Diplomat. But if diplomatic relations remain cordial, it is only an appearance. Kazakhstan, which has let more than 98,000 Russians cross its borders since the start of the partial mobilization in Russia, is trying not to be dragged into the war in Ukraine, while trying not to offend its “big neighbour”, whose reaction may have uncertain implications for its national security.

Cautious diplomacy

On September 17, during the UN General Assembly, Kazakhstan decided to abstain during the vote which would allow Ukrainian President Volodimyr Zelensky to speak or not. It also abstained on a resolution demanding the end of the war and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine, recalls Radio Azattyq, the Kazakh branch of the American media Radio Free Europe. A week after the start of the Russian invasion in February, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had called on the parties to “seek compromises”. This sums up Kazakhstan’s careful diplomacy since the start of the Russian invasion. Astana maintains a certain neutrality regarding the war in Ukraine, which is increasingly difficult to maintain. Not wanting to criticize Russia directly, Kazakhstan confines itself to recalling the importance of defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states.

Tracking Western sanctions against Russia

But behind the official statements, there are the facts. At the economic forum in Saint-Petersburg, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev asserted that the sanctions “were the sanctions” and that Kazakhstan would not oppose them, reports Radio Free Europe, in order not to be in turn disapproved of by the West. Read more on Novastan: Central Asia and Russia: an ever-changing relationship In September, the largest country in Central Asia indeed opposed the legalization of parallel imports, preventing Russian and Belarusian truckers from importing goods from Europe, explains the Kazakh news agency KazTag, in order to align with European legislation. In the banking sector, the Halyk bank, the most important in Kazakhstan, announced on September 21 the suspension of payments by Mir card for Russians in Kazakhstan, reports Radio Azattyq.

An upcoming CSTO departure?

The estrangement of Kazakhstan and Russia could also have repercussions in the military field. After the new clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia since September 15, rumours that Kazakhstan plans to leave the CSTO have spread on social networks, reports the Kazakh media Tengri News.   While these rumours have been denied by a press release from the presidential administration, and while the military exercises of the CSTO are still planned to take place from September 27 to October 5 in Kazakhstan, the exit of the country from the military alliance would be made possible by the Kazakh administration, explains political scientist Arkady Dubnov in an article by the Kyrgyz media Kaktus. Indeed, following the annexation of four Ukrainian republics on September 29, “the Kremlin will have the right to use the most effective means to protect Russia, including nuclear weapons” explains the political scientist. Moscow has responded to the call of the Kazakh President and stepped up during the demonstrations of January 2022, so “Russia could try to attract allied countries, [including Kazakhstan], to its military operation in Ukraine”, which would be strongly against Kazakhstan’s interests.

Breaking away from Russian influence

In the public sphere, Kazakhstan is trying to rid itself of Russian influence through various means. The cancellation of the May 9 military parade, the most important holiday in the Soviet Union and then in Russia, which had also been celebrated in Kazakhstan, was already a strong signal of distancing. Earlier, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had refused to be decorated with the Order of Alexander Nevsky, a high Russian distinction generally awarded to national civil servants or eminent foreign politicians, reports the Kazakh media Vlast. More recently, during the official visit to Baku, the Kazakh President spoke to the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev not in Russian as usual, but each in their native language, being able to understand each other thanks to the Turkic roots common to Azeri and Kazakh. A dangerous game for Kazakhstan? The consequences of the estrangement with Russia seem to have already been felt during the summer. In less than a few months, the route through which Kazakhstan exports 80% of its oil, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, had to stop working, officially due to technical problems, reports the Reuters news agency. This event, however, shows signs of tension between Russia and Kazakhstan, with Moscow “punishing” Astana for its non-support of Russian positions. These tensions were bolstered by a Facebook post by former Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, denying Kazakhstan’s national sovereignty. Even though the post was immediately deleted after publication, stated to be a hack according to Russian officials, several analysts envisage the reproduction of the Ukrainian scenario in Kazakhstan. Indeed, the researcher in international relations between Russia and the Central Asian countries, Temur Umarov, points out that the northern region of Kazakhstan, home to many ethnic Russians, which is also sharing a long border with Russia, seems threatened. On September 27, during an official visit to Turkestan in the southwest of the country, the Kazakh President was indeed worried about the national security of Kazakhstan: “With this in mind, we must first think about the security of our country… For us, the most important thing is the territorial integrity and the well-being of our people. Therefore, we must exercise caution and patience, we must not allow ourselves to be led by provocateurs.”

Written by Emma Collet

Translated from French by Matthew Devereux

Edited by Maya Ivanova

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On May the 3rd 2021, the two ministers spoke about the future of the Franco Uzbek cooperation, the possible prospects and the actual obstacle. Their telephone conversation demonstrates a new step towards a partnership already robust.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 10 May 2021.

As reported by Uzbek media Uzbekistan Daily, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, Abdulaziz Kamilov, rang his French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian on 3 May 2021.

The two ministers discussed the current situation and the perspective of the Franco-Uzbek cooperation in political, commercial, economic, cultural, and humanitarian areas among others.

A full schedule for Uzbekistan and France

The joint events to come between both countries were inspected, such as the next meeting of the Franco-Uzbek intergovernmental committee on commercial and economic cooperation. The latter was held on May 10 at Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s capital, as described by the French minister of Foreign Affairs. Both counterparts also mentioned the second ministerial meeting as part of the France-Central Asia format.

Abdulaziz Kamilov and Jean-Yves Le Drian discussed some local problems in Central Asia regarding security. Afghanistan’s situation was part of the discussion, together with the recent confrontation at the Tajik-Kyrgyz border that has caused about fifty deaths. In such circumstances, both ministers expressed the necessity of a local stability.

Read more on Novastan: What are the underlying reasons for the deadly Kyrgyz-Tajik border clashes?

At the end of the discussion, Abdulaziz Kamilov expressed his will to see France be part of the International Conference “Central and Southern Asia: Regional Connectivity. Challenge and opportunity.” This conference, which will take place in July 2021 in Tashkent, will be welcoming the involvement of Russia, as declared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Serguey Lavrov.

This event should allow Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan to talk about the development of the transport network between the three countries. This is a major issue which is part of a tourism development project announced by Uzbek government in late February. In late April, a railway line between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has been provided with electricity, showing the ambition of developing the railway network.

Read more on Novastan: Russia commits to railroad corridor China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan

Jean-Yves Le Drian already had the will to strengthen the relationship of France and Uzbekistan. During a conference held on July 20 2018, the minister delivered a speech describing the willpower of France to reinforce the commercial and economic relationships with Uzbekistan. “I deeply wish France to become a partner in Uzbekistan. To achieve this goal, I know that administration and businesses […] are not sparing themselves.”, he concluded in his speech.

However, this speech was the last connection between Uzbekistan and Jean-Yves Le Drian before the telephonic talk with his counterpart on 3 May.

France and Uzbekistan, a long-time cooperation

The relations between the two countries are not new. Since the ratification of the friendship and cooperation treaty between Uzbekistan and France in 1993, both demonstrate a strong bond and work together in several fields.

French companies are particularly involved in Uzbekistan’s business. In December 2020, an agreement was signed to allow French company Rungis to set up in Uzbekistan. And vice versa, Uzbek businesses collaborate with France. In late April, Uzbek society Global Exports furnished thousands of tons of beans to Bonduelle, a massive vegetable distribution company in France.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan is not the first minister from Central Asia with whom Jean-Yves Le Drian talked recently. This establishing contact with Abdulaziz Kamilov is reminiscent of the conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Kazakhstan, Mukhtar Tleuberdi on late April 28, as reported by the French ministry’s website. In the same fashion, the two ministers discussed relationships between both countries and expressed their desire to strengthen cooperation.

