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		<title>Why Uzbekistan Imports Rice Despite Producing Its Own</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/why-uzbekistan-imports-rice/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/why-uzbekistan-imports-rice/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Shirish Khare]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 14:43:35 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uzbekistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agriculture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rice]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=50191</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/why-uzbekistan-imports-rice/">Why Uzbekistan Imports Rice Despite Producing Its Own</a></p>
<p>Uzbekistan produces enough rice to meet its domestic demand, yet continues to import from Kazakhstan, India and Pakistan while exporting to neighbouring countries. What explains these trade flows? An examination of domestic production, consumer preferences, prices and evolving transport routes reveals a complex regional rice market.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/why-uzbekistan-imports-rice/">Why Uzbekistan Imports Rice Despite Producing Its Own</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/why-uzbekistan-imports-rice/">Why Uzbekistan Imports Rice Despite Producing Its Own</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Uzbekistan’s relationship with rice is shaped by two realities. It is a major domestic crop, grown across several agricultural regions and central to the country’s food culture. At the same time, rice crosses its borders in both directions. Uzbekistan imports from neighbouring Kazakhstan and more distant suppliers such as India and Pakistan, while also exporting to other Central Asian markets.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>The country’s rice imports are not simply a response to a shortage of domestic production. Uzbekistan grows substantial quantities of rice, and imported supplies serve a market with different varieties, price levels and commercial requirements. To understand why Uzbek businesses buy rice from different countries, it is necessary to look at the country’s own producers, consumers, traders and transport networks.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>A market with its own production</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In April 2026, Uzbekistan’s Competition Policy and Consumer Rights Research Center published an analysis of the domestic rice market. It estimated annual demand at approximately 368,000 tonnes and said domestic production was sufficient to meet that demand. The Centre described the market as largely supplied by local producers, with imports accounting for a relatively small share. It identified Khorezm, Syrdarya, Fergana and Andijan as the country’s main rice-producing regions. [<a href="https://www.ccprc.uz/en/news/802" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.ccprc.uz/en/news/802">1</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan has a substantial domestic rice industry. A 2025 study by researchers associated with the country’s agricultural research institutions recorded more than 100,000 hectares under rice cultivation in recent years. Average yields rose from 4.21 tonnes per hectare in 2021 to 5.02 in 2024. The study also identified varieties such as Lazurniy and Iskandar among those cultivated in the country. [<a href="https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART003252909" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART003252909">2</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The range of varieties is wider still. A 2024 study comparing rice varieties grown in Uzbekistan examined Tantana, Iskandar, Tarona, Lazer, Independence, UzRos-713 and Devzira, among others. The researchers compared their grain characteristics and productivity. [<a href="https://supportscience.uz/index.php/ojbc/article/view/1531" data-type="link" data-id="https://supportscience.uz/index.php/ojbc/article/view/1531">3</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For consumers, differences in grain length, texture and cooking behaviour influence which rice is suitable for particular dishes. For traders, they create distinct product categories and price points. Imported rice therefore enters a market where buyers already have access to a range of locally grown varieties.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/photo-of-the-day/smells-of-plov/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/photo-of-the-day/smells-of-plov/">Smells of plov</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Water availability is also shaping where and how rice is grown. In March 2025, Vlast reported that Bakhodir Elmurodov, a rice farmer from Khorezm, had shifted cultivation to Syrdarya, nearly 1,000 kilometres from home, because water shortages and a shallower Amu Darya had made farming in his home region difficult. In Karakalpakstan, the UNDP has been supporting the introduction of upland rice, which could use up to 40 per cent less water than conventional cultivation. The first seed samples of 15 varieties were supplied to the region’s Scientific-Production Association of Grain and Rice in May 2025. [<a href="https://vlast.kz/kz/english/64260-uzbek-rice-farmers-face-water-shortages-and-migrate.html" data-type="link" data-id="https://vlast.kz/kz/english/64260-uzbek-rice-farmers-face-water-shortages-and-migrate.html">4</a>][<a href="https://www.undp.org/uzbekistan/press-releases/undp-supports-transition-water-saving-rice-cultivation-aral-sea-region-0" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.undp.org/uzbekistan/press-releases/undp-supports-transition-water-saving-rice-cultivation-aral-sea-region-0">5</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/environment/amu-darya-pamirs-aral-sea-central-asia/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/environment/amu-darya-pamirs-aral-sea-central-asia/">From the Pamirs to the Aral Sea: Following the Amu Darya Through Central Asia</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Who supplies the imported rice?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">World Bank trade data records that Uzbekistan imported 37,544.7 tonnes of rice worth approximately $14.85 million in 2024. Kazakhstan was by far the largest supplier, accounting for 24,330.8 tonnes. Pakistan supplied 5,507.3 tonnes, while India supplied 2,265.7 tonnes. Turkey and China were smaller suppliers. [<a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/UZB/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/partner/ALL/product/1006" data-type="link" data-id="https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/UZB/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/partner/ALL/product/1006">6</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The figures used here are Uzbekistan’s reported import data. They may differ from the corresponding export figures reported by its trading partners, as the two sides record trade flows separately and mirror statistics do not always match.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan accounted for nearly two-thirds of Uzbekistan’s total rice imports that year. Its geographical advantage is considerable: the two countries share a border and are connected through established road and rail networks. For buyers seeking regular supplies, shorter transport distances can help reduce delivery costs and simplify logistics.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The picture changes when the product category is narrowed to semi-milled or wholly milled rice, classified under HS code 100630. In 2024, Uzbekistan imported 31,142.4 tonnes in this category. Kazakhstan supplied 18,096.7 tonnes, Pakistan 5,464.3 tonnes and India 2,265.7 tonnes. [<a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/UZB/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/partner/ALL/product/100630" data-type="link" data-id="https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/UZB/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/partner/ALL/product/100630">7</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The distinction between total rice imports and milled rice matters. Paddy rice, husked rice and milled rice are different products, with different processing requirements and commercial uses. Comparing suppliers within the same category gives a more meaningful picture of the trade.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Official Uzbek statistics show that the supplier mix continued to change in 2025. From January to July, Uzbekistan imported 6,500 tonnes of rice worth $2.9 million from 13 countries. Kazakhstan supplied 4,300 tonnes, India 1,100 tonnes, the Kyrgyz Republic 582 tonnes and Pakistan 186 tonnes. [<a href="https://stat.uz/en/press-center/news-of-committee/63557-zbekiston-indistondan-1-1-ming-tonna-guruch-import-ilgan-4" data-type="link" data-id="https://stat.uz/en/press-center/news-of-committee/63557-zbekiston-indistondan-1-1-ming-tonna-guruch-import-ilgan-4">8</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India’s position in this period is worth noting. It supplied more rice than Pakistan, although Kazakhstan remained the leading source. Indian rice has a place in the Uzbek market despite the distance between the two countries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Why buyers choose different suppliers</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Import statistics identify the countries supplying rice, but they do not explain the purchasing decisions of individual companies. Those decisions can depend on the variety required, grain quality, price, availability, processing, packaging and the cost and reliability of delivery.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The difference between suppliers becomes clearer when import values are compared within the same product category. In 2024, the recorded customs value of semi-milled or wholly milled rice from Kazakhstan was approximately $5.12 million for 18,096.7 tonnes. India’s 2,265.7 tonnes were valued at approximately $2.06 million, while Pakistan’s 5,464.3 tonnes were valued at approximately $2.05 million. [<a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/UZB/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/partner/ALL/product/100630" data-type="link" data-id="https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/UZB/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/partner/ALL/product/100630">7</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These figures translate into approximate customs unit values of:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan: $283 per tonne.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan: $375 per tonne.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India: $909 per tonne.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These are calculated averages, not retail prices or individual supplier quotations. They can reflect differences in varieties, grades, processing, packaging, freight and insurance. They do not establish that every Indian shipment is more expensive than every shipment from Kazakhstan or Pakistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The contrast is nevertheless striking. India’s recorded import value was almost equal to Pakistan’s despite supplying less than half the quantity. This suggests that Indian rice entering Uzbekistan may occupy a different product and price segment. The data does not identify every variety in those shipments, so the difference cannot be attributed to basmati alone.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">India is a major exporter of both basmati and non-basmati rice. According to APEDA, the country exported 20.19 million tonnes of rice worth $12.47 billion in the 2024–25 financial year. The All India Rice Exporters Association records approximately 6.07 million tonnes of basmati and 14.13 million tonnes of non-basmati exports in the same period. [<a href="https://apeda.gov.in/Requirement_Export_Rice" data-type="link" data-id="https://apeda.gov.in/Requirement_Export_Rice">9</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A shipment record offers one specific example of Indian rice reaching Uzbekistan. Volza’s trade database lists a consignment of 23 tonnes of Pure Basmati Sella Rice shipped from India to Uzbekistan in August 2024. It was packed in 575 bags of 40 kilograms each. This is an individual shipment, not a measure of the wider market, but it documents the movement of a processed basmati product into Uzbekistan. [<a href="https://www.volza.com/p/rice/export-data/exports-from-india/destination-uzbekistan" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.volza.com/p/rice/export-data/exports-from-india/destination-uzbekistan">10</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For an Uzbek importer, the choice is not necessarily between the cheapest available rice and a more expensive alternative. A buyer supplying a mass-market segment may prioritise volume, consistency and delivery costs. Another may be looking for a particular grain type or quality that can be sold at a higher price. Different suppliers can meet different requirements within the same market.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1024" height="768" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/11/20210617_133132_compressed-1024x768.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-50206" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/11/20210617_133132_compressed-1024x768.jpg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/11/20210617_133132_compressed-300x225.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/11/20210617_133132_compressed-768x576.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/11/20210617_133132_compressed-1536x1152.jpg 1536w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/11/20210617_133132_compressed.jpg 2048w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Plov in Uzbekistan. Courtesy of Mathieu Lemoine.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The businesses behind the trade</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Local trading businesses offer a glimpse of how rice moves through Uzbekistan’s commercial networks. Food Grains, a trading company based in Tashkent, describes its work as connecting local agriculture with international markets through sourcing, processing and distribution. The company says food commodities, particularly rice, account for the majority of its turnover. It lists business connections across Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Iraq. [<a href="https://www.foodgrains.uz" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.foodgrains.uz">11</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The company’s profile presents rice trading as part of a wider regional network. Its stated activities extend beyond importing finished rice to include sourcing, processing and distribution, with links to local farmers and overseas markets.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The importance of local consumer preferences is also reflected in the experience of Uzbek rice entrepreneur Ibrahim Muratov, founder of UzRice. In a January 2020 interview with the Uzbek business publication Spot, Muratov described how the company’s first product was received coolly by consumers because its rice had been polished to a much whiter finish than local buyers were accustomed to. He also found that consumers preferred to inspect the grains before buying, sometimes even tasting them. The company subsequently changed its packaging to make the rice more visible and provide more information. Muratov said that Uzbekistan’s climatic, varietal and consumer characteristics required a specific approach to the market. His experience illustrates why rice producers and suppliers need to understand local preferences, rather than relying on processing standards or packaging developed for other markets. [<a href="https://www.spot.uz/ru/2020/01/06/uzrice/" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.spot.uz/ru/2020/01/06/uzrice/">18</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Commercial shipment data identifies several Uzbek businesses involved in importing milled rice. Orion Markets, which tracks customs shipment records, lists KHONQA RICE, TANDEM INC, CHEMPION GREEN LANDS, NAMEXIM and JLTS among the leading importers recorded under HS code 100630 between October 2025 and September 2026. During the same period, its database recorded 295 import shipments involving 45 companies. Kazakhstan accounted for 61.9 per cent of the recorded import shipments, followed by the Kyrgyz Republic, India, Tajikistan and Turkey. [<a href="https://orionmarkets.io/trade/uz/100630" data-type="link" data-id="https://orionmarkets.io/trade/uz/100630">12</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These figures come from a commercial shipment database rather than an official national statistical release. They should be treated as an indication of recorded trade activity, not a complete account of every rice import into Uzbekistan. They do, however, point to a market involving multiple businesses and supply relationships.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Competition Policy and Consumer Rights Research Center’s 2026 analysis provides the broader domestic picture. It examined the process from rice cultivation to delivery to the final consumer, and concluded that domestic production was sufficient to meet demand, with imported rice accounting for a relatively small share of the market. [<a href="https://www.ccprc.uz/en/news/802" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.ccprc.uz/en/news/802">1</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What rice costs in the domestic market</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Customs unit values and consumer prices describe different stages of the market. The former represent the declared value of imported goods divided by their quantity. They are not the prices at which consumers buy rice.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to open data from Uzbekistan’s Statistics Agency, the average price of rice in the country’s farmers’ markets was 15,175 Uzbek soums per kilogram in September 2026. A year earlier, in September 2025, the average had been 17,325 soums per kilogram, a decline of 12.4 per cent. [<a href="https://agroimkon.uz/en/prices/rice" data-type="link" data-id="https://agroimkon.uz/en/prices/rice">13</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Prices also varied considerably by region. In September 2026, the reported average was 11,445 soums per kilogram in Karakalpakstan, 12,841 in Syrdarya and 13,518 in Khorezm. In Tashkent city, it was 17,615 soums per kilogram.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A national average does not describe the price in every region. Local production, transport costs, quality and the type of rice being sold all influence what consumers pay. The regional differences also show why a single national figure cannot capture the conditions faced by buyers and sellers across the country.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The fall in the national average between September 2025 and September 2026 points to changing conditions in the domestic market. Importers are operating alongside local producers, and their commercial decisions are affected by the prices and availability of rice already being sold within Uzbekistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The transport route from India</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Geography is one of Kazakhstan’s strongest advantages. India, by contrast, is separated from Uzbekistan by several borders and has no direct land route for ordinary commercial freight. Transport costs and delivery times consequently form an important part of the final price.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A documented multimodal route connects Indian ports with Uzbekistan. In August 2024, Uzbekistan’s container transport company Uztemiryulcontainer organised shipments from the Indian ports of Mundra, Nhava Sheva and Chennai. The goods travelled by sea to Bandar Abbas in Iran and were then transported by rail to Sergeli station in Uzbekistan. The first freight train carried 20 containers and covered 2,673 kilometres in 20 days. The company said it planned to reduce the delivery time to 15 days. [<a href="https://utk.uz/en/news/17" data-type="link" data-id="https://utk.uz/en/news/17">14</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Another development followed in March 2025, when a container train service was launched from India to Kazakhstan through Uzbekistan. The route covered 4,885 kilometres and involved sea transport from Mundra to Bandar Abbas, followed by rail transport across Iran and Central Asia. The first train carried 12 standard containers. The service involved Uztemiryulcontainer, Kazakhstan’s Kedentransservice and the Transport and Logistics Center of Turkmenistan. [<a href="https://kun.uz/en/news/2025/03/04/new-cargo-train-service-links-india-uzbekistan-and-kazakhstan" data-type="link" data-id="https://kun.uz/en/news/2025/03/04/new-cargo-train-service-links-india-uzbekistan-and-kazakhstan">15</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These services provide documented examples of multimodal freight connections between India and Central Asia. They do not establish that every rice consignment uses these routes, or that the recorded basmati shipment travelled along either one. They do show that containerised goods have already moved between India and the region through these corridors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan’s wider logistics network is also developing. Its official investment portal identifies the North-South Corridor, which connects routes through Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan, including links with India. The Middle Corridor connects Central Asia with the Caspian region, Azerbaijan, Georgia and onward markets. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is under construction, while the Trans-Afghan railway remains a planned project. [<a href="https://invest.gov.uz/en/reason/logistics" data-type="link" data-id="https://invest.gov.uz/en/reason/logistics">16</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For rice traders, the distinction between an operating route and a planned corridor is essential. The India-Bandar Abbas-Uzbekistan connection is a documented transport option. Other projects may create new possibilities, but they should not be treated as existing routes for current shipments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Uzbekistan is also a rice exporter</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan’s role in the regional rice economy is not limited to imports. It also supplies neighbouring countries. According to the National Statistics Committee, the country exported 14,800 tonnes of rice worth $6.4 million to 11 countries between January and November 2025. Kazakhstan received 8,000 tonnes, Tajikistan 3,400 tonnes and the Kyrgyz Republic 2,400 tonnes. The United States was another destination, receiving 824.8 tonnes. [<a href="https://stat.uz/en/press-center/news-of-committee/66342-zbekiston-khorizhga-14-8-ming-tonna-guruch-eksport-ilgan-4" data-type="link" data-id="https://stat.uz/en/press-center/news-of-committee/66342-zbekiston-khorizhga-14-8-ming-tonna-guruch-eksport-ilgan-4">17</a>]</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan is therefore both Uzbekistan’s largest rice supplier and its largest export destination. The relationship is not simply one of dependence on imported food. It is part of a regional trading system in which countries can import particular types or volumes of rice while exporting their own production to neighbouring markets.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Indian rice needs to be understood within this wider Central Asian market. India is not competing with Kazakhstan on price or distance alone. It is entering a market where domestic producers are well established, regional trade is active and buyers have access to several suppliers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Indian exporters, the opportunity is likely to lie in matching specific products to specific market requirements rather than treating Uzbekistan as a large, undifferentiated destination. The customs data suggests that Indian rice may already serve a different price segment from much of Kazakhstan’s supply. The container routes provide evidence of transport connections, while domestic production and regional price differences underline the importance of understanding local competition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan’s rice market is not waiting for a foreign supplier to fill an empty space. It has its own farmers, varieties, traders, consumers and regional export connections. Any supplier hoping to build a lasting presence in the country will need to understand how this market works.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>By Shirish Khare.</strong></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph">Shirih Khare is an independent writer and journalist from India. He has been writing for the past 25 years, reporting on rural life, social change, migration and communities beyond the country’s major cities.</p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph">Edited by Mathieu Lemoine<strong>.</strong></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/why-uzbekistan-imports-rice/">Why Uzbekistan Imports Rice Despite Producing Its Own</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>Uzbekistan Tightens Environmental Rules for Greenhouses Near Tashkent</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-greenhouses-tashkent-environmental-rules/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-greenhouses-tashkent-environmental-rules/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Caroline Solomon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 17:12:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Environment and Climate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uzbekistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agriculture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air pollution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[climate change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energy transition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Environment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Environmental regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Greenhouses]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tashkent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=50136</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-greenhouses-tashkent-environmental-rules/">Uzbekistan Tightens Environmental Rules for Greenhouses Near Tashkent</a></p>
<p>Uzbekistan has introduced stricter environmental regulations for greenhouses in Tashkent and surrounding districts to tackle air pollution. From December 1, coal-fired facilities must switch to cleaner energy sources or install pollution-control equipment. The government is offering subsidies and preferential loans to help operators comply with the new requirements.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-greenhouses-tashkent-environmental-rules/">Uzbekistan Tightens Environmental Rules for Greenhouses Near Tashkent</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-greenhouses-tashkent-environmental-rules/">Uzbekistan Tightens Environmental Rules for Greenhouses Near Tashkent</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>The government of Uzbekistan has introduced new environmental regulations for greenhouses operating in Tashkent and five neighbouring districts. Under the new rules, coal-fired greenhouses must switch to natural gas, electricity, geothermal or solar energy, or recovered waste heat by December 1, unless they meet strict pollution-control requirements.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Originally published by <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/10/23/greenhouses/" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/10/23/greenhouses/">Gazeta.uz</a> on October 23, 2026. Translated from Russian into English by Caroline Solomon for Novastan.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The government of Uzbekistan has introduced new environmental regulations for greenhouses operating in Tashkent and five surrounding districts. Under the new <a href="https://lex.uz/ru/docs/8553258">resolution</a>, issued October 22, coal-fired greenhouses must make the switch to natural gas, electricity, geothermal or solar energy, or waste heat by December.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The directive also created additional measures to ensure greenhouses in Tashkent and its adjacent areas are operating in a more environmentally friendly manner. These requirements apply exclusively to greenhouses operating in a new “ecological zone”, encompassing the capital city of Tashkent, as well as the Yuqorichirchiq, Qibray, Yangiyo‘l, Zangiota and Tashkent districts of Tashkent Region. The requirements were <a href="https://gov.uz/ru/eco/news/view/236707">announced</a> by the National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change (NCECC), which also <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/10/14/greenhouses-monitoring/">presented</a> this proposal to the president on October 13.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What Is Required?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In this new ecological zone, heating systems within greenhouses can only be fuelled by natural gas, including liquefied gas, electricity, geothermal or solar energy, or waste heat from thermal power plants. Greenhouses must also pass a state environmental assessment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This means that greenhouses using solid fuels, such as coal or biomass in briquette or pellet form, must transition their systems to the allowed energy sources by December 1 of this year if they wish to continue operating without additional pollution-control measures.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The only exception to this general restriction on solid fuels is if the facility installs all of the following systems:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Automatic fuel supply and combustion control systems;</li>



<li>Pollution-control devices such as scrubbers;</li>



<li>Continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS) with real-time data output capabilities;</li>



<li>Certificates of compliance for boilers, pollution-control equipment and monitoring systems;</li>



<li>Cameras providing real-time, remote monitoring of boiler operations and emissions;</li>



<li>Reliable power supplies and backup generators for all emissions-control equipment.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In addition to these physical systems, greenhouses must also collect, transport and properly dispose of all captured pollutants, including ash, heavy metals, scale, sludge and other toxic substances. Equipment must be certified, and all data from CEMS and cameras must be integrated with state information systems. Unauthorised modifications affecting equipment operations are also prohibited.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Greenhouses operating in the ecological zone are also forbidden to burn any of the following materials as fuel: tyres, bitumen, heating oil, plastics, synthetic cardboard, rubber, wool fibres, used oil, household and industrial waste, and any other materials of similar composition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Financial Incentives</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Greenhouses in the designated zone will not have to enact these changes entirely at their own expense: the state will also provide financial support for environmental upgrades.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Specifically, the directive introduces subsidies covering 50% of expenses related to the purchase of emissions-scrubbing equipment, boilers, energy-saving screens, energy-efficiency technologies and heating systems using electricity, geothermal or solar energy, or cogeneration. These subsidies will be available until January 1, 2028, with a maximum of 50 million soums per hectare.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Greenhouse operators may also apply for favourable financing terms. In 2026 and 2027, commercial banks are to provide seven-year loans, in Uzbek soums, at an annual interest rate of 14% (4% of which will constitute the bank&#8217;s margin). The loans include a three-year grace period and can cover up to 50% of project costs, but must not exceed 3 billion soums per hectare.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Additionally, greenhouses installing CEMS are eligible for financial support of up to 350 million soums per monitoring station.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This financing will be provided on the basis of a three-way agreement, with interest-free instalments over seven years. Recipients must meet technical requirements approved by the NCECC-managed State Environmental Certification and Standardisation Centre. As a condition of this financial support, they must install CEMS, integrate them with NCECC&#8217;s information systems and ensure uninterrupted data transmission.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Failure to comply with these requirements, or late payments, may result in the monitoring systems being removed and recovered following written notice. Overdue debts may also be recovered according to the procedures established in the agreement.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Boilers in other industries relying on emissions-intensive fuels for heat generation will also be subject to environmental regulations. Businesses with an environmental impact will be assigned levels of “red”, “yellow” and “green”, with corresponding requirements for each level to be established in future legislation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Finally, the resolution calls for imports of eligible emissions-reduction technologies not manufactured in Uzbekistan to be exempt from customs duties until January 1, 2030. This exemption would apply to scrubbers, energy-efficient boilers, cogeneration infrastructure, CEMS and equipment associated with the use of geothermal or solar energy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Wastewater Treatment and Reuse</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the directive, hazardous liquid waste generated through the filtration of greenhouse heating systems, as well as wastewater from hydroponic systems, must also be treated and reused as technical water. A reservoir for the temporary storage of these effluents will be installed in an “eco-industrial” zone in the Akhangaran district of Tashkent Region by January 1, 2027, with the land plot for this reservoir to be determined by the Tashkent Regional Administration by November 1 of this year.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A competitive bidding process will be held for a contractor to process the hazardous effluents, with a winner selected by June 1, 2027. The construction of the reservoir for temporary storage will be carried out in stages based on the project documentation, in compliance with urban planning standards and regulations. Owners of greenhouses, regardless of the form of ownership, will be required to transfer the effluents they generate to the selected contractor at agreed-upon prices.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">“Balancing Business Development with a Clean Environment”</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In its statement, the Committee on Ecology noted: “The retrofitting of greenhouse farms with emissions reduction equipment is an important step in our comprehensive effort to improve air quality in Tashkent and surrounding areas. Modern scrubber systems, automatic monitoring, and energy-efficient technologies will help address our local environmental concerns, while also making our greenhouses more sustainable for years to come.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“Our main goal is to achieve a balance between allowing for business development, the efficient use of resources, and the right of our citizens to a clean environment,” the committee stressed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Earlier this month, the Committee on Ecology <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/10/13/greenhouses/">reported</a> that representatives of area greenhouses had suggested installing a special air-filtration system that would allow them to continue operating. However, the filter presented was not effective enough to pass the committee&#8217;s tests.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In November 2025, as air quality in Tashkent rapidly deteriorated, a <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2025/11/25/greenhouses/">decision</a> was made to immediately switch all greenhouses in the capital and surrounding areas to gas heating. In March of this year, it was reported that <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/03/24/greenhouses/">restrictions</a> on the construction of new greenhouses in the capital and adjacent areas would be introduced, effective as of October.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In June, a special commission aimed at improving air quality began <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/07/02/greenhouses/">dismantling</a> greenhouses in the Tashkent region and disconnecting them from solid-fuel heating systems. As part of this effort, greenhouse owners were also offered the opportunity to relocate their businesses to the Surkhon-Agro free economic zone in the Surxondaryo Region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The mayor of Tashkent, Shavkat Umrzoqov, had said in a recent <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/10/07/shavkat-umurzakov/">interview with Gazeta.uz</a> that, for greenhouse farms wishing to continue operating in the capital region, the possibility of using permitted fuels with scrubbers was being considered. He also mentioned the possibility of using financing instruments as a policy tool to support these goals.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><em>Originally published by <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/10/23/greenhouses/" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2026/10/23/greenhouses/">Gazeta.uz</a> on October 23, 2026. Translated and edited from Russian into English by Caroline Solomon for Novastan.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-greenhouses-tashkent-environmental-rules/">Uzbekistan Tightens Environmental Rules for Greenhouses Near Tashkent</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>Gilgit-Baltistan: Who Benefits from Development in Pakistan&#8217;s Mountain North?</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/politics/gilgit-baltistan-tourism-land-rights-development/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/politics/gilgit-baltistan-tourism-land-rights-development/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 21:00:02 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Environment and Climate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Interview]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics and Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uzbekistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China-Pakistan Economic Corridor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hunza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Land rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=50088</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/politics/gilgit-baltistan-tourism-land-rights-development/">Gilgit-Baltistan: Who Benefits from Development in Pakistan&#8217;s Mountain North?</a></p>
<p>Tourism, infrastructure and investment are transforming Gilgit-Baltistan, but who benefits from the region's growing economic importance? Nadia Ali, researcher at BICC-Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies, discusses political representation, contested land rights, China's influence and the environmental pressures facing communities in Pakistan's mountainous north.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/politics/gilgit-baltistan-tourism-land-rights-development/">Gilgit-Baltistan: Who Benefits from Development in Pakistan&#8217;s Mountain North?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/politics/gilgit-baltistan-tourism-land-rights-development/">Gilgit-Baltistan: Who Benefits from Development in Pakistan&#8217;s Mountain North?</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em><em><em>As tourism, infrastructure projects and interest in mineral resources reshape Gilgit-Baltistan, questions over land ownership, political representation and the distribution of economic benefits are becoming increasingly urgent. Nadia Ali, a researcher at bicc-Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies, examines questions of land governance, development and political marginalisation in Gilgit-Baltistan. Drawing on her research in Hunza and Gilgit, she discusses the region&#8217;s contested constitutional status, the implications of land reforms, the expansion of tourism and the challenges facing local communities.</em></em></em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Situated at the intersection of Pakistan, China, India and Afghanistan, Gilgit-Baltistan occupies a strategically important position in South Asia. Its mountains, glaciers and valleys have attracted growing numbers of tourists, while the Karakoram Highway and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have reinforced its significance for trade and connectivity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/pakistan-central-asia-gwadar-karachi-trade-corridor/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/economics/pakistan-central-asia-gwadar-karachi-trade-corridor/">Gwadar, Karachi and the Central Asian Dream of the Sea</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet Gilgit-Baltistan remains outside Pakistan&#8217;s constitutional provincial structure. For many of its residents, economic development has therefore brought renewed questions about who controls the region&#8217;s land, resources and political future.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nadia Ali, a researcher whose work examines land governance, development and political marginalisation in Gilgit-Baltistan, has studied these tensions, including through fieldwork in Hunza. In this interview with Novastan, she discusses the region&#8217;s contested constitutional status, the implications of the 2025 land reforms, the expansion of tourism and the challenges facing local communities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="724" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/nadia_ali_portrait_02_wordpress-1024x724.jpg" alt="Nadia Ali, researcher at bicc-Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies, whose work focuses on land rights, development and political marginalisation in Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan. Photo: Courtesy of Nadia Ali." class="wp-image-50098" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/nadia_ali_portrait_02_wordpress-1024x724.jpg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/nadia_ali_portrait_02_wordpress-300x212.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/nadia_ali_portrait_02_wordpress-768x543.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/nadia_ali_portrait_02_wordpress-1536x1086.jpg 1536w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/nadia_ali_portrait_02_wordpress.jpg 2048w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Nadia Ali, researcher at bicc-Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies, whose work focuses on land rights, development and political marginalisation in Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan. Photo: Courtesy of Nadia Ali.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A region whose political aspirations remain overlooked</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Novastan: Gilgit-Baltistan is often discussed internationally primarily in relation to the wider Kashmir dispute. What does this framing miss about the political and social realities of the region today?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Nadia Ali:</strong> Gilgit-Baltistan is not Kashmir. Yet its political fate is entangled in the India–Pakistan dispute over Jammu and Kashmir because of its historical connection to the former princely state. This has shaped how the region is represented internationally, often leaving its distinct political realities and the aspirations of its people invisible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan are administered by Pakistan, but neither has the same constitutional status as Pakistan&#8217;s provinces. While Azad Jammu and Kashmir has its own interim constitutional framework and elected institutions, Gilgit-Baltistan operates under a separate administrative arrangement.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It does not enjoy full constitutional provincial status or representation in Pakistan&#8217;s federal parliament. Instead, it has been governed through a series of Governance Orders that have provided limited substantive political empowerment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the same time, Gilgit-Baltistan&#8217;s strategic location has made it increasingly important for Pakistan&#8217;s regional connectivity ambitions. The Karakoram Highway, its subsequent upgrades and its integration into CPEC have encouraged tourism and growing state and private interest in land and mineral extraction.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" width="768" height="1024" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/khunjerab_pass_wordpress-768x1024-1.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-50100" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/khunjerab_pass_wordpress-768x1024-1.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/khunjerab_pass_wordpress-225x300.jpg 225w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/khunjerab_pass_wordpress-1152x1536.jpg 1152w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/khunjerab_pass_wordpress.jpg 1536w" sizes="(max-width: 768px) 100vw, 768px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">A truck travels along the Karakoram Highway near Khunjerab Pass, on the border between Pakistan and China. The mountain crossing is a key link in the region&#8217;s trade and connectivity networks. Photo: Courtesy of Nadia Ali.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/afghanistan-central-asia-trans-afghan-railway/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/afghanistan-central-asia-trans-afghan-railway/">Can Afghanistan Become Central Asia’s Bridge to the South?</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet this growing economic importance has not brought constitutional recognition. In my view, the region&#8217;s legal ambiguity facilitates state control and external investment while weakening customary <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2025.2566959" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2025.2566959">land rights</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">International discussions that consider Gilgit-Baltistan only through the Kashmir dispute risk further marginalising local aspirations by subordinating people&#8217;s rights and agency to competing claims of sovereignty.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>How would you describe the relationship between Gilgit-Baltistan and the Pakistani state? What are the main sources of political frustration today?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The relationship is marked by a fundamental contradiction: the state seeks control over the territory without fully assuming the political responsibilities that should accompany it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Many residents want to be recognised as full citizens, with meaningful political representation and access to the rights and protections afforded to citizens elsewhere in Pakistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The state values Gilgit-Baltistan&#8217;s strategic location, land, water, mountains and mineral resources, but its inhabitants remain in a condition of legal uncertainty.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The main sources of frustration include unresolved constitutional status, limited representation, contested land rights, control over natural resources and insufficient local influence over decisions affecting people&#8217;s lives.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These concerns should not necessarily be interpreted as opposition to Pakistan itself. They are often demands for recognition, accountable governance and a meaningful voice in the region&#8217;s economic and political future.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The central question is not simply who exercises sovereignty over Gilgit-Baltistan, but whether those governing the territory are accountable to the people who live there.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Land rights and the struggle over ownership</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Land has become an increasingly important political and economic issue. What is driving disputes over ownership, and what do they reveal about power and representation?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Land is particularly contentious because it is not merely an economic asset. It is also a source of community identity, livelihood and political authority.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gilgit-Baltistan&#8217;s mountainous geography means that cultivable and residential land is limited. Expanding tourism and growing interest in mineral extraction have further increased its value.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Disputes are rooted in overlapping systems of ownership, including customary practices, communal and individual claims, and state legislation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The <em>Khalisa Sarkar</em> framework, under which certain lands were classified as state property, was a particularly important source of conflict. Local communities challenged state claims over land they considered their own.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Although the 2025 land reforms abolished this framework, that does not necessarily resolve longstanding disputes over communal rights, ownership and administrative authority.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New forms of territorial control can emerge through legal reclassification, privatisation and commercial investment. The implementation of the reforms could therefore generate further disputes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These disagreements go beyond property rights. They concern who has the authority to define ownership, regulate land use and determine who benefits from economic development.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a region without full constitutional recognition, unresolved political questions directly affect communities&#8217; ability to protect their livelihoods and retain control over natural resources.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Infrastructure: Greater connectivity, unequal benefits?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Large-scale infrastructure projects have transformed parts of Gilgit-Baltistan. How have they affected local communities, and who has benefited most?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Infrastructure projects have significantly improved connectivity between Gilgit-Baltistan and the rest of Pakistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Karakoram Highway and other roads have made travel and the transport of goods easier. They have supported tourism and trade while improving access to education, healthcare and employment opportunities outside the region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, the Karakoram Highway was not built solely to improve mobility. It has also served Pakistan&#8217;s geopolitical interests, strengthened state control and attracted private investment in tourism and mineral extraction.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Beyond roads, investment in hydropower remains limited relative to the region&#8217;s potential. Communities continue to experience severe electricity shortages.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Diamer-Bhasha Dam, a 4,500-megawatt project under construction, is primarily intended to contribute to Pakistan&#8217;s wider electricity generation and water-storage capacity, rather than provide a dedicated electricity supply for Gilgit-Baltistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Its development raises important questions about how costs and benefits are distributed between affected communities and the wider national population.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Digital connectivity also creates opportunities for communication, education and online employment. However, service quality remains uneven, particularly in remote mountain communities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Major infrastructure projects may promote economic growth, but their lasting value depends on whether they address local needs and environmental risks. Community-focused development initiatives, including those associated with the Aga Khan Development Network, offer examples of approaches that emphasise local participation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="768" height="1024" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/nadia_ali_attabad_lake_2-768x1024-1.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-50092" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/nadia_ali_attabad_lake_2-768x1024-1.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/nadia_ali_attabad_lake_2-225x300.jpg 225w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/nadia_ali_attabad_lake_2-1152x1536.jpg 1152w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/nadia_ali_attabad_lake_2.jpg 1536w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 768px) 100vw, 768px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">A road winds through the mountainous landscape overlooking Attabad Lake in Hunza, where expanding tourism is transforming local communities and livelihoods. Credits: Nadia Ali.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Tourism transforms Hunza&#8217;s economy and landscape</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Tourism has expanded considerably in Gilgit-Baltistan. What changes have you observed, particularly in Hunza, where you conducted research?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tourism has significantly transformed local economies and communities in Hunza, generating opportunities while intensifying environmental pressures and changing traditional livelihoods.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I see tourism not simply as economic development, but as a process that reshapes people&#8217;s relationships with land, resources and local ways of life.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Hunza, tourism has created employment and business opportunities for guesthouse owners, restaurant operators, transport providers and tour guides.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, it has also attracted investors from other parts of Pakistan, raising questions about who captures the greatest economic benefits.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One of the most significant concerns is the conversion of agricultural land, particularly within Hunza&#8217;s green belt, into concrete buildings, including multi-storey tourism facilities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This transformation threatens mountain agriculture and the ecological character of the region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Local communities are increasingly moving away from subsistence farming towards tourism-related livelihoods, potentially weakening traditional relationships with land.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet tourism is not the only driver of change. Rising educational attainment, employment opportunities in cities and remittances from younger generations working elsewhere in Pakistan and abroad also influence household aspirations and land-use patterns.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The central tension is between tourism&#8217;s immediate economic benefits and its longer-term social and environmental costs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Hunza&#8217;s experience highlights the need to ask who controls land, who benefits from tourism and how development can be balanced with the protection of local livelihoods and ecosystems.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">China&#8217;s presence: More visible in trade than everyday politics</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Gilgit-Baltistan is strategically important for Pakistan&#8217;s connectivity with China. How visible is China in everyday life, and how do local communities perceive this relationship?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China&#8217;s presence is shaped by cross-border trade, infrastructure development, tourism and wider economic cooperation with Pakistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, it is not necessarily highly visible in everyday political and economic life.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Beyond official narratives surrounding CPEC and the Pakistan–China strategic partnership, people encounter China&#8217;s presence more routinely through Chinese products in local markets, tourists visiting during the summer and official delegations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The growing availability of Chinese-language courses at universities and other institutions also reflects the educational dimensions of this relationship.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Public perceptions are influenced by narratives portraying China as Pakistan&#8217;s close friend and an emerging global power.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My research suggests that these perceptions are not uniform. Positive views are particularly evident among people involved in cross-border trade, who see China as a source of economic opportunity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the same time, increasing regulations and taxation are placing pressure on small-scale traders, making it more difficult for some to sustain their livelihoods.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Climate change becomes a political question</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Gilgit-Baltistan is highly exposed to environmental pressures. How are these interacting with tourism and development, and to what extent have they become political issues locally?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Climate change and environmental degradation pose major challenges because local communities depend on fragile mountain ecosystems, glaciers, agricultural land and transport routes vulnerable to natural hazards.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rising temperatures and glacial instability threaten lives, livelihoods and essential infrastructure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-adygene-glacier-women-documentary/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-adygene-glacier-women-documentary/">On a disappearing Kyrgyz glacier, seven women learn to read the ice</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Landslides and flooding damage roads, hydropower facilities, irrigation channels and bridges, disrupting access to markets and public services.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tourism is adding further pressure on limited water and electricity supplies, inadequate waste-management systems and local ecosystems.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These pressures are especially difficult to manage where communities already face gaps in public services and have limited influence over development priorities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Environmental threats increasingly intersect with political grievances. Protests over electricity shortages, clean drinking water and inadequate services are often connected to broader concerns about political exclusion and unequal development.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Climate change is therefore not simply an environmental issue in Gilgit-Baltistan. It is increasingly inseparable from questions of governance, representation and accountability.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What future for Gilgit-Baltistan?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Looking ahead, what developments do you think will shape Gilgit-Baltistan most profoundly over the next decade? Could its relationship with Pakistan change?</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I believe climate change, mineral extraction, tourism expansion and implementation of the 2025 land reforms will be particularly important.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Climate change is perhaps the most immediate threat, given the region&#8217;s exposure to glacial lake outburst floods, landslides and extreme weather.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A second major development will be growing interest in mineral extraction, including through Pakistan–China cooperation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These investments may create economic opportunities, but they could also intensify conflicts over land ownership, communal resources and the distribution of benefits.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The implementation of the Land Reforms Act 2025 will be equally important. Its consequences will depend on whether the authorities address existing disputes and recognise local communities&#8217; claims in practice.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If decision-making remains concentrated in state institutions and external commercial interests, the reforms could reproduce longstanding patterns of marginalisation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I therefore expect Gilgit-Baltistan&#8217;s unequal relationship with the Pakistani state to persist through new forms of economic and territorial control, unless communities gain greater influence over decisions affecting their future.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Meaningful change requires more than economic investment or land reform. It demands political representation, legal protections and recognition of the region&#8217;s rights.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Without these, Gilgit-Baltistan risks becoming increasingly valuable to external actors while its inhabitants remain politically marginalised.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph">By Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan English.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/politics/gilgit-baltistan-tourism-land-rights-development/">Gilgit-Baltistan: Who Benefits from Development in Pakistan&#8217;s Mountain North?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>World Bank’s Najy Benhassine on Economic Growth and Transformation in Central Asia</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/economics/world-bank-najy-benhassine-central-asia-economic-transformation/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/economics/world-bank-najy-benhassine-central-asia-economic-transformation/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 18:56:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Interview]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kazakhstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kyrgyzstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tajikistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkmenistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economic development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Najy Benhassine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Private sector]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regional connectivity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[World Bank]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=49983</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/world-bank-najy-benhassine-central-asia-economic-transformation/">World Bank’s Najy Benhassine on Economic Growth and Transformation in Central Asia</a></p>
<p>Central Asia is attracting growing international investment, but strong economic growth has yet to deliver deeper structural transformation. World Bank director Najy Benhassine explains what needs to change.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/world-bank-najy-benhassine-central-asia-economic-transformation/">World Bank’s Najy Benhassine on Economic Growth and Transformation in Central Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/world-bank-najy-benhassine-central-asia-economic-transformation/">World Bank’s Najy Benhassine on Economic Growth and Transformation in Central Asia</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em><em>Central Asia is attracting unprecedented international attention, but can new investment and infrastructure translate into more productive economies and better jobs? World Bank Division Director for Central Asia Najy Benhassine discusses reform, private-sector development, regional connectivity and the challenges facing the region through 2035.</em></em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Central Asia has become a focal point for investment, trade and connectivity initiatives involving partners from Europe, Asia and the Gulf. Yet strong growth and major infrastructure projects do not automatically deliver a more diversified economy or higher-quality employment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In this interview with Novastan, Najy Benhassine, the World Bank’s Division Director for Central Asia, discusses the opportunities and structural constraints facing the five Central Asian economies, from access to finance and skills development to the Middle Corridor and climate resilience.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Central Asia is receiving unprecedented attention from major economic partners, including the EU, China, the Gulf states, South Korea and others. To what extent is this greater geopolitical and investment interest already translating into deeper economic transformation within the region?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The interest is real and, in some respects, historic. Central Asia has moved from the margins to the centre of multiple strategic agendas simultaneously, and that creates genuine opportunities &#8211; more infrastructure financing, greater trade flows along economic corridors, and more diversified economic partnerships than at any point since independence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But I would make a distinction between interest and actual transformation. Global attention generates visits, pledges, and headlines, but these are just the start. Translating this interest into actual investments takes more. Economic transformation requires institutional reforms, competitive markets, and an environment where domestic and foreign firms can grow, become more productive, and generate more and better-paid jobs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So far, we are seeing expanding trade volumes and transit activity, along with some increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) in extractive industries and connectivity and logistics-related infrastructure. For a landlocked region, that is very welcome, but it does not yet amount to structural transformation in terms of diversified productive capacity, rising total factor productivity, or significant movement up export value chains.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When I look for genuine reform momentum, I see encouraging signs across Central Asia, although the nature and pace of reform differ. Uzbekistan, for example, has sustained a significant economic transformation since 2017, including exchange rate liberalisation, opening of state-dominated sectors to private participation, significant progress towards WTO accession, improvements in tax and customs administration, and the removal of deep distortions such as mandatory crop placement and the <em>propiska</em> system. Together, these reforms have created a more dynamic investment environment, with significant impacts on growth, job creation, and poverty reduction.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-mongolia-reform-undp-matilda-dimovska/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-mongolia-reform-undp-matilda-dimovska/">When reform reaches everyday life: Lessons from Uzbekistan and Mongolia</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan, as the region’s largest economy and an upper-middle-income country, is at an equally important stage. Its reform agenda focuses on reducing the dominance of state-owned enterprises, deepening capital markets, and advancing the transition to a more knowledge-intensive and private-sector-driven growth model.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Tajikistan, recent reforms have advanced greater competition in backbone sectors such as telecommunications and aviation, a stronger legal framework for foreign investment, and a more transparent environment for private investors. On the inclusion side, a new Benefits Sharing Program has been adopted that would direct part of the revenue from electricity sales from the Rogun Hydropower Plant towards pro-poor spending, alongside measures to make basic education services more inclusive.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the Kyrgyz Republic, the government is reforming utilities to allow private participation, establishing the framework for public-private partnerships (PPPs) and a more competitive and streamlined business environment, while digitising public services and financial systems to expand access and efficiency. These reforms are laying the foundations for large-scale investments, such as the Kambarata-1 Hydropower Plant and the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, to translate into jobs and inclusive growth.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="768" height="1024" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/najy-benhassine-portrait-world-bank-768x1024.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-50054" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/najy-benhassine-portrait-world-bank-768x1024-1.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/najy-benhassine-portrait-world-bank-225x300.jpg 225w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/najy-benhassine-portrait-world-bank.jpg 900w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 768px) 100vw, 768px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Najy Benhassine, World Bank Division Director for Central Asia. Courtesy of the World Bank.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Growth rates across Central Asia have remained relatively strong, but headline growth does not always translate into productivity gains or better-quality employment. Where do you see the biggest gap between economic growth and structural transformation?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The biggest gap is in productivity and skilled job creation. Growth has been driven primarily by favourable commodity prices, public investment, and remittance inflows. These are real contributions to GDP, but they are not the same as an economy becoming more productive or competitive.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When you look at firm-level data, labour productivity in manufacturing has stagnated or grown only modestly across most of the five countries. The private sector remains dominated by small firms that struggle to access finance, skilled labour, and markets at scale. State-owned enterprises continue to absorb capital and crowd out private investment in sectors where they should not dominate. The quality of jobs &#8211; measured by formality, wages, and skills content &#8211; has not improved commensurately with headline growth figures.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Access to finance remains a major constraint. Banking sectors remain relatively shallow, and credit allocation is often distorted by state-owned banks and directed lending practices. Small and medium-sized enterprises face collateral requirements they cannot meet and interest rates that make investment difficult to justify. The regulatory environment compounds this: compliance burdens, uneven application of rules, weak contract enforcement, and governance deficiencies all raise the cost of doing business and disproportionately disadvantage smaller, domestically oriented firms.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is exactly the kind of challenge that our FINGROW, or the Access to Finance for Jobs and Growth Program, is designed to address at scale. It brings together the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in a One World Bank Group approach, with $2 billion in IBRD financing and $1 billion each from IFC and MIGA, aiming to mobilise up to $6 billion in private capital.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By addressing financing gaps for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises and scaling digital financial solutions, it has the potential to support up to 18 million more or better jobs across participating countries over time. In Central Asia, Phase 1 is already underway in Uzbekistan, with the programme designed to be flexible enough to address each country’s specific structural and institutional context.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">FINGROW is also a model for how we think about our work more broadly: focusing on outcomes at scale, with the World Bank, IFC, and MIGA defining shared goals from the outset rather than working in parallel.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most important structural gap, however, is the disconnect between education systems and labour market needs. All five countries have relatively high school enrolment rates, but graduates’ skills do not always match what a more diversified, productivity-driven economy requires. Closing that gap requires sustained investment in the quality of education, not just its quantity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The five Central Asian economies are often discussed as a single region, yet their economic structures and reform trajectories differ considerably. Which differences matter most when assessing their development prospects?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Central Asia is a genuine region &#8211; not simply a geographic label. The five countries share a common history, a cultural heritage shaped by the Silk Road civilisations, and a Soviet institutional legacy that continues to influence how states and public institutions function. That shared foundation matters for how regional cooperation can be built.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What is striking today is that regional identity is being consciously strengthened. The Consultative Meetings of Central Asian leaders reflect a deliberate collective effort by all five heads of state to build a cooperative regional agenda on key issues affecting the sub-region, including trade, water, energy, and connectivity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is also worth noting that all five countries are, in different ways, resource-rich &#8211; though the nature of those resources varies considerably. Kazakhstan has vast land and hydrocarbon reserves. Turkmenistan holds some of the world&#8217;s largest natural gas deposits. Uzbekistan has gold, and a large and growing population that is itself a demographic asset.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have what the region urgently needs and will need more of: hydropower potential that could be transformative not just nationally but regionally. These differences shape their individual development paths, but also create opportunities for much deeper economic complementarity across the region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Many Central Asian governments want to attract more foreign direct investment. What distinguishes investment that contributes to long-term domestic productive capacity from investment that has relatively limited spillover effects?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is one of the most important questions for the region, and governments are increasingly asking it themselves rather than simply pursuing FDI volume.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The constraint in Central Asia is not a global shortage of capital. Banks and institutional investors manage roughly $280 trillion globally. The question is whether capital can reach viable opportunities at an acceptable risk and return, and that is precisely where development institutions like the World Bank Group have a critical role.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Through our Private Sector Investment Lab, we identified five recurring barriers to quality private investment in developing economies: policy and regulatory uncertainty, gaps in political risk coverage, foreign exchange risk, insufficient junior equity, and limited mechanisms to originate and distribute assets at scale. These five barriers are as relevant in Central Asia as anywhere.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The World Bank Group’s response has been concrete. We have brought our guarantee instruments under one platform, delivering more than $25 billion in guarantees globally in FY2026. Roughly one-third of IFC’s investments are now in local currency, reducing the foreign exchange risk that deters long-term investors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We have launched the Frontier Opportunities Fund to provide junior equity in markets where promising businesses cannot yet reach commercial scale. We are also bringing the World Bank, IFC and MIGA closer together so that policy reform and investment work in tandem.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Investment in extractive industries has historically generated strong revenues for Central Asian governments but relatively limited spillovers. By contrast, investment in agro-processing, light manufacturing, tourism, or business services is more likely to generate the supply chain linkages, employment, and knowledge spillovers that build domestic productive capacity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Attracting more of this investment requires governments to reduce policy uncertainty, strengthen contract enforcement, and address the risks that prevent global capital from entering these markets.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="683" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/najy-benhassine-world-bank-meeting-1024x683.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-50055" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/najy-benhassine-world-bank-meeting-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/najy-benhassine-world-bank-meeting-300x200-1.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/najy-benhassine-world-bank-meeting-768x512.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/najy-benhassine-world-bank-meeting-1536x1024.jpg 1536w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/najy-benhassine-world-bank-meeting.jpg 1600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Najy Benhassine speaking during a World Bank meeting. Courtesy of the World Bank.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Regional connectivity has become a central policy priority, particularly around the Middle Corridor and other east-west transport routes. How much economic value can improved connectivity generate if border procedures, logistics, customs and regulatory coordination do not improve at the same pace?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/middle-corridor-kazakhstan-logistics-challenges/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/economics/middle-corridor-kazakhstan-logistics-challenges/">The Middle Corridor is growing, but can it deliver? A logistics operator’s perspective</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is exactly the right question to ask. Physical infrastructure is necessary but not sufficient. The bottlenecks on the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC) are not primarily about the absence of roads or railways &#8211; they are about border-crossing procedures, transshipment coordination, documentation requirements, and the fragmentation of logistics services across multiple jurisdictions. Since 2022, shifts in regional trade patterns have exposed these constraints more clearly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The economic value of connectivity therefore depends critically on the “soft” dimension keeping pace with the “hard” infrastructure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our new report, <em><a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstreams/c992e1a4-aec3-4847-920e-9da63ac2c777/download" data-type="link" data-id="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstreams/c992e1a4-aec3-4847-920e-9da63ac2c777/download">Integration: World-Class Trade Logistics Along the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor</a></em>, estimates that strategic investments in the corridor &#8211; covering nine countries and nearly 200 million people &#8211; could more than triple trade volumes and halve travel times, creating 2 million additional jobs by 2040 by a conservative estimate. Combined with reforms that improve trade and transport efficiency, volumes could quadruple and travel times could fall by two-thirds.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The report estimates that more than $25 billion in physical infrastructure investment &#8211; in rail, ports, and feeder roads &#8211; is needed through 2040, alongside potentially significant enabling investments in logistics hubs, digital systems, and rolling stock.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It identifies four concrete priorities: a single digital corridor system; integrated rail and maritime services; corridor-wide mechanisms to monitor performance and resolve bottlenecks; and governance reforms to help state-owned rail, port, and shipping companies operate more commercially.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The World Bank Group is contributing through analytical work, customs and trade-facilitation reforms, infrastructure financing, and risk mitigation. MIGA recently issued a $785 million guarantee supporting Kazakhstan’s national road rehabilitation programme, including strategic sections of the corridor, while the World Bank is supporting Kazakhstan’s Transport Resilience and Connectivity Enhancement Project.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The central point is simple: without sustained progress on the soft dimension, the economic returns to infrastructure investment will be significantly below potential. The gains will be real but incremental rather than transformative.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/afghanistan-central-asia-trans-afghan-railway/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/afghanistan-central-asia-trans-afghan-railway/">Can Afghanistan Become Central Asia’s Bridge to the South?</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What kinds of jobs will Central Asia need to create as its young and increasingly urban populations enter the labour market, and which sectors are most likely to generate them?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The demographic situation across Central Asia is notably different from much of the rest of the world. While Eastern Europe and Russia face shrinking working-age populations, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have young and rapidly growing populations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To put the global context around this: over the next 10 to 15 years, 1.2 billion young people are expected to reach working age worldwide, while only around 420 million jobs are projected to be created. The private sector creates nine out of ten jobs in developing economies &#8211; which means the answer to Central Asia’s employment challenge cannot come from governments alone. It requires an environment where private firms can grow, invest, and hire at scale.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Several sectors have potential to generate productive employment: agro-processing and food manufacturing; modern services, including tourism, logistics, retail finance, and digital services; and light manufacturing oriented towards regional markets.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The challenge is both the supply of skills and the quality of opportunities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the Kyrgyz Republic, our analytical work found that roughly half of young people entering the labour market lacked the competencies employers need. In Uzbekistan, more than half of employers cite an inadequately skilled workforce as a binding constraint to growth, even as the country’s working-age population is projected to expand significantly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Digital services illustrate the opportunity. Several Central Asian cities have a critical mass of technically educated young people and improving connectivity. There is genuine potential for the region to participate in global markets to generate employment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But realising that potential requires education systems to shift from delivering credentials to delivering competencies. That will be one of Central Asia’s central human-capital challenges over the next decade.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Looking ahead to 2035, what would successful economic transformation in Central Asia actually look like? Which indicators would convince you that the region had moved beyond strong growth towards a more resilient and productive economic model?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The question I always ask is: what is driving growth, and who is participating in it? Strong headline growth can coexist with a very narrow base of beneficiaries and a very narrow range of drivers. Successful transformation by 2035 would look different in several concrete respects.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On economic structure, one would want to see the share of non-resource tradable sectors &#8211; manufacturing, agro-processing, tourism, modern services, etc. &#8211; growing as a share of GDP and employment, driven by private firms rather than state-owned enterprises. Export diversification, measured not just by the number of products but by their complexity and value-added content, would be a key signal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On productivity, I would look for sustained total factor productivity growth &#8211; evidence that the economy is not just accumulating inputs but using them more efficiently.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On inclusion, one would look at the income of the bottom 40 percent growing faster than the average, declining spatial disparities between capitals and secondary cities, and improving labour force participation rates &#8211; particularly for women and youth, where gaps remain large across the region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On resilience, a critical indicator would be reduced fiscal and external sensitivity to commodity price cycles. But the climate-related risks are perhaps the most structurally consequential. Central Asia faces the most acute water stress, and glacial retreat in the Tien Shan and Pamir ranges threatens long-term water availability across the region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Governments are investing in irrigation efficiency, rural water supply, and renewable energy, and we support these efforts through the Central Asia Water and Energy Program (CAWEP), with generous contributions from the EU, the United Kingdom and Switzerland.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Launched in 2009 and now in its fourth phase, CAWEP is the only multi-donor programme in the region working simultaneously on water and energy security at the regional level. The fourth phase alone has supported $3.3 billion in World Bank investments and helped mobilise more than $7 billion in private and public investments in Central Asian economies &#8211; a signal of how critical this agenda is to our long-term engagement in Central Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Finally, on governance and institutions &#8211; which underpin everything else &#8211; one would look for measurable improvements in the rule of law, contract enforcement, and the quality and independence of regulatory institutions. Ultimately, transformation depends on the institutions that govern markets, allocate capital, and enforce rules.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph">By Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan English.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/world-bank-najy-benhassine-central-asia-economic-transformation/">World Bank’s Najy Benhassine on Economic Growth and Transformation in Central Asia</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Middle Corridor is growing, but can it deliver? A logistics operator&#8217;s perspective</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/economics/middle-corridor-kazakhstan-logistics-challenges/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/economics/middle-corridor-kazakhstan-logistics-challenges/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 09:14:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Interview]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kazakhstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uzbekistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Caspian sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Logistics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle Corridor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transport infrastructure]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=49837</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/middle-corridor-kazakhstan-logistics-challenges/">The Middle Corridor is growing, but can it deliver? A logistics operator&#8217;s perspective</a></p>
<p>The Middle Corridor is attracting growing freight volumes, but can its infrastructure keep pace? Christian Hirschmann of Azurite Logistics discusses the Caspian bottleneck, commercial competitiveness and Kazakhstan's growing role in Central Asian trade.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/middle-corridor-kazakhstan-logistics-challenges/">The Middle Corridor is growing, but can it deliver? A logistics operator&#8217;s perspective</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/middle-corridor-kazakhstan-logistics-challenges/">The Middle Corridor is growing, but can it deliver? A logistics operator&#8217;s perspective</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em><em><em><em><em><em><em>As trade routes between Europe and Asia undergo profound changes, the Middle Corridor is attracting growing attention as an alternative to transit through Russia. Yet infrastructure bottlenecks, limited shipping capacity across the Caspian Sea and coordination problems continue to undermine its reliability. Christian Hirschmann of Azurite Logistics discusses the challenges facing the route, Kazakhstan&#8217;s growing importance and what would make the corridor commercially sustainable.</em></em></em></em></em></em></em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, connects China and Europe through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus. Its strategic importance has increased considerably since Russia&#8217;s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as businesses seek to diversify their supply chains and reduce exposure to geopolitical risks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The route&#8217;s potential is substantial. In a report published in September 2026, the World Bank estimated that targeted investments could more than triple trade volumes along the corridor and halve travel times by 2040. Further regulatory and operational reforms could produce even greater gains.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, translating that potential into reliable commercial services remains a major challenge. Limited vessel capacity across the Caspian Sea, overloaded rail networks and fragmented coordination between national operators continue to affect transit times and costs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To better understand these challenges from an industry perspective, <strong>Novastan spoke with Christian Hirschmann of Azurite Logistics</strong>, a European logistics company active in transport between Europe and Central Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-key-link-middle-corridor/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-key-link-middle-corridor/">Kazakhstan continues to assert itself as the “key link” in the Middle Corridor</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Novastan: How much has the Middle Corridor changed over the past three or four years? Are we seeing a structural shift in freight flows, or is demand still largely dependent on geopolitical disruptions?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Christian Hirschmann: The Middle Corridor has become one of the most important routes for Eurasian trade, and also one of the most volatile. Geopolitical developments affect it immediately, from the Iran conflict to the Russia-Ukraine war spreading into the Black Sea region. With alternative Eurasian routes increasingly restricted, freight volumes are shifting to the Middle Corridor at a growing rate.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Infrastructure has not kept up. Capacity on the Caspian crossing is limited, rail capacity in Turkey is constrained, and extensive track maintenance across Europe causes further disruption. Together these create bottlenecks along the corridor, and shippers should expect longer and less predictable lead times.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Azurite, these challenges are part of day-to-day operations. With in-depth knowledge of the corridor and a close watch on every critical node, Azurite anticipates disruptions early and adjusts routings before delays reach its customers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The company is currently developing new block train services connecting Antwerp with Halkalı (Istanbul) and Halkalı with Alat (Baku). It is also building its own railway operations, making it independent of market capacity and giving customers dependable access to the Middle Corridor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="493" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/middle-corridor-map-novastan-1024x493.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49841" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/middle-corridor-map-novastan-1024x493.jpg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/middle-corridor-map-novastan-767x369.jpg 767w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/middle-corridor-map-novastan-1536x739.jpg 1536w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/middle-corridor-map-novastan-300x144.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/middle-corridor-map-novastan-2048x986-1.jpg 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">The Middle Corridor connects Europe and China through Türkiye, the South Caucasus and Kazakhstan, crossing the Caspian Sea. Map: Courtesy of Azurite Logistics.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What are the main bottlenecks today? Which parts of a journey between Europe and Central Asia create the greatest uncertainty?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The biggest single source of uncertainty is still the Caspian crossing. Ferry and vessel capacity between Alat/Baku and Aktau/Kuryk is limited, departures are irregular, and weather can stop operations for days. Once a backlog builds at the ports, it spreads quickly along the whole corridor. Containers wait, storage and demurrage costs rise, and planned connections are missed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second factor is rail capacity on the approach routes. Turkey&#8217;s rail network is under heavy pressure, and extensive track maintenance across Europe keeps reducing available train paths. Together these cause delays before cargo even reaches the Caspian.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What is often underestimated is coordination between the many parties involved. A single shipment passes through several national railways, port operators, ferry lines and customs authorities. Each has its own schedules, tariffs and priorities. Changes in rail gauge and transloading points add more handovers. Every interface is a possible point of delay, and when information isn&#8217;t shared in real time, small problems turn into big ones.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Border crossings and customs have improved noticeably thanks to digital transit documents and closer cooperation between the corridor countries. They remain a risk when paperwork is incomplete or regulations change at short notice.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Finally, the corridor reacts to geopolitics, often within days. When other Eurasian routes are restricted, volumes shift to the Middle Corridor and put even more strain on existing bottlenecks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/environment/caspian-sea-declining-water-level-central-asia/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/environment/caspian-sea-declining-water-level-central-asia/">The Caspian Sea Is Retreating. Central Asia Is Not Ready</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The World Bank has highlighted the corridor&#8217;s potential for significant growth. Does it currently have the capacity to absorb a major increase in traffic? Where is investment most urgently needed?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Not yet, at least not without longer and less predictable transit times. The corridor has grown significantly in recent years, but infrastructure hasn&#8217;t kept up. It already runs close to its limits at several points. A further sharp rise in traffic, for example from new geopolitical disruptions on other Eurasian routes, would mostly mean more congestion rather than more throughput.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Investment is most urgently needed in four areas.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, the Caspian crossing. This is the corridor&#8217;s biggest bottleneck. It needs more and larger vessels, regular scheduled departures, and expanded berth and terminal capacity in Alat, Aktau and Kuryk. As long as the sea leg stays the weakest link, improvements elsewhere along the route have limited effect.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, rail infrastructure and rolling stock. In Türkiye and the Caucasus, extra track capacity, modernised lines and efficient transloading points are essential. Equally important is enough wagons and locomotives to run more trains on a reliable schedule.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, digitalisation and harmonisation. Many delays are caused by processes, not infrastructure. Shared digital transit documents, real-time information exchange between railways, ports and customs, and harmonised tariffs would raise capacity noticeably, with comparatively little investment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fourth, terminals and hubs. Inland terminals with storage, consolidation and handling capacity help absorb peaks and keep cargo moving when one section of the corridor is disrupted.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">How commercially competitive is the Middle Corridor today? For which types of cargo does it make economic sense, and where does it still struggle?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Middle Corridor makes most economic sense where sanctions and risk exposure narrow the alternatives, and that applies in both directions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Eastbound, many European shippers can no longer use the northern route through Russia, or no longer want to. Sanctions, compliance rules and reputational risk rule out Russian transit for a large share of exports to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the wider region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For machinery, industrial equipment, automotive parts, chemicals and project cargo for the energy and infrastructure sectors, the Middle Corridor is often the only practical land option. For landlocked Central Asian destinations, it is usually also faster than a long sea route followed by an expensive inland leg.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Westbound, the drivers are similar, plus a second factor: missing insurance coverage for sea freight. Because of conflicts along key maritime routes, war-risk cover is in some cases unavailable or only available at very high premiums. Shippers who can&#8217;t insure their cargo at sea are moving it to land routes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Exporters from Central Asia and China who want to avoid Russian transit choose the Middle Corridor for the same reason. As a result, westbound volumes have risen noticeably.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The corridor is particularly competitive for medium- to high-value goods where capital tied up in transit and speed matter, time-sensitive supply chains, customers with strict compliance requirements, and project and energy cargo bound for Central Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It still struggles in three areas.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Price: for low-value bulk and commodity cargo, sea freight stays clearly cheaper wherever it is available and insurable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Speed: transit times are competitive in theory, but in practice they are held back by bottlenecks at the Caspian crossing, in Turkey and on European rail sections.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Predictability: this is the biggest weakness. Many handovers between operators, irregular sailings on the Caspian, and fast reactions to geopolitical events lead to fluctuating transit times. For shippers running just-in-time production, that is often more critical than price.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For shippers who aren&#8217;t restricted by sanctions, the northern route still has an advantage in price and transit time. The Middle Corridor&#8217;s strength is that it is the reliable, compliant alternative when that option isn&#8217;t available. Its long-term success depends on making transit times more predictable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/pakistan-central-asia-gwadar-karachi-trade-corridor/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/economics/pakistan-central-asia-gwadar-karachi-trade-corridor/">Gwadar, Karachi and the Central Asian Dream of the Sea</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are emerging as important logistics markets. How evenly are the benefits of the Middle Corridor spreading across Central Asia?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The benefits are not spread evenly yet. Kazakhstan is clearly becoming the main logistics hub for Central Asia. It is the only country in the region that links China, the Caspian Sea and the rest of Central Asia within its own borders.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk, the border crossings to China at Khorgos and Dostyk, and the largest rail network in the region, most Middle Corridor flows pass through Kazakhstan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Investment in port capacity, dry ports, terminals and rail lines is reinforcing that position, and more consolidation, warehousing and distribution for the whole region is moving there.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan is developing into the second centre, but with a different profile. With the largest population in the region and a growing industrial base, it is above all a strong origin and destination market rather than a transit hub. Being double landlocked, it depends on its neighbours for transit, especially Kazakhstan. That makes Kazakhstan&#8217;s hub role even stronger.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New opportunities are emerging elsewhere too.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kyrgyzstan could gain considerably from the planned China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, which would create a direct southern link between China and Central Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Turkmenistan, with the port of Turkmenbashi, offers an additional Caspian crossing and could ease pressure on the bottlenecks in the future.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tajikistan is still mostly a destination market, but needs better connections for its growing trade with China and Europe.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For logistics providers, this means Kazakhstan is the strategic anchor point for Central Asia. Anyone who wants to serve the region reliably needs a strong operational presence there. From that base, the neighbouring markets can be reached efficiently.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/afghanistan-central-asia-trans-afghan-railway/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/afghanistan-central-asia-trans-afghan-railway/">Can Afghanistan Become Central Asia’s Bridge to the South?</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">How important is sanctions compliance in customers&#8217; decisions? Has this permanently changed how European businesses approach supply-chain risks?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sanctions compliance is now one of the deciding factors in route choice, and for many customers it is the first filter. Before price or transit time are even discussed, they want to know whether a route is fully compliant and legally secure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For European companies, the risks of breaching sanctions are simply too high: fines, personal liability for management, blocked payments, losing access to banks and insurers, and lasting reputational damage.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On top of the sanctions themselves, there is the economic risk of doing business in Russia. Many European companies have seen how quickly assets can be frozen, payments blocked or businesses placed under state control. As a result, they have not only rerouted their transport flows, they have also rethought their entire regional set-up.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Moscow used to be the natural hub for Central Asia and the wider CIS region. Today, European companies are moving regional distribution, warehousing and in many cases regional management to Kazakhstan. It offers political stability, an investor-friendly environment, a central location and direct access to the Middle Corridor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This shift is a major reason why Kazakhstan is developing into the leading logistics hub for Central Asia, serving as the base from which European companies supply Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and neighbouring markets.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The change is lasting. European companies have learned that relying on one corridor or one transit country is a strategic risk. Supply-chain risk is now part of board-level decisions. Route diversification, alternative scenarios and full transparency along the transport chain have become standard. Even if the political situation changes, few companies will go back to their old dependencies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That&#8217;s why sanctions-compliant routing is one of Azurite&#8217;s core Middle Corridor services. We plan routes that avoid sanctioned territories completely. We screen goods, parties and end users, and we provide full documentation for every shipment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Looking five years ahead, what would make the Middle Corridor a genuinely mature and reliable trade route? What is the biggest obstacle to achieving this?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In five years, I would call the Middle Corridor mature when shippers no longer treat it as an emergency alternative but as a fixed part of their supply-chain strategy. The key is this: the corridor will only be reliable if shippers secure transport capacity in advance.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Today, many shippers still book on a spot basis, when other routes are blocked or when rates look attractive. That behaviour creates the very volatility everyone complains about. Railways, port and ferry operators and logistics providers can only invest in rolling stock, vessels and terminals if they can count on stable, plannable volumes. Without long-term commitments, there is no long-term capacity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A mature corridor would therefore show these features:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Shippers sign long-term capacity agreements and plan the corridor into their supply chains as a fixed route.</li>