Léonard Dillies Writer for Novastan

Translated from French by Flavie Deschamps

Edited by Emma Bekrine

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Dr Jade McGlynn has published an article for The Diplomat discussing the modernisation of Britain’s Central Asian Trade Strategy, based on her report for the Henry Jackson Society, entitled ‘A Steppe Change: Should Britain Be Bolder In Central Asia?’. In it, she states the UK “needs to think more ambitiously and coherently about its business aims with Central Asia”. In developing relations with the Central Asian states, the UK could balance trade with human rights and developmental assistance. So far, the UK has failed to develop such a strategy, and efforts remain focused on trading opportunities. McGlynn wants the UK to take head of the political realities of these states and ensure it champions and actively encourages democracy and greater human rights while simultaneously organising and developing trade agreements. Novastan spoke to Dr McGlynn to find out more about her strategy. An example of where the UK has failed to do as much is their increasing arms deals with Turkmenistan, considered by human rights groups as one of the world’s most repressive and authoritarian regimes. In comparison, the UK’s assistance to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has benefitted both nations and given the UK considerable soft power through showing commitment to the region beyond trade. The emerging signs of democratisation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s two largest economies and nations, show the region to be making a gradual change from what has long been considered an authoritarian area of the world. The landslide election of Sadyr Japarov in Kyrgyzstan should be cautiously championed for implementing democracy. By providing vocal support for Kyrgyzstan, the UK reminds the other nations that its trade, investment and support are connection to Kyrgyzstan’s continued democratic style of governance. This in turn could increase the likelihood for democratisation in the neighbouring states. The UK should take inspiration from the Obama administration’s C5+1 initiative and build on its positive reputation gained from development work in the region. This would then allow the UK to maintain channels with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and shows they are open to trade should they ever move towards democratisation. The UK has not paid enough attention to Central Asia. When it has, only specific countries or aspects, for example trade with Kazakhstan, have been made the point of focus. A region-focused approach instead would benefit both Britain and countries where regional cooperation has not always been strong. Human rights must remain a priority As much as increased trade negotiations with these countries should be encouraged, she maintains that the UK cannot sign deals at the expense of human rights and jeopardization of a free and fair society. The UK’s current arms deals with Turkmenistan are a shocking example of sacrificing ethics in order to bolster trade. The lack of pressure on the UK to halter these deals is due to a lack of knowledge and media coverage of the area. Too often the mainstream, generalised media focuses on the bizarre rules put in place by President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, shining the country in a comedic, ridiculous light. The reality of the brutal human rights abuses and widespread poverty despite the wealth of natural resources in the country is forgotten. Larger organisations rather than just specialised areas should give the country more attention in order to increase knowledge of Turkmenistan, something which would elevate pressure to stop these morally and ethically entirely unacceptable arms deals. These deals undermine the UK’s pronounced championship of human rights and should be stopped. Elsewhere, little has been done to improve the state of human rights for the citizens of Central Asia: despite claims by the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as to the development of human rights, little evidence of this has yet been shown. Recent human rights abuses include censorship of journalists and oppression of the LGBTQ+ community. While democratic, the election of Sadyr Japarov in Kyrgyzstan and imprisonment of the most outspoken critic and presidential hopeful, Omurbek Tekebayev, puts the country as risk of returning to the populist authoritarianism overturned in 2010. It would be hypocritical of the UK to adopt a trade policy with such countries after public anti-authoritarian efforts in China and Russia and could demoralise activists in these countries who need the UK’s support. Implementing a human rights checklist backed up by independent NGOs from the region in order to assess milestones in terms of achieving greater democracy and freedom could encourage increased democratisation. This would enable the UK to measure economic engagement against human rights and democratisation milestones. Goals could be set for countries like Uzbekistan that claim to be installing more democratic milestones such as free access for election observers, the establishment of NGOs and funds to support independent media. Once reached, the country could continue to the next stage in economic relations. Putting a permanent representative in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, would symbolise the UK’s commitment to supporting the democratic potential of the region. Kyrgyzstan is currently the most democratic country and would demonstrate the UK’s hope that they should stay on this path. It would also reward and prioritise the most democratic country and encourage Sadyr Japarov, President of Kyrgyzstan, to continue this work. The UK alone would have enough power to rely on their influence to speed up democratisation in Central Asia. However, the European interest, particularly from countries who keep human rights as a core component of their foreign policy, namely Scandinavian countries, and desires in Washington for the Biden administration to continue with Obama’s policy, allow for a combined effort which ups the pressure for Central Asian nations. Background of Central Asia The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and subsequent independence for Central Asian countries led to a long-term struggle for democracy. Many of these countries contain deeply embedded ethnic tensions dating back to Stalin’s policies, for example in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan. These countries have had to deal with civil wars, widespread humans rights abuses and as a result their economies have struggled to achieve their full potential. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan still rely heavily on remittances. However, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have seen a near doubling in per capita income in purchasing power parity since independence and political conflicts have not deterred interest from abroad in trade and investment. These countries are rich in natural resources, which constitute 65 per cent of exports in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as over 90 per cent in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The UK has now left the EU and thus has the freedom to pursue its own trade deal. Economic, security and geopolitical considerations make Central Asia a good trade partner, including the appetite for British goods in countries such as Kazakhstan and the pre-established trade and diplomatic presence of the UK in each of the nations. The Department of International Trade has put in effort to build on existing standing especially in Kazakhstan, where UK cultural, service and educational exports are popular. For example, 4,000 Kazakh students are currently studying in the UK and more visas are issues to Kazakh students than Australians. With two established UK trade offices in Kazakhstan, a comparatively large economy and a consistently open approach to free trade, McGlynn deems the country a promising contender for UK export growth. In comparison, Uzbekistan also has potential since the United Kingdom-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 2019 enabled the two to grant each other the most favoured nation (MFN) treatment. This is important because Uzbekistan does not belong in the World Trade Organisation. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have less ample economic opportunities due to widespread poverty, a relatively low GDP of $8.09 and $7.52 billion respectively, although it is still important to include them. The UK accounts for almost half of all Kyrgyzstan’s export, mainly gold, which provides leverage to promote democratisation. Trade between the UK and Turkmenistan has flourished under the auspices of the Turkmen-British Trade and Economic Council, even if it allows for a growth in controversial arms deals. The UK is not alone in the rush to take advantage of such lucrative deals: Italy has established a business forum with Central Asian countries, signing arms deals with Turkmenistan. The USA has just launched the Central Asia Investment Partnership and the Scandinavian nations have recently held the Kazakhstan Northern European Investment Forum. McGlynn advises the UK to hurry in these countries’ footsteps but paying heed not to lose sight of their moral and democratic values. Impact on other countries

Economic investment can also improve security interests, namely in helping to stabilise the countries. With a combined population of 75million, the average age of a Central Asian citizen is 27.6, highlighting the need for economic opportunities for young people. Without such opportunities, the likelihood for young people to become radicalised or turn to extremist groups is far greater. The UK’s trade influence can be used as a positive counter example to major geopolitical players in that region- Russia and China. The UK has condemned China’s campaign against the Uyghur people in Xinjiang, a campaign which has also targeted ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, the Kazakhs being the second largest Turkic-speaking indigenous community in the region after the Uyghurs. It also contains many ethnic Kyrgyz. The UK’s economic approach must take into account these people, support them and help refugees.

 Lily Shanagher Edited by Tommy Hodgson

The post How can Britain develop trade in Central Asia? appeared first on Novastan English.

ANALYSIS. The political landscape of Kyrgyzstan was tumultuous in 2020. Novastan Deutsch’s founder and editorial manager Florian Coppenrath analyses Sadyr Japarov’s path to the top and ventures an outlook on its global implications.

The following article appeared in the December 2020 issue of Zentralasien-Analysen. We republish it with the kind permission of the editors. 