<li>Scheduled block trains and regular sailings across the Caspian run to fixed timetables.</li>



<li>Transit times are predictable, with limited variation.</li>



<li>Operators along the route share data and work together as one integrated chain.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The decisive shift is in mindset: reliability and available capacity matter more than price. A slightly cheaper rate is worth little if the container waits two weeks in Aktau or misses its production slot.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The companies that succeed on this corridor will be the ones that see secured capacity as an investment in supply-chain security, not as a cost factor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph">By Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan English.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/middle-corridor-kazakhstan-logistics-challenges/">The Middle Corridor is growing, but can it deliver? A logistics operator&#8217;s perspective</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>Kazakhstan&#8217;s AI Ambitions Face an Energy and Water Test in Ekibastuz</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-ai-data-center-ekibastuz/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniyar Sadvakasov]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 19:42:13 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kazakhstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Electricity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Infrastructure]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=49777</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-ai-data-center-ekibastuz/">Kazakhstan&#8217;s AI Ambitions Face an Energy and Water Test in Ekibastuz</a></p>
<p>Kazakhstan wants to turn Ekibastuz into a major hub for AI computing. But as its Data Center Valley could eventually reach 1 GW, questions are mounting over electricity, water and who will bear the environmental costs.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-ai-data-center-ekibastuz/">Kazakhstan&#8217;s AI Ambitions Face an Energy and Water Test in Ekibastuz</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-ai-data-center-ekibastuz/">Kazakhstan&#8217;s AI Ambitions Face an Energy and Water Test in Ekibastuz</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Kazakhstan has begun building a major data centre cluster in the industrial city of Ekibastuz. Its first phase will require around 50 MW of power, but the government&#8217;s longer-term ambition is to expand the site to as much as 1 GW. As the country seeks to position itself as a regional hub for artificial intelligence and computing, questions remain over whether its electricity and water infrastructure can keep pace</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In early 2026, Kazakhstan launched construction of its Data Center Valley project in Ekibastuz, in the northern Pavlodar region, following instructions from President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The first facility in the planned cluster is expected to have an energy capacity of around 50 MW. Depending on investor demand, however, the campus could eventually expand to as much as 1 GW and occupy up to 1,300 hectares.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ekibastuz was not chosen by accident. The city is one of Kazakhstan&#8217;s main energy centres and is home to the Ekibastuz GRES-1 and GRES-2 coal-fired power stations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet the scale of the project raises questions over whether Kazakhstan can generate enough electricity for such a large new consumer, how the data centres will be supplied with water, and what environmental pressures the development could create.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What is Kazakhstan planning to build?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the Pavlodar regional administration, the precise distribution of land between individual data centres, energy facilities and other infrastructure will be determined as project documentation is developed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The first stage includes data centre facilities, energy and engineering infrastructure, administrative buildings and AI computing infrastructure. Work is currently under way on site preparation, foundations, administrative facilities, checkpoints and the necessary engineering infrastructure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="576" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/img-20260130-144424-831-1-1024x576.jpeg" alt="" class="wp-image-49782" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/img-20260130-144424-831-1-1024x576.jpeg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/img-20260130-144424-831-1-300x169.jpeg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/img-20260130-144424-831-1-1536x864.jpeg 1536w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/img-20260130-144424-831-1-768x432.jpeg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/10/img-20260130-144424-831-1.jpeg 1920w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><em>Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov inspects progress on the Data Center Valley project in Ekibastuz.</em> Photo: Prime Minister of Kazakhstan’s official website.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The authorities say the initial stage will require around 50 MW, with capacity subsequently increasing in phases. Additional land has been reserved to allow the campus to expand if demand from investors and technology companies materialises.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhtelecom, one of the operators involved in the Data Center Valley project, told Novastan that the project envisages a hybrid cooling system combining precision air conditioning with closed liquid-cooling circuits using non-freezing liquid solutions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Construction has already begun, but public hearings with local residents have not yet taken place.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Pavlodar regional administration said hearings would be held after the necessary project documentation had been completed and the procedures required for environmental assessment had been carried out.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The biggest question: electricity</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Connecting a new consumer with an eventual capacity of 1 GW would be unrealistic under Kazakhstan&#8217;s current energy conditions if such capacity were required all at once, according to Yerkebulan Kozhmambet, a member of the Public Council on Fuel and Energy Issues under Kazakhstan&#8217;s Ministry of Energy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;If we are being honest, today this looks unrealistic, particularly given that the average age of our generating capacity is more than 65 years,&#8221; Kozhmambet said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A phased project would be possible, he added, provided new generation and grid infrastructure were developed at the same time.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The first launch complex is expected to require 50 MW and is scheduled to enter operation in June 2027, while 1 GW represents a longer-term target rather than capacity the power system is expected to provide immediately.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The scale is nevertheless considerable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to Kozhmambet, a continuous 1 GW load would consume around 8.76 billion kWh of electricity annually. Kazakhstan&#8217;s total annual electricity consumption is approximately 110-115 billion kWh, meaning the completed Data Center Valley could theoretically account for around 7-8 percent of current national consumption.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;No region today has a free reserve of this scale,&#8221; he said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The project also comes as Kazakhstan&#8217;s electricity system has faced shortages and imports, particularly from Russia during peak periods.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kozhmambet warned that if the full 1 GW capacity were introduced before Kazakhstan achieves a sustainable electricity surplus, the new data centres could absorb that additional generation and push the system back into deficit.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Energy expert Asset Nauryzbayev takes a less pessimistic view.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He argues that 1 GW would not necessarily pose a major problem for Ekibastuz if the development of the data centres is synchronised with new generating capacity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;If I understand the government&#8217;s intention correctly, it is based on the Soviet project to build four 4 GW power stations in Ekibastuz,&#8221; Nauryzbayev said. &#8220;In today&#8217;s conditions, the units would be 660 MW rather than 500 MW. An eight-unit station would therefore generate 5.8 GW. In those circumstances, 1 GW of consumption is absolutely not a large amount.&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He also pointed to planned new gas generation in southern Kazakhstan, which he expects to reduce the country&#8217;s electricity deficit.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But there is an environmental price.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;This will undoubtedly create an enormous carbon footprint,&#8221; Nauryzbayev said, although he believes the price of carbon offsets is unlikely to fundamentally affect the economics of the project.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/carbon-neutral-by-2060-kazakhstans-green-pledge-faces-a-reality-check/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/carbon-neutral-by-2060-kazakhstans-green-pledge-faces-a-reality-check/">Carbon neutral by 2060? Kazakhstan’s green pledge faces a reality check</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is another potential risk if data centres are completed before the generation intended to supply them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;Data centres will undoubtedly be able to pay more than ordinary consumers,&#8221; he said. &#8220;That could strongly affect the market if there is no direct link to newly built power stations. Data centres built quickly will take electricity away from ordinary consumers.&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan&#8217;s Ministry of Energy says the government plans to add more than 26.3 GW of generating capacity by 2035 through modernisation, new conventional generation, renewable energy projects and nuclear power.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Of this, 13.3 GW is planned through 2029.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The ministry expects the country to be able to cover domestic electricity demand from 2027 onwards and subsequently develop a surplus sufficient to accommodate energy-intensive AI infrastructure and large data centres.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Whether those projects are delivered on schedule will therefore be crucial to Data Center Valley&#8217;s longer-term expansion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Could water become the bigger constraint?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Electricity may not be the only &#8211; or even the most difficult &#8211; resource question facing the project.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan&#8217;s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation told Novastan that it has not yet received an application to establish a water-use limit for Data Center Valley. No specific limit has therefore been set.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The ministry said that the appropriate volume would be assessed once an application and supporting documents were submitted.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Citing information from the Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development, it also said planned AI data centres in Kazakhstan would use immersion cooling with specialised liquids, which should not require large volumes of water or restrict supplies to existing users.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This description differs from Kazakhtelecom&#8217;s statement that Data Center Valley will use a hybrid system combining precision air conditioning and closed liquid-cooling circuits.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The exact volume of water that the Ekibastuz facilities will require &#8211; and how liquids used during maintenance will be handled &#8211; has not yet been specified in the information provided to Novastan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For environmentalists, this lack of detail is significant.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Svetlana Mogilyuk, chair of the ECOM public association, the Civil Alliance of Pavlodar Region and coordinator of the Aarhus Centre in Pavlodar, considers water consumption one of the project&#8217;s main environmental risks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;The Ekibastuz area has significant limitations in terms of natural water resources,&#8221; she said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These constraints have historically been addressed through the Satpayev Canal, which draws water from the Irtysh River.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;But the canal also has limited capacity, and the Irtysh, from which the water is taken, is not unlimited either,&#8221; Mogilyuk said. &#8220;That is precisely why water is one of the main issues that concerns us as environmentalists when assessing the planned data centre project.&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nauryzbayev similarly believes the project&#8217;s weakest point may lie outside the electricity sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;The main risk of the project is not electricity,&#8221; he said. &#8220;The weakest point is the Irtysh-Karaganda Canal.&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The canal was originally designed in part to support large-scale industrial and power development around Ekibastuz, he explained, but it was not designed for the subsequent growth of Astana.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-residents-suffer-from-lack-of-water/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-residents-suffer-from-lack-of-water/">Kazakhstan: Residents suffer from lack of water</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;Power stations and Astana will now compete for water,&#8221; he said, adding that the situation could be exacerbated by an expected reduction in water entering the Irtysh from China.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One possible solution would be to use dry cooling towers, Nauryzbayev said, although this would increase costs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vadim Ni, founder of the Save the Caspian Sea civic movement and director of a social and environmental foundation, said any meaningful assessment would require clear information about water consumption, water sources and the cooling technology being used.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;The main environmental and social costs associated with data centre projects are their large consumption of electricity and water,&#8221; he said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While electricity consumption can be significant at national level, he added, water use creates a particularly important local impact.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;For local populations, the sensitive issue is first and foremost increased competition for clean drinking water, which is already scarce in many regions of Kazakhstan.&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Environmental assessment is still pending</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan&#8217;s Ministry of Ecology told Novastan that it had not yet received project materials for an environmental impact assessment of the Ekibastuz data centre development.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An environmental assessment would need to consider the project&#8217;s location, technical characteristics, technology, timetable, resource requirements, emissions, waste and potential direct and indirect environmental effects.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vadim Ni argues that Kazakhstan&#8217;s existing environmental assessment framework is not yet well adapted to large data centre projects.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Data centres are not currently explicitly included among the categories of projects automatically requiring an environmental impact assessment or screening under the relevant sections of Kazakhstan&#8217;s Environmental Code, he said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He believes Kazakhstan should develop mechanisms allowing the environmental and social effects of individual data centres to be assessed, while strategic environmental assessments could examine the cumulative impact of data-centre development across a region or the country.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At regional level, preliminary figures may eventually emerge through the IKI Nexus project supported by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, he added.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Meanwhile, public hearings on Data Center Valley have yet to take place.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mogilyuk said environmental groups hoped the authorities would soon begin a genuine dialogue with local residents.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;So far, as often happens, the authorities have not entered into dialogue with the public and have simply communicated the idea of implementing the project through the media,&#8221; she said. &#8220;There have been no hearings yet, but we hope they will take place in the near future.&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Ni, the quality of public consultation depends not simply on holding a meeting but on whether affected communities receive information early enough, whether documentation is accessible, and whether comments can genuinely influence the final project.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;The most important thing is that the people who are genuinely concerned about the project&#8217;s risks should participate in the discussions,&#8221; he said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consultation loses much of its purpose, he argued, if participants are selected primarily because they are already inclined to support the development.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why does Kazakhstan want data centres?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Despite the questions surrounding resources and environmental impact, there are strong economic and technological arguments behind Kazakhstan&#8217;s data-centre ambitions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">IT analyst and large language model researcher Timur Bektur describes data centres as the physical foundation of the digital economy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cloud services, government information systems, banking services and AI models all depend on computing infrastructure, while Kazakhstan also has legal requirements governing the domestic storage of its citizens&#8217; data.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;If you want to create your own AI product and need a GPU server to run an LLM model, you need a data centre and a server,&#8221; Bektur said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Global demand for computing power is rising rapidly, and Kazakhstan could potentially supply not only its domestic market but neighbouring Central Asian countries as well.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The development of a major computing cluster could also attract cloud services, AI infrastructure, telecommunications and cybersecurity companies, as well as engineers, developers and specialised service providers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Kazakhstan, Bektur argues, this creates the possibility of selling something beyond its traditional commodities and energy exports: computing power.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-futuristic-city-alatau-special-status/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-futuristic-city-alatau-special-status/">In Kazakhstan, the futuristic city of “Alatau” reaches a new milestone with special status</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But he also remembers Ekibastuz&#8217;s own recent infrastructure problems.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The city suffered a major heating crisis in 2022, leaving residents without adequate heating during extremely cold weather.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;People were literally freezing,&#8221; Bektur said. &#8220;So the question has to be asked: who guarantees that something like this will not happen again?&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He remains optimistic about Data Center Valley but argues that the economics of the project must be demonstrated, particularly if the state is expected to carry a significant share of infrastructure costs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;It is important to me that this project does not become an additional burden placed on the state or the population,&#8221; he said. &#8220;If it is economically justified, backed by demand and can bring real benefits to the country, then I am fully in favour. And I very much hope it creates no problems for the residents of Ekibastuz.&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Who benefits &#8211; and who bears the costs?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Yevgeny Khabarov, director of the TAUAN public foundation in Pavlodar, Data Center Valley should ultimately be judged not simply by the amount of investment it attracts, but by what Ekibastuz itself gains from hosting it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;I am interested not only in the question of how many billions of dollars will be invested,&#8221; he said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The more important questions, he argues, concern how many resources the project will consume, who will pay for the necessary infrastructure, what tax and social benefits will remain in Ekibastuz, and what obligations investors will assume towards the local area.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;Investment in itself does not automatically constitute a public good,&#8221; Khabarov said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;If most of the economic benefit remains with companies and investors, while the environmental burden and the use of water, land, electricity and infrastructure remain with the territory, then a perfectly legitimate question arises: are we privatising the benefits while socialising the costs?&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">From a human-rights perspective, he added, development should ultimately improve people&#8217;s lives rather than simply increase asset values and investment volumes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Kazakhstan, Data Center Valley therefore represents more than an infrastructure project. It is a test of whether the country can convert its abundant energy resources and strategic location into a new digital industry &#8211; without shifting the costs of that ambition onto the people and environment of Ekibastuz.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph">By Daniyar Sadvakasov.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-ai-data-center-ekibastuz/">Kazakhstan&#8217;s AI Ambitions Face an Energy and Water Test in Ekibastuz</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>Nothing to Waste: Dildora’s Science of Peanuts</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-dildora-nurmatova-peanuts-circular-economy/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Shakhnoza Zafari]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 18:21:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-dildora-nurmatova-peanuts-circular-economy/">Nothing to Waste: Dildora’s Science of Peanuts</a></p>
<p>In Uzbekistan’s Andijan region, researcher and entrepreneur Dildora Nurmatova is building a family peanut business around a simple principle: waste nothing. From snacks and milled kernels to animal feed made from shells and stems, her work combines science, entrepreneurship and circular-economy thinking. UNDP</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-dildora-nurmatova-peanuts-circular-economy/">Nothing to Waste: Dildora’s Science of Peanuts</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-dildora-nurmatova-peanuts-circular-economy/">Nothing to Waste: Dildora’s Science of Peanuts</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>This article was originally published by <a href="https://www.undp.org/uzbekistan/stories/nothing-waste-dildoras-science-peanuts" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.undp.org/uzbekistan/stories/nothing-waste-dildoras-science-peanuts">UNDP Uzbekistan</a> and is republished here with permission.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Dildora Nurmatova has a very pleasant smile and she smiles a lot.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>She smiles as she explains what the samples are in the university lab, as she walks through the peanut field, as she explains what is inside the bags and containers in her family workshop, and when someone reaches for the brown notebook she carries everywhere, she quickly holds it tight with a smile.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>“I don’t leave it anywhere – it has all my work,” she says.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="683" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439258088_05b81d8def_k-1024x683.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49765" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439258088_05b81d8def_k-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439258088_05b81d8def_k-300x200-1.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439258088_05b81d8def_k-768x512.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439258088_05b81d8def_k.jpg 1440w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Dildora in the institute lab.<br>Photo: Elyor Nemat, UNDP Uzbekistan</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The notebook is filled with calculations, observations and records. It travels with her between the laboratory, the field and the family business in Andijan region. Dildora is pursuing her PhD in agriculture, raising two children and building a business from a crop she first became interested in as a researcher.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">She is also about to turn 30.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Dildora, this seems to come with a sense of urgency. There is still so much she wants to do. She talks about “catching up”. Yet, watching her move between the laboratory, the field and home, one wonders how anyone could catch up with her.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Dildora is among the 417 women business owners and entrepreneurs whose paths have crossed with UNDP’s Aid for Trade initiative since 2022. Its trainings, entrepreneurship support, and mentorship programmes were shaped to improve productive capabilities, job creation and the export potential of businesses.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Dildora’s initiative, however, started with the peanut.&nbsp;</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="683" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439533490_506d354b81_k-1024x683.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49766" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439533490_506d354b81_k-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439533490_506d354b81_k-300x200-1.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439533490_506d354b81_k-768x512.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439533490_506d354b81_k.jpg 1440w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Filtered peanut kernels grown by Dildora<br>Photo: Elyor Nemat, UNDP Uzbekistan</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">It started with a different kind of peanut </h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Her fascination with peanuts began during her master&#8217;s studies, when she was researching different varieties and came across one developed by another woman scientist – Amanova Maxfurat. It was unusual: larger than conventional peanuts and distinctive in taste.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Dildora wanted to see what it could do outside research. After obtaining the necessary certification and permission from the scientist for small-scale production, she began growing it herself.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The variety has the potential to yield around six tonnes per hectare, according to project data. In 2024, Dildora&#8217;s enterprise was already harvesting five tonnes from one hectare, which yielded almost 3 tonnes of first-grade peanut kernels.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But Dildora was interested in more than yield.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="576" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55438176767_33b75e178b_k-1024x576.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49767" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55438176767_33b75e178b_k-1024x576.jpg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55438176767_33b75e178b_k-300x169.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55438176767_33b75e178b_k-768x432.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55438176767_33b75e178b_k.jpg 1440w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><br>Photo: Elyor Nemat, UNDP Uzbekistan</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">She began looking at the whole plant and what could be done with every part. This approach is deeply rooted in Uzbek culture, where using resources thoughtfully and finding a purpose for everything have long been part of everyday life.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The good kernels were obvious. They could be sold or roasted and packaged as snacks. Selling processed snacks instead of raw crop gave her a three-fold increase of profit. Lower-grade kernels did not have to be discarded either – they could be milled and used in other products. This is why she would need a sorting machine.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Then there were the parts most people would consider waste.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The green stems could feed animals. The hard outer shells could be ground down for animal feed. Even the thin red skins surrounding the kernels could be ground and used as rabbit feed.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But finding a possible use for something is not enough for Dildora – she wants to know the best way it can work. Her natural mindset is tuned to a waste-free value chain, which echoes well in the Aid for Trade initiative. In the last years, it has supported 77 small businesses in adopting more waste-reducing, energy and water efficient business practices.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Before Dildora began making animal feed, she consulted a professor to understand what a healthy ration should contain for different species. She now prepares different mixtures, accordingly, adding minerals and other supplements in calculated proportions depending on what type of animal the order is placed for.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is how Dildora tends to work: An idea comes first. Then she learns, consults someone who knows more. She calculates, tests and records.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And the results go into her favorite brown notebook.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">A family business in every sense </h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Her business has an unusual name: ErElDi. There is a simple explanation.&nbsp;Er comes from Erkin – her father, El from Eldor, her brother and Di from Dildora – herself a nice family team.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To understand the business, it helps to visit their home: vegetables grow in neat rows outside; the production equipment is carefully maintained; inside the workspace, everything is in its place; beside the first-aid kit stands a vase of flowers. There is work everywhere, but there is also warmth.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Conversations overlap. People tease one another and laugh.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="683" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439530720_0a4612b286_k-1024x683.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49762" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439530720_0a4612b286_k-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439530720_0a4612b286_k-768x512.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439530720_0a4612b286_k-300x200-1.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55439530720_0a4612b286_k.jpg 1440w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Dildora&#8217;s family at lunch laughing together<br>Photo: Elyor Nemat, UNDP Uzbekistan</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is also the place Dildora&#8217;s two children wait for her when she is in the field or laboratory. Her younger child is only a few months past one. When Dildora works, her brothers&#8217; wives help care for the children.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Her ambitions, in other words, are not pursued alone. The same is true of the business.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Her brother works with her. And her father is particularly proud to tell visitors something that makes Dildora laugh again: his daughter taught him how to use the equipment. She also taught him how to prepare the mixture. There is no ceremony around this reversal of roles. Her father simply seems delighted by it.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The researcher in the family happens to be his daughter. She knows the calculations. He learned from her. And now they work side by side.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="683" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55438175432_4be8f83de4_k-1024x683.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49761" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55438175432_4be8f83de4_k-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55438175432_4be8f83de4_k-300x200-1.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55438175432_4be8f83de4_k-768x512.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/55438175432_4be8f83de4_k.jpg 1440w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Dildora and her father making animal feed out of milled peanut shells<br>Photo: Elyor Nemat, UNDP Uzbekistan.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">From an idea to a production line </h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There was, however, a limit to how far ingenuity alone could take the family.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If ErElDi was going to move from experiments and small-scale production to a viable business, it needed equipment, reliable electricity and proper space for processing.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Through UNDP’s Aid for Trade initiative, supported by the Government of Finland, the enterprise received equipment for peeling, crushing, frying and drying peanuts, as well as packaging machinery. The support also included a separate processing workshop, a three-phase power line, mentoring, and consultancy on product development, processing, and business management.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">ErElDi is not alone. It was among the 30 businesses supported by Aid for Trade across the Ferghana Valley, half of them start-ups venturing into identified sustainable value chains. Each grew with its own mix of technical assistance, mentorship and entrepreneurship support, and access to assets and financing. Together, they generated almost 500 jobs, more than two thirds now held by women.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This support gave the family the means to do more with what they were already growing. And Dildora is the one who can make maximum use out of anything.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Instead of selling only a crop, they process it. Instead of throwing away by-products, they look for another use for them. &nbsp;The snacks go to wholesale market in Andijan, milled peanuts are bought by local ice-cream producers and bakeries, and animal feed is prepared based on orders (but in the rural community where they live, there is always demand).&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The enterprise has demonstrated a capacity to produce 1,000 packages of peanuts per month, and has created several jobs, alongside additional income opportunities for farmers and lower-income rural households.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There are still things Dildora wants to improve. These days she is working on a new collaboration that would allow her to potentially expand the area for planting and experimenting.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Almost 30&nbsp;</strong><br>&nbsp;<br>Back at home, the scientist who is also an entrepreneur thinking about new products is also&nbsp;a mother about to turn 30, thinking about the next academic degree.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But as strong as she is, it helps not to do it alone. Aid for Trade’s mentorship programmes support women like Dildora who are starting out in business, drawing on the knowledge and experience of others. In 2024 and 2025, the programmes connected 33 experienced women entrepreneurs with 74 newcomers and provided technical and practical support to 15 women-led start-ups as they developed their businesses.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Andijan, women entrepreneurs like Dildora are shaping the region’s economic future. As their businesses grow, new jobs expand the opportunities for other women in different roles, and their knowledge and experience pave the path for emerging entrepreneurs through community and mentorship networks. Women-led businesses with upgraded productive capacities and business skills are demonstrating that women in rural communities can gain financial independence and even promote circular economy solutions.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Around Dildora, the family makes room for all of it – caring for the children, tending to the home, learning the equipment and building ErElDi together.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And somewhere nearby is that brown notebook. There is still space for a lot of new work.&nbsp;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&nbsp;&#8212;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>UNDP recently completed its regional “Aid for Trade in Central Asia” initiative, funded by the Government of Finland. For over a decade, the initiative worked across Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to advance more diversified, inclusive and future-fit economies, adaptive to the green and digital shifts reshaping global markets and trade. It enhanced the capabilities of businesses and institutions for developing job-rich, sustainable value chains and strengthened enterprise productivity and competitiveness.&nbsp;</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em> The project contributed towards SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals).&nbsp;</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph">By Shakhnoza Zafari, Head of Comms at UNDP Uzbekistan.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-dildora-nurmatova-peanuts-circular-economy/">Nothing to Waste: Dildora’s Science of Peanuts</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>Far from home, behind the wheel: A Kyrgyz truck driver on Europe’s roads</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyz-truck-driver-europe-migrant-work/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyz-truck-driver-europe-migrant-work/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anvar Whitlock]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:49:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kyrgyzstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[labour migration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[migrant workers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Migration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[road transport]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[truck drivers]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=49686</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyz-truck-driver-europe-migrant-work/">Far from home, behind the wheel: A Kyrgyz truck driver on Europe’s roads</a></p>
<p>A truck driver from Kyrgyzstan describes life on Europe’s roads, from recruitment costs and salary deductions to sleeping in his cab, supporting his family and saving for a future back home.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyz-truck-driver-europe-migrant-work/">Far from home, behind the wheel: A Kyrgyz truck driver on Europe’s roads</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyz-truck-driver-europe-migrant-work/">Far from home, behind the wheel: A Kyrgyz truck driver on Europe’s roads</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em><em><em><em>For three years, a truck driver from Kyrgyzstan has been working across the European Union, sleeping, cooking and living inside his vehicle for months at a time. His story reveals both the opportunities and the precarious realities faced by Central Asian drivers working far from home.</em></em></em></em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex is sitting on the bed inside the cabin of his truck, his head almost touching the ceiling.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“I can’t stand,” he says as he films the cramped space around him.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the bed beside him, he chops a cucumber next to a box of garlic. Between his legs, a gas stove supports a kazan filled with pearl barley, meat, potatoes and garlic. The truck is not only his workplace. For much of the year, it is also his kitchen, bedroom and living room.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In another video, Alex opens the small refrigerator squeezed into the cabin. It is packed with salted fish fillets and what he estimates to be between 10 and 15 kilograms of meat. Above it sits a basket of dry goods: rice, pearl barley, salt and soy sauce. When the weather is good, he cooks outside in the truck park. When it is not, everything happens inside.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="768" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/truck_cooking_under_1MB-1024x768.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49755" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/truck_cooking_under_1MB-1024x768.jpg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/truck_cooking_under_1MB-300x225.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/truck_cooking_under_1MB-768x576.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/09/truck_cooking_under_1MB.jpg 1448w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Alex prepares a meal inside the cab of his truck, where he also sleeps and spends much of his time while working across Europe. Photo courtesy of Alex.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex, a pseudonym, is in his early forties and comes from Kyrgyzstan’s Talas region. For the past three years, he has worked as a long-distance truck driver in the European Union. The wages are considerably higher than those available to him at home, but getting to Europe was difficult, and life on the road has proved far more precarious than the promise of European employment might suggest. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Losing money before reaching Europe</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex’s path into European trucking began with failure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On his first attempt to find work abroad, he says he lost between 60,000 and 70,000 Kyrgyz som to a <em>posrednik</em>, or middleman, in Slovakia. He obtained the contact through an acquaintance. According to Alex, the intermediary promised to arrange a work visa, contracts and other documents.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“The money was burned,” he recalls.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He tried again and lost money a second time, though less than on the first occasion. It was only on his third attempt that he found a viable route. Rather than relying on another intermediary, Alex contacted a Lithuanian logistics company directly through WhatsApp. According to him, the company prepared a contract, invitation letter and the other documents he needed. Within two or three months, the process was complete, and his principal expenses were administrative fees and flights. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The experience left him deeply suspicious of intermediaries. Although some of his criticism is based on what he has heard from other drivers rather than his own experience, he believes agencies can withhold information or charge workers for poorly explained services.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">His experience reflects concerns documented more widely among migrant truck drivers. Research on the European road transport sector has described cases in which drivers paid high recruitment fees, faced unexpected charges after arrival or were misled about working conditions. Other research on Central Asian migration to Europe has similarly identified weaknesses in recruitment systems, including inadequate contract verification and limited pre-departure information. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A truck that doubles as a home</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Once Alex started working in Europe, the realities of the job became clearer.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He has worked for companies based in Lithuania and Czechia, driving across large parts of the European Union. Alex says he initially started on around €85 per day, but once he moved into vehicle transport &#8211; the work he now specialises in &#8211; his pay rose to around €100-€120 per day, sometimes reaching €130.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">His current Czech employer, he says, allows him to work for considerably longer periods and with fewer expenses than his previous Lithuanian company. By comparison, the Lithuanian employer operated what Alex describes as a “cadence” system, with drivers moved in and out of different routes and countries by minibus.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“They split drivers up across Europe, over to Germany, France, Italy and Belgium,” he says. One driver would arrive with his belongings and continue the work while another returned home in the same minibus. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The financial attraction of Europe is obvious to him.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“In Kyrgyzstan a driver’s salary is roughly $800 per journey,” Alex says, but a single trip can mean collecting cargo in China and returning to Kyrgyzstan, or driving from Kyrgyzstan through Kazakhstan and onwards to Russia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On those routes, “nothing is provided”, he says. Repairs, tyre changes and other costs may have to be handled by the driver. Border queues can also consume days. Drivers may wait two or three days, or sometimes as long as a week, he says, while spending part of their earnings on food and other expenses along the way.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By contrast, he considers trucking in the EU better paid and, in some respects, easier. But that income comes with a lifestyle dominated by the vehicle itself. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Even buying groceries can become an expedition. In one video recorded in Germany, Alex walks back from Lidl carrying a full shopping bag. On that occasion, the supermarket was only 2.5 kilometres from where he had parked. At other stops, he says, drivers may have to walk five or even ten kilometres to reach a large shop.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Truck parking determines much of daily life. Drivers cannot simply take their vehicles into many city streets, while roadside facilities do not always provide the food or services they need. Finding somewhere to stop is itself a recurring problem. Alex has filmed parking areas where trucks double-park, occupy exits or line the roadside because designated spaces are full.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“The number one problem is always parking,” he says, especially in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Czechia. Spain and France are somewhat easier, though he says parking around Lyon and Paris can also be difficult.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Basic facilities vary considerably. Alex carries his own water and has recorded truck stops without showers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“The most important thing,” he says, “is that it has a toilet.” </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Sleeping where you work</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex says he rarely stays in a hotel or hostel while on the road. Most nights, he sleeps in the bed built into the truck cabin.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That can mean spending entire days and nights inside the same few square metres. The truck becomes somewhere to eat, sleep, exercise, store food and wait between assignments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At night, security is another concern. Alex loops the seatbelts through the interior door handles in an attempt to make it harder for thieves to force open the cabin while he sleeps. He says he has not personally experienced a break-in, but learned the technique from other drivers and from stories circulating among them. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">EU rules prohibit drivers from taking their regular weekly rest period of at least 45 hours inside their vehicles. Suitable accommodation outside the truck should instead be provided, with the cost covered by the employer.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex is familiar with the rule.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“For 45 hours the driver must rest and the company must provide him with a proper room so that he can go in there and sleep and rest,” he says.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But according to him, that often does not happen.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“No one arranges hotel accommodation. The driver is the one who has to sort it out,” he says, adding that in his experience only a minority of companies consistently comply. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At his former Lithuanian employer, Alex recalls drivers being housed between assignments in three large dormitories. He personally saw two of them, one with five floors and another that appeared to have four. Drivers could spend periods there waiting to be assigned another route.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">His current Czech employer, he says, gives him more freedom to decide when and for how long to take a break.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">When the driver carries the risk</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pay is another source of uncertainty.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex says his experience has varied considerably between employers. At his first company in Lithuania, drivers waiting to be deployed were supposed to receive the Lithuanian minimum wage, he says, but he claims this did not happen. Instead, while he and several other drivers waited between assignments, the company charged them €15 per night for accommodation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex also alleges that one former manager at the Lithuanian company accepted payments from drivers in return for preferential treatment. According to him, drivers could pay to receive trucks with more spacious, higher-roof cabins or to move more quickly into an assignment, while others remained in the dormitories waiting for work.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When he returned to work, Alex says further sums were deducted from his salary without a clear explanation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The reasons were difficult for him to understand. His contract was in Lithuanian, a language he does not speak. When he was eventually given a Russian-language contract, he remembers employers telling workers to sign quickly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“Come on, sign here quickly, quickly, quickly. No need to read it, just sign it quickly,” he recalls.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“We were glad they were taking us on, so we just agreed.” </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Damage to cargo can also become a financial burden.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex recalls transporting BMW cars for his Lithuanian employer and being charged €1,000 after some of the vehicles were found to have scratches.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">His current Czech employer, he says, operates differently. The company covers the first incident of damage. On a second occasion, the cost may be divided between employer and driver, while after a third incident the driver can be expected to cover the full amount.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to Alex, this arrangement was explained to him verbally rather than set out in his contract.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He considers such systems unfair because drivers may not always be able to see damage while loading vehicles. Snow, rain, poor lighting or darkness can make scratches difficult to identify, he says. At unloading, by contrast, inspectors may examine vehicles under bright lights or with mirrors and lamps.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“The driver does not have such capabilities,” Alex says.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Even theft can become the driver’s problem. He recalls a friend whose fuel was stolen and who, according to Alex, had to give up around half of one month’s salary to cover the loss. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A wider dispute over working conditions</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex says his own relationships with employers have generally remained manageable. Other migrant truck drivers in Europe have experienced much more direct confrontations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2023, dozens of drivers, many of them from Uzbekistan and Georgia, staged protests at the Gräfenhausen motorway service area in Germany in a dispute with their Polish employer. They accused the company of withholding wages and criticised working conditions, including long periods spent living inside trucks. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Gräfenhausen protests attracted wider attention because they brought grievances normally scattered across motorways, parking areas and logistics depots into public view.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex’s own experience is not identical to that of the striking drivers. But some of the pressures he describes &#8211; long periods inside a truck, deductions he struggles to understand, and dependence on employers far from home &#8211; echo concerns raised elsewhere in the road transport sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The <a href="https://www.rtdd.org/" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.rtdd.org/">Road Transport Due Diligence Foundation</a> has documented broader patterns in which third-country drivers may be formally employed in one EU member state while spending much of their working time elsewhere, alongside delayed wages and deductions that workers struggle to understand. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Europe through a windscreen</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex’s life in Europe is not defined entirely by work.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">During rest stops, he tries to exercise. He bought a skipping rope and trains in truck parking areas. When time allows, he walks around wherever he happens to be parked.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">His journeys have also brought unexpected encounters: ships in Belgium, local markets, unfamiliar towns and landscapes, and animals he had never seen before.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On one occasion in Antwerp, Alex and some colleagues visited the zoo.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“That’s where, for the first time, I saw a flamingo,” he says. He also remembers seeing elephants and giraffes. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One thing he particularly appreciates about Europe is the greenery.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“There are even bridges that simply connect the wildlife on the right side of the motorway with that on the left-hand side,” he says, referring to wildlife crossings. “Not for cars, not for anything else, not for trains, but specifically for animals, so that the animals can cross back and forth.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He also values being able to travel around the Schengen area during his time off without needing separate tourist visas. He has visited Paris and the Louvre, Madrid, Antwerp, Prague and Luxembourg. Rome remains on his list.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Another difference he notices is policing. In his experience, traffic police in Europe behave differently from those he remembers at home.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“They aren’t like we have back home, always waving their batons and handing out fines,” he says. “That sort of thing doesn’t happen here.” </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Other aspects of life are less convenient. Alex says truck stops often offer little beyond fast food, and he sometimes struggles to find halal options along his routes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">More broadly, he feels that migrant drivers are treated as more interchangeable than local workers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“For their own drivers they treat them differently and provide them with better vehicles,” he says of some employers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In his view, migrant drivers are easier to replace.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“If an Indian won’t do the work, then a Russian will come to do it. If not a Russian then a Ukrainian. If not a Ukrainian then a Filipino. If not Filipino then an Uzbek, Tajik or Kazakh.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is his interpretation of a labour market in which drivers from different countries are constantly moving through the same companies, routes and parking areas. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Earning in Europe, imagining a future in Kyrgyzstan</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But these glimpses of Europe are incidental.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex did not come for tourism, and he does not describe trucking as a long-term dream.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“If I could have the job I do back home, I would do it,” he says.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The reason he stays is money.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Flights to Kyrgyzstan are expensive, and Alex has relatives to support. Until recently, he says, he had spent almost two years in Europe without returning home because leaving work and paying for the journey made little financial sense.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He has two daughters. He speaks to them regularly and sends money, clothes and other things home.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/society/remittances-central-asia-migration-russia/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/society/remittances-central-asia-migration-russia/">Money, boxes and absent men: the hidden economy reshaping Central Asia</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“Going home is not profitable,” he says. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For now, the truck is a means to something else.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alex is saving. His ambition is to buy one or two apartments in Kyrgyzstan and eventually establish a farm with sheep, sweetcorn and potatoes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Talas, he estimates that suitable land costs around €10,000 per hectare. A decent farm, he says, would require at least five to ten hectares, alongside additional investment in buildings, equipment and livestock. By his own estimate, establishing the kind of farm he imagines could ultimately require around €200,000.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“My children are growing up,” he says. “Until my pension I will work, I think. In the future I will receive a European pension.” </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The cramped cabin, the long walks to supermarkets and the nights spent sleeping behind the steering wheel are, in his mind, temporary sacrifices.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Europe is where he earns the money.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kyrgyzstan is where he imagines his future.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph">By Anvar Whitlock, Contributor for Novastan.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyz-truck-driver-europe-migrant-work/">Far from home, behind the wheel: A Kyrgyz truck driver on Europe’s roads</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>South Korea’s Central Asia strategy is regional in form, bilateral in practice</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/south-korea-central-asia-strategy-summit/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/south-korea-central-asia-strategy-summit/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:14:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kazakhstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kyrgyzstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics and Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tajikistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkmenistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uzbekistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Korea-Central Asia Summit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Korea]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=49719</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/south-korea-central-asia-strategy-summit/">South Korea’s Central Asia strategy is regional in form, bilateral in practice</a></p>
<p>South Korea has elevated ties with Central Asia to summit level. But experts tell Novastan that the real test lies in investment, local value creation and cross-border cooperation - not diplomatic declarations.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/south-korea-central-asia-strategy-summit/">South Korea’s Central Asia strategy is regional in form, bilateral in practice</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/south-korea-central-asia-strategy-summit/">South Korea’s Central Asia strategy is regional in form, bilateral in practice</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em><em><em><em><em><em>Seoul has elevated its relationship with Central Asia to summit level and placed critical minerals, supply chains and industrial cooperation at the centre of the agenda. But four experts interviewed by Novastan argue that the real test will be whether South Korea can turn regional diplomacy into investment, local value creation and practical cross-border cooperation across five very different states</em></em></em></em></em></em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When the <a href="https://www.president.go.kr/briefings/8RvaLYMn" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.president.go.kr/briefings/8RvaLYMn">leaders of South Korea and the five Central Asian states</a> met in Seoul on 16 September, the symbolism was difficult to miss. A relationship that had operated through the Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum since 2007 was elevated to heads-of-state level for the first time, while the Seoul Declaration set out a broader framework for cooperation in industry, infrastructure, technology, climate and people-to-people ties. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The economic agenda was equally prominent. South Korea and the Central Asian states <a href="https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_29514/view.do?seq=141" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_29514/view.do?seq=141">established</a> a C5+1 meeting of industry ministers, agreed to deepen cooperation on critical minerals and supply chains, and dkiscussed local processing, manufacturing, infrastructure and digital transformation. A parallel business summit produced 19 memoranda of understanding. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But the diplomatic upgrade does not necessarily mean that South Korea suddenly has a coherent regional strategy for Central Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The five states differ markedly in economic structure, resources, labour markets and their existing relations with Seoul. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have by far the deepest Korean industrial and political ties, while Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan occupy very different places in the relationship.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The more important question is therefore not whether South Korea has become more interested in Central Asia. It plainly has. It is whether a regional diplomatic framework can add something meaningful to relationships that will remain, in practice, highly differentiated.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Four specialists interviewed by Novastan suggest that it can &#8211; but only if Seoul avoids treating Central Asia as either a single economic bloc or simply a new source of strategic raw materials.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A new emphasis, not a new relationship</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">South Korea’s growing focus on supply-chain resilience can easily be presented as a dramatic shift. Yet Matteo Fumagalli, Director of the Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus Studies at the University of St Andrews, sees considerably more continuity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“There is indeed an additional emphasis on supply chain resilience,” he told Novastan, but this is being added to “pre-existing priorities” rather than replacing them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The change reflects a series of shocks that have forced governments to think differently about economic vulnerability: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, worsening trade tensions and instability in the relationship between the United States and China.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alexandre Haym, an analyst of South Korean foreign policy, similarly places the current push in a longer trajectory. Seoul’s recent initiatives build on earlier efforts, including the New Northern Policy and the K-Silk Road strategy. In this reading, economic security has accelerated South Korea’s engagement with Central Asia rather than fundamentally reinventing it. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Critical minerals nevertheless give the relationship a new sense of urgency.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Central Asia possesses uranium, rare metals and other resources attractive to a Korean economy heavily dependent on imported inputs. Yet Fumagalli cautions against assuming that Seoul intends to replace its existing suppliers with Central Asian ones.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“I don’t think that Seoul’s objective is for Central Asia to become a key source of imports,” he said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The key word is <strong>diversification</strong>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">South Korea is looking for additional suppliers and additional options, not necessarily a new dominant source of raw materials. And the distance between identifying a mineral deposit and incorporating it into a Korean industrial supply chain remains considerable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Central Asian governments have only recently begun updating geological data that in some cases dated back to the Soviet period, Fumagalli notes. Exploration may identify promising reserves, but commercial development still requires finance, infrastructure, processing capacity, reliable energy and water, and customers willing to buy the resulting products.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That distinction matters because summit diplomacy can make a deposit strategically interesting without making it economically viable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">“Investment. Investment. Investment”</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">From the Central Asian perspective, the priorities are not identical to Seoul’s.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Asked what the region most wants from South Korea, Fumagalli’s answer was emphatic:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“Investment. Investment. Investment.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Central Asian governments, diversification is not simply about selling minerals to an additional foreign buyer. It is also about attracting capital, technology, training and industrial activity that remains in the region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Aidar Kurmashev, Head of the Department of Asian Studies at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, argues that the success of a minerals partnership should therefore be assessed by the productive capabilities it creates.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“Resource exports can generate revenue,” he told Novastan. “The more demanding task is to use that activity to develop processing, engineering services and suppliers that can remain competitive over time.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Technology transfer, in this sense, cannot simply mean importing Korean machinery. It requires local engineers able to operate and improve production processes, laboratories capable of maintaining quality standards, trained maintenance teams and domestic suppliers able to meet industrial specifications.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The objective need not be to manufacture the most sophisticated finished product domestically. In some cases, a refined metal, industrial component or intermediate material may represent a more realistic step up the value chain.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What matters is whether Korean investment leaves behind skills and commercially viable production.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That is also where the interests of Seoul and Central Asian governments can diverge.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">South Korea wants resilient access to strategic inputs. Central Asian states increasingly want to avoid remaining exporters of unprocessed resources.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Professor Jieon Lee, Head of the Department of Central Asian Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, argues that an engagement driven too narrowly by Korean supply-chain concerns could undermine one of Seoul’s principal advantages in the region: the relatively positive image it has accumulated through education, culture, technology and long-term cooperation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A relationship perceived as extractive would put that goodwill at risk. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">One region, five different relationships</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The difficulty for Seoul is that there is no single Central Asian economic model to which it can apply a uniform Korean strategy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the obvious anchors. Both have substantial populations, established industrial links with Korean companies, important mineral resources and large Koryo-saram communities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Their relationship with Seoul is therefore qualitatively different from that of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan or Turkmenistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fumagalli notes that South Korea itself needs different things from different Central Asian states. Labour migration, for example, matters more in its relationships with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan than with Turkmenistan. Training programmes or cultural cooperation may have greater relevance elsewhere.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lee argues that the answer is not to force uniformity, but to combine differentiated bilateral relationships with cooperation on what she calls <strong>“regional public goods.”</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These could include water management, climate cooperation, human-capital development, digital governance and different stages of the critical-minerals value chain.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan may remain Seoul’s main industrial partners. Cooperation with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan might place greater emphasis on education, hydropower, labour mobility or development cooperation, while Turkmenistan presents a different set of opportunities in energy and logistics.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A regional strategy, in other words, does not require each country to receive the same Korean factory, investment package or sectoral priority.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Its value lies elsewhere.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Where regionalism can actually help</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kurmashev offers perhaps the clearest test of whether the new summit format matters.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“The summit can give political authority to work that already has an institutional base,” he said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Simply creating another opportunity for leaders to meet would “change very little.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The regional format becomes useful when it tackles problems that cannot be solved through a bilateral investment agreement alone.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Korean company could build a factory in Kazakhstan, buy inputs from Uzbekistan and sell its products across several Central Asian markets. Yet even an excellent bilateral relationship cannot by itself resolve incompatible certification rules, unpredictable border procedures or transport arrangements involving several jurisdictions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A delay at a border can undermine an investment whose financing and construction proceeded smoothly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Kurmashev, the summit’s significance will become clearer when it is possible to “trace a political decision to an observable change across a border.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This also provides a more realistic way for the smaller Central Asian economies to participate in Korean-led production networks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Regional cooperation need not mean reproducing an entire industrial chain in every country. A specialised supplier in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan could benefit from a larger network centred on production elsewhere if borders, certification and logistics allow it to participate.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is less spectacular than announcing another billion-dollar investment package.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But it may ultimately matter more.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Middle Corridor is not the whole answer</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Transport is another area where political rhetoric can obscure commercial reality.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Middle Corridor across the Caspian Sea and South Caucasus has gained enormous geopolitical visibility as governments search for routes that reduce dependence on Russia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For South Korea, however, geography creates an additional complication.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Because North Korea blocks direct overland access from South Korea to the Eurasian continent, Korean cargo must first travel by sea before entering a continental route.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“The Middle Corridor is important to many countries,” Fumagalli said. But for Korea, simply getting goods onto the Eurasian landmass adds both time and cost. Seoul is therefore examining multiple possibilities rather than betting everything on a single route.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kurmashev likewise cautions against treating connectivity as one uniform corridor problem.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Korean goods entering Kazakhstan may arrive through China. A Korean-invested Kazakh factory selling to Europe may have a much stronger interest in the Trans-Caspian route. The same factory selling to Uzbekistan primarily needs predictable transport within Central Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“The Middle Corridor is important, but its relevance depends on the origin and destination of the cargo,” he said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The underlying issue is therefore less glamorous: customs procedures, compatible digital systems, certification, transport reliability and clear responsibility when shipments are delayed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Those are precisely the areas in which a regional political framework can potentially complement bilateral investment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Korea’s soft advantage &#8211; and its limits</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">South Korea does have one advantage that is harder to measure than investment flows.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is generally perceived differently from Russia, China or the major Western powers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fumagalli describes Seoul as retaining a relatively “non-threatening” profile in Central Asia, reinforced by the extraordinary reach of Korean popular culture.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Historical ties through Koryo-saram communities, Korean universities, consumer technology, development programmes and K-pop all contribute to a familiarity that conventional economic statistics do not capture.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/koryo-saram-koreans-central-asia/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/koryo-saram-koreans-central-asia/">How Central Asia became home for the Koryo-Saram</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kurmashev nevertheless warns against turning that favourable image into an assumption of automatic trust.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Korea has no history of ruling Central Asian territory and shares no border with the region, but governments, companies and local communities may still perceive individual projects differently. A positive national image does not settle concerns about employment, water use, working conditions or the terms of a particular investment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lee points to another increasingly important dimension: the experience of Central Asians in South Korea itself.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Students, migrant workers and other Central Asian residents encounter questions of labour rights, integration, discrimination and visa insecurity. Those experiences also shape perceptions of Korea.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Economic diplomacy therefore does not take place separately from human relationships.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A country may enjoy strong cultural appeal while simultaneously damaging its reputation through the everyday experience of the people who study and work there.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The test comes after the summit</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The first Korea-Central Asia summit has already succeeded in one respect: it has institutionalised a relationship that Seoul increasingly regards as strategically important.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_29514/view.do?seq=141" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_29514/view.do?seq=141">The Republic of Korea government</a> itself emphasised that cooperation should move beyond individual infrastructure projects toward local processing, manufacturing, industrial capacity and “mutually beneficial value chains.” </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The harder question is whether that language produces projects.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fumagalli would watch whether announced investments &#8211; particularly in areas such as renewable energy &#8211; actually move forward.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kurmashev proposes an even more concrete measure: financing secured, factories operating, transport becoming more reliable, and local companies acquiring capabilities they can use beyond a single Korean partnership.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Lee, the regional framework will also have to prove that it can address shared problems without pretending that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are interchangeable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And Haym’s emphasis on continuity provides an important corrective to the language of diplomatic breakthroughs. South Korea has been building relationships in Central Asia for decades. The summit did not create them. It gave them a new institutional form.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That may be precisely why the most realistic Korean strategy will remain <strong>regional in form and bilateral in practice</strong>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are likely to continue attracting the deepest economic engagement. The other Central Asian states will participate through different sectors, at different scales and for different reasons.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That is not necessarily a failure of regionalism.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The real test is whether the new framework can make those unequal relationships work better together &#8211; allowing investment to cross borders, local companies to enter production networks, skills and technology to remain in the region, and Central Asian governments to gain meaningful new economic choices.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If it does, South Korea may carve out a distinctive role in one of the world’s increasingly crowded arenas of economic diplomacy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If it does not, Seoul will have succeeded in creating another summit &#8211; without fundamentally changing what lies beneath it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph">By Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief of Novastan English.</p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/south-korea-central-asia-strategy-summit/">South Korea’s Central Asia strategy is regional in form, bilateral in practice</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>From Development Partner to Strategic Supplier: What Seoul&#8217;s First Central Asia Summit Really Signals?</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/south-korea-central-asia-summit-critical-minerals/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kodirjon Eshonkulov]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 11:08:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kazakhstan]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/south-korea-central-asia-summit-critical-minerals/">From Development Partner to Strategic Supplier: What Seoul&#8217;s First Central Asia Summit Really Signals?</a></p>