“Yesterday, police forces performed their duties perfectly … As President of State I repeat once again: calm in society should be the priority”, declared the then president of Kyrgyzstan Sooronbay Jeenbekov on 3 March 2020. The day before, between 1,500 and 3,000 people demonstrated for over eight hours in Bishkek for the release of Sadyr Japarov, a politician sentenced to over eleven years in prison for hostage-taking. The demonstration was broken up in the evening by the police as demonstrators were marching to the White House. 

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In retrospect, these events seem like a prelude to Japarov’s stellar rise from prison to the top of the executive system. The former advisor of the ex-president Kumanbek Bakiev (2005-2010) was released on 6 October and elected prime minister on 10 October. He also became interim president after the resignation of Jeenbekov and after the government’s spokesman, Kanatbek Isaev, stepped down. All these moves were also supported by a group of committed and sometimes aggressive demonstrators. 

There was hardly any counter-protest. As early as March, many opposition-minded residents of Bishkek showed their lack of understanding for Japarov’s supporters, who were perceived as rural and alien. In October also, many people in Bishkek and abroad were wondering what this “Japarov phenomenon” was all about. The fact that he has the support of a significant part of the population cannot be denied. Yet, he is also a reflection of the rising divergence between social strata. 

Revolution or coup?

Japarov, who resigned from his executive post on 14 November to run in the presidential election emerges as the clear winner of the political turmoil following the disputed and eventually annulled parliamentary election of 4 October. Like a Machiavellian prince, he and his supporters were able to seize the opportunity single-mindedly. Now, people close to Japarov occupy many key positions in the government, most notably his long-time comrades-in-arms Kamchybek Tashiev, now head of the GKNB security service. The outgoing parliament and the judiciary have also quickly sided with him.

Legally, many decisions made in Autumn are highly questionable, as the Venice Commission confirmed at the request of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. According to the constitution, the term of the parliament ended five years after its first session i.e. at the end of October. Nevertheless, MPs passed new bills hastily and with numerous procedural violations. According to the electoral law and the electoral commission, the parliamentary election was supposed to be organised at the end of December, but has been postponed indefinitely. This is an illustration of the fact that even the highest of laws is only relevant if enough people and institutions commit to its validity.

Read more: Rise and fall… and rise: the career of Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov

Japarov effectively pushed for a new constitution that would, in particular, increase the powers of the president, establish a vaguely defined, unelected kurultai (a traditional assembly) to control the executive and legislative branches, and invoke “traditional values” and “respect for elders”. A relevant draft was first presented on 17 November and promptly dubbed the “Khanstitutsiya”, the “Khan Constitution”, on social media. According to Japarov, now president, the new constitution will rid the state of corruption, but according to many observers, it will usher a new authoritarian chapter in Kyrgyzstan’s political history. 

Whether the incidents in Autumn 2020 will be remembered as the third Kyrgyz revolution or as a coup d’état remains to be seen. In any case, they reveal the limits of the thought patterns that all too often manifest themselves in Russian, Western European and US analyses of Kyrgyzstani politics. We can only speak of a competition between different clans to a very limited extent here, and even less of a division between the north and the south of the country. Neither was Jarapov’s rise promoted by geopolitical actors, rather the opposite: Kyrgyzstan’s international partners have uniformly reacted sceptically to the change of president and now tend to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. 

Such analytical motifs place the emphasis on local dynamics in Kyrgyzstan. They refer to partly existing distinctions of interests groups, but tend to be exotic in order to convey one thing to the readership abroad: ‘Something this crazy could not happen here’. Yet Kyrgyzstan has long been integrated into global processes and financial flows, and money stolen from the Kyrgyz state is often found on European bank accounts. Japarov’s success to date can also be described by globally quite common categories: as a right-wing populist episode in a neoliberal state. 

National populism in sheep’s clothing

In a feature of the Japanese weekly Nikkei Asia, Kyrgyz political expert Asim Asimov explained Japarov’s success through a ‘Trump-effect’: “There are very few points on his résumé that show that he is the most suitable candidate for the position of prime minister or president. But he has very strong public support, especially among traditional nationalists and very conservative rural people in Kyrgyzstan”. 

Japarov was imprisoned for taking the governor of the Issyk-Kul region hostage in 2013, in reaction to the nationalisation of the Kumtör, the country’s largest gold mine. He first spent several years in exile in Cyprus and was finally arrested on the Kyrgyz border in 2017 and sentenced to over eleven years in prison. He lost both his parents while in prison, and his son died in a motorbike accident. The tragedy in his biography feeds into a martyr narrative: he has already sacrificed a lot for his motherland; he started at the bottom and can thus understand the concerns of the ‘common people’ better than anyone else. 

He himself uses such an anti-elitist narrative in which he opposes the ordinary people with the corrupt political class. For example, in his interview with Al Jazeera on October 20, he replied to the journalist’s concerns: “I am a democrat. Those who say otherwise are my opponents who did not get the positions they wanted”. He does not stand for a concrete political programme, but only for the fight against corruption, which is being exaggerated as a battle between good and evil. 

Through his image and rhetoric, Japarov, the man of the people, fills a political vacuum. As researcher Asel Doolotkeldieva explained in the TV programme ‘Vecher Trudnogo Dnya‘ (A Hard Day’s Night) back in November 2020, a successful political communication campaign has already been created around his person over the past years via Youtube channels ‘in a very accessible language’. He stands for the non represented, the “working class without a job”: “this part of the population, these 35 percent of the poorest and maybe more from the middle class, who can not see any future prospects in this country. They think that Japarov really and sincerely represents their interests,” explained Doolotkeldieva.

Read more: Can Sadyr Japarov fulfil his promises?

This background also explains some of the opportunistic-looking political statements that cater to nationalist sentiments. One of Japarov’s first acts as prime minister was to reintroduce the indication of ethnicity (in Russian ‘natsionalnost’) in new identity cards and passports. The reference to the kurultai in the constitutional reform also refers to a supposed Kyrgyz tradition. Unlike Donald Trump, however,  Japarov has so far refrained from overly aggressive rhetoric. He is making an effort to win the sympathy of foreign investors and donors, as well as the urban middle class. For example, the fence of the White House in Bishkek has been dismantled and some of his opponents, such as MPs Tilek Toktogaziev and Elvira Zurabaldieva, were co-opted in the government (though they are not part of the government composed in February 2021). Toktogaziev and Zurabaldiyeva had previously been vocal members of the youth-led ‘lustration movement’ for a renewal of the political class. 

Japarov’s anti-elitism is populist, but so are his proposals of easy solutions to complicated problems and his selective understanding of the law. For example, the proposal of an economic amnesty for corrupt personalities: as reported in a journalistic investigation series, Raimbek Matraimov, a former customs official was accused of illegally taking at least 700 million US dollars out of the country, was briefly arrested at the end of October but released in exchange for a promise of repayment of almost 24 million US dollars. He was later detained again and finally released for the last time in April 2021. According to Japarov, this a “political decision”, because, imprisoned, such a person would not pay back a cent to the state. 

Read more: Matraimov’s millions: the story of a Kyrgyz corruption scandal

The current political crisis in Kyrgyzstan is also a socio-economic one. Many analysts did not without reason draw attention to the gap between urban and rural populations and the poverty and lack of prospects. This also motivated the original protest against the parliamentary election. “A country of volunteers and vigilantes. All by themselves,” complained the journalist Aidai Irgebaeva on Facebook in early October. Whether it is caring for people infected with Covid-19 or protecting the city from being sacked, it is always up to the citizens alone, she said. The state is conspicuous above all by its absence, which on the one hand leads to a certain political competition, but also to a shortage of public services. 

A shallow state

In their work Competitive Authoritarianism (2010), Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way introduced the concept of “rotten door transitions”: These “often happen quickly and look spectacular. Indeed, images of protesters taking the parliament while security forces look aside or join them have led to some of these transitions being called revolutions.” The political scientists refer mainly to the so-called colour revolutions of 2004-2005, and the events of the night of 5-6 October in Bishkek, when the White House was “occupied” by protesters within hours, also fit this pattern. According to the authors, such changes of political power rarely lead to a stable government and point above all to the weakness of the state, the party system and civil society. 

The often chaotic political events in Kyrgyzstan can be explained by the widespread absence of the state. This reached its peak in the days after 5 October, when, for a time, not even the security function of the state was guaranteed. The months before showed how quickly the public health system was overwhelmed by the Covid-19 crisis and many affected people could only count on their own resources or contacts. A similar picture emerges in the education sector, where the private sector continues to grow and public schools are increasingly run down, as Aigul Abdubaetova pointed out in the previous issue of Zentralasien-Analysen. 

Kyrgyzstan is an extreme example of a minimalist, neoliberal state. Appropriate reforms have been pursued with remarkable continuity since the early 1900s, albeit at a somewhat slower pace after 2010, commented the neo-left Kyrgyz portal Kyrgsoc.org on the legislative package “Towards New Economic Freedom and Development” adopted in April 2020. “Right now, in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, even the most market-oriented states are beginning to break neoliberal principles […] our government is blowing the whistle on its citizens and introducing harsh economic measures in order to obtain loans”, deplored Kyrgsoc’s editorial board. 

According to Kyrgsoc, such reforms sometimes led to the “destruction of industrial complexes and factories” and the “degradation of agriculture”, with wealth concentrated in urban centres via investors and the service sector, especially in the capital Bishkek. This situation is strongly reflected in people’s daily lives: according to the Statistics Committee, at the country level in 2018, an average of just under 38% of households had a permanent sewage system. In Bishkek, the figure is over 97%. These divergent realities also illustrate the gap between those who support Japarov and those who do not.

There is no coherent economic policy in Kyrgyzstan, and in the absence of attractive economic sectors, the state itself becomes a resource. In his thesis, researcher Johan Engvall showed that “the logic of an investment market lies at the core of the Kyrgyz state’s operations”. In other words, state functions are traded like financial assets that guarantee a stable income to the ‘buyers’ who occupy them. It is no secret in Kyrgyzstan that government posts and seats in parliament (or favourable list position) are for sale. Instead of creating public goods, respective officials are first busy making private capital out of their positions. 

Something similar seems to be happening after the recent incidents: “State posts are being grabbed by the same corrupt elites … According to insider information, the new team makes money by selling state posts as valuable resources,” described Doolotkeldieva on Twitter in November, for example. Thus, Japarov’s presidency is expected to bring continuity in the economic and social spheres. He will hardly be able to live up to the expectations many have of him today. He has already backtracked on his former hobby horse, the nationalisation of the Kumtör gold mine: there is not much gold left there anyway, he said. 

The question of who benefits from the situation remains. There are many indications that the events of October were probably an organised shift of power. Some of the demonstrators were driven around the city in buses and served food rations and even cultural programmes. It is not yet clear who is behind this. Some talk of organised crime, others of the circle of ex-president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who was overthrown during the April Revolution of 2010 after five years in office. In fact, Japarov and many of his circle held political positions under Bakiyev. 

A growing political culture

After Japarov’s success in the presidential elections in January, one would be tempted to say that the once highly praised Kyrgyzstan is going back many years in its democratisation process. This not only would correspond to the somewhat condescending reflex of describing countries in transition as good or bad pupils, but also overlook underlying social dynamics. 

Last but not least, the Covid-19 crisis rightly stirred up a lot of resentment towards the political class, but it also represents a collective experience of self-efficiency. It was volunteers who provided much of the social and medical care. Likewise, it was some 10,000 volunteer “Druzhinniki” who protected Bishkek from looting in the days following 5 October. For the researcher Erica Marat, such examples show “how a resilient society gains in complexity and organisation  in order to resist the insolence of those in power”. 

In an interview with the Akipress press agency, the former interim president Roza Otunbaeva also asserts that one cannot speak of an end of democracy in Kyrgyzstan. Rather, Kyrgyz society is experiencing “growing pains”: “There is a knowledgeable youth growing, the generation of the 21st century, they will not go backwards, but only forwards! We do not stand by idly, fight, take risks, make sacrifices, move and drive political processes forward.”

Paradoxically, even Japarov’s populism can be seen as a sign of such social processes. For all its instrumentalisation, populism is also a democratic phenomenon because it is an indirect recognition of the political role of the people. In an interview with The Economist, the then presidential candidate affirmed: “You [the people] can put up with things for one, two or three years and then drive out any president … You cannot establish a dictatorship in our country.” 

Kyrgyzstan: a prime example of global social developments 

The new constitution should act as a wake-up call for many in Bishkek. A first demonstration against the constitutional changes on 8 November gathered only about 20 people. The following demonstration on 22 November brought together about 500 people, according to media reports: a relatively large gathering by Bishkek standards, but much smaller than the protest against the results of the parliamentary election on 5 October. There was a certain political fatigue at the end of an already exhausting year. 

The underlying causes of political instability in Kyrgyzstan are more likely to worsen. A stronger vertical power and the weakening of democratic institutions of control will only make the state more attractive as a playground for private interests and will hardly ensure more social justice within society. On this basis, “the people”, to whose will Japarov constantly appeals, can also quickly turn against him once the “post-revolutionary” honeymoon feeling has dispelled.

Read more: Kyrgyzstan: voters approve new constitution in referendum

Unlike Lukashenko, Japarov will hardly be able to draw on a public security apparatus that has been consolidated for over two decades. So the door remains rotten, to return to Levitsky and Way’s metaphor. 

Processes determining social developments in Kyrgyzstan are no less shaped by global dynamics than they are in Europe. This is especially true for translocal interconnections of a media-communicative and financial-economic nature, of which Kyrgyz citizens are just as much a part as the inhabitants of other countries.

This also shows that it is much more fruitful and interesting not to constantly portray Kyrgyz politics as something that is “backward”, “chaotic” and “alien to us”. After all, phenomena like right-wing populism and neoliberalism are happening globally, even if they may take on particularly extreme features in Kyrgyzstan. But instead of being stuck in a “not yet sufficiently democratised” past, the country might as well find itself in a threateningly approaching future.

Florian Coppenrath
Founder of Novastan Deutsch

Translated from German by Manon Montant

Edited by Alexander Fuss

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The post Between nationalist populism and neoliberalism: Kyrgyzstan and global political trends appeared first on Novastan English.

The Uzbek party Erk intends to field a candidate at the presidential election this October. The opposition party was banned in the 1990s and its leader fled the country.

A version of this article was first published on Novastan’s French website on 14 April 2021.

The opposition party Erk, whose name means “freedom” in Uzbek, intends to take part in Uzbekistan’s presidential election in October, it said in a statement on 5 April. The statement also condemned “the actions of the current government of Uzbekistan, which prevents the registration of newly created parties and uses violence against them, thereby violating their constitutional rights.”

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The party has not chosen a candidate yet. Currently in exile in Istanbul, party leader Muhammad Salih cannot participate as he is not allowed back in Uzbekistan. The party’s statement specifies that two candidates are in the running instead: party veteran Salovat Umrzoqov and Uzbek singer-turned-politician Jahongir Otajonov.

The latter announced in December 2020 that he was ending his music career because it was “against Sharia law”, as Radio Ozodlik, the Uzbek branch of the American media Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), reported at the time. The former musician also says he has been threatened since announcing his intention to run for president, an assertion supported by CCTV footage and an RFE/RL recording of three unknown men warning there is a contract out to beat him.