<p>On 16 September, Seoul hosted the first-ever Korea–Central Asia Summit, bringing President Lee Jae-myung together with the heads of state of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan &#8211; a dialogue that has run at ministerial level since 2007, now elevated to heads of state and producing a joint &#8220;Seoul Declaration&#8221; on supply-chain cooperation (Seoul Shinmun, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/south-korea-central-asia-summit-critical-minerals/">From Development Partner to Strategic Supplier: What Seoul&#8217;s First Central Asia Summit Really Signals?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/south-korea-central-asia-summit-critical-minerals/">From Development Partner to Strategic Supplier: What Seoul&#8217;s First Central Asia Summit Really Signals?</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em><em><em>On 16 September, Seoul hosted the first-ever Korea–Central Asia Summit, bringing President Lee Jae-myung together with the heads of state of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan &#8211; a dialogue that has run at ministerial level since 2007, now elevated to heads of state and producing a joint &#8220;Seoul Declaration&#8221; on supply-chain cooperation (<a href="https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/politics/2026/09/11/20260911500156">Seoul Shinmun, 李대통령 16일 첫 중앙아시아 정상회의</a>). Most coverage has treated this as a diplomatic first, full stop &#8211; a historic photograph, five new bilateral memoranda, a summit that &#8220;elevates&#8221; a relationship, nothing more. The more interesting story is why it took this particular shape now, in September 2026 rather than at any point over the preceding three decades, and what that shape reveals about a quiet shift in how Seoul thinks about the region.</em></em></em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">From aid recipient to resource partner</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For most of the three decades since 1992, Seoul&#8217;s relationship with Central Asia has combined development assistance with a real, if modest, industrial footprint &#8211; Daewoo&#8217;s car assembly plant in Uzbekistan since the 1990s and Samsung&#8217;s household-appliance manufacturing among the longest-running examples of Korean direct investment in the region (<a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/09/14/k-silk-road-boosts-seouls-central-asia-presence/">Modern Diplomacy, &#8220;K-Silk Road Boosts Seoul&#8217;s Central Asia Presence&#8221;</a>). But that investment sat for decades within a relationship organized primarily around cooperation and technical assistance rather than resource dependence. That balance is now shifting. The Presidential Office frames this summit&#8217;s central purpose as combining Central Asia&#8217;s critical-mineral reserves with Korean processing technology &#8211; supply-chain language layered on top of the older development framing, not replacing it outright (<a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10870886">Korea Herald</a>). The anxiety behind this is concrete: by 2025, South Korea&#8217;s mineral-import dependence had reached roughly 99.7 percent, with more than four-fifths sourced from China (<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/18793665261442863">Kim et al., &#8220;Central Asia as New Battle Grounds&#8221;</a>).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The build-out has been rapid and institutional, not rhetorical. Just three days before the summit, Korea&#8217;s industry ministry convened the first-ever &#8220;C5+1&#8221; meeting of industry ministers with all five Central Asian states, agreeing to build supply chains spanning mining, refining, high-value materials processing and finished-goods manufacturing, alongside a parallel track on industrial parks, smart-factory cooperation and manufacturing AI (<a href="https://www.newspim.com/news/view/20260914000730">Newspim, 한-중앙아 산업장관회의</a>). On the ground, Korea&#8217;s own state geological survey (KIGAM) has agreed with Uzbekistan to carry out joint exploration of nickel and cobalt deposits at Sultanuvays, with the explicit logic &#8211; laid out by Korean officials themselves &#8211; that public-sector exploration is needed to de-risk projects private mining firms won&#8217;t touch without proven reserves; if the deposits prove commercially viable, the plan is to move toward a joint venture and eventually refining and production, with Korean firms invited in at that stage (<a href="https://biz.heraldcorp.com/article/10872431">Herald Business, &#8220;중앙아시아에서 여는 핵심광물 협력의 새 길&#8221;</a>). In his own bilateral meeting with Uzbek President Mirziyoyev ahead of the summit, President Lee explicitly proposed pairing Korean processing technology with the Asian Development Bank&#8217;s financing capacity to stabilize Central Asian mineral supply chains (<a href="https://www.segye.com/newsView/20260914516301">Segye Ilbo</a>) &#8211; a formulation that captures Seoul&#8217;s emerging model exactly: Korea supplies expertise, others supply capital and territory.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">The connectivity problem</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">None of this works if the minerals cannot reach Korean plants, and here the summit&#8217;s ambition runs ahead of infrastructure &#8211; though it is worth being precise about which infrastructure. Neither Korea nor Central Asia shares a border with the other, so cargo has, in principle, several ways to travel: north through Russia, west across the Caspian toward Turkey and the Black Sea (the &#8220;Middle Corridor&#8221;), or east and south through China to a Pacific port. Public Korean commentary on the K-Silk Road initiative has invoked the Middle Corridor as a rhetorical alternative to routes dependent on China&#8217;s Belt and Road infrastructure (<a href="https://bisi.org.uk/reports/koreas-new-k-silk-road-initiative-in-central-asia">BISI, &#8220;Korea&#8217;s new &#8216;K-Silk Road&#8217; Initiative in Central Asia&#8221;</a>), but there is little public evidence that Seoul has committed to the Trans-Caspian route specifically as the backbone of its minerals strategy. If anything, the available evidence points the other way: a peer-reviewed routing study comparing options for Korea–Central Asia cargo found that a China-transit corridor &#8211; Incheon to Qingdao to Horgos to Almaty &#8211; outperformed alternatives on cost, the single factor logistics firms weighted most heavily (<a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/marpmg/v45y2018i1p3-18.html">Wang and Yeo, &#8220;Selecting a Cargo Transport Route to Central Asia&#8221;</a>). The same BISI analysis is candid on this point: China&#8217;s Belt and Road infrastructure is likely to remain the dominant channel for regional development projects regardless of what Korea builds, precisely because it already exists at scale.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Korean government-commissioned study of logistics barriers in Central Asia, based on interviews with Korean freight-forwarding firms already operating in the region, found customs procedures and inadequate transport infrastructure &#8211; not any single missing corridor &#8211; to be the two most severe obstacles, ranked above financing or licensing constraints (<a href="https://www.nkis.re.kr/subject_view1.do?otpId=KMI00050147&amp;otpSeq=0&amp;popup=P">National Knowledge Information System, 중앙아시아 물류장벽 연구</a>). Read against that finding, the more accurate framing is not that Seoul&#8217;s mineral strategy hinges on completing a specific Trans-Caspian route, but that it depends on a broader and messier connectivity problem &#8211; customs harmonization, storage capacity, transport reliability &#8211; that touches every route out of the region, Chinese-transit ones included.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Seoul&#8217;s response has been to avoid the corridor-building role entirely regardless of which route eventually dominates. Rather than financing rail or port capacity itself, Korea is positioning as a technology and processing partner layered onto infrastructure others pay for &#8211; hence President Lee&#8217;s pitch to route Korean expertise through Asian Development Bank financing rather than bilateral Korean capital in his meeting with President Mirziyoyev (<a href="https://www.segye.com/newsView/20260914516301">Segye Ilbo</a>).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Why now</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two pressures help explain the timing, though they are best read as a plausible interpretation rather than an explicitly stated Korean rationale. The first is status, and here Seoul has been unusually candid in its own words. President Lee has framed the summit explicitly as part of a wider diplomatic diversification, telling his own senior secretaries that &#8220;the global order is rapidly becoming multipolar&#8221; and that &#8220;this is exactly the moment to join hands with more countries and expand our diplomatic reach into more diverse regions&#8221; (<a href="https://daily.hankooki.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=1405336">Daily Hankook, 유럽서 첨단산업·중앙아서 핵심광물</a>) &#8211; a framing his own spokesperson echoed by describing Korea as having &#8220;joined the resource-diplomacy race&#8221; already under way among the major powers (<a href="https://view.asiae.co.kr/article/2026091410371801440">Asia Economy, 강대국 &#8216;러브콜&#8217;에 몸값 뛴 중앙亞</a>). That timing follows a French state visit built around advanced-industry cooperation, suggesting a deliberate, sequenced diplomatic expansion rather than a Central Asia-specific reaction. It sits, too, against a crowded backdrop: roughly ten &#8220;C5+1&#8221;-style formats now link Central Asia to outside powers, Japan&#8217;s dating back two decades and Washington&#8217;s marking its tenth anniversary last November with over $100 billion in announced deals (<a href="https://cirsd.org/horizon-article/the-c51-on-the-central-asian-geopolitical-chessboard/">CIRSD</a>; <a href="https://www.state.gov/c51">U.S. State Department</a>). For a country that has cultivated middle-power status as deliberate policy, being among the last major economies without a leaders&#8217;-level format with the region plausibly carried a cost measured in standing, even if no Korean official has said so in those terms.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Central Asia is not a passive audience</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The five governments arriving in Seoul are practiced at extracting better terms from competing suitors without committing to any one of them. Kazakhstan runs parallel Caspian and Chinese overland links simultaneously rather than choosing between them (<a href="https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-south-korea-relations-next-steps/">Times of Central Asia</a>). Uzbekistan&#8217;s own framing of cooperation with Korea explicitly stresses local refining capacity and technology transfer over raw extraction (<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/18793665261442863">Kim et al.</a>) &#8211; a hedge against what regional analysts call a &#8220;green resource curse,&#8221; and a pointed contrast with Chinese capital, which regional governments increasingly criticize for financing without technology transfer. Uzbekistan&#8217;s insistence, in the KIGAM nickel-cobalt talks, on holding open the option of a joint venture rather than a straightforward extraction concession is one small but telling instance of that same instinct at work &#8211; Tashkent structuring the deal so that value stays onshore if the deposit proves out. With Washington, Tokyo, Brussels and now Seoul all running comparable outreach in the same eighteen-month window, the five republics can accept summits and memoranda from all of them while committing exclusively to none, and each new suitor arriving in the region only strengthens that leverage rather than diminishing it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">An open bet, not a settled shift</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The institutional architecture &#8211; the ministerial-to-presidential upgrade, the new C5+1 industry channel, joint KIGAM exploration on the ground &#8211; is real and represents coordination that didn&#8217;t exist two years ago. But the connectivity infrastructure needed to make a minerals strategy commercially viable does not yet exist in reliable form on any route, and Korea&#8217;s own logistics-sector research says as much: firms already moving freight through the region, not diplomats drafting communiqués, are the ones flagging customs and infrastructure as the binding constraint, regardless of whether that freight ultimately crosses the Caspian or transits China. What the summit signals, then, is a bet rather than a breakthrough: that being an early, technically credible partner is valuable now, even before the logistics catch up, and that Gulf, European and multilateral capital will eventually close the connectivity gap into which Korean firms can plug their offtake deals. Whether that bet pays off depends less on what is signed in Seoul this week than on whether the region&#8217;s transport and customs bottlenecks, on whichever route ends up mattering most, get resolved soon enough to matter.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph">By Kodirjon Eshonkulov. </p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph">Kodirjon Eshonkulov is an independent researcher specializing in Central Asian geopolitics, transboundary infrastructure, and relations with the European Union. He is a graduate of the Graduate School of International Studies at Ajou University in South Korea. Since 2017, he has worked as a correspondent and television journalist covering social and political reforms in Uzbekistan.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/south-korea-central-asia-summit-critical-minerals/">From Development Partner to Strategic Supplier: What Seoul&#8217;s First Central Asia Summit Really Signals?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>“Follow the invoices”: Marius Dragomir on how money shapes independent journalism</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/independent-media-sustainability-central-asia/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:28:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/independent-media-sustainability-central-asia/">“Follow the invoices”: Marius Dragomir on how money shapes independent journalism</a></p>
<p>Independent journalism cannot survive on good journalism alone. Marius Dragomir, director of the Media and Journalism Research Center, speaks to Novastan English Editor-in-Chief Mathieu Lemoine about media capture, donor dependence, the transition from volunteer initiatives to professional newsrooms, the particular economics of Central Asian and exiled media, and the growing threat AI poses to specialist [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/independent-media-sustainability-central-asia/">“Follow the invoices”: Marius Dragomir on how money shapes independent journalism</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/independent-media-sustainability-central-asia/">“Follow the invoices”: Marius Dragomir on how money shapes independent journalism</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Independent journalism cannot survive on good journalism alone. <strong>Marius Dragomir, director of the Media and Journalism Research Center,</strong> speaks to Novastan English Editor-in-Chief Mathieu Lemoine about media capture, donor dependence, the transition from volunteer initiatives to professional newsrooms, the particular economics of Central Asian and exiled media, and the growing threat AI poses to specialist publications.</em></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Why good journalism does not guarantee financial survival</strong></h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Novastan: To begin, could you introduce yourself and the Media and Journalism Research Center to our readers? What questions have guided your work on media ownership, funding, policy and editorial independence?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Marius Dragomir, director of the <a href="https://journalismresearch.org/" data-type="link" data-id="https://journalismresearch.org/">Media and Journalism Research Center</a></em>: I am a journalist by training who ended up spending most of his career studying the economics and politics of journalism rather than practising it. I spent over a decade at the Open Society Foundations, where I ran the research and policy portfolio of the Program on Independent Journalism and edited comparative projects such as <em><a href="https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/television-across-europe-regulation-policy-and-independence" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/television-across-europe-regulation-policy-and-independence">Television Across Europe</a></em> and <em><a href="https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/mapping-digital-media-global-findings" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/mapping-digital-media-global-findings">Mapping Digital Media</a></em>, which covered 56 countries. I then directed the Center for Media, Data and Society at Central European University until it closed in 2022, and I founded the Media and Journalism Research Center that same year to continue that body of work.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">MJRC is an independent research centre funded through a mix of research grants, philanthropic contributions and commercial revenue. All profits are reinvested in research, and we accept no government money of any kind. That last point is not a slogan, but a methodological necessity. It is difficult to publish credible research on how governments capture media while taking money from governments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Our main projects follow the links between ownership, influence, money and journalism. The <a href="https://statemediamonitor.com/" data-type="link" data-id="https://statemediamonitor.com/">State Media Monitor</a>, for example, maps the funding, governance and editorial autonomy of state and public media worldwide: in the 2025 edition, 606 outlets across 170 countries. The Media Influence Matrix examines, country by country, who actually shapes journalism: government and regulators, funders, and technology companies. The <a href="https://globalmediaownership.com/global-media-finances-map/" data-type="link" data-id="https://globalmediaownership.com/global-media-finances-map/">Global Media Finances Map</a> tracks the financial performance of some 24,000 media companies in around 60 countries. We also run a <a href="https://journalismresearch.org/media-capture-monitoring-report/" data-type="link" data-id="https://journalismresearch.org/media-capture-monitoring-report/">Media Capture Monitoring Report </a>with IPI in Vienna.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The question that has guided all of it is deceptively simple: <em>who pays for journalism, through which channel, and what does that money buy?</em> Ownership registries and press-freedom rankings tell you part of the story. But influence over journalism is usually exercised through the accounting department, not the newsroom: through an advertising contract, a licence renewal, a printing bill, a tax audit, a grant condition. If you want to understand editorial independence, it is important to follow the invoices.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Independent media are often evaluated primarily through the quality and public value of their journalism. Why does strong editorial work so often fail to produce financial sustainability?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Because quality and revenue are produced by two different organisational capacities, and most independent outlets have only invested in one of them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Journalism was never really sold to audiences at cost. For most of the twentieth century, readers paid a fraction of the price of producing news, and advertisers covered the rest, in most cases not because they valued journalism, but because they had no cheaper way to reach an audience. Once they found one, that subsidy left, and it left permanently.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What remains is a market in which attention, not quality, is the priced commodity. Nothing in that market rewards the six months of work behind an investigation more than it rewards a piece of aggregation produced in 20 minutes. In captured markets, the distortion is even blunter: the biggest buyer of advertising is often the state, and it is not buying attention at all, but compliance.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">We also have to remember that independent newsrooms are usually founded by journalists, for good reasons. But journalistic culture treats commercial work as slightly disreputable, something to be done reluctantly and by whoever has least to do. An outlet can win awards for a decade while nobody ever owns the revenue line.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Excellent journalism does not fail to produce sustainability. It simply does not produce it <em>by itself</em>: it has to be converted into money by someone whose job that is, and that conversion is a professional skill, not a moral consequence of doing good work.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What are the main structural weaknesses of the traditional media business model today? Are these problems fundamentally different for small, nonprofit or specialist publications than for large national media organisations?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The traditional model rested on three pillars that have all been removed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, bundling: a newspaper sold sport, classifieds, weather, obituaries and investigative reporting in one package, and the profitable parts paid for the unprofitable ones. Digital distribution unbundled all of it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, control of distribution: a printing press and a licence were expensive, which created a barrier to entry and a local monopoly. That barrier is gone.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, direct access to the audience: publishers now reach most readers through intermediaries &#8211; search engines, social platforms, and increasingly AI assistants &#8211; that own the relationship, set the terms, and can change them overnight.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For small, nonprofit and specialist publications, the diagnosis differs in important ways. Their weakness is not the collapse of a legacy model they never had; it is a structural overhead problem. There is a floor of institutional cost &#8211; legal compliance, accounting, fundraising, editorial management, security, technology &#8211; that does not shrink in proportion to the size of the newsroom. A five-person outlet carries almost the same administrative burden as a 50-person one and has one-tenth of the capacity to absorb it. That is why so many small outlets are structurally condemned to under-invest in the very functions that would make them sustainable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Their advantages are real but narrow. They have low fixed costs, no legacy print infrastructure, no unionised back office and, very importantly, a defined and identifiable audience, which is the precondition for any direct revenue model. A specialist publication covering Central Asia knows exactly who its readers are and why they need it, in a way a general national daily no longer does.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Large national organisations face the opposite problem: they have the resources to build revenue capacity but are far more exposed to capture. They are big enough to be worth buying, worth pressuring and worth subsidising. <a href="https://journalismresearch.org/2025/05/new-report-reveals-political-influence-skewing-financial-outcomes-in-hungarian-media/" data-type="link" data-id="https://journalismresearch.org/2025/05/new-report-reveals-political-influence-skewing-financial-outcomes-in-hungarian-media/">Our financial analysis of Hungarian media companies, published in 2025, showed measurably how proximity to political power reshapes the financial outcomes of media firms</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Small outlets are rarely captured through acquisition: they are captured through starvation, or simply outlawed.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Can readers and donors sustain independent media?</strong></h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Your research has emphasised the importance of building a direct relationship between media outlets and their audiences. Under what conditions can memberships, subscriptions and reader donations provide a meaningful source of income? Why do these models succeed for some publications but fail for others?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Four conditions, in my experience, and the model tends to fail when any one of them is missing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One is a clearly bounded community. People do not pay for information, which is abundant. They pay for belonging, identity, or a service they cannot obtain elsewhere. Outlets serving a defined community &#8211; a profession, a diaspora, a region, a cause &#8211; convert far better than general-interest outlets, regardless of quality.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second is a market where paying is normal, safe and technically possible. This is the condition most often overlooked from Western Europe. In much of the world, small recurring online payments are unusual, card penetration is low, and, decisively, a domestic payment to an independent outlet leaves a traceable record. In an environment where an outlet may be declared extremist, asking readers to subscribe is asking them to accept a risk, not a price.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, an actual product. Membership is not a donation button. It is a set of obligations the outlet takes on: newsletters, events, access, data, community, a reason to renew. Many outlets adopt the vocabulary of membership without building the product, then conclude the model does not work.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And finally, someone who owns it. The single strongest predictor is whether anybody is professionally responsible for the revenue relationship. For example, for-profit European digital natives derive their main revenue from advertising, website subscriptions and grants, in that order, while nonprofits rely on grants, individual donations and membership. Legal form shapes the achievable revenue mix more than most founders expect at the moment they register the organisation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Where these models fail, it is usually for one of three reasons: the audience is large but poor or dispersed; the outlet asks for money without changing anything it offers in return; or it starts asking too late, after grant income has already collapsed, when there is no time left to build the habit.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Audience revenue is a slow asset. It has to be built while you still have other money.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Many independent outlets rely heavily on grants and international donors. What are the principal benefits and risks of this model? Can donor dependence influence editorial priorities even when funders never directly interfere with content?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The benefit is straightforward and should not be minimised: donor money funds journalism that no market will pay for. Investigative reporting on corruption in an authoritarian state has, from a commercial standpoint, a negative expected return. Without philanthropy, most of the independent journalism produced in many countries in the Global South over the past 20 years would not exist.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The risks became brutally visible in 2025. When the US government suspended most foreign assistance, roughly $150 million in annual support for journalism and the wider information ecosystem disappeared almost overnight. The consequences: closures, mass layoffs, abandoned investigations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The cut also taught another lesson: many organisations believed they had diversified, holding grants from several different agencies and implementing partners, only to discover that every one of those grants traced back to the same ultimate source, and all were cancelled simultaneously.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the second half of your question: yes, donor dependence shapes editorial priorities even when no funder ever comments on content, and this is the more insidious mechanism precisely because nobody is doing anything wrong.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Influence operates through anticipation. Editors learn which themes attract funding &#8211; this year climate, next year disinformation, then AI, then gender &#8211; and reporting drifts toward the fundable. Story selection begins to be justified internally by whether it fits a logframe. Impact is reported in metrics donors recognise, which are rarely the metrics that matter to the audience. Over several cycles, an outlet can end up producing journalism that is accountable primarily to institutions abroad rather than to readers at home.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And there is a political cost that is now unavoidable in an increasing number of countries. Foreign funding has been converted into a legal weapon in countries that have adopted legislation on foreign-funded organisations. That makes the very funding that keeps an outlet alive a pretext to delegitimise it as a foreign instrument.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What do international donors and media-development organisations most frequently misunderstand about the needs of independent media? How do funding criteria, project cycles and reporting requirements shape the organisational behaviour and editorial priorities of the outlets they support?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Five things, in descending order of damage.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">They fund projects when organisations need institutions. Donors buy outputs: an investigation series, a training programme, a podcast. What outlets need is the capacity to exist: a business manager, a lawyer, an accountant, a security budget, a functioning CMS. These are usually classified as overhead and capped at some arbitrary percentage. The result is systemic under-investment in exactly the functions that would end donor dependence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Secondly, project cycles do not match institutional time. Building an audience-revenue base takes three to five years. Grants run twelve to eighteen months. An outlet is therefore asked to become sustainable on a timetable that makes sustainability structurally impossible, and instead spends its senior editorial time writing applications. In small newsrooms, fundraising and reporting compete for the same person, usually the editor-in-chief, who is also the best reporter.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Thirdly, reporting requirements consume the capacity they are meant to safeguard. A five-person outlet managing four grants with different reporting formats, currencies, audit standards and impact frameworks is running a compliance department disguised as a newsroom. Donors underestimate this because each individually imposes a reasonable burden; nobody counts the aggregate.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fourth, impact is measured in the wrong units. Reach and output are easy to count and largely meaningless. What a captured environment requires is different: did a procurement decision change, did a public debate shift, did an official resign, did the audience trust you enough to send documents? Those outcomes are slow, irregular and unsuited to quarterly reporting.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And finally, exits are unmanaged. Funders enter loudly and leave quietly. There is rarely a wind-down plan, a transition fund or an endowment mechanism. If 2025 taught the sector anything, it is that responsible donors should be building reserve and endowment structures &#8211; including pooled, multi-donor vehicles insulated from any single government&#8217;s foreign policy &#8211; rather than annual grant cycles that transfer all volatility onto the weakest party in the chain.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">From volunteer initiative to professional newsroom</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Some media organisations begin as volunteer initiatives but later seek to establish professional structures and remunerate editors, journalists and contributors. What determines whether that transition succeeds? What mistakes should volunteer-founded publications avoid?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This transition kills more promising publications than censorship does, and the causes are almost always internal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What determines success, in the cases I have observed, is that the organisation formalises its governance <em>before</em> significant money arrives, not after. It decides who decides &#8211; who can hire, who can spend, who appoints the editor &#8211; while the stakes are still low enough that the conversation is not personal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It defines roles rather than distributing tasks. Volunteer organisations run on generalists; professional ones need someone who owns revenue, someone who owns editorial, someone who owns operations, and these should not be the same person.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And it accepts that the founding culture must end. A volunteer collective runs on consensus, goodwill and unlimited discussion. That is not a management system, and it does not survive payroll.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The mistakes to avoid are consistent. One is paying everyone a little. Spreading a small budget across 15 contributors produces 15 people who are underpaid and still treat the outlet as a side project. Two properly paid full-time roles change an organisation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Another is not paying the founders. Founder self-sacrifice looks noble and creates a hidden subsidy that masks the real cost base, and an organisation that cannot survive the day its founder burns out.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Another is choosing the legal form by accident. The structure you register determines which revenue you can access: whether you can take tax-deductible donations, sell advertising, receive foundation grants. Many outlets discover this three years too late.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And finally, professionalising editorial while leaving management voluntary is a major error. The business side is the side that most needs a paid professional, and it is invariably the last to get one.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Diversification is frequently presented as the solution to media sustainability. In practice, how many sources of revenue can a small organisation realistically manage without diverting excessive time and energy away from journalism?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is no given formula. But from experience, I can say that between two and six revenue sources appears optimal, and that more sources do not correlate with greater success. Outlets with fewer than two sources are likely to fall in the bottom third of revenue earners in their markets. So there is a floor and there is a ceiling.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The reason there is a ceiling is that every revenue stream has a fixed management cost that has nothing to do with how much it earns. Advertising needs a salesperson and an ad server. Membership needs a payment system, a CRM, retention work and a product. Events need logistics and risk. Grants need proposals and audits. Consultancy and training pull your best journalists out of the newsroom.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Each one is a small business, and a five-person organisation cannot operate six small businesses without ceasing to be a newsroom.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The practical rule I would offer: no revenue line without an owner. If nobody&#8217;s name is against it, it is not a revenue stream; it is an aspiration that consumes attention. Three streams that someone actively manages will out-earn seven that everyone manages occasionally.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I would add one refinement about diversification that the 2025 funding shock made obvious: what matters is not the number of sources but their <em>correlation</em>. Four grants from four organisations ultimately funded by the same government are a single point of failure. One grant, one advertising base, one membership programme and one licensing deal is genuinely diversified, because no single political or economic event removes all four at once.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">How money becomes a tool of media capture</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Media capture is often associated with censorship or direct political control. How does capture operate more subtly through ownership, government advertising, subsidies, commercial dependency, regulatory decisions or access to distribution?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Capture is what happens when direct censorship becomes unnecessary. I defined it in a paper in 2019 as a situation in which most or all news media operate as part of a government-business cartel that controls the flow of information in order to protect its unrestricted access to public resources. The key point is that capture is an economic arrangement, not an editorial one.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It works through four levers: media regulation, state-owned outlets, government financing, and private ownership. Within financing, governments use four recognisable tactics: direct funding, state advertising, subsidies, and deliberate market disruption. What unifies them is that none requires anyone to tell a journalist what to write.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">State advertising is the cleanest instrument. It is legal, discretionary, unaudited and enormous relative to these markets. When the state is the largest buyer of advertising, media outlets are not operating in a market; they are competing for patronage. No instruction is needed, because every editor can calculate.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/leaving-the-island-japarovs-campaign-to-silence-independent-media/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/leaving-the-island-japarovs-campaign-to-silence-independent-media/">Leaving the island: Japarov’s campaign to silence independent media</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Then there are the less visible mechanisms. One is informal payments: payments to outlets from politicians and officials &#8211; prime ministers, mayors, MPs, sitting and former presidents. This money never appears in any accounts, which is precisely the point.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Another is opacity: companies are not obliged to disclose revenues, so basic market data simply do not exist. Where nobody can see the finances, capture cannot be proven.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Regulation and administrative friction also contribute to building capture: accreditation rules, registration requirements for online publications, licensing, tax inspections, &#8220;false information&#8221; statutes. Ownership transfer, when companies close to the government buy media outlets, is the most efficient method of all.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And, of course, distribution and infrastructure: printing, kiosks, cable carriage, app stores, domain blocking all matter in how content is controlled. Control of the pipe is control of the publication.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/pressure-from-russia-increases-on-central-asian-media-outlets/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/pressure-from-russia-increases-on-central-asian-media-outlets/">Pressure from Russia increases on Central Asian media outlets</a></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Can private or philanthropic ownership protect editorial independence, or does dependence on wealthy individuals and foundations simply create different forms of vulnerability? What governance safeguards are most effective in protecting editorial decision-making?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It can, but it substitutes one dependency for another, and the honest answer is that ownership form matters far less than governance design.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Private ownership by a wealthy owner, for example, can truly insulate a newsroom from state pressure: a patron with independent wealth can absorb losses and ignore the withdrawal of state advertising. But it creates a different exposure: to that individual&#8217;s business interests, political ambitions, mortality and change of mind. Central and Eastern Europe offers an abundant record of proprietors who bought outlets as instruments rather than businesses. Our State Media Matrix includes a whole category, captured private media, precisely because privately owned outlets can be as editorially captured as state ones.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Philanthropic ownership avoids the profit motive but not the dependency. A foundation-owned outlet is subject to strategic shifts, board politics and the thematic fashions of the philanthropic sector. It is more stable and more transparent than an oligarch, but it is not a guarantee.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What actually protects editorial decision-making is a set of structural safeguards, and I would rank them roughly in this order.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, structural separation of funding from appointment: whoever provides the money must not control who is appointed editor. This is the single most important rule.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, appointment rules: fixed, non-renewable terms, supermajority or qualified appointment procedures, and a formal role for the newsroom in the selection or veto of the editor-in-chief.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, a capital structure that outlasts the donor: endowments, trusts and foundation-ownership models remove annual renewal as an instrument of pressure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fourth, radical transparency of funding: publishing every source above a threshold as a form of protection.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And finally, self-imposed concentration limits. An internal rule that no single source may exceed, say, 40% of revenue is worth more than any editorial charter.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The sustainability challenge for Central Asian media</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Your Media Influence Matrix studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan examined how state financing, ownership, political influence, informal payments and foreign donor support shape journalism. Looking back at those findings, how do you think the two media systems have evolved since 2019, and which developments most urgently merit renewed research today?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I have to be honest here because we have not conducted updated fieldwork in Central Asia since those studies, and I would not want to offer an assessment of how the two systems have evolved based on third-party sources. Our method depends on locally sourced financial and regulatory data collected by researchers in the country, and without that I would be speculating.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What I can restate is the baseline we established in 2019, because it defines what would have to be re-measured.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The two countries presented distinct configurations. <a href="https://journalismresearch.org/2019/06/media-influence-matrix-kazakhstan-funding-journalism/" data-type="link" data-id="https://journalismresearch.org/2019/06/media-influence-matrix-kazakhstan-funding-journalism/">Kazakhstan</a> was a system of financial dominance: an overwhelming state presence in media funding combined with no obligation on companies to disclose their finances, and marginal donor money.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/context/in-central-asia-the-freedom-of-press-is-in-decline/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/context/in-central-asia-the-freedom-of-press-is-in-decline/">In Central Asia, the Freedom of Press is in Decline</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://journalismresearch.org/2019/10/media-influence-matrix-kyrgyzstan-funding-journalism/" data-type="link" data-id="https://journalismresearch.org/2019/10/media-influence-matrix-kyrgyzstan-funding-journalism/">Kyrgyzstan</a> was a system of informal dependence: a weak advertising market, media instrumentalised by politicians and businessmen who treated outlets as tools rather than businesses, and widespread undisclosed payments from officials, but alongside a rather plural space, a significant donor presence, and a handful of outlets that funded themselves from grants and advertising and could therefore set their own editorial line.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On what most urgently merits renewed research, I would name four things.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, the actual flow of state media financing since 2019: amounts, recipients and the conditions attached. This is the single most consequential and least documented lever in both countries, and it is precisely the kind of figure that cannot be estimated from outside.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, the economics of exile: what it costs to run a Kyrgyz or Kazakh newsroom from abroad, how it is financed, and whether any of it is sustainable beyond the current funding cycle.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">R<strong>ead more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/when-freedom-of-speech-is-a-joke-author-of-a-satirical-news-outlet-detained-in-kazakhstan/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/when-freedom-of-speech-is-a-joke-author-of-a-satirical-news-outlet-detained-in-kazakhstan/">When Freedom of Speech Is a Joke: Author of a Satirical News Outlet Detained in Kazakhstan</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, the migration of journalism to YouTube and Telegram, where a substantial part of independent reporting now appears. We know very little about who funds these projects, what they earn, or how exposed they are to platform decisions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fourth, the effect of the 2025 collapse in US media assistance, which I suspect hit this region harder than the global headline figures suggest, and which will have reshaped the funding structure we described in 2019 more thoroughly than any legal change.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Independent Central Asian media often operate across borders or from exile, while attempting to reach audiences exposed to state-controlled information and increasingly restrictive legislation. Does this require a different sustainability model from that used by independent media in Western Europe?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yes, fundamentally, and the standard Western sustainability playbook is close to useless for them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The reason is a structural mismatch: for an exiled outlet, the audience and the revenue base are in different countries. A German or French independent outlet builds a virtuous circle: it serves a local audience, that audience pays, local advertisers want to reach it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An exiled Central Asian or Azeri or Iranian outlet has an audience it cannot legally monetise, in a jurisdiction where its brand may be criminalised, reached through channels that can be blocked, while its costs are incurred in euros in a European capital. Every link in the Western circle is broken.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/closure-of-radio-azattyk-sparks-discontent-from-civil-society-and-international-human-rights-activists/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/closure-of-radio-azattyk-sparks-discontent-from-civil-society-and-international-human-rights-activists/">Closure of Radio Azattyk sparks discontent from civil society and international human rights activists</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Their cost structure is also different in kind, not degree: legal defence, digital security, physical security, relocation and visas for staff and their families, trauma support, redundant infrastructure, translation, and the permanent overhead of operating under two legal systems. These are not luxuries, yet they are rarely funded.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And there is a distinctive risk absent in Western Europe: asking the audience for money can endanger the audience. A domestic bank transfer to an outlet designated extremist is evidence, making reader revenue &#8211; the model everyone recommends &#8211; not merely difficult but ethically fraught.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So what does work? In practice, based on my experience, a different portfolio is needed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, revenue raised outside the audience&#8217;s jurisdiction: diaspora communities in Europe, North America and other relevant countries who can pay safely and often have strong motivation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Then, institutional and B2B income needs to be considered: syndication, content licensing to international outlets, translation, research and consultancy for organisations that need country expertise they cannot generate themselves.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Increasingly, we have found that shared services are becoming important for such media. The most realistic efficiency for small exile media is not individual growth but pooled infrastructure: shared legal counsel, shared security, shared accounting, shared fiscal hosting in an EU jurisdiction, joint fundraising vehicles, and so on. Myanmar&#8217;s exiled outlets moved towards exactly this kind of cooperation after 2025.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">AI poses a new threat to independent journalism</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Artificial intelligence and automated information systems are increasingly determining which sources people encounter and how information is summarised. What risks does this create for smaller independent publications, particularly those covering countries or regions that receive limited international attention? Could their reporting become essential to AI systems while bringing them little traffic, recognition or revenue?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Your question contains a sharp formulation of the problem, and the answer is: yes, exactly that. Their reporting can become essential to AI systems while returning almost nothing in traffic, recognition or revenue. This is the defining economic asymmetry of the coming period, and small outlets covering under-reported regions are its most exposed victims.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There are various aspects of that. Let me refer to a few that I consider important.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One is what I call referral collapse: the distribution model that publishers built for 20 years assumed intermediaries would send readers onward. Answer engines are designed not to. When a summary satisfies the query, the visit never happens. For a small outlet whose advertising, membership conversion and reputational visibility all depend on that visit, the loss is not just a decline in traffic; it is the removal of the mechanism by which reporting converts into anything at all.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Another aspect is extraction asymmetry, concentrated on the specialists. Precisely because you are the only detailed English-language source on, say, Kyrgyz media legislation or Tajik labour migration, your reporting is disproportionately load-bearing in any system generating answers about the region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Large publishers can negotiate licensing deals; a specialist outlet with four staff has no leverage, no legal capacity and no realistic path to individual negotiation. Thus, we expect a situation where the most essential sources have the least bargaining power. That is an inversion of how markets are supposed to work.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And finally, relevant to your question is the language problem, which worries me most. Models are trained on what exists in a language. For some languages &#8211; and here I would guess most of the Central Asian ones &#8211; the available corpus is dominated by state and state-aligned media, simply because they publish more. Independent reporting is a rounding error by volume.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So the statistical baseline for what is &#8220;normally said&#8221; about these countries is likely to be drawn overwhelmingly from captured sources, and it is then reproduced fluently, in the user&#8217;s own language, with no visible provenance and none of the contextual cues that would once have signalled a state outlet.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Media capture can thus be laundered into apparently neutral infrastructure. This is a new distribution channel for propaganda that requires no propagandist.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">MJRC has begun mapping this terrain: our study on how AI is changing media and journalism in Central Europe, <em><a href="https://journalismresearch.org/2024/11/control-beyond-code-new-mjrc-report-maps-ownership-and-finances-of-ai-companies-used-by-media-and-journalists/">Control Beyond Code</a></em>, which examines the ownership and financial structures behind the AI systems newsrooms are adopting, and the AI Information Map, which maps the sources of information the largest LLMs use to give answers in various languages.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What can small publishers actually do? Three things, none sufficient alone.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Build channels that do not pass through an intermediary &#8211; newsletters, events, direct communities, Telegram &#8211; because owned relationships are the only assets not subject to unilateral repricing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Negotiate collectively. Licensing is only viable for small publishers through consortia, and this is where regional and thematic associations should be putting their effort.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And push for provenance and attribution requirements in regulation, because if summarisation is going to become the default interface for information, the minimum acceptable standard is that the source is visible, attributed and linkable.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What does sustainable independent media look like?</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Looking ahead, what would a genuinely healthy and sustainable independent-media organisation look like? Which combination of revenue, governance, audience engagement and institutional support offers the best prospect of editorial independence over the long term?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is very difficult to answer, as there is no ideal model and local context and factors matter immensely. But generally, I would describe it in five dimensions, and I would insist that no one of them substitutes for another.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Revenue first: between two and six streams, with no single source above roughly 40% and no two major sources sharing an ultimate political principal. At least one stream should come directly from the audience, however small, because it is the only income that is also a measure of whether anyone needs you. And at least one person must be professionally responsible for revenue.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Then, governance. A structural firewall between whoever funds the organisation and whoever appoints its editor. Fixed terms, transparent appointment procedures, a formal newsroom role in editorial leadership decisions, and published funding down to a low threshold.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Then, audience. A defined community rather than a general public, and a relationship the outlet owns rather than rents from a platform. In a period when intermediaries are actively removing referral traffic, direct audience relationships have shifted from a marketing asset to a survival asset.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Institutional support next. This is the part that cannot be solved by any individual newsroom, and where policy has to do the work: multi-year unrestricted core funding rather than project grants; pooled and endowed funding vehicles insulated from any single government&#8217;s foreign policy; favourable tax treatment for nonprofit journalism; shared back-office and legal infrastructure; and enforceable transparency in state advertising allocation, which remains the most powerful and least regulated instrument of capture worldwide.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Finally, reserves and realism about scale. Six to twelve months of unrestricted reserves, and an accurate sense of the size the organisation can sustainably be. A great many outlets have destroyed themselves by growing into a grant.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>A healthy independent outlet is one that could survive losing its largest funder, its largest platform and its most prominent journalist &#8211; not comfortably, but survivably.</strong></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Interview by Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan English.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/independent-media-sustainability-central-asia/">“Follow the invoices”: Marius Dragomir on how money shapes independent journalism</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway: Who wins from Central Asia&#8217;s new trade route?</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-central-asia-trade-route/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-central-asia-trade-route/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kodirjon Eshonkulov]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 09:55:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kyrgyzstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uyghur Region]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uzbekistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CKU Railway]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Logistics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle Corridor]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=49245</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-central-asia-trade-route/">China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway: Who wins from Central Asia&#8217;s new trade route?</a></p>
<p>For more than two decades, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway existed mainly on planning maps and in diplomatic communiqués. First discussed in the late 1990s, the project was repeatedly delayed by disagreements over financing, track gauge and route. That changed when construction was formally launched in Kyrgyzstan&#8217;s Jalal-Abad region in December 2024. A year later, a [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-central-asia-trade-route/">China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway: Who wins from Central Asia&#8217;s new trade route?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-central-asia-trade-route/">China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway: Who wins from Central Asia&#8217;s new trade route?</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>For more than two decades, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway existed mainly on planning maps and in diplomatic communiqués. First discussed in the late 1990s, the project was repeatedly delayed by disagreements over financing, track gauge and route.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>That changed when construction was formally launched in Kyrgyzstan&#8217;s Jalal-Abad region in <a href="https://timesca.com/financing-agreement-for-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-project-signed-in-bishkek/">December 2024</a>. A year later, a syndicate of Chinese banks signed a <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/en/2025/12/18/financing/">loan agreement</a> securing the project&#8217;s main external financing.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For the first time, the railway is taking physical shape rather than remaining a proposal. But its long-term significance will depend on more than steel, concrete and tunnels. The three governments will also have to manage debt, land disputes and environmental risks, while determining where the railway fits within an increasingly complex network of Eurasian trade corridors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The planned route runs for approximately <a href="https://timesca.com/kyrgyzstan-approves-chinese-loan-for-cku-railway/">523 kilometres</a>. It begins in Kashgar in China&#8217;s Xinjiang region, crosses into Kyrgyzstan through the Torugart Pass, continues through Arpa and Makmal to Jalal-Abad, and then reaches Andijan in Uzbekistan, where it connects with the existing Uzbek and wider Central Asian rail network.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="720" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/08/960px-Torugart_Pass.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49249" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/08/960px-Torugart_Pass.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/08/960px-Torugart_Pass-300x225.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/08/960px-Torugart_Pass-768x576.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><em>The Torugart Pass on the Kyrgyzstan-China border, through which the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is planned to run. Photo: Paul</em>/<em> Wikimedia Commons</em>, CC BY-SA 2.0.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China&#8217;s railway network uses the 1,435 mm standard gauge, while the existing networks of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan use the Soviet-derived 1,520 mm gauge. Under the CKU design, the standard-gauge line will extend from China into Kyrgyzstan as far as Makmal. There, a transshipment hub will transfer cargo to trains running on the broader 1,520 mm gauge for the western section of the route.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Kyrgyz section carries most of the project&#8217;s engineering difficulty. Roughly <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/03/the-politics-of-the-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway/">90 percent</a> of the route through Kyrgyzstan passes through mountainous terrain. It will include <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/en/2025/12/18/financing/">29 tunnels and 50 bridges</a> with a combined length of around 120 kilometres &#8211; roughly 40 percent of the 304-kilometre Kyrgyz section.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A $4.7 billion bet</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The total cost of the railway is estimated at around <a href="https://jamestown.org/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-financing-loan-signed/">$4.7 billion</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the financing agreement signed in Bishkek in December 2025, approximately half of that amount &#8211; around $2.3 billion &#8211; is being provided through a 35-year loan from a consortium of Chinese banks led by the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. The loan is to be repaid by the joint venture established to build and operate the railway.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The remainder is being provided as equity. The joint venture, registered under Kyrgyz law, is <a href="https://caspianpost.com/kyrgyzstan/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-secures-4-7b-financing">51 percent Chinese-owned, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5 percent</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kyrgyzstan&#8217;s equity contribution amounts to approximately <a href="https://timesca.com/kyrgyzstan-approves-chinese-loan-for-cku-railway/">$609 million</a>. Around half is to come from the state budget, while the other half is being financed through a $304.5 million preferential loan from China&#8217;s Export-Import Bank. The loan has a 25-year maturity, a five-year grace period and an annual interest rate of 1.5 percent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Authorities hope to open the line by 2030, although the scale of the engineering works and the mountainous terrain leave significant room for delays.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Kyrgyzstan: transit opportunity, financial exposure</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Kyrgyzstan, the railway offers something the country has long lacked: a direct rail connection with China and the possibility of turning its geography from a constraint into an economic asset.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">President Sadyr Japarov has said that the completed railway will transform Kyrgyzstan <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/03/the-politics-of-the-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway/">&#8220;into a transit power&#8221;</a>. The government expects transit revenues, new jobs and a stronger role for the country in regional trade.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Around <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/07/progress-on-the-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-some-challenges-remain/">5,000 people</a> are currently employed on the Kyrgyz section, including some 2,000 Kyrgyz citizens. Supporting infrastructure, including substations and transmission lines, is also being built.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But the opportunity comes with financial exposure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kyrgyzstan already owed China&#8217;s Export-Import Bank around <a href="https://timesca.com/kyrgyzstan-approves-chinese-loan-for-cku-railway/">$1.5 billion</a> in early 2026, making China the country&#8217;s largest single external creditor. The new railway adds further liabilities, even if the borrowing terms are relatively favourable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This has prompted debate over whether the project could deepen Kyrgyzstan&#8217;s dependence on Chinese financing. The more useful question, however, is not whether the railway fits the contested label of a Chinese &#8220;debt trap&#8221;, but whether the revenues it generates will ultimately justify Kyrgyzstan&#8217;s additional exposure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The loans have long maturities, low interest rates and grace periods intended to keep repayments manageable. Yet future debt servicing will depend in part on transit and logistics revenues that remain projections rather than receipts.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is also a separate question over how much of the economic value generated by the railway will remain inside Kyrgyzstan. If warehousing, customs services, freight consolidation and other higher-value logistics activities are concentrated elsewhere, Kyrgyzstan could gain transit revenue while capturing a smaller share of the wider commercial benefits.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="555" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/08/Snimok.jpeg" alt="" class="wp-image-49251" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/08/Snimok.jpeg 1024w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/08/Snimok-300x163.jpeg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/08/Snimok-768x416.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Photo: Podrobno.uz.</figcaption></figure>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Uzbekistan: the logistics-hub strategy</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan enters the project from a different position.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andijan is already connected to the country&#8217;s national rail network, meaning Uzbekistan does not face the immense engineering challenge of building a new railway across the Tien Shan. Instead, the CKU line would extend Uzbekistan&#8217;s transport network eastward and give the country a more direct rail connection with China.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That fits a broader Uzbek strategy of turning the country into a logistics hub connecting East Asia, Central Asia and routes leading west and south.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Domestic infrastructure has already strengthened this position. The Pop-Angren railway links the Fergana Valley directly with the rest of Uzbekistan without requiring trains to cross neighbouring territory. Tashkent is simultaneously promoting other international routes, including the proposed Trans-Afghan corridor towards Pakistan and transport links across the Caspian towards the South Caucasus, Türkiye and Europe.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Uzbekistan, the CKU railway is therefore not a stand-alone project. Its value lies in how it can connect with a wider network of existing and proposed corridors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If those connections prove commercially viable, Uzbekistan could strengthen its position as one of the principal junctions between China and markets to the west and south.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Land, compensation and environmental costs</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The railway&#8217;s benefits are national and regional, but many of its immediate costs are local.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the intergovernmental arrangements, Kyrgyzstan is responsible for a range of obligations on its territory, including social and environmental impact assessments, protection of cultural heritage, land acquisition, demolition and resettlement.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the Kyrgyz government, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/07/progress-on-the-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-some-challenges-remain/">214 homes are to be demolished</a> to make way for the railway &#8211; 191 of them in Suzak district in Jalal-Abad region and the remainder in Naryn.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The government says that most affected owners have accepted compensation and that only a small number continue to dispute the amounts offered. However, <a href="https://open.kg/en/news/local-news/104181-dva-vladelca-ne-soglasny-s-razmerom-kompensacii-za-snos-domov-radi-zheleznoj-dorogi.html">some residents have publicly challenged the compensation process</a>, while the use of compulsory acquisition has generated <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyz-authorities-face-public-pushback-over-railway-construction">public resistance in affected communities</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Authorities have hired an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/07/progress-on-the-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-some-challenges-remain/">independent company to assess the value of affected properties</a>, but questions about transparency, participation and compensation remain sensitive as construction advances.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Environmental concerns are also becoming more visible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kyrgyz regulators have already <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2026/07/progress-on-the-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-some-challenges-remain/">fined contractors for environmental violations</a>. Specialists have warned that large-scale tunnelling, blasting and earthworks in mountainous terrain can affect watercourses, habitats and local ecosystems.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kyrgyz economist <a href="https://dialogue.earth/en/business/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-remains-uncertain/">Kubat Rahimov has noted</a> that mountain railway construction can require rivers to be redirected and concrete supports to be placed in watercourses, with potential consequences for surrounding flora and fauna.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chinese and Kyrgyz officials have stressed environmental requirements in contractor selection and construction. But the scale of the engineering works means environmental management will remain an important test throughout the project.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A new route &#8211; but not a replacement for Kazakhstan</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The strategic importance of the CKU railway comes less from the line itself than from the networks it can connect.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Once operational, it will create another overland rail route between China and Central Asia that bypasses Kazakhstan. From Uzbekistan, freight could continue west through existing networks towards Turkmenistan and the Caspian Sea, or connect with other routes feeding into the broader Trans-Caspian system towards Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkiye and Europe.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Longer-term plans also envisage stronger connections south towards Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But CKU should not be understood as a replacement for the established China-Kazakhstan rail corridors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The new line will cross difficult mountainous terrain and will operate largely as a single-track railway. Kazakh analyst <a href="https://jamestown.org/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-emerges-as-competitor-to-kazakhstans-rail-network/">Marat Shibutov has argued</a> that these physical constraints will limit the number and length of trains that can use the route.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The difference in scale is considerable. Rail freight between China and Kazakhstan exceeded <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2025/01/kazakh-china-rail-cargo-transportation-reaches-record-32-million-tons-in-2024/">32 million tonnes in 2024</a>, while the CKU railway&#8217;s eventual annual capacity is commonly estimated at around <a href="https://caspianpolicy.org/research/middle-corridor/a-new-link-in-global-trade-the-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-and-its-role-in-the-middle-corridor">15 million tonnes</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Its importance therefore lies less in displacing Kazakhstan than in adding another option to the Eurasian transport network.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For China, this means greater route diversification. For Central Asian states, it creates additional bargaining power and greater resilience if disruption affects one of the region&#8217;s existing corridors.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Who captures the gains?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The strategic gains are easiest to identify at state level.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China acquires another westbound route that reduces its reliance on Kazakhstan and gives Xinjiang an additional connection to Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan gains a direct railway link with China and the possibility of substantial transit revenues. Uzbekistan advances its ambition to become a major logistics junction linking China with Central Asian, Trans-Caspian and southern transport corridors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Construction companies, banks and logistics operators are also among the project&#8217;s most immediate economic beneficiaries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Whether those gains will spread more widely is harder to predict.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Construction jobs are temporary. Families along the route are already dealing with displacement and compensation. And Kyrgyzstan will benefit most if it can develop logistics, warehousing, customs and other services around the railway rather than serving primarily as territory through which trains pass.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The same question applies regionally. The CKU railway could redistribute trade flows and create new economic opportunities, but the value generated by the corridor will depend on border procedures, customs governance, freight costs and connections with other transport networks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">None of this diminishes the railway&#8217;s historic significance. After decades of delay, the project is finally moving from diplomatic ambition to physical infrastructure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But the CKU railway is also the beginning of a longer contest over financing, environmental protection, compensation, logistics and regional competition. The outcome of that contest &#8211; more than the rails themselves &#8211; will determine who ultimately benefits from Central Asia&#8217;s newest trade route.</p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Kodirjon Eshonkulov</strong></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><em>Kodirjon Eshonkulov is an independent researcher specialising in Central Asian geopolitics, transboundary infrastructure and relations with the European Union. He is a recent graduate of the Graduate School of International Studies at Ajou University in South Korea. Since 2017, he has worked as a correspondent and television journalist covering social and political reforms in Uzbekistan. His writing on Uzbekistan&#8217;s water scarcity and Middle Corridor policy has appeared in The Times of Central Asia and the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-central-asia-trade-route/">China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway: Who wins from Central Asia&#8217;s new trade route?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>Gwadar, Karachi and the Central Asian Dream of the Sea</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/economics/pakistan-central-asia-gwadar-karachi-trade-corridor/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/economics/pakistan-central-asia-gwadar-karachi-trade-corridor/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2026 00:39:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kazakhstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kyrgyzstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkmenistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gwadar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Karachi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=49059</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/pakistan-central-asia-gwadar-karachi-trade-corridor/">Gwadar, Karachi and the Central Asian Dream of the Sea</a></p>
<p>Can Pakistan become the long-promised southern gateway for landlocked Central Asia? A brightly painted Pakistani truck carrying boxes of kinnow mandarins towards Central Asia looks almost festive. Its cab may be covered with flowers, peacocks, mountain landscapes, fragments of poetry and polished metal ornaments. Chains hanging from its body announce its arrival before the driver [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/pakistan-central-asia-gwadar-karachi-trade-corridor/">Gwadar, Karachi and the Central Asian Dream of the Sea</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/pakistan-central-asia-gwadar-karachi-trade-corridor/">Gwadar, Karachi and the Central Asian Dream of the Sea</a></p>