One of the first opposition parties

However, Erk’s participation is not confirmed as the authorities have to allow its registration. In fact, in the parliamentary elections in December 2019, Erk was refused registration and did not run. Birlik (Unity), another opposition party, suffered the same fate.

In an interview with Current Time, a channel created by RFE/RL and Voice of America, Salih said that, were the authorities to refuse Erk’s registration, it would belie President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s image as a reformer. “We would simply show that Mirziyoyev’s image, an image that’s still alive to the people, was always a lie,” he said.

Erk is not a newcomer to Uzbekistan’s political scene. The first non-governmental party to be registered in 1991, it took part in the first post-independence presidential election that same year, when Salih ran against the then president, Islam Karimov. According to RFE/RL, observers said that about 50% of voters cast their ballot for Solih in 1991, but officially he only received 12% of the vote.

Salih fled Uzbekistan in 1993, first to Azerbaijan and later to Turkey, where he currently lives, RFE/RL’s Uzbek service notes. Salih was then accused of helping plot the 1999 Tashkent bombings and the crackdown on Erk intensified. His three brothers were arrested.

Lucie Philip
Novastan.org

Translated and edited by Valentine Baldassari

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A new Kyrgyz constitution, proposed by referendum, was approved by 79.3% of voters according to preliminary results. Turnout, however, was low: just over 35%.

Voters in Kyrgyzstan have approved a new constitution. According to preliminary results of the 11 April constitutional referendum, 79.3% voted for the change, the Kyrgyz Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced. With this vote and the new constitution, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov sees his role gain sweeping new powers.

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The vote, which took place at the same time as local elections, had very low turnout. Also according to the CEC, 35.9% of citizens of voting age participated in the poll, slightly above the threshold of 30% legally required to validate the referendum. This proportion is similar to that of the presidential election on 10 January, which Sadyr Japarov won with nearly 80% of the vote but a 39% turnout.

A victory for the “Khanstitution”

Despite everything, the vote remains a new milestone for Kyrgyzstan’s new strongman. Sadyr Japarov proposed this constitutional change in mid-November 2020, shortly after a rise to power that saw him go from convict to prime minister and interim president. Critics in and out of the country say the new constitution will make Kyrgyzstan an authoritarian state.

Read more: Rise and fall… and rise: the career of Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov

These critics have sometimes referred to this new constitution as a “Khanstitutsiya” (that is, a “Khan constitution”). Indeed, it greatly expands the president’s power without providing institutional counterbalance. As described by the Kyrgyz media outlet Kloop, the new constitution makes the president the sole head of the executive, reducing the prime minister to a subordinate role. The president can in addition now propose laws directly to parliament. According to the Venice Commission’s analysis at the end of March, this “creates a real risk of undermining the separation of powers and the rule of law in the Kyrgyz Republic”.

“Super-presidential” government

Correspondingly, the Kyrgyz press agency AKIPress describes the new constitution as a “legally enshrined super-presidential form of government “ and points out that Kyrgyzstan was de facto under such a system of government already under the presidents Askar Akaev (1990-2005), Kurmanbek Bakiev (2005-2010) and the final years of Almazbek Atambaev‘s presidency (2011-2017).

“To put it simply, the governments of Kyrgyzstan have already tried all possible variants of the political system,” AKIPress adds. “But the problem that we do not want to recognise does not lie in the constitution or in the lack of ideal laws…”

President Japarov describes the constitutional referendum as a solution to political instability in Kyrgyzstan. “Kyrgyzstan has been looking for its way for thirty years, a time during which there have been waves of unrest. All of this is a consequence of the incoherence of our intentions and aspirations,” he declared on the day of the referendum. “Our future path is closely linked to your decision today.”

Updated at 11.50am on 12 April 2021: added final section

Etienne Combier
Editor-in-chief of Novastan France

Florian Coppenrath

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On 6 February 2021, a delegation from the Taliban visited the Turkmen capital, Ashgabat. The meeting, held with Turkmenistan’s foreign affairs minister Raşit Meredow, related to the construction of the TAPI pipeline, which aims to connect several countries within the region. 

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 24 February 2021.

Visits of this kind don’t happen every day: on 6 February, Taliban leaders held talks with Turkmenistan’s minister of foreign affairs Raşit Meredow. During the talks, both parties emphasised the importance of ensuring stability and peace in Afghanistan. In addition, they discussed the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline.

Turkmenistan has never ceased to support this initiative, which dates back to a memorandum signed in 1995. This pipeline would allow Turkmenistan to be less dependent on the Chinese market and diversify gas exportation routes to reach South-Asia countries. The TAPI pipeline project would pass through Afghanistan, Pakistan then India, a route which seems to attract endless complications. 

The Taliban (once again) vouches for the security of the pipeline

Following this meeting, the Taliban declared their support for the pipeline project, which they believe would contribute to development and prosperity in Afghanistan. In this respect, they reiterated intentions they had already expressed in 2016. The declaration included a pledge not to jeopardise the constructions of facilities and infrastructure that could benefit their country. The statement came not long after an attack on regional electric power infrastructure, connecting various Central Asia countries to the Afghan territory. 

Read more: Agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan paves the way for Trans-Caspian Pipeline

This declaration was made after negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, which had started in September 2020 in Qatar, resumed in January. Their objective is finding a compromise to ensure the country’s stability. This northward expansion is an opportunity to gain legitimacy from the rest of the world and to be seen as consistent and essential contributors to the peace-making process. However, even if peace were achieved, it may not guarantee the construction of the pipeline. 

As the American media Eurasianet notes, given the dominant role that the Taliban play in the region’s security, Turkmenistan is directly affected by events that take place in Afghanistan.

In a RFE/RL analysis relating to the visit, the journalist and regional specialist Bruce Pannier evokes many details, including the Taliban’s practices over the past months. Contrary to what they had promised at the end of 2016, the Taliban destroyed strategic regional infrastructure, including electrical. So with this precedent of going back on pledges, it is difficult to see the Taliban as a partner reliable and consistent enough to ensure the success of the pipeline project. 

No US facilitation

One year after signing an agreement with the Taliban, the USA decided not to interfere in the talks between Turkmenistan and the Taliban. In a statement to the American magazine Newsweek on 19 February, the Department of State denied facilitating the recent meeting: “The United States played no role in the Taliban’s visit to Turkmenistan and has no position to share on those discussions.”

“The United States has long supported efforts by Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors to strengthen their connectivity, boost economic coordination, and improve regional transportation infrastructure, including energy infrastructure,” the statement added. Similarly, in October 2020, in a joint statement with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, the American government said it continued to support energy infrastructure in the region. 

It is possible that this meeting between the Taliban and Turkmenistan will succeed in pushing forward a project that has been stopped and started so many times. The decision to welcome the Afghan Taliban allows Turkmenistan to pursue a stable project and to reassure investors, including private Afghan, Pakistani and Indian companies, as well as the Islamic Development Bank. 

TAPI’s phantom construction

In effect, for practical reasons, construction has not progressed quickly, if at all. During the meeting on 6 February, Turkmenistan did not release an official date or any information regarding the financing of the project. The Afghan news outlet Tolonews explained that, as of January 2020, construction had not started in Afghanistan. The Diplomat reported that this was enough to curb the optimism of certain countries who, in 2016, hoped for completion by 2018.

In 2015, Turkmenistan organised a ceremony lavishly celebrating the start of construction of the Turkmen section of the pipeline. Now, many experts question whether this section has actually been completed, when it was supposed to be ready by 2019. Endlessly pushed back, the TAPI project could quite possibly never reach completion. 

Many factors cast doubt on the viability of this project, making former optimism seem outdated. In an April 2019 article, RFE/RL noted that Turkmenistan had ordered additional pipes to construction sites despite stating construction on its territory had already been completed. This led the American media to conclude that, taking into account the volume of material purchased, the installation was far from being finished. In this context, it is difficult to imagine how the Afghan construction could have started, as no prior preparation had been completed. 