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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Can Pakistan become the long-promised southern gateway for landlocked Central Asia?</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A brightly painted Pakistani truck carrying boxes of kinnow mandarins towards Central Asia looks almost festive. Its cab may be covered with flowers, peacocks, mountain landscapes, fragments of poetry and polished metal ornaments. Chains hanging from its body announce its arrival before the driver reaches the border.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet the fruit inside imposes a less decorative reality. Every customs delay shortens its commercial life. Every border closure risks turning a profitable shipment into spoiled cargo.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/violence-against-foreign-students-in-bishkek/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/kyrgyzstan/violence-against-foreign-students-in-bishkek/">Violence against foreign students in Bishkek</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinnow" data-type="link" data-id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinnow">kinnow</a> &#8211; a sweet, easy-to-peel mandarin hybrid grown mainly in Punjab &#8211; can already be found in Central Asian markets. Uzbekistan has become a destination for Pakistani citrus, and Islamabad has introduced measures to facilitate the registration of exporters supplying the country.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A truck carrying kinnow therefore offers a more useful test of regional connectivity than the maps displayed at diplomatic summits. Pakistan and Central Asia can already trade. The question is whether goods can travel between them regularly, predictably and quickly enough for the journey to remain profitable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rice can survive a detour. A mandarin cannot wait indefinitely at a closed border.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Central Asia has spent decades searching for reliable access to the sea. Pakistan says it can provide it. Karachi, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_Qasim" data-type="link" data-id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_Qasim">Port Qasim</a> and Gwadar are increasingly promoted as the southern endpoints of roads and railways that would connect the region to the Arabian Sea.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="720" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/Gwadar_Port.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49066" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/Gwadar_Port.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/Gwadar_Port-300x225.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/Gwadar_Port-768x576.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Gwadar Port. Photo: Paranda / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Some elements of this vision are beginning to move beyond declarations. Pilot consignments have tested routes between Pakistan and Central Asia through China. New transit arrangements have been discussed through Iran. Pakistan has offered space at Gwadar for facilities intended to serve Central Asian trade.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But the most transformative part of the vision &#8211; a direct railway through Afghanistan &#8211; remains at the feasibility-study stage.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rather than asking only whether Pakistan could one day become Central Asia’s gateway to the sea, it is therefore more useful to examine what already exists, what goods are actually moving, what remains experimental and what is still largely confined to political speeches.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The drivers behind the corridor</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Transport corridors are usually represented as clean lines drawn across maps. On the ground, they are embodied by drivers travelling in some of the most visually distinctive commercial vehicles in the world.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistani trucks are transformed into moving works of art. Their surfaces combine floral patterns, animals, religious imagery, political personalities, landscapes, calligraphy and verses about love, distance and returning home. Painters, metalworkers, woodcarvers and other specialist artisans may spend weeks decorating a single vehicle.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="674" height="1024" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-A_decorated_Pakistani_truck_on_Gilgit-Skardu_Road-674x1024.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49072" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-A_decorated_Pakistani_truck_on_Gilgit-Skardu_Road-674x1024.jpg 674w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-A_decorated_Pakistani_truck_on_Gilgit-Skardu_Road-198x300.jpg 198w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-A_decorated_Pakistani_truck_on_Gilgit-Skardu_Road-768x1166.jpg 768w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-A_decorated_Pakistani_truck_on_Gilgit-Skardu_Road.jpg 960w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 674px) 100vw, 674px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Aapkamajid, CC BY-SA 4.0 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0</a>, via Wikimedia Commons.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Regional styles can also be recognised. Trucks associated with Peshawar are known for elaborate woodwork, while decorative traditions in Balochistan may incorporate different materials and motifs. The result is not standard commercial branding but an expression of the driver’s identity, memories and aspirations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/politics/belarus-central-asia-relations/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/politics/belarus-central-asia-relations/">Minsk’s Eastern Bet: Why Central Asia Matters More Than Ever</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These are the vehicles that must convert the language of international connectivity into an actual journey.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Their drivers encounter customs officials, poor roads, security checkpoints, mountain passes, mechanical failures and borders that may close with little warning. When governments suspend transit, it is the driver who sleeps beside the cargo, the porter who loses a day’s income and the trader who watches the value of a shipment decline.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The decorated truck is therefore more than a colourful detail. It is where the corridor becomes human.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">How long does the journey take? Which borders must the driver cross? How many documents are required? How much is spent on fuel, insurance, customs and informal delays? How much of the fruit is still marketable when it arrives?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These questions determine whether a corridor exists in commercial reality, rather than merely in diplomatic language.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A bag of rice and the problem of geography</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The same story can be told through something as ordinary as a bag of Pakistani basmati rice on a supermarket shelf in Almaty or Tashkent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan is one of the world’s major rice exporters, and its products already reach Central Asian consumers. The presence of Pakistani rice, citrus, pharmaceuticals and textiles in the region shows that trade is not hypothetical.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The difficult question is how these goods arrive.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="634" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-OZELR-0309_with_freight_train.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49069" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-OZELR-0309_with_freight_train.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-OZELR-0309_with_freight_train-300x198.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-OZELR-0309_with_freight_train-768x507.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><code>Freight train at Sergeli station, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Photo: Semen1966 / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0.</code></figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Pakistani exporter attempting to reach Central Asia faces several possibilities. Cargo can pass through Afghanistan, travel west through Iran, or move north-east through China. Goods may also be sent by sea to an Iranian port before continuing overland.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Each option carries disadvantages.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-key-link-middle-corridor/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-key-link-middle-corridor/">Kazakhstan continues to assert itself as the “key link” in the Middle Corridor</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Afghanistan offers the most direct geographical connection but also the greatest political and security uncertainty. The Iranian route may provide access to established road and rail networks, but it is longer and vulnerable to sanctions-related complications and wider regional tensions. The Chinese route benefits from comparatively predictable state infrastructure, but requires difficult mountain crossings and substantial additional distance.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The shortest line on the map is not necessarily the cheapest or most dependable commercial route.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="640" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Gawadar_Port.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49067" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Gawadar_Port.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Gawadar_Port-300x200.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Gawadar_Port-768x512.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Gwadar Fishing Port, Balochistan. Photo: Rajabslote / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For rice, delays reduce margins. For kinnow, mangoes, meat and other refrigerated or perishable products, delays can destroy the shipment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is why the most meaningful measure of connectivity is not the number of agreements signed, but whether transport companies can quote predictable prices and delivery dates. A corridor becomes commercially significant when businesses use it repeatedly without requiring exceptional government intervention for each consignment.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">From pulao to plov</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rice also reveals that Pakistan and Central Asia are less culturally distant than modern regional labels may suggest.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistani pulao and Central Asian plov belong to a much wider family of rice dishes stretching through South Asia, Iran, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Their names share a Persian linguistic ancestry, although recipes, cooking techniques and cultural meanings differ considerably.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Pakistan, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/food/recipes/pakistani_chicken_pulao_13179" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.bbc.co.uk/food/recipes/pakistani_chicken_pulao_13179">pulao</a> may be prepared with meat, stock and spices, with regional variations found across the country. In Uzbekistan, plov is a national institution associated with weddings, holidays, neighbourhood gatherings and hospitality. Tajik osh occupies a similarly important place.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/ouzbekistan/louzbekistan-lance-un-indice-plov/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/fr/ouzbekistan/louzbekistan-lance-un-indice-plov/">L’Ouzbékistan lance un indice Plov</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The comparison should not be exaggerated. Pakistani pulao and Uzbek plov are not the same dish. But their familiarity offers a small reminder of the historical movement of tastes, words and people between the regions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A bag of Pakistani rice arriving in Tashkent is therefore not merely anonymous cargo. It enters a culinary culture in which rice already carries powerful associations with family, celebration and collective identity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The proposed corridor would connect ports and markets, but it would also reconnect societies that already recognise elements of one another.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Pakistan looks north</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan’s interest in Central Asia is easy to understand.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The five Central Asian states form a market of more than 80 million people. Pakistan offers them access not only to a population exceeding 240 million, but also to the Arabian Sea and onward maritime trade.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet actual commerce remains limited compared with the ambitions expressed by regional governments. Pakistan exported goods worth approximately $106 million to Uzbekistan in 2025, but its combined trade with the five Central Asian republics remains small relative to the size of the markets involved.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The gap between geographic proximity and commercial integration is partly historical.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Soviet Central Asia’s transport infrastructure was designed primarily to connect the region northwards through Russia, not southwards through Afghanistan and Pakistan. After independence, China became an increasingly important economic partner, while routes across the Caspian Sea gained prominence as Central Asian governments sought alternative connections to Europe.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/environment/caspian-sea-declining-water-level-central-asia/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/fr/ouzbekistan/louzbekistan-lance-un-indice-plov/">The Caspian Sea Is Retreating. Central Asia Is Not Ready</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan was separated from Tajikistan by Afghanistan’s narrow <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wakhan_Corridor" data-type="link" data-id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wakhan_Corridor">Wakhan Corridor</a> and from the wider region by difficult terrain, insecurity and weak cross-border infrastructure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The resulting irony is striking: Central Asia and Pakistan are geographically close, but moving goods between them can require enormous detours.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Islamabad now hopes to change that. Pakistani officials increasingly describe their country as a bridge between Central Asia, South Asia, China and the Middle East. Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar are promoted as potential maritime outlets for landlocked economies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But Central Asia does not need access to the sea in the abstract. It needs access that is affordable, dependable and connected to regular shipping services.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Karachi already works</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Discussions of Pakistan’s maritime offer often group Karachi and Gwadar together. Commercially, however, they are very different propositions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Karachi is Pakistan’s established economic and maritime centre. Together with nearby Port Qasim, it handles most of the country’s seaborne commerce. It possesses regular shipping connections, freight-forwarding services, customs infrastructure, warehouses and access to Pakistan’s largest industrial and consumer market.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For a Central Asian trader seeking a southern outlet today, Karachi is therefore the more credible option.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The main obstacle is not the port itself, but the journey required to reach it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/tadjikistan/que-vend-on-a-la-frontiere-tadjiko-afghane/" data-type="link" data-id="https://novastan.org/fr/tadjikistan/que-vend-on-a-la-frontiere-tadjiko-afghane/">Que vend-on à la frontière tadjiko-afghane ?</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A reliable road or railway through Afghanistan could give Uzbekistan and parts of southern Central Asia a comparatively direct connection to Karachi. The port could also serve trade moving in the opposite direction, improving Pakistani access to Central Asian markets.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This two-way traffic is crucial. A truck delivering Pakistani products to Uzbekistan but returning empty is less profitable. A commercially sustainable corridor needs southbound cargo as well as goods moving north.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbek textiles, Kazakh grain and metals, and other Central Asian products could help provide that return traffic. Uzbekistan already exports textiles to Pakistan, demonstrating that the relationship need not consist only of Central Asia importing Pakistani food and consumer goods.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Karachi offers commercial scale. What it lacks is a reliable land bridge to Central Asia.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Gwadar offers something else</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gwadar_Port" data-type="link" data-id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gwadar_Port">Gwadar</a> has become the more powerful symbol.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Situated in Balochistan near the entrance to the Gulf of Oman, the deep-sea port occupies a location that appears strategically ideal. It lies close to Iran and forms the southern centrepiece of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/articles/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-hard-reality-greets-bris-signature-initiative" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.cfr.org/articles/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-hard-reality-greets-bris-signature-initiative">China-Pakistan Economic Corridor</a>, or CPEC.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Its significance also derives from China’s role.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan transferred the operation of Gwadar to China Overseas Ports Holding Company in 2013. The company describes itself as the concession holder and operator of the port and its associated free-zone activities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The concession is commonly described as lasting 40 years. Gwadar itself remains Pakistani territory and the port remains a Pakistani asset, but its operation and development are closely tied to a Chinese company and to Beijing’s broader Belt and Road Initiative.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="500" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-GwadarFishHarbour.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49068" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-GwadarFishHarbour.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-GwadarFishHarbour-300x156.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-GwadarFishHarbour-768x400.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Gwadar West Bay. Photo: wetlandsofpakistan / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chinese involvement provides investment, political support and a long-term strategic framework. But it also complicates the idea that Gwadar offers Central Asia an alternative independent of the major powers already shaping its trade.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gwadar promises Central Asia another route to the sea, but not necessarily an alternative to Chinese influence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Central Asian governments, this may not be an obstacle. All five countries already maintain substantial economic relationships with China, and several actively seek Chinese infrastructure investment. Beijing’s participation may increase confidence that projects will retain financing and political backing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet Gwadar remains far less commercially mature than Karachi. It has limited regular traffic, lacks Karachi’s dense logistics ecosystem and faces significant security problems in the surrounding province.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A port does not become a regional hub because governments designate it one. Shipping companies, freight forwarders and exporters must decide that it is cheaper, faster or more reliable than the alternatives.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Gwadar and the Balochistan question</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gwadar’s strategic position cannot be separated from the political realities of Balochistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The province is Pakistan’s largest by territory and among its poorest and least densely populated. It contains <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/minerals-diplomacy-meets-market-reality-case-pakistan" data-type="link" data-id="https://www.csis.org/analysis/minerals-diplomacy-meets-market-reality-case-pakistan">major gas and mineral resources</a>, as well as the port that Islamabad and Beijing present as a future centre of Eurasian commerce.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet many Baloch activists argue that local communities have received too little benefit from the extraction of the province’s resources and from the infrastructure projects developed in their name.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These grievances are connected to a decades-long separatist insurgency, allegations of enforced disappearances and abuses by the security forces, and recurring protests over political exclusion and economic marginalisation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Gwadar itself, residents and local movements have protested over access to water and electricity, restrictions affecting fishing communities, security controls and the perception that the benefits of port development are flowing primarily to outside actors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Armed Baloch separatist organisations have also attacked Pakistani security forces, infrastructure and Chinese personnel. China’s involvement has turned Gwadar and other parts of CPEC into symbolic targets, while Pakistan has responded with an extensive security presence intended to protect foreign workers and strategic installations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Security remains one of the principal concerns surrounding renewed Chinese and Pakistani plans to turn Gwadar into a regional connectivity hub.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This creates a contradiction at the centre of the project.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A port promoted as a gateway of openness and connection is located in a province marked by checkpoints, political distrust and recurring violence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Security measures may protect ships, roads and foreign personnel, but they also impose costs and reinforce local perceptions that Gwadar is being developed for outsiders. For Central Asian traders, the question is not only whether the port can physically handle cargo. It is whether the surrounding political and security environment permits goods, workers and investment to move predictably.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gwadar cannot become a convincing gateway for Central Asia without also becoming a more credible economic gateway for the people who already live around it.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What has actually moved?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The strongest evidence for new links between Pakistan and Central Asia does not yet come from the proposed railway. It comes from trucks and limited trial consignments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In April 2026, Pakistan launched an export consignment from the <a href="https://epza.gov.pk/portfolio/epz-karachi/" data-type="link" data-id="https://epza.gov.pk/portfolio/epz-karachi/">Karachi Export Processing Zone</a> to Kyrgyzstan through <a href="https://timesca.com/pakistan-and-uzbekistan-turn-to-china-for-transit-trade-amid-regional-security-risks/" data-type="link" data-id="https://timesca.com/pakistan-and-uzbekistan-turn-to-china-for-transit-trade-amid-regional-security-risks/">China’s Sost Dry Port</a> under the international <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TIR_Convention" data-type="link" data-id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TIR_Convention">TIR customs-transit system</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The route was geographically indirect: goods moved towards the Chinese border before continuing through China to Kyrgyzstan. Yet its apparent inefficiency revealed something important. Businesses may prefer a longer route if it offers more predictable procedures and avoids the volatility of Afghanistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This does not yet constitute a high-volume trade corridor. A first or pilot consignment tests customs systems, roads and political agreements; it does not prove that a route is commercially competitive at scale.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nevertheless, actual shipments matter.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">They show that Pakistan is beginning to convert corridor diplomacy into physical cargo movements. They also reveal how far reality remains from the elegant north-south lines usually drawn on official maps.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The corridor has begun to function in fragments, sometimes by going around its presumed centre.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Afghanistan: bridge and bottleneck</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Any serious attempt to connect Uzbekistan directly to Pakistan must confront Afghanistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most discussed project is the proposed <a href="https://timesca.com/pakistan-and-uzbekistan-turn-to-china-for-transit-trade-amid-regional-security-risks/" data-type="link" data-id="https://timesca.com/pakistan-and-uzbekistan-turn-to-china-for-transit-trade-amid-regional-security-risks/">Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway</a>. The line would connect Uzbekistan to Pakistan’s rail network and ports through Afghan territory. Supporters argue that it could reduce transport times, lower costs and create the first direct rail connection between Central and South Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The railway could be transformative. It could also remain unbuilt.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="639" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-The_friendship_bridge_connects_Mangusar_Uzbekistan_and_Hariatan_Afghanistan.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49070" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-The_friendship_bridge_connects_Mangusar_Uzbekistan_and_Hariatan_Afghanistan.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-The_friendship_bridge_connects_Mangusar_Uzbekistan_and_Hariatan_Afghanistan-300x200.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-The_friendship_bridge_connects_Mangusar_Uzbekistan_and_Hariatan_Afghanistan-768x511.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">The &#8220;Friendship Bridge&#8221; runs across the Amu Darya River between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The friendship bridge connects Mangusar, Uzbekistan and Hariatan, Afghanistan. ..(U.S. Air Force Photo By Staff Sgt. Bradley Lail) (released)</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In July 2025, the three countries signed an agreement to conduct a joint feasibility study. Uzbekistan ratified the agreement in February 2026, and officials later announced that the study had entered an active phase.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This represents progress, but the terminology matters.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A feasibility study is not construction. The route, engineering specifications, financing arrangements and security guarantees still require resolution. Afghanistan’s terrain will make the project expensive, while differing railway gauges and connections to existing networks create further technical complications.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The political environment is no less difficult.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have deteriorated amid disputes over border security and armed groups operating from Afghan territory. Repeated closures of key crossings have disrupted traders and encouraged Afghanistan to divert commerce through Iran and Central Asia. In 2025, Afghan traders increasingly used alternative routes through Chabahar and neighbouring Central Asian states to compensate for disruptions at the Pakistani border.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Such closures affect people far beyond foreign ministries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Drivers lose income while waiting at the border. Porters and customs workers lose daily wages. Traders watch perishable goods deteriorate. Importers must explain delays to customers who may never have heard of the diplomatic dispute that stopped their order.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For a Central Asian company choosing a trade route, these experiences matter more than the theoretical number of kilometres saved.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Afghanistan is therefore both the bridge and the bottleneck. Without it, the most direct southern route becomes substantially longer. With it, the corridor remains exposed to insecurity and political confrontation.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Routes around the bottleneck</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan is not waiting for the Trans-Afghan railway to be completed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Routes through Iran and China offer alternatives, although neither recreates the direct north-south connection envisioned by the railway.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The western option can connect Pakistani ports to Iran and then to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the wider Central Asian network. It avoids the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and may be particularly relevant to western and southern Central Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But it introduces other uncertainties. Iran faces sanctions, financial restrictions and recurrent regional tensions. A corridor that avoids one geopolitical vulnerability may inherit another.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The route through China benefits from close Pakistan-China relations and from Chinese transport connections with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khunjerab_Pass" data-type="link" data-id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khunjerab_Pass">Khunjerab Pass</a> and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karakoram_Highway" data-type="link" data-id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karakoram_Highway">Karakoram Highway</a> provide a physical connection, although difficult terrain, weather conditions and distance limit the route’s suitability for some cargo.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="604" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Truck_Art.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49075" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Truck_Art.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Truck_Art-300x189.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Truck_Art-768x483.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Truck on Karakorum Highway. Mehtab Alam, CC BY-SA 4.0 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0</a>, via Wikimedia Commons.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China and Pakistan renewed their commitment in May 2026 to improving CPEC, the Karakoram Highway and Gwadar’s role as a regional connectivity hub.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet strategic commitment does not automatically produce commercial demand.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The existence of several imperfect alternatives may nevertheless prove more realistic than waiting for one grand railway to solve every problem. Different routes may serve different countries, seasons and products.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kinnow may require the fastest viable road. Machinery may tolerate a longer journey. Bulk commodities may need rail. A corridor is ultimately not one line but a network of commercial decisions.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Central Asia already has alternatives</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan is also entering a competitive market.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Central Asian governments are developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly called the Middle Corridor, across Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye. The route has gained strategic importance as countries seek to diversify away from Russia and strengthen connections with Europe.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Iran offers access to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea through ports such as Bandar Abbas and Chabahar. China provides access to eastward markets and global maritime supply chains. Russia remains a major commercial and transit partner despite ongoing efforts to diversify.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan must therefore offer more than access to the sea as a concept. Central Asia already possesses several maritime options.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan’s strongest potential advantage is proximity to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and parts of southern Central Asia. A reliable route through Afghanistan could be shorter than many alternatives. Pakistan also provides direct access to South Asian markets rather than functioning merely as a passage to ships bound elsewhere.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Its disadvantages are equally substantial: unstable borders, incomplete infrastructure, difficult terrain, security risks and the absence of established high-volume logistics chains.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The balance also differs from one Central Asian country to another.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan, with its large population, manufacturing ambitions and doubly landlocked geography, has the clearest strategic interest in a southern connection. Tajikistan could benefit from improved north-south trade but lacks direct access to the proposed principal railway. Turkmenistan already borders Iran and the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan is more closely integrated into routes through Russia, China and the Caspian. Kyrgyzstan’s geography may make connections through China more immediately relevant than a route through Afghanistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is no single Central Asian interest. What works for Tashkent may offer little advantage to Astana or Ashgabat.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">From Babur to border paperwork</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The north-south connection is not new.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Zahir-ud-din Muhammad <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babur" data-type="link" data-id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babur">Babur</a> was born in Andijan, in present-day Uzbekistan. After losing his Central Asian possessions, he established himself in Kabul, captured Lahore and founded an empire that included large parts of present-day Pakistan and northern India.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Five centuries before governments began promoting a railway from Uzbekistan to Pakistan, Babur travelled along the same broad axis through the Ferghana Valley, Afghanistan and the Indus basin.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The modern journey is less romantic. It depends on axle-load limits, customs guarantees, insurance contracts, refrigerated trailers and border opening hours.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="539" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Truck_art_in_Pakistan.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49073" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Truck_art_in_Pakistan.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Truck_art_in_Pakistan-300x168.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Truck_art_in_Pakistan-768x431.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Pakistani truck art. imusasheikh, CC BY-SA 4.0 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0</a>, via Wikimedia Commons.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet the historical reference is more than decorative. It reminds us that Central and South Asia were not always treated as separate worlds. Empires, trading networks, migration, language and culture connected the regions long before Soviet infrastructure redirected Central Asia’s economy northwards.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Today’s corridor projects are therefore not creating a relationship from nothing. They are attempting to rebuild connections that modern borders and political systems made increasingly difficult.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A gateway, but not yet a corridor</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan has moved beyond promises, but only partly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Goods already travel between Pakistan and Central Asia. Initial consignments have tested new routes through China. Karachi provides a major functioning commercial port. Gwadar is operational, supported by China and increasingly presented as a potential destination for Central Asian cargo. The three governments behind the Trans-Afghan railway have moved into the feasibility-study phase.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These are real developments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But they do not yet amount to a regular, high-volume corridor connecting Central Asia to the Arabian Sea.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The shortest route remains politically fragile. Routes avoiding Afghanistan are longer and face other geopolitical or physical constraints. Gwadar remains less commercially established than Karachi and cannot be separated from the conflict and political grievances surrounding it in Balochistan. Central Asian traders already have competing options through Russia, China, Iran and the Caspian.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="540" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Khunjrab_Pass_-.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-49076" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Khunjrab_Pass_-.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Khunjrab_Pass_--300x169.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/07/960px-Khunjrab_Pass_--768x432.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Khunjerab Pass. Sajjadsb, CC BY-SA 3.0 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0</a>, via Wikimedia Commons.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pakistan’s southern offer should therefore be treated neither as an illusion nor as an inevitable geopolitical transformation. It is an emerging network whose commercial value must still be demonstrated shipment by shipment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The decorated truck carrying kinnow matters because it places a driver, a product and a deadline inside the abstraction of regional connectivity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The decisive moment will come when another truck follows without a ministerial ceremony, and then another &#8211; carrying mandarins and rice north, textiles and other goods south, along a route whose successful completion is no longer considered newsworthy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That is when a diplomatic corridor becomes an economy.</p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English</strong></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/pakistan-central-asia-gwadar-karachi-trade-corridor/">Gwadar, Karachi and the Central Asian Dream of the Sea</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>Beyond the Counter: Uzbekistan’s Public Service Reforms and the Hidden Infrastructure of the Digital State</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/economics/uzbekistan-digital-public-services/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/economics/uzbekistan-digital-public-services/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 23:59:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uzbekistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digitalization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public service]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public service delivery]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=48944</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/uzbekistan-digital-public-services/">Beyond the Counter: Uzbekistan’s Public Service Reforms and the Hidden Infrastructure of the Digital State</a></p>
<p>For most citizens, the state is not first encountered through laws, strategies or official speeches. It is encountered in practical moments of need: registering a birth, obtaining a passport, opening a business, receiving a certificate, applying for social support, connecting to utilities or correcting an administrative error. These ordinary interactions shape whether people see the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/uzbekistan-digital-public-services/">Beyond the Counter: Uzbekistan’s Public Service Reforms and the Hidden Infrastructure of the Digital State</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/uzbekistan-digital-public-services/">Beyond the Counter: Uzbekistan’s Public Service Reforms and the Hidden Infrastructure of the Digital State</a></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For most citizens, the state is not first encountered through laws, strategies or official speeches. It is encountered in practical moments of need: registering a birth, obtaining a passport, opening a business, receiving a certificate, applying for social support, connecting to utilities or correcting an administrative error. These ordinary interactions shape whether people see the administration as predictable or arbitrary, helpful or humiliating, accessible or distant.</p>