Other obstacles

Even presuming that the Turkmen section has been completed, that doesn’t at all guarantee the certainty of the project on the other side of the border. From a political standpoint, the support coming from Pakistan and India has been dependent on Turkmenistan’s pledge to decrease the price of the natural gas it exports. 

Accordingly, Pakistan has explicitly said that its participation in this project depended on a reduction in gas prices. Last June, Islamabad expressed its intent to revise certain terms of the contract that tied it to Turkmenistan, especially the clauses concerning the responsibility of repair in the case of an accident that might take part on the Afghan territory. The German news source Deutsche Welle published an in-depth analysis on this subject, which suggested that Pakistan’s demands have not been observed for the moment and remain an obstacle, delaying completion of the pipeline. Many of the experts interviewed in the piece asserted that the meeting on 6 February could be used as leverage by the Pakistani government in upcoming negotiations.

Read more: Uzbekistan: towards greater cooperation with Iran?

Finally, from a legal standpoint, The Diplomat reported that an Afghan law, voted into effect in 2019, delayed the start of construction. Whether the problems arise for security, legal or political reasons, the project seems to remain uncertain, facing both internal and external hurdles. While the meeting between Turkmenistan and the Taliban remained an attempt to prove commitment towards the project, the project is substantial in serving Turkmenistan’s interests. 

A crucial project for Turkmenistan 

The country, boasting some of the greatest natural gas reserves in the world, depends almost entirely on the sale of this commodity to uphold its economy. This situation becomes all the more problematic for Ashgabat which has, for the moment, only one major client, China. According to the American Trade Administration, in 2019, an overwhelming percentage of Turkmen oil was exported to the Chinese market via the Central Asian pipeline, shared with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The price of this oil was particularly low in 2016, after China negotiated a lower rate in exchange for investments in pipeline construction.  

Read more: Russia commits to railroad corridor China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan

Even though Turkmenistan relaunched oil exportation to the Russian market in 2019, Gazprom remains just a minor contributor to the Turkmen economy. 

As such, the Turkmen government has every interest in ensuring greater security for its Afghan neighbour. For the Central Asian state, it would ensure that construction go ahead unhindered and, in the long term, secure the two countries’ shared energy infrastructure. This project has become even more critical as China has decreased Turkmen oil importation to favour their neighbours, as the Foreign Policy Institute, a US-based think tank, analyses in a 2020 report.

Zenon Bekdouche
Novastan.org

Translated from French by Alice Coveney

The post Turkmenistan: what future for TAPI pipeline after Taliban visit? appeared first on Novastan English.

It’s official: Kyrgyzstan will choose whether or not to modify its constitution on 11 April. Parliament approved the bill making provisions for a referendum last week and the president, Sadyr Japarov, signed it into law on 12 March. Proponents say the changes will make government more efficient, but many worry they give the president too much power and restrict freedom of speech.

Kyrgyzstan will vote on constitutional amendments on 11 April 2021 according to a new law President Sadyr Japarov signed on 12 March. The Jogorku Kenesh, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament, approved the bill in second and third readings the previous day. 94 MPs voted in favour of the bill and six against.

A draft of the constitutional amendments was first published on 17 November 2020 on the initiative of Sadyr Japarov while he was campaigning for the presidential election. It proved controversial, with activists promptly dubbing it a “Khanstitution” because of the strong powers it gave the president, the Kyrgyz media Kloop.kg reports. Talant Mamytov, the interim president from November 2020 to January 2021, then formed a constitutional council to rework the amendments.  

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A referendum followed on 10 January, on the same day as the presidential election, asking voters to choose their preferred form of government. According to the official results, nearly 85% opted for a presidential regime. Just over 11% supported a parliamentary system and a little under 5% voted “against all”. Turnout was 39.12%, above the 30% minimum threshold.

Expanded presidential powers

The proposed amendments increase presidential powers. Article 70 grants the president the power to call a referendum “on their own initiative or on the initiative of at least 300 thousand voters, or on the initiative of a majority of deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh” and to propose new bills in parliament.

The same article also plans for the president to appoint members of the government, appoint and dismiss the chairs of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court and their deputies. Under current law, the president already appoints local judges and the procurer general.

The changes would also allow the president to run for a second term, which the current constitution forbids, and reduce the Jogorku Kenesh from 120 to 90 members.

Read more: Rise and fall… and rise: the career of Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov

President Sadyr Japarov told Azattyk, the Kyrgyz branch of the American media RFE/RL, that the change was necessary to “establish order”. In his view, in the current system “neither the president, nor the government, nor the parliament, decides anything”, leaving the country at a standstill.

“According to the current Constitution, there are three branches – government, parliament and president. The last 10 years have shown that this has led to an increase in bureaucracy, no one wants to take on the solution of issues,” he said. “The president does everything through the government and parliament, shifts the responsibility unto them. I could do that, too. But in this case, Kyrgyzstan will lose another 5-10 years.”

People’s Kurultai

Another section of the draft provides for the creation of an assembly known as the “People’s Kurultai”, a name derived from a type of council in Turkic culture. It gives “recommendations on the directions of social development” but says little about what this might mean. The kurultai can also recommend the dismissal of members of government, advises the president, and proposes new laws to parliament. 

Aksana Ismailbekova, a research fellow at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) whose work focuses on kinship and patronage in Kyrgyzstan, explains that in theory the People’s Kurultai is a way to involve the country’s regions and hold officials accountable.

“Ideally, the kurultai will be able to address very important political issues in which representatives of each regional group will take an active part. The idea is that once the kurultai is legitimised, state officials will be required to report annually on their activities, work, and projects to the regional leaders of Kyrgyzstan,” Ismailbekova told Novastan.

But she highlights this is the ideal and practice could be different. “The big question remains whether the country’s current leaders would allow members of the kurultai, once it is legitimized, to objectively control state officials,” she said. “There are also groups of people who distort the essence and meaning of the People’s Kurultai. Some state officials might use the Kurultai as a political tool to gain power.”

The legal aid clinic Adilet, in Bishkek, expresses a more negative point of view in its analysis of the draft constitution, describing the goals and reasons for the creation of the People’s Kurultai as unclear. It also underlines the new assembly could be used to serve the president’s ends: “There are risks of interference and pressure on all institutions of power, as on the civil sector, from the president through the People’s kurultai,” the analysis reads.

Emphasis on “moral and ethical values”

Another contentious part of the draft is article 10, which states: “Events that contradict moral and ethical values and the public consciousness of the people of the Kyrgyz Republic, may be limited by law.” It goes on to say that “the list of activities subject to restriction and the list of restricted access and dissemination of information is established by law” without further detail.

“Article 10 of the Constitution contrains a threat to freedom of speech,” the former lawmaker Ravshan Jeenbekov said in a discussion organised by Azattyk. “It’s dangerous to limit freedom of speech with reference to the preservation of moral values.”

The worry arises despite parts 1-3 of article 10 guaranteeing freedom of expression and media freedom, according to Mars Tulegenov, the head of the media rights organisation Journalist.kg.

“There are points that raise questions. If the constitution is adopted and ‘the rest will be determined by an additional law,’ what laws will be adopted? … We have enough media laws. We don’t need any more,” he said.

A controversial project

Although the amendments are expected to be approved in the referendum, many in Kyrgyzstan have criticised the project from the onset. “We are returning to authoritarianism,” the MP Dastan Bekechev wrote on his Facebook page at the time.

The former president Roza Otunbaeva even stated that after the implementation of such a constitution, international organisations would stop providing aid to Kyrgyzstan, Kloop reported.

Read more: Kyrgyzstan elects Sadyr Japarov and opts for presidential government

In response to criticism, a new Constitutional Council reworked the document. A new version was published on 9 February. Although it notes “positive changes”, Adilet’s analysis of this new document concludes that it “violates the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty, there are internal contradictions of a fundamental nature, as well as incorrect wording of the rules of law”.

Local media also highlights that the parliamentary votes of the draft law establishing the referendum did not follow the correct procedure. Notably, Kloop.kg alleges that although 100 deputies voted, there were only around 80 people in the room at the time, meaning some cast votes on behalf of their colleagues. 

A member of the Jogorku Kenesh, Janar Akaev, told journalists lawmakers had voted under pressure. “Those who voted against [the bil] in the first reading were pressured and threatened. Therefore, they did not come to vote today” he said, as quoted by 24kg. “Deputies are afraid to speak openly.”

Aksana Ismailbekova expands on the pressure exerted on parliament in Kyrgyzstan, explaining that, according to her research, many deputies are businessmen. “It is impossible to do business entirely legally in Kyrgyzstan, so the State Committee for National Security has compromising documents and you can’t say anything against it,” she said. “As a result, this parliament cannot be independent when the president has influence on the security sector.”

Valentine Baldassari

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The post Kyrgyzstan to hold constitutional referendum in April appeared first on Novastan English.

Since the death of long-time ruler Islam Karimov in 2016, Uzbekistan has seen greater media freedom under his successor Shavkat Mirziyoyev. However, recent cases of imprisonment, harassment, and the use of intimidation tactics show that the Uzbek government is still trying to silence media outlets, freelance reporters, and citizen journalists.

3 February 2021 marked the moment that independent reporter Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska finally received accreditation to work in Uzbekistan. For months prior she experienced bureaucratic impediments and sexual harassment as she struggled to obtain a press card. The Tashkent-based independent reporter, originally from Poland, has worked with Al-Jazeera English and Eurasianet, among others.

Her government contact had begun sending her inappropriate messages via the messaging app Telegram, and had also made unwanted physical advances. Upon rejection, he began to criticise her coverage, demanding she write more positive articles about Uzbekistan. Pikulicka-Wilczewska, whose Uzbekistan coverage for Al-Jazeera includes articles on judicial malpractice and the ramifications of coronavirus for civil liberties, was then denied extension of her accreditation on the grounds that she was writing for outlets other than the one she was initially accredited for.

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Pikulicka-Wilczewska wrote about her experiences on Twitter on 1 February, triggering outrage and calls for investigation. Eventually, the Uzbek Foreign Ministry announced they had fired the perpetrator and swiftly granted Pikulicka-Wilczewska press credentials.

However, according to Pikulicka-Wilczewska, this outcome does not signify substantive change: “I don’t see this as any sign of change. They just didn’t have a choice. They had to do it,” she told Eurasianet. “But people might now be a bit more careful how they treat journalists, and how they treat women in general.”

Mirziyoyev promises change

The “change” she does not see happening is the increased press freedom promised by the president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev. In August 2019, Mirziyoyev addressed the first World Influencers Congress (WIC) in Tashkent, referencing the gradual increase in media freedoms in Uzbekistan since he assumed office. He stated: “In recent years, Uzbekistan has been opening up to the world and wants to bring the whole truth to the international community. Most importantly, you can discuss, criticise. Know that the President will always support you.”

He expressed a similar sentiment on 4 February 2021, telling journalists to during a visit to the Fergana Region: “Do not stop delivering justice, do not be afraid. We will not deviate from this path. If you advocate justice, write the truth, the leaders may hate you now, but eventually they will start working. This will lead to systematic work. I wish you the best in your work.”

Mirziyoyev has been eager to show that he is modernising Uzbekistan and enabling freedom of speech­, in contrast to his predecessor Islam Karimov. Some of his reform pledges have been carried out: in May 2018, the broadcaster Voice of America became the first USA-headquartered outlet to receive accreditation in Uzbekistan in over a decade, followed by Eurasianet and others. Registered media outlets such as Uzbek-language daily Kun.uz have occasionally published articles on sensitive issues like forced labour in the cotton industry.

Government media censorship

Pikulicka-Wilczewska’s case is not unique, except perhaps for its swift and fortunate resolution.

Despite Mirziyoyev’s promises, the media remains under strict control. Journalists are often denied official information and statistics are rarely made publicly available. While Uzbekistan’s law on mass media and information states that anybody is entitled to receive information from the government (as long as it does not constitute a state secret), this rarely occurs: many government press services only divulge information to favoured journalists.

Uzbekistan remains near the bottom of many freedom of speech tables, ranking 156^th in the world according to the 2020 Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom ratings. Freedom House labels the country as “not free”, scoring it 10 out of 100 in 2020.

The government also maintains an official list of banned material and websites, which includes particular media pertaining to Islam and criticisms of government religious regulation, as well as social media accounts of imams and religious preachers.

Censorship extends to citizen journalists

It is not only mainstream media that is being suppressed. Days before Mirziyoyev’s speech in the Fergana Region, Otabek Sattoriy, a citizen journalist based in the southern city of Termiz, was seized outside his house by plainclothes Interior Ministry personnel on allegations of fraud and extortion. Human Rights Watch have called the charges “dubious”.

His YouTube channel “Khalq Fikri” (People’s Opinion) discusses issues including gas and electricity shortages and the demolition of people’s homes in the Surxondaryo Region. His sister Sitora told Eurasianet that police searched his home the day after his arrest, confiscating his computer and memory sticks. Another citizen journalist, Farkhod Ismailov, was subject to accusations of forming a joint criminal enterprise with Sattoriy and also had his home searched.

In the exclave of So’x, the citizen journalist Haydarjon Bobohaydarov (who publishes under the name Dadahon Khaydarov) was arrested after calling for the ousting of Governor Shukhrat Ganiev of the Fergana region. Bobohaydarov had criticised Ganiev’s neglect of the residents of the exclave while they endured conflict over the disputed border with neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. Bobohaydarov, RFE/RL reports, had a hood thrown over his head and was detained on charges of resisting a government official or person performing a civic duty, and participating in mass unrest. Shortly after, in September 2020, Ganiev was appointed deputy prime minister.

Read more on Novastan: The Wife: the short film highlighting domestic violence in Kazakhstan

There are numerous accounts of reporters risking their jobs and freedom to speak out against corruption and the government. One of the most infamous cases is perhaps that of Bobomurod Abdullaev, who in 2017 was accused of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of the Republic of Uzbekistan. According to the human rights organisation Amnesty International, Abdullaev spent seven months in a detention centre where he was allegedly tortured in an effort to make him to confess to trumped up charges. After a global outcry from human rights organisations including Amnesty, he was freed from prison, but had to pay 20% of his salary to the state for the next two years.

In light of these examples, despite reforms, Mirziyoyev’s promises seem largely unfulfilled, and journalists still face consequences for criticising the Uzbek government.

Lily Shanagher
Novastan.org

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The post Uzbekistan: harassment incident underlines mistreatment of journalists appeared first on Novastan English.

As part of a government reshuffle, Turkmenistan’s president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow has named his son Serdar deputy prime minister. The appointment comes after several months of speculation about the political rise of Berdimuhamedow junior.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s German website on 14 February 2021.

Serdar Berdimuhamedow’s political rise continues. Turkmenistan’s president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow made his only son deputy prime minister for digitisation and innovative technologies on 11 February, Turkmenistan’s state news agency TDH reports. The 39-year-old Serdar was previously minister of construction and industry.

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The post of deputy prime minister for digitisation and innovative technologies was created on the same day. As reported by Turkmenportal, the office includes the chair of the Supreme Control Chamber, which manages government spending, and membership in the State Security Council. The president of Turkmenistan signed the corresponding decree “to further improve the work of the cabinet and the State Security Council, as well as to strengthen control over state property“.