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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Uzbekistan, this everyday relationship between citizens and the state has changed significantly since 2017. Public service reform has been one of the most visible parts of the country’s broader modernization agenda. Public Service Centers, online portals, digitized records and simplified procedures have made many interactions faster and less burdensome. According to the Ministry of Justice data used in a recent UNDP-supported analysis, Uzbekistan now has 1,040 public services in its Unified Register, of which 780 are delivered through the <a href="https://my.gov.uz/en" type="link" id="https://my.gov.uz/en">Unified Interactive Public Services Portal</a>, 507 through Public Service Centers, and more than 150 licenses and permits through the “License” information system. The number of services available through Public Service Centers has increased almost fourteen-fold since 2017, while more than 60 million civil registry records have been digitized.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These are not marginal changes. They reflect a real shift away from the older model in which citizens often had to move from one office to another, carrying documents between agencies, seeking information from officials and navigating unclear procedures. In the Uzbek context, where bureaucratic discretion has long affected both citizens and entrepreneurs, public service reform has an importance that goes beyond administrative convenience. It touches trust in institutions, the business climate, corruption risks and the state’s ability to use digital transformation for public benefit.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-to-invest-in-its-digital-infrastructure/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-to-invest-in-its-digital-infrastructure/">Uzbekistan to invest in its digital infrastructure</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet Uzbekistan’s reform story is now entering a more difficult phase. The country has already modernized much of the visible “front office” of the state: the counters, portals, kiosks and service centers through which people interact with public administration. The harder challenge lies behind the counter. It concerns the digital, legal and institutional infrastructure that allows agencies to exchange data securely, recognize electronic decisions, reduce unnecessary paperwork, protect personal information and make administrative action accountable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In other words, the next stage of Uzbekistan’s public service reform will be decided less by the number of services available online than by the quality of the digital state behind them.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">From paperwork to platforms</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The first phase of reform focused on access. Public Service Centers created a recognizable front door to the state, while the national portal offered citizens and businesses a way to access services online. Requirements to submit many types of certificates and documents have been abolished. Some services have been simplified under the “three-step” principle. Birth-related procedures have been bundled, while some utility-related services have become proactive, meaning that citizens no longer need to initiate every administrative step themselves.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This matters because public services are among the few areas where state reform becomes immediately tangible. A citizen may not read a public administration strategy, but he or she will notice whether a birth certificate can be obtained more quickly, whether a passport can be delivered, whether a license can be requested online or whether a business can be registered without visiting multiple offices.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For businesses, the same logic applies. The quality of the business climate is not determined only by tax rates or investment laws. It is also shaped by routine interactions with the administration: permits, licenses, inspections, utility connections, property registration, tax administration and access to official information. The old World Bank Doing Business ranking may no longer exist in its previous form, but the underlying question remains central: can entrepreneurs rely on predictable, transparent and timely administrative procedures?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In this sense, public service reform is also business-climate reform. When <a href="https://license.gov.uz/" type="link" id="https://license.gov.uz/">licensing procedures</a> are digital, deadlines are clear and documents are not repeatedly requested, businesses face fewer informal costs. When application status is traceable, officials have less room to delay or bargain. When data can be verified directly between agencies, citizens and entrepreneurs no longer have to act as messengers inside the state.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But digitalization alone does not solve the problem. It can also reproduce old bureaucracy in a new form. A paper form can become an online form without the procedure itself becoming simpler. A citizen may still be asked for information that another agency already holds. A business may still face delays if the back-office systems of the responsible institutions are not connected. The real reform, therefore, is not simply to put services online. It is to redesign the relationship between citizens, data, agencies and responsibility.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The invisible infrastructure of reform</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One of the most important ideas in modern public service reform is the “once-only” principle: citizens and businesses should not be required to provide information that the state already possesses. In practical terms, this means that if a person’s identity, residence, family status, property record or business registration data already exist in a public registry, another agency should be able to verify that information lawfully and securely.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This sounds simple. In reality, it is one of the most difficult parts of digital government. It requires reliable registries, shared technical standards, secure data exchange, legal rules for data reuse, clear institutional mandates and staff who trust digital verification. It also requires cybersecurity. The more the state relies on digital identity, automated services and inter-agency data exchange, the more public service delivery becomes part of national digital resilience.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the old bureaucracy, citizens carried paper between agencies. In the digital bureaucracy, data must move instead &#8211; securely, lawfully and with accountability.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is where Uzbekistan’s reform agenda becomes more complex and more interesting. The country has already built many of the visible elements of a modern service system, including Public Service Centers, an expanding online portal, digitized civil registry data and early proactive services. But the next phase, as the UNDP-supported report argues, is about consolidation and depth: clarifying legal and institutional foundations, deepening interoperability and lawful data reuse, simplifying high-volume services, embedding accountability and ensuring that digital progress does not widen gaps for people with limited connectivity, digital skills or documentation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That is a very different reform agenda from simply launching another platform. It is about who controls data, who is responsible when data are wrong, who can access which records, whether electronic decisions are legally valid, how citizens can appeal mistakes and whether agencies are obliged to rely on shared systems rather than maintaining their own isolated channels.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why comparison matters</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan is not alone in facing this transition. <a href="https://e-estonia.com/solutions/interoperability-services/x-road/" type="link" id="https://e-estonia.com/solutions/interoperability-services/x-road/">Estonia</a> and Denmark show that digital public services only become transformative when the state treats digital identity, secure data exchange and authoritative registries as core public infrastructure. Georgia and Kazakhstan, closer to Uzbekistan in administrative heritage, demonstrate the political value of one-stop service centers: they make reform visible, reduce face-to-face discretion and create a clearer front door to the state. France offers a different lesson: digitalization must be balanced with physical access points and assisted services, especially for rural areas and citizens who cannot easily navigate online procedures. Singapore and South Korea, meanwhile, show how mature digital states use service data, feedback systems and cross-agency platforms not only to deliver services, but to manage performance and detect bottlenecks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These examples matter not because they offer models to copy, but because they clarify the choices Uzbekistan now faces. The countries that have modernized public services most successfully did not do so only by introducing new technologies. They also rethought the rules, institutions and incentives behind every counter and every online form. Their reforms became sustainable when they combined digital access with service standards, feedback channels, legal recognition of electronic decisions and visible mechanisms for redress.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Uzbekistan, the comparison is especially useful because the country is not starting from zero. It has already built public-facing infrastructure and achieved meaningful simplification. The more difficult question is whether it can now create the institutional discipline needed for genuine interoperability. Agencies must be willing, or required, to share data through common systems. Ministries must accept common service standards. Digital and legal reform must move together. Cybersecurity, data protection and administrative accountability must be treated as part of the same reform ecosystem.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Corruption moves, it does not disappear</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Public service reform also has a direct anti-corruption dimension. In paper-heavy systems, corruption often thrives at the point of contact between citizen and official: unclear fees, unpredictable deadlines, unnecessary certificates, repeated visits and discretionary refusals. One-stop shops and online procedures can reduce these risks by standardizing processes, limiting face-to-face interactions and making cases easier to track.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is one reason why Public Service Centers have been politically powerful in several post-Soviet states. They offer a visible break with the image of the fragmented, discretionary administration. Clear counters, queue management, published fees and predictable timelines send a message: the citizen should not have to know someone inside the system to obtain a routine service.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But digitalization does not automatically eliminate corruption. It can change where discretion sits. Instead of the desk officer, discretion may move to the database, the algorithm, the access right, the procurement contract or the agency that controls the platform. If digital systems are opaque, poorly audited or controlled by institutions with weak oversight, new forms of manipulation become possible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is why cybersecurity, data privacy and anti-corruption cannot be treated as separate agendas. A service platform that is not secure can be manipulated. A database without audit trails can be abused. A system that allows officials to access personal data without clear justification can undermine trust. An automated decision without explanation can reproduce arbitrariness under a digital label.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For citizens, the promise of digital government is not simply speed. It is predictability, traceability and the ability to challenge mistakes. For businesses, the promise is not only convenience. It is a more reliable operating environment in which permits, licenses and registrations do not depend on informal negotiation. For the state, the promise is a more efficient administration that can detect bottlenecks, reduce duplication and allocate resources more intelligently.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The remaining bottlenecks</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan’s progress is significant, but the system remains uneven. Ninety-seven agencies and organizations still provide public services, often under their own procedures and information systems. More than 220 services remain paper-based, and more than 180 are delivered through isolated internal platforms. Many processes still require excessive documents and multiple steps, while only around 100 services have been fully simplified under the “three-step” principle.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These figures are important because they show that the problem is no longer only access to a front office. It is the fragmentation of the back office. If agencies maintain parallel systems, citizens will continue to face repeated documentation requests. If registries are incomplete or not treated as authoritative, officials will continue to rely on paper. If legal deadlines are unrealistic, digital platforms will not prevent delays. If staff lack digital skills or fear responsibility for electronic verification, they may continue to reproduce old procedures.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Monitoring data cited in the report also show persistent performance problems in several sectors. Uzsuvta’minot alone registered more than 175,000 violations, mainly related to delays in connecting customers to water networks or replacing meters. The Cadastre Agency recorded more than 50,000 violations, while other agencies reported tens of thousands of cases, many linked to delays and, in some cases, unjustified refusals.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This does not mean that reform has failed. It means that public service delivery is entering the stage where the easy improvements have already been made and the harder institutional problems are becoming more visible. The first wave could reduce queues and digitize records. The next wave must address mandates, data quality, staff capacity, cybersecurity, appeal mechanisms and the incentives that shape agency behavior.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Data privacy and the citizen</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The same interoperability that makes services faster also creates new risks. When agencies exchange more data, the state can reduce paperwork and improve service quality. But it also gains a more complete picture of citizens’ lives. Civil status, property, residence, business activity, education, benefits, utilities and health-related administrative data can become increasingly connected.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is not a reason to reject digital government. It is a reason to govern it carefully.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A trustworthy service state needs privacy safeguards, access controls, audit trails, correction rights and clear rules on who can use which data for which purpose. Citizens should know when data are being reused, how decisions are made and what they can do when information is incorrect. The more services become proactive or automated, the more important it becomes to ensure that people can challenge errors and that vulnerable groups are not excluded by inaccurate records or inaccessible digital channels.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is also where inclusion matters. “Digital by default” should not become “digital only.” Rural residents, elderly people, persons with disabilities, low-income households and people with limited digital skills may benefit greatly from simplified services, but only if assisted channels remain available. Public Service Centers, kiosks, mobile units, postal delivery and community-based support are not leftovers from the pre-digital era. They are part of an inclusive digital state.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">France’s experience is useful here: even a highly centralized and digitally advanced administration has had to invest in physical access points and assisted services to address territorial inequality and digital exclusion. For Uzbekistan, with its regional disparities and uneven administrative capacity, this lesson is particularly relevant.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A Law on Public Services as a test</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan’s forthcoming Law on Public Services could become the cornerstone of the next reform phase. Its importance will depend on whether it is conceived narrowly or strategically.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A narrow law would simply list existing services and formalize current arrangements. A more ambitious law would define what citizens and businesses can expect from the administration: clear deadlines, transparent fees, valid electronic decisions, fewer unnecessary documents, access through several channels, secure data reuse, protection of personal information, and meaningful remedies when the system fails.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The law could also clarify who does what. The Ministry of Justice already plays a central role in legal reform, service standards and Public Service Centers. The Ministry of Digital Technologies leads on digital infrastructure, interoperability and cybersecurity. Line ministries remain responsible for the substance of decisions in their sectors. The challenge is to align these roles so that public service delivery becomes a coherent system rather than a collection of institutional islands.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is not only a legal issue. It is a governance issue. If Uzbekistan wants citizens to stop carrying paper between agencies, then agencies must be required to trust shared data. If the state wants businesses to rely on digital licensing, then electronic procedures must be legally valid and technically resilient. If public services are to reduce corruption, then deadlines, refusals, complaints and appeals must be traceable. If digital government is to build trust, then cybersecurity and data privacy must be visible parts of the reform, not hidden technical details.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">From administrative simplification to a service state</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan’s public service reforms are therefore more than an administrative modernization story. They are a window into the country’s broader transformation: how the state organizes information, manages discretion, interacts with citizens and creates conditions for economic activity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The next test will not be whether Uzbekistan can launch more portals or add more services to existing platforms. It will be whether the state can connect its institutions in a secure and accountable way, so that public services become faster without becoming opaque, more digital without becoming exclusionary, and more efficient without weakening rights.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most important reform may be the least visible one. It will take place not at the counter, but in the connections between agencies; not in the app, but in the rules governing data; not in the number of services online, but in whether citizens and businesses can trust the digital state behind them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If Uzbekistan succeeds, public service delivery could become one of the clearest indicators of a new phase in the country’s modernization: a move from paperwork to platforms, and from administrative simplification to a more predictable, secure and citizen-centered service state.</p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English</strong></p>


<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/uzbekistan-digital-public-services/">Beyond the Counter: Uzbekistan’s Public Service Reforms and the Hidden Infrastructure of the Digital State</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>Minsk&#8217;s Eastern Bet: Why Central Asia Matters More Than Ever</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/politics/belarus-central-asia-relations/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/politics/belarus-central-asia-relations/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 20:23:40 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics and Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uzbekistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Belarus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Asia]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=48940</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/politics/belarus-central-asia-relations/">Minsk&#8217;s Eastern Bet: Why Central Asia Matters More Than Ever</a></p>
<p>As Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev prepares to travel to Minsk on 8-9 July, the visit is expected to produce another series of agreements on trade, industry and regional cooperation. At first glance, it may appear to be just another bilateral meeting between two post-Soviet states. In reality, it illustrates one of the most overlooked geopolitical [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/politics/belarus-central-asia-relations/">Minsk&#8217;s Eastern Bet: Why Central Asia Matters More Than Ever</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/politics/belarus-central-asia-relations/">Minsk&#8217;s Eastern Bet: Why Central Asia Matters More Than Ever</a></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev prepares to travel to Minsk on <a href="https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/preparation-for-shavkat-mirziyoyevs-visit-to-belarus-discussed-in-minsk/" type="link" id="https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/preparation-for-shavkat-mirziyoyevs-visit-to-belarus-discussed-in-minsk/">8-9 July</a>, the visit is expected to produce another series of agreements on trade, industry and regional cooperation. At first glance, it may appear to be just another bilateral meeting between two post-Soviet states. In reality, it illustrates one of the most overlooked geopolitical developments in Eurasia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstans-gradual-divorce-from-russia/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstans-gradual-divorce-from-russia/">Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Since Russia&#8217;s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Belarus has become increasingly isolated from Europe. Political dialogue with the European Union has largely frozen, Western sanctions have multiplied, and Minsk&#8217;s dependence on Moscow has deepened. Yet while much of Europe has turned away from Belarus, Central Asia has not. On the contrary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and especially Uzbekistan have continued to strengthen political dialogue, industrial cooperation, educational exchanges and trade with Minsk.</p>



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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This apparent paradox reveals much about both Belarus and Central Asia. For Brussels, Belarus has become primarily a sanctions problem and Russia&#8217;s closest ally. For Tashkent, Astana or Dushanbe, however, Belarus remains something rather different: a producer of tractors, buses and mining equipment, an engineering partner, an educational destination and a familiar interlocutor with decades of technical expertise. That difference in perception lies at the heart of Belarus&#8217;s enduring relevance across the region.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The war that changed everything &#8211; but not everything</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><br>The war in Ukraine undoubtedly transformed Belarusian foreign policy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Before 2022, Minsk balanced relations between Russia and the West while simultaneously cultivating long-standing ties across the former Soviet space. Afterwards, its room for manoeuvre narrowed dramatically. Unable to restore normal political relations with Europe in the foreseeable future, Belarus increasingly looked east.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If the first phase after 2022 was one of survival, the second has become one of adaptation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/central-asia-political-traditions/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/central-asia-political-traditions/">The Vocabulary of Reform: Why Central Asia Is Reimagining Its Political Traditions</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Central Asia has emerged as one of the principal beneficiaries of this strategic reorientation. Unlike Europe, the five Central Asian republics never sought to isolate Belarus politically. None endorsed Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine, and several &#8211; particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan &#8211; carefully defended the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet they also chose not to sever relations with Minsk.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Instead, they compartmentalised them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Political disagreements over Ukraine did not prevent cooperation in agriculture, heavy industry, transport, education or food security. This pragmatic approach reflects the increasingly confident multi-vector diplomacy that has characterised Central Asia over the past decade.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Belarus&#8217;s comparative advantage</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Unlike China, Belarus cannot finance billion-dollar infrastructure projects.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Unlike Russia, it does not provide security guarantees.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Unlike the European Union, it does not offer grants, regulatory convergence or accession prospects.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Its comparative advantage lies elsewhere.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Belarus remains one of the few post-Soviet states that preserved much of its industrial base after 1991. Companies such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Tractor_Works" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Tractor_Works">MTZ</a>, MAZ, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BelAZ" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BelAZ">BelAZ</a>, Gomselmash, Bobruiskagromash and Amkodor continue to manufacture tractors, buses, heavy trucks, harvesters, mining equipment and construction machinery that remain highly competitive across Eurasia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Central Asian governments seeking to modernise agriculture, develop mining industries or improve municipal transport, Belarus offers something few other partners can provide: reliable industrial technologies adapted to post-Soviet realities and available at competitive prices.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In that sense, Belarus has become Eurasia&#8217;s overlooked industrial power.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Uzbekistan: from friendly relations to strategic partnership</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nowhere has Belarus&#8217;s eastern strategy been more successful than in Uzbekistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The relationship began to accelerate after Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in 2016 and launched sweeping economic reforms. Successive presidential visits &#8211; including Alexander Lukashenko&#8217;s trips to Tashkent and Mirziyoyev&#8217;s visits to Minsk &#8211; have transformed bilateral relations from cordial political dialogue into an increasingly comprehensive economic partnership.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Trade has expanded dramatically, approaching one billion US dollars annually, while both governments openly discuss reaching two billion dollars over the coming years.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/central-asia-critical-minerals-rare-earths/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/en/economics/central-asia-critical-minerals-rare-earths/">What lies beneath Central Asia? Rare earths, critical minerals and the new race for resources</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">More importantly, cooperation has moved beyond exports.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Belarusian and Uzbek partners are developing industrial projects valued at around 800 million dollars, spanning agricultural machinery, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals and food processing. Hundreds of enterprises involving Belarusian capital now operate in Uzbekistan, making the country Belarus&#8217;s fastest-growing economic partner in Central Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Preparations for Mirziyoyev&#8217;s current visit have themselves demonstrated the depth of the relationship. Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Shuleiko and Uzbekistan&#8217;s Minister of Investment, Industry and Trade Laziz Kudratov have spent recent weeks coordinating the agenda, with discussions focusing not only on bilateral trade but also on investment projects and preparations for the next Forum of Regions.<br></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Beyond presidential diplomacy</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Belarus-Uzbekistan relations is that they are no longer centred exclusively on presidents.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The <a href="https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/uzbekistan-and-belarus-to-launch-new-industrial-cooperation-projects/" type="link" id="https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/uzbekistan-and-belarus-to-launch-new-industrial-cooperation-projects/">Forum of Regions</a>, launched in 2019, has become an institutional mechanism linking provinces, municipalities, universities, chambers of commerce and businesses. Belarusian regions now cooperate directly with counterparts in Samarkand, Bukhara, Fergana and Tashkent, creating relationships that continue independently of high-level political visits.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This gradual institutionalisation distinguishes Belarus from many other external partners in Central Asia. Rather than relying solely on summit diplomacy, Minsk has invested in long-term cooperation between local authorities, universities and companies.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Kazakhstan: industrial integration</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan remains Belarus&#8217;s largest economic partner in Central Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bilateral trade reached approximately 1.1 billion dollars in 2024, while industrial integration has become increasingly sophisticated. Rather than merely exporting machinery, Belarus has helped establish fourteen joint industrial projects worth nearly 280 million dollars, eleven of which are already operational.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Assembly plants now manufacture MTZ tractors, MAZ trucks and Gomselmash agricultural equipment within Kazakhstan itself. More than one thousand enterprises involving Belarusian participation operate across the country, supported by around 170 official Belarusian dealers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These figures illustrate an important evolution. Belarus is no longer simply exporting products to Central Asia. Increasingly, it is participating directly in local manufacturing and industrial development.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan: smaller economies, growing ambitions</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Belarus&#8217;s engagement is no less significant in the region&#8217;s smaller economies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Tajikistan, cooperation has progressively shifted from trade towards manufacturing. In the Hisor district near Dushanbe, Belarusian companies assemble MTZ tractors, Gomselmash harvesters and Bobruiskagromash agricultural equipment, allowing Tajik farmers to access machinery adapted to local conditions while supporting domestic production. More than thirty Belarusian distribution companies now operate in the country, reflecting Minsk&#8217;s long-term commitment to the Tajik market.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kyrgyzstan has likewise sought to deepen economic ties. Both governments have adopted ambitious roadmaps to increase bilateral trade, focusing on agriculture, food processing, machinery and logistics. As fellow members of the Eurasian Economic Union, Minsk and Bishkek also benefit from institutional frameworks that facilitate commercial cooperation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Turkmenistan presents a somewhat different picture. While economic relations remain constrained by Ashgabat&#8217;s relatively closed economy, education has emerged as one of the strongest pillars of the bilateral relationship. Around 4,000 Turkmen students are estimated to study in Belarus, particularly in engineering, medicine and technical disciplines. These graduates often return home with professional networks that strengthen long-term cooperation between the two countries.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Soft power without ideology: Tradition as State Legitimacy</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Unlike Russia, Türkiye or China, Belarus has never projected influence through grand geopolitical narratives.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Its soft power is considerably quieter.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is found in universities rather than television channels, engineering schools rather than cultural institutes, and technical cooperation rather than ideological messaging.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belarusian_State_University" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belarusian_State_University">Belarusian State University</a>, Belarusian National Technical University and Belarusian State Medical University continue to attract students from across Central Asia, offering Russian-language education, recognised technical qualifications and comparatively affordable tuition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For many Central Asian families, Belarus represents a practical alternative. It offers a familiar academic environment outside Russia, while maintaining close links with industries that remain highly relevant to Central Asian development.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Education therefore performs several functions simultaneously. It generates revenue for Belarusian universities, strengthens professional networks and creates generations of engineers, doctors and public officials familiar with Belarusian institutions and technologies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This represents a distinctly Belarusian model of soft power: practical, technocratic and long-term.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Beyond tractors: exporting institutions</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tajikistan follows a different path.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Belarus is also seeking to export institutions alongside industrial products.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One telling example is the growing role of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belarusian_Universal_Commodity_Exchange" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belarusian_Universal_Commodity_Exchange">Belarusian Universal Commodity Exchange</a> (BUCE). In 2025, BUCE signed a cooperation agreement with Kazakhstan&#8217;s Caspiy Commodity Exchange, aiming to improve commodity trading, develop electronic trading platforms and facilitate commercial exchanges between Belarus and Central Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While less visible than presidential summits, such initiatives illustrate Minsk&#8217;s efforts to integrate itself into the region&#8217;s economic architecture.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Belarus has also promoted specialised business forums, including the Belarus-Central Asia Economic Forum held in Brest in 2026, bringing together companies interested in expanding into Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Such initiatives demonstrate that Belarus&#8217;s eastern engagement is becoming increasingly institutionalised rather than remaining dependent upon political goodwill alone.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A different understanding of Eurasia</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ultimately, however, this story is not simply about Belarus.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is about Central Asia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For more than three decades, the region has refined what is often described as a multi-vector foreign policy. Rather than aligning exclusively with one geopolitical centre, Central Asian governments seek productive relations with multiple partners simultaneously.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Russia remains indispensable in security matters.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/central-asian-prisoners-war-russia-ukraine/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/central-asian-prisoners-war-russia-ukraine/">“I only needed a passport” : In Ukraine, Central Asian prisoners of wars caught between loyalty and regret</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China has become the region&#8217;s principal economic partner and infrastructure investor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Türkiye has significantly expanded its cultural, educational and political presence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The European Union offers investment, regulatory cooperation and connectivity through initiatives such as the Global Gateway.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Japan and South Korea remain valued partners in technology and industrial development.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Belarus occupies a different niche.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It neither competes with these actors nor seeks to replace them. Instead, it provides industrial expertise, engineering education, agricultural technology and manufacturing partnerships that complement rather than challenge Central Asia&#8217;s broader foreign policy strategy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This helps explain why relations have continued to deepen despite the war in Ukraine.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Central Asian governments have not ignored Belarus&#8217;s international isolation. They have simply concluded that practical cooperation remains in their national interest.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Looking east</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As Shavkat Mirziyoyev arrives in Minsk, observers will understandably focus on the agreements signed, the trade figures announced and the diplomatic symbolism of the visit.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet its broader significance lies elsewhere.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The visit reflects the emergence of a Eurasia whose political geography no longer corresponds neatly to the map of sanctions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While Europe has largely distanced itself from Belarus, Central Asia has continued to engage it through industry, education, agriculture, regional diplomacy and technical cooperation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This does not mean that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan or their neighbours have chosen Belarus over Europe, or Russia over the West. Quite the opposite. Their continued engagement with Minsk illustrates the essence of multi-vector diplomacy: the refusal to view international relations as a zero-sum choice between competing blocs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read more on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/society/remittances-central-asia-migration-russia/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/en/society/remittances-central-asia-migration-russia/">Money, boxes and absent men: the hidden economy reshaping Central Asia</a><br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Belarus, Central Asia has become an increasingly important diplomatic and economic outlet at a time when options elsewhere have narrowed. For Central Asia, Belarus remains a useful partner whose industrial capabilities, educational institutions and technical expertise continue to meet concrete national needs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The geography of sanctions, it turns out, is not the geography of diplomacy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Belarus did not escape isolation after 2022. But it has worked to avoid irrelevance. By looking east, Minsk has found not a substitute for Europe, but a region willing to judge it less by geopolitical alignment than by practical cooperation. And in an increasingly fragmented international order, that may prove to be one of the most consequential shifts in Eurasian diplomacy that few outside the region have noticed.</p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English</strong></p>