Cabinet reshuffle

The appointment of Serdar Berdimuhamedow goes hand in hand with a general government reshuffle. According to the Amsterdam-based news site Turkmen.news, another deputy prime minister and the minister of agriculture and the environment were replaced.

Myratgeldi Meredow, who was deputy prime minister in charge of fuel and energy, was dismissed for “serious deficiencies” in his work and replaced by the former rector of the International Oil and Gas University Şahym Abdrahmanow.

The agriculture minister Magtymguly Baýramdurdyýew was relieved of his post on the same grounds. His deputy Altanur Altyýew succeeds him. As for Serdar Berdymuhamedow, his previous deputy Baýmyrat Annamämmedow is taking over as minister of construction and industry.

A step fuelling speculations of further political rise

Serdar Berdimuhamedow’s appointment as deputy prime minister is likely to have been just another step up the career ladder. The president’s son took up his previous office as minister of construction and industry almost exactly a year ago. Before that, he had been governor of the Ahal Region, bordering Iran, for a good six months and, even earlier, deputy foreign minister and member of parliament.

Read more: Central Asia in 2020: the year in review

Such an appointment comes as little surprise, but it nevertheless reinforces the rumors that Serdar could succeed his father as president. As early as November 2020, a source from government circles told Turkmen.news that Berdimuhamedow Junior would be promoted either to a leadership role in the Supreme Control Chamber or to the Halk Maslahaty, the upper house of parliament. The source further claimed that a transfer to the Supreme Control Chamber was more likely, given that the constitutional reform which created the upper house was still very recent.

As Turkmen.news notes, observers still assume that the constitutional reform is part of a transfer of power. The constitution now states that, should the president die or become incapacitated, the chair of the Halk Maslahaty will succeed them. It is therefore not unlikely that Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow will either promote his son to the head of the Halk Maslahaty in the foreseeable future or even hand over the office of president to him during his lifetime.

Robin Roth
Editor of Novastan Deutsch

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The post Turkmenistan’s president appoints his son deputy prime minister appeared first on Novastan English.

Kyrgyzstan’s new prime minister and his government officially took office last week. Ulukbek Maripov could go down in history as the last prime minister of Kyrgyzstan, as President Sadyr Japarov wants to transform the parliamentary system into a presidential one.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 7 February 2021.

On 3 February, Kyrgyzstan’s president Sadyr Japarov signed a decree appointing Ulukbek Maripov as prime minister. The Kyrgyz parliament had previously approved his candidacy, as well as the structure and composition of his government, by 84 votes to 1. The same day, the new government, composed of only 16 members, was sworn before parliament.

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As Radio Azattyk, the Kyrgyz branch of the American media RFE/RL, notes, the presidential decree is usually signed the day after the vote in parliament and the swearing in takes a few days later. However, in the case of the new Maripov government, all three stages happened on the same day.

The parliament approved Ulukbek Maripov’s candidacy on 1 February, though early signs indicated the interim prime minister Artyom Novikov would get the position. For example, on 29 January, the Kyrgyz news agency 24.kg asserted that Novikov was expected to keep his post. Instead, he became a deputy prime minister in Maripov’s cabinet.

Who is Ulukbek Maripov?

Ulukbek Maripov is relatively unknown to the general public. The 41-year-old has spent much of his career in the shadow of the former deputy prime minister Askarbek Chadiev and of the former president Almazbek Atambayev (2011-2017). According to Radio Azattyk, his political rise began with his appointment as Atambayev’s aide in 2011, before he became, four years later, the then president’s deputy chief of staff. In 2016, he became head of the Accounts Chamber, a state auditing institution, a position he held until his new appointment. However, as 24.kg notes, in February 2020, a dispute with then-president Sooronbay Jeenbekov nearly cost him his position.

Maripov comes from an influential family from the south of the country. His father, Asamidin Maripov, is a former member of parliament. In addition, Maripov’s brother Baktybek Maripov was the head of a district in Osh Region, in southern Kyrgyzstan. On 4 February, he was dismissed by decree in order to avoid a conflict of interest.

Members of parliament from the opposition have raised questions about the role of Maripov’s family in his career. Zarylbek Rysaliev, from the Ata Jurt party, even went so far as to publicly ask whether the prime minister was just a “daddy’s boy”. For the MP Janar Akayev, quoted in the same Azattyk article, the reasons for Maripov’s appointment lie elsewhere: “in a period when the country moves to presidential rule, whoever becomes prime minister will be an assistant to the president. Therefore, Ulukbek Maripov’s candidacy is the most optimal. He has no political ambition, as he says himself.”

The last prime minister of Kyrgyzstan?

Sadyr Japarov does not hide his desire to transform the Kyrgyz parliamentary regime into a presidential system. A majority of voters expressed their approval for this project in a referendum on 10 January 2021, the same day as the presidential election. However, over 60% of eligible voters did not cast a ballot.

Read more: Kyrgyzstan elects Sadyr Japarov and opts for presidential government

The new prime minister thus finds himself in a precarious position. In addition, on 4 February, Japarov expressed his intention to get rid of the position altogether: “the post of prime minister will be abolished, as well as other redundant government positions,” he wrote in a message on the social network Telegram. He also indicated he was planning to put his words into action in the next six months.

A streamlined government

In the meantime, the new prime minister and the president have formed a small government, with only 16 cabinet members. As Radio Azattyk points out, the number of deputy prime ministers has been halved, from four to two. In addition, the number of government ministries, agencies and committees has been drastically reduced, from 48 to 12. As a result, only five ministries remain intact, with all the others subject to restructuring or mergers. For example, the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Finance are now a single entity.

As Eurasianet notes, eight members of the new cabinet were already part of the interim government set up following the events of October 2020, when protests led to the president’s resignation and Japarov’s coming to power. Within the new government, two figures emerge in particular: Kamchybek Tashiev, a long-time ally of Sadyr Japarov, who retains his strategic post at the head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB in Russian), and Taalaybek Ömüraliev, now minister of defense, a post he had held from 2011 to 2014.

Read more: Kyrgyzstan: President Sooronbay Jeenbekov steps down

The restructuring has the full support of President Sadyr Japarov, who sees it as a tool for efficiency and economic rationalisation. According to Eurasianet, the Kyrgyz president thus claimed that reducing the number of ministries and government agencies would help “stop theft from the treasury”. For example, in a message posted on his Facebook account on 2 February, Japarov assured that the merger of the ministries would save 2 billion som (approximately £18 million) on electricity. The president also said that for a “small” country like Kyrgyzstan, “12 ministries is still too many”.

The opposition is far less enthusiastic. The former prime minister Temir Sariev (2015-2016) considered the restructured cabinet “wrong” and “unnecessary”. Another former prime minister, Felix Kulov, compared it to Russian dolls, arguing that some agencies will not function properly: “You can’t just, automatically, without justification, nest [government institutions] like matryoshka dolls. For example, if the financial police becomes part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, how will it be managed?”

First steps

Addressing parliament, Ulukbek Maripov declared his government’s priority was the economic crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic. “The new government will not get involved in politics.Our staff will only work to revive the economy and develop the welfare sector,” he said. On 3 February, the cabinet also met with Sadyr Japarov, who insisted on the need to implement an anti-crisis program as quickly as possible, Katkus.media reports.

On 5 February, the new prime minister also took his first steps on the international stage with a visit to the Digital Forum in Almaty, Kazakhstan. As AKIpress reports, Maripov was able to meet with several of his regional counterparts. This included a brief meeting with the Russian prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin. Russia is also the planned destination of Japarov’s first foreign visit.

Quentin Couvreur
Novastan France

Translated by Valentine Baldassari

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The post Kyrgyzstan: Ulukbek Maripov heads pared-down government appeared first on Novastan English.