<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/politics/belarus-central-asia-relations/">Minsk&#8217;s Eastern Bet: Why Central Asia Matters More Than Ever</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>What lies beneath Central Asia? Rare earths, critical minerals and the new race for resources</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/economics/central-asia-critical-minerals-rare-earths/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/economics/central-asia-critical-minerals-rare-earths/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 21:26:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kazakhstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kyrgyzstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tajikistan]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Uzbekistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[critical raw materials]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rare earths]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=48772</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/central-asia-critical-minerals-rare-earths/">What lies beneath Central Asia? Rare earths, critical minerals and the new race for resources</a></p>
<p>Central Asia is often described as the next frontier in the global race for rare earths. The reality is both more promising and more complicated. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and their neighbours do hold major reserves of critical raw materials, from uranium and copper to chromium, manganese, tungsten, antimony, graphite and rare earth elements. But much remains [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/central-asia-critical-minerals-rare-earths/">What lies beneath Central Asia? Rare earths, critical minerals and the new race for resources</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/central-asia-critical-minerals-rare-earths/">What lies beneath Central Asia? Rare earths, critical minerals and the new race for resources</a></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Central Asia is often described as the next frontier in the global race for rare earths. The reality is both more promising and more complicated. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and their neighbours do hold major reserves of critical raw materials, from uranium and copper to chromium, manganese, tungsten, antimony, graphite and rare earth elements. But much remains uncertain: some deposits are still under exploration, processing capacity is limited, and the most valuable parts of the supply chain remain outside the region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What is already clear, however, is that governments, state mining companies and foreign investors are moving fast. The European Union has signed critical raw materials partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. American investors are looking at tungsten and rare earths. France is active in uranium. Development banks are financing graphite and mining governance. China remains the unavoidable reference point, because it dominates global refining and processing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Central Asia, the question is not only what lies underground. It is whether the region can avoid becoming simply another supplier of raw materials for richer industrial powers.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why these minerals matter</h2>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="720" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Baiken_Mine_Site_-_Kazakhstan.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-48779" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Baiken_Mine_Site_-_Kazakhstan.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Baiken_Mine_Site_-_Kazakhstan-300x225.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Baiken_Mine_Site_-_Kazakhstan-768x576.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Baiken Mine Site, Kazakhstan. NAC Kazatomprom JSC, CC BY-SA 4.0 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0</a>, via Wikimedia Commons.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Also read on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/carbon-neutral-by-2060-kazakhstans-green-pledge-faces-a-reality-check/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/carbon-neutral-by-2060-kazakhstans-green-pledge-faces-a-reality-check/">Carbon neutral by 2060? Kazakhstan’s green pledge faces a reality check</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The term “critical raw materials” can sound technical, but the products they make possible are familiar. A smartphone contains copper, tungsten, rare earth elements and other metals. An electric vehicle depends on lithium, graphite, copper and sometimes cobalt. Wind turbines require steel, copper and powerful permanent magnets. Satellites, missiles, semiconductors and aircraft all need specialised metals.</p>



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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rare earths are only one part of the story. They include elements such as neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, cerium, lanthanum and yttrium. Some are used in permanent magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines, drones, missiles and electronic devices. Others are used in polishing, catalysts, lasers or specialised industrial applications.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But Central Asia’s strategic importance is wider than rare earths. Uranium is essential for nuclear power. Copper is needed for electrical grids, renewable energy infrastructure, electric vehicles and data centres. Graphite is used in battery anodes. Tungsten hardens steel and is used in cutting tools, aerospace and defence. Antimony is used in flame retardants, ammunition, batteries and semiconductors. Chromium and manganese are essential for steel. Titanium is used in aircraft, spacecraft and medical implants. Molybdenum strengthens steel used in pipelines, industry and defence. Gallium is important for semiconductors, radar systems and advanced electronics.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In other words, the issue is not only about “green energy”. It is also about industrial power, military technology, digital infrastructure and geopolitical dependency.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>What is actually known</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the OECD, Central Asia holds a significant share of global reserves of several critical raw materials. The region accounts for around 39% of global manganese ore reserves, 31% of chromium, 20% of lead, 13% of zinc, 9% of titanium, 6% of aluminium, and about 5% each of copper, cobalt and molybdenum.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan is the strongest player. It is already the world’s largest uranium producer and can export many of the materials included in the European Union’s critical raw materials list. Its known strengths include uranium, chromium, manganese, copper, titanium, tungsten, beryllium, gallium and rare earth potential.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="640" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Solidcores_Kyzyl_open_pit_mine_in_Abai_Region_Kazakhstan.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-48781" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Solidcores_Kyzyl_open_pit_mine_in_Abai_Region_Kazakhstan.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Solidcores_Kyzyl_open_pit_mine_in_Abai_Region_Kazakhstan-300x200.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Solidcores_Kyzyl_open_pit_mine_in_Abai_Region_Kazakhstan-768x512.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Solidcore&#8217;s Kyzyl open pit mine in Abai Region, Kazakhstan. Djlik1, CC BY-SA 4.0 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0</a>, via Wikimedia Commons.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Uzbekistan is also increasingly visible. The country has large copper resources, uranium, molybdenum, tungsten, gold-associated metals and rare metals. Its mining sector is dominated by national champions such as Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex, Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company and Navoiyuran.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kyrgyzstan has a smaller mining sector, but it is important for antimony, gold and rare earth occurrences. Tajikistan is also relevant for antimony, silver and rare metals. Turkmenistan remains the least transparent case, with public information still much thinner than for the rest of the region.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Kazakhstan’s rare earth moment</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The strongest recent rare earth story comes from Kazakhstan. In 2025, the Kazakhstani authorities announced the discovery of the Zhana Kazakhstan deposit, reportedly containing more than 20 million metric tons of rare earth metals. The deposit is said to include neodymium, cerium, lanthanum and yttrium, with an average content of about 700 grams per ton.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The announcement attracted attention because neodymium and related elements are central to permanent magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines and defence technologies. But it should be treated with caution. A deposit is not the same as a mine. A mine is not the same as a processing industry. And processing rare earths is technically difficult, expensive and environmentally sensitive.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is one of the main problems in the global rare earth race. China does not dominate only because it has resources. It dominates because it controls refining, separation and manufacturing capacity. For Central Asia, the real challenge is therefore not only geological. It is industrial.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The companies entering the race</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Kazakhstan, several national and foreign actors are already positioning themselves.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tau-Ken Samruk, the state mining company, is expected to play a central role in exploration and strategic mineral projects. Kazatomprom remains the key uranium actor, while Eurasian Resources Group is important for aluminium, copper, cobalt and gallium. ERG has announced plans to produce gallium in Kazakhstan, a metal used in semiconductors, radar systems and missile guidance.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">American interest is also growing. Cove Capital has been linked to tungsten projects in Kazakhstan, including Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty, in partnership with Tau-Ken Samruk. Tungsten is strategically important because it is used in hard metals, defence and industrial tools, while Western countries are trying to reduce dependence on China.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sarytogan Graphite, active in Kazakhstan’s Karaganda region, is another example. Graphite is essential for battery anodes, especially in electric vehicles. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development acquired a stake in the company in 2024, showing that development banks are also entering the critical minerals field.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="960" height="720" src="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Inkai_Uranium_Mine_in_Kazakhstan.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-48782" srcset="https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Inkai_Uranium_Mine_in_Kazakhstan.jpg 960w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Inkai_Uranium_Mine_in_Kazakhstan-300x225.jpg 300w, https://novastan.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/06/960px-Inkai_Uranium_Mine_in_Kazakhstan-768x576.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 960px) 100vw, 960px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Inkai Uranium Mine in Kazakhstan. NAC Kazatomprom JSC, CC BY-SA 4.0 <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0</a>, via Wikimedia Commons.</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Uzbekistan, the main actors are domestic state companies. Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex is central for copper, molybdenum and other metals. Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company remains one of the country’s major mining giants. Navoiyuran, the Uzbekistani uranium company, has signed with France’s Orano to develop a new uranium mining venture.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These examples show that the critical minerals race is not only a matter of abstract geopolitics. It is already visible in company strategies, financing decisions and bilateral agreements.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Europe, China, Russia and the United States</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Europe, Central Asia is attractive because it offers potential diversification. The European Union signed a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan in 2022 on sustainable raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen value chains. In 2024, it signed a similar memorandum with Uzbekistan. The first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand in 2025 also placed critical raw materials within a broader agenda of trade, transport, energy and connectivity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For the United States, Central Asian minerals are part of a larger attempt to reduce dependence on China in strategic supply chains. Interest in tungsten, rare earths, gallium and other materials fits into this broader competition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Also read on Novastan:</strong> <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/tadjikistan/lheritage-de-tabochar-lextraction-duranium-au-tadjikistan-et-ses-consequences/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/tadjikistan/lheritage-de-tabochar-lextraction-duranium-au-tadjikistan-et-ses-consequences/">L’héritage de Tabochar : l’extraction d’uranium au Tadjikistan et ses conséquences</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China remains the central actor, even when it is not directly mentioned. It is the world’s dominant processor of rare earths and many other critical minerals. Any Western strategy on Central Asian resources is therefore, implicitly or explicitly, about reducing China’s leverage.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Russia still matters through legacy infrastructure, Soviet-era geological knowledge, uranium links and regional influence. But Moscow is no longer the only external actor able to shape Central Asia’s mineral future. This is one reason why the topic is becoming politically sensitive.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The real bottleneck: processing</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most important part of the story is not extraction. It is processing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A country can have uranium, copper, tungsten or rare earth deposits and still capture only a small part of the value. The highest profits and strategic leverage often come from refining, separation, metallurgy, battery components, magnets and advanced manufacturing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is where Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are trying to change the model. Both countries want more local value creation, not only raw exports. Uzbekistan is promoting mining reform and industrial processing. Kazakhstan is trying to position itself as a partner for value chains rather than just a supplier of ore.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Also read on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/en-ouzbekistan-la-percee-saoudienne-dans-le-secteur-de-lenergie/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/en-ouzbekistan-la-percee-saoudienne-dans-le-secteur-de-lenergie/">En Ouzbékistan, la percée saoudienne dans le secteur de l’énergie</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The risk is obvious. Central Asia has already experienced extractive economic models: cotton, oil, gas, uranium and metals have often generated revenue without creating diversified, high-value economies. Critical minerals could reproduce the same pattern under a greener label.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Environmental and social risks</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Critical minerals are often presented as tools of the green transition, but their extraction can be environmentally damaging. Mining requires water, energy, chemicals and waste management. Rare earth processing can be particularly polluting if not properly regulated. In a region already facing water stress, desertification and fragile ecosystems, this matters.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There are also governance questions. Who benefits from new mining projects? How transparent are contracts? Are local communities consulted? Are environmental standards enforced? Do projects create skilled employment, or mainly export raw materials?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Also read on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/en-asie-centrale-le-marche-des-vehicules-electriques-fait-ses-debuts/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/en-asie-centrale-le-marche-des-vehicules-electriques-fait-ses-debuts/">En Asie centrale, le marché des véhicules électriques fait ses débuts</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Central Asian governments, the opportunity is real. But so is the danger of a “green resource curse”, where global demand for clean technologies reinforces old patterns of dependency, opacity and environmental damage.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A starter pack for readers</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The simplest way to understand the issue is this:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Rare earths such as neodymium and dysprosium are used in magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines and defence technologies.</li>



<li>Uranium is used for nuclear power.</li>



<li>Copper is used in electrical grids, renewable energy, electric vehicles and data centres.</li>



<li>Graphite is used in battery anodes.</li>



<li>Lithium is used in rechargeable batteries, though Central Asia is not yet a major global lithium centre.</li>



<li>Cobalt is used in batteries and aerospace alloys.</li>



<li>Tungsten is used in hard metals, cutting tools, aerospace and military equipment.</li>



<li>Antimony is used in flame retardants, ammunition, batteries and semiconductors.</li>



<li>Chromium and manganese are used in steelmaking.</li>



<li>Titanium is used in aircraft, spacecraft and medical implants.</li>



<li>Molybdenum is used in high-strength steel.</li>



<li>Gallium is used in semiconductors, radar and advanced electronics.</li>



<li>Beryllium is used in aerospace, satellites, telecommunications and defence systems.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is why Central Asia’s mineral base is suddenly being watched so closely. The region is not only sitting on obscure metals. It may hold some of the materials needed for the energy transition, digital technologies and modern defence industries.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">More than a mine?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The coming years will show whether Central Asia can turn critical minerals into a development opportunity. The region has the resources. It has growing diplomatic attention. It has national mining companies and foreign investors willing to engage.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But the decisive question is whether Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and their neighbours can move beyond extraction. Without processing, transparency, environmental standards and local value creation, the new critical minerals boom could simply repeat older patterns of dependency.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Also read on Novastan</strong>: <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/nucleaire-le-kazakhstan-renforce-emprise-sur-les-ressources-uranium/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/nucleaire-le-kazakhstan-renforce-emprise-sur-les-ressources-uranium/">Le Kazakhstan renforce son emprise sur son uranium face à une demande mondiale croissante</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Central Asia is not yet the next rare earth superpower. But it is becoming an important region in the global competition for critical raw materials. For the region itself, the challenge is to ensure that what lies beneath the ground helps build something above it.</p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English</strong></p>


<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/economics/central-asia-critical-minerals-rare-earths/">What lies beneath Central Asia? Rare earths, critical minerals and the new race for resources</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>In Kazakhstan, the futuristic city of “Alatau” reaches a new milestone with special status</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-futuristic-city-alatau-special-status/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-futuristic-city-alatau-special-status/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 13:45:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kazakhstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics and Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[alatau]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Almaty]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=48562</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-futuristic-city-alatau-special-status/">In Kazakhstan, the futuristic city of “Alatau” reaches a new milestone with special status</a></p>
<p>Presented as a future major technological and economic hub, the city of Alatau in Kazakhstan is entering a new phase of institutional structuring after obtaining special status, amid persistent uncertainties about its development. On 27 March, Kazakhstan’s Parliament adopted a law establishing a special legal regime for the city of Alatau, located a few dozen [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-futuristic-city-alatau-special-status/">In Kazakhstan, the futuristic city of “Alatau” reaches a new milestone with special status</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-futuristic-city-alatau-special-status/">In Kazakhstan, the futuristic city of “Alatau” reaches a new milestone with special status</a></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Presented as a future major technological and economic hub, the city of Alatau in Kazakhstan is entering a new phase of institutional structuring after obtaining special status, amid persistent uncertainties about its development.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><br>On 27 March, Kazakhstan’s Parliament adopted a law establishing a special legal regime for the city of Alatau, located a few dozen kilometres from <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/almaty-la-ville-aux-1000-couleurs-et-aux-1001-annees/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/almaty-la-ville-aux-1000-couleurs-et-aux-1001-annees/">Almaty</a>. This status as a “territory of accelerated development”, with specific economic, administrative and legal rules, is intended to attract investment and foster innovation. The decision marks an important step in the evolution of a project that has been presented for several years as a future technological showcase for the country.</p>


<p style="background-color: #d4d4d4; text-align: center;"><a href="https://donorbox.org/soutenir-novastan"><b>Soutien à Novastan</b></a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Until recently, however, Alatau remained largely associated with political announcements and ambitious projections, without any real implementation on the ground. The adoption of this special status therefore reflects the Kazakhstani authorities’ desire to structure the project and give it an operational dimension. It remains to be seen whether this institutional advance will make it possible to turn a futuristic vision into a tangible reality.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A project revived by the adoption of a special legal regime</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the <a href="https://alatau.city/news/parliament-approves-constitutional-law-on-the-special-status-of-alatau-city" type="link" id="https://alatau.city/news/parliament-approves-constitutional-law-on-the-special-status-of-alatau-city">municipality</a>, the city will now benefit from a distinct governance system, with an organisation designed to speed up decision-making and facilitate the establishment of economic actors. The project notably provides for the creation of a strategic authority, the Alatau City Authority, responsible for defining development priorities, as well as an operational body dedicated to the day-to-day management of the project.<br></p>


<p style="background-color: #d4d4d4;"><span style="color: #000000;">Novastan est le seul média en français et en allemand spécialisé sur l'Asie centrale. Entièrement associatif, il fonctionne grâce à votre participation. Nous sommes indépendants et pour le rester, nous avons besoin de vous ! Vous pouvez nous soutenir <strong><a href="https://www.okpal.com/soutenez-novastan-seul-media-francais-sur-l-asie/#/">à partir de 2 euros par mois</a></strong> (défiscalisé à 66 %), ou en devenant membre actif<strong> <strong><a href="https://www.helloasso.com/associations/novastan/adhesions/devenez-membres-de-novastan-france">par ici</a></strong>.</strong></span></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The city will therefore be placed under the supervision of a council chaired by Prime Minister Olzhas <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oljas_Bektenov" type="link" id="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oljas_Bektenov">Bektenov</a>, in order to ensure direct coordination at the highest level of the state. At the same time, traditional local institutions, such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akim" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akim">akimats</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%A4slihat" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%A4slihat">maslikhats</a>, will retain their powers in urban management and public social services.<br></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Also read on Novastan : <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/almaty-cyclabilite-decisions-politiques-projets-innovants/">Almaty, une ville en quête de cyclabilité</a></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Beyond governance, this status comes with a specific regulatory framework, including tax incentives, simplified administrative procedures and rules adapted to innovative sectors. This development allows the project to move beyond the announcement stage and enter a concrete institutional framework, marking a new phase in its development.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>An economic and regulatory framework designed to attract investment</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Launched in the early years of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s mandate in the 2020s, Alatau is intended to become a hub capable of attracting international investment and supporting the country’s economic diversification, notably through its integration into a special economic zone.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The city, which has more than 50,000 inhabitants, is also intended to become a hub for digital technologies, digital assets and innovative financial services. In May 2025, President Tokayev <a href="https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-unveils-alatau-investor-led-city-with-crypto-ambitions/" type="link" id="https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-unveils-alatau-investor-led-city-with-crypto-ambitions/">announced</a> the creation of a pilot zone called “CryptoCity” in Alatau, where cryptocurrencies could be legally used to pay for goods and services. This direction is part of a broader strategy aimed at positioning Kazakhstan as an emerging player in high value-added sectors.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Also read on Novastan : </strong><a href="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/le-kazakhstan-envisage-lutilisation-de-cartes-de-paiement-cryptographiques/"><strong>Le Kazakhstan envisage l’utilisation de cartes de paiement cryptographiques</strong></a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Several concrete initiatives illustrate this ambition. As reported by <a href="https://alatau.city/news/kazakhstan-and-south-korea-discuss-infrastructure-development-of-alatau-city-under-the-eipp-program" type="link" id="https://alatau.city/news/kazakhstan-and-south-korea-discuss-infrastructure-development-of-alatau-city-under-the-eipp-program">Alatau</a> City, discussions have been held with South Korea under the Economic Innovation Partnership Program, or EIPP, for the development of the city’s infrastructure. In addition, a branch of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, or <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KAIST" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KAIST">KAIST</a>, one of South Korea’s leading technological universities, is set to be established in Alatau, strengthening its academic and scientific positioning.<br></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="https://novastan.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2026/04/tours-jumelles-alatau-1024x656.png" alt="" class="wp-image-74757"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><strong>Projection of the “Iconic Towers” in Alatau. Credit: Alatau City</strong></figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Financial ambitions are also significant. According to the Kazakh authorities, planned investment in the project could reach 10.4 trillion tenge, or around €20 billion. At the same time, the municipality has <a href="https://alatau.city/news/alatau-city-prepares-to-launch-construction-of-iconic-towers-a-world-class-multifunctional-complex" type="link" id="https://alatau.city/news/alatau-city-prepares-to-launch-construction-of-iconic-towers-a-world-class-multifunctional-complex">announced</a> the upcoming start of construction on a landmark architectural complex called “Iconic Towers”. Work is due to begin in May 2026, with completion expected by 2029, at an estimated cost of $800 million, or around €680 million. These elements reflect a desire to give Alatau an economic, technological and symbolic dimension.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Between stated ambitions and persistent uncertainties</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Despite these advances, several factors call for caution regarding the project’s immediate impact. In particular, a lack of clarity remains around the tax and legal rules applicable to Alatau, raising questions about the coherence and effective implementation of the system. These uncertainties reflect the difficulties inherent in creating an entirely new regulatory framework.</p>


<p style="background-color: #d4d4d4;"><span style="color: #000000;">Want more Central Asia in your inbox? Subscribe to our newsletter <strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><a href="https://2ff41361.sibforms.com/serve/MUIFAKS0hXNCcjFtbbcHdbJer3pXwcATF16qgsum6tyGvEoLgCq6WxavUIwFIL5eEtBRM4bkdWo7mhR1SC46O1OVL-kNQ3V6dDIMW2lW4yX07D38i9F5WPnDQ4DAntlKpsydvy7tqGoq93Wq0aDjvzmAy4QqjMEHX5pDsqLrfgyB9JJM_MlmNURoizq5Y9h8wB3nHnr5Lk_g0RP5">here.</a></span></strong></span></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Above all, the situation on the ground remains limited at this stage. In March 2026, Kazakh influencer Alimbek Ulan <a href="https://youtu.be/XhtYRGL3gLg?is=xzvBdMxz9JlPUpUf" type="link" id="https://youtu.be/XhtYRGL3gLg?is=xzvBdMxz9JlPUpUf">visited</a> the Alatau site and observed the start of excavation work on the outskirts of the area concerned. However, no major structural progress was visible, confirming that the project remains largely in a preparatory phase.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Also read on Novastan : </strong><a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/au-kazakhstan-la-privatisation-dune-partie-du-parc-national-dile-alatau-fait-polemique/"><strong>Au Kazakhstan, la privatisation d’une partie du parc national d’Ile-Alatau fait polémique</strong></a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This gap between stated ambitions and concrete progress has fuelled criticism from some observers, who point to the risk of Alatau remaining a primarily symbolic project. The year 2026 therefore appears to be a decisive moment: with the announced launch of construction work, the authorities will have to demonstrate their ability to turn announcements into reality and begin a genuine construction phase.</p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Lenny Cabrol Noto</strong><br><strong>Author for Novastan</strong></p>


<p>Thank you for reading this article! If you have time, we would appreciate your feedback, either through this anonymous form or by email at <a href="mailto:editorial@novastan.org"><em>editorial@novastan.org</em></a>. Thank you very much!</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-futuristic-city-alatau-special-status/">In Kazakhstan, the futuristic city of “Alatau” reaches a new milestone with special status</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>Overview of environmental issues in Kazakhstan</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/environment/overview-of-environmental-issues-in-kazakhstan/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/environment/overview-of-environmental-issues-in-kazakhstan/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 13:20:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Environment and Climate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kazakhstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Environment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pollution]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/environment/overview-of-environmental-issues-in-kazakhstan/">Overview of environmental issues in Kazakhstan</a></p>
<p>Like many countries, Kazakhstan is facing major environmental problems. Kazakh media outlet The Village has listed the environmental issues most frequently discussed in the country. Kazakhstan continues to actively address the environmental challenges affecting different regions of the country. In recent years, the environmental situation in major cities has deteriorated significantly: the basins of many [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/environment/overview-of-environmental-issues-in-kazakhstan/">Overview of environmental issues in Kazakhstan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/environment/overview-of-environmental-issues-in-kazakhstan/">Overview of environmental issues in Kazakhstan</a></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Like many countries, Kazakhstan is facing major environmental problems. Kazakh media outlet <em>The Village</em> has listed the environmental issues most frequently discussed in the country.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakhstan continues to actively address the environmental challenges affecting different regions of the country.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In recent years, the environmental situation in major cities has deteriorated significantly: the basins of many water bodies are gradually drying up, emissions of harmful substances exceed permitted levels several times over, and industrial enterprises are releasing chemicals into the environment in an uncontrolled manner.</p>



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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazakh media outlet <em>The Village</em> has listed the main ecological problems facing the country.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Air pollution</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For many years, the East Kazakhstan <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Kazakhstan_Region" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Kazakhstan_Region">region</a> remained the country’s largest industrial region. According to the Bureau of National Statistics, more than 15,000 companies are <a href="https://stat.gov.kz/ru/region/vko/" type="link" id="https://stat.gov.kz/ru/region/vko/">registered</a> there. These include major industrial giants such as Kazzinc, KazMinerals, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oskemen" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oskemen">Ust</a>-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulba_Metallurgical_Plant" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulba_Metallurgical_Plant">Ulba</a> Metallurgical Plant and others.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The mining and metallurgical company Kazzinc, which produces zinc, copper, lead and other precious metals, is the most significant source of pollution. According to the region’s ecology department, in 2021 Kazzinc accounted for almost <a href="https://vlast.kz/obsshestvo/42033-u-vas-ze-v-almaty-ese-huze-kak-zadyhaetsa-ust-kamenogorsk.html" type="link" id="https://vlast.kz/obsshestvo/42033-u-vas-ze-v-almaty-ese-huze-kak-zadyhaetsa-ust-kamenogorsk.html">half</a> of all pollutant emissions in the region.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read also on Novastan : <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/au-kazakhstan-les-villes-industrielles-souffrent-de-la-pollution-atmospherique/">Au Kazakhstan, les villes industrielles souffrent de la pollution atmosphérique</a></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to Kazhydromet, in the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk, the region’s administrative centre, unfavourable weather conditions are recorded around 100 days a year. These are days when there is no wind in the region, causing harmful substances to accumulate in the air. During such periods, scientists even advise residents to avoid long walks outdoors, not to open windows, and to prioritise distance learning for schoolchildren.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Today, the East Kazakhstan region tops the national ranking for cancer incidence. The rate in the oblast is 55% higher than the national average: 321 cases per 100,000 inhabitants. Residents themselves say they have been experiencing a sweet, metallic taste in their mouths for <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZf7jAvo_eg&amp;t=994s" type="link" id="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZf7jAvo_eg&amp;t=994s">years</a>.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Polluted rivers</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Senator Olga Bulavkina has <a href="https://ulysmedia.kz/regiony/42515-400-tysiach-zhitelei-vko-stradaiut-ot-zagriazneniia-vozdukha-situatsiiu-nazvali-kriticheskoi/" type="link" id="https://ulysmedia.kz/regiony/42515-400-tysiach-zhitelei-vko-stradaiut-ot-zagriazneniia-vozdukha-situatsiiu-nazvali-kriticheskoi/">highlighted</a> the critical level of air pollution in Ust-Kamenogorsk, noting that hydrogen chloride levels exceed the norm by nine times. She has also linked this pollution to the increase in cancer cases.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Representatives of the prosecutor’s office have <a href="https://kazpravda.kz/n/v-vostochno-kazahstanskoy-oblasti-vsego-13-poligonov-tbo-sootvetstvuyut-ekologicheskim-trebovaniyam/?utm_source" type="link" id="https://kazpravda.kz/n/v-vostochno-kazahstanskoy-oblasti-vsego-13-poligonov-tbo-sootvetstvuyut-ekologicheskim-trebovaniyam/?utm_source">stated</a> that, out of the region’s 165 landfills, only 22 comply with environmental requirements — just 13%.</p>





<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It should be noted that pollution of local water bodies is regularly recorded in the region. In May 2019, residents noticed that the Berezovka River had turned bright green. Following an inspection, scientists found that the water contained 140 times the permitted level of manganese, 44 times the permitted level of zinc, twice the permitted level of ammonium, and five times the permitted levels of sulphate and copper.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kazzinc was held responsible for uncontrolled discharges and fined 8 million tenge, or €14,640. In July 2023, residents <a href="https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/ecogeo/press/news/details/595523?lang=ru" type="link" id="https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/ecogeo/press/news/details/595523?lang=ru">noticed</a> that the water in the Filippovka River had turned milky white. Kazzinc again paid a fine, this time of 50 million tenge, or €91,589.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Modernising industrial facilities to reduce pollution</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is important to note that many rivers in East Kazakhstan are tributaries of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irtysh" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irtysh">Irtysh</a>. They form part of a single ecosystem. When one body of water is polluted, there is always a risk that harmful substances will enter other channels. The water from these rivers is used not only for drinking water, but also for agriculture and for the operation of thermal power plants and industrial enterprises.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read also on Novastan : <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/hecatombe-de-cygnes-causee-par-la-pollution/">Kazakhstan : une hécatombe de cygnes causée par la pollution</a></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As a result, the Ust-Kamenogorsk metallurgical complex had to <a href="https://minexforum.com/ru/2025/01/10/%D1%8D%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%8B-%D0%B2-%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%85%D1%81/?utm_source" type="link" id="https://minexforum.com/ru/2025/01/10/%D1%8D%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%8B-%D0%B2-%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%85%D1%81/?utm_source">modernise</a> its sulphur gas purification units, which should reduce sulphur emissions by 10 to 20%. In <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ridder,_Kazakhstan" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ridder,_Kazakhstan">Ridder</a>, a new workshop was built, reducing emissions by 714 tonnes in 2024.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On 9 October 2024, it was announced that an environmental air monitoring <a href="https://www.inform.kz/ru/v-vko-sozdadut-novuyu-sistemu-ekologicheskogo-monitoringa-vozduha-2179cc?utm_source">system</a> was being introduced and that eco-offices would be opened to allow residents to monitor air quality themselves. Work is also under way to improve the emissions monitoring system. This was stated by the akim, or local government representative, of the East Kazakhstan region, Ermek Kosherbayev.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Air pollution in Almaty</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In January 2025, <a href="https://www.novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/almaty-la-ville-aux-1000-couleurs-et-aux-1001-annees/" type="link" id="https://www.novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/almaty-la-ville-aux-1000-couleurs-et-aux-1001-annees/">Almaty</a> topped the <a href="https://www.inform.kz/ru/v-vko-sozdadut-novuyu-sistemu-ekologicheskogo-monitoringa-vozduha-2179cc?utm_source" type="link" id="https://www.inform.kz/ru/v-vko-sozdadut-novuyu-sistemu-ekologicheskogo-monitoringa-vozduha-2179cc?utm_source">ranking</a> of the world’s most polluted megacities. According to environmentalists from the Almaty Air Initiative, one year of living in the city is equivalent to smoking 487 cigarettes. Annual emissions of pollutants into the atmosphere amount to around 125,000 tonnes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In addition, according to a <a href="https://aqparat.info/news/2024/10/01/10711953-opros_42_respondentov_schitayut_kachestv.html" type="link" id="https://aqparat.info/news/2024/10/01/10711953-opros_42_respondentov_schitayut_kachestv.html">survey</a> carried out by the Almaty Air Initiative in August 2024, 42% of respondents believe that air quality in their neighbourhood is poor or very poor. One in six residents is considering moving because of the poor environmental conditions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read also on Novastan : <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/decryptage/la-pollution-de-lair-toujours-aussi-forte-en-asie-centrale/">La pollution de l’air toujours aussi forte en Asie centrale</a></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2024, 202 days of high air pollution were recorded in Almaty. Specialists <a href="https://www.nur.kz/society/2216177-zhitelyam-rekomenduetsya-nosit-maski-ekologicheskaya-situaciya-v-almaty-stala-kriticheskoy-zayavil-deputat/?utm_source" type="link" id="https://www.nur.kz/society/2216177-zhitelyam-rekomenduetsya-nosit-maski-ekologicheskaya-situaciya-v-almaty-stala-kriticheskoy-zayavil-deputat/?utm_source">recommend</a> that residents limit their time outdoors and use protective masks, particularly those who are especially sensitive.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At a meeting of the Public Council, <a href="https://www.inform.kz/ru/zagryaznenie-vozduha-v-almati-v-48-raza-previshaet-dopustimuyu-normu-eksperti-fd61c8?utm_source" type="link" id="https://www.inform.kz/ru/zagryaznenie-vozduha-v-almati-v-48-raza-previshaet-dopustimuyu-normu-eksperti-fd61c8?utm_source">data</a> on the main sources of pollution in Almaty were presented. Motor transport is the city’s main source of air pollution, accounting for around 60% of total emissions. Industrial enterprises also heavily <a href="https://ile-tany.kz/2025/03/04/chto-proishodit-s-vozduhom-v-almaty/?utm_source" type="link" id="https://ile-tany.kz/2025/03/04/chto-proishodit-s-vozduhom-v-almaty/?utm_source">pollute</a> the environment, emitting around 27.5% of all harmful substances. The use of coal heating in private homes also contributes to air pollution, accounting for around 11% of total <a href="https://ile-tany.kz/2025/03/04/chto-proishodit-s-vozduhom-v-almaty/?utm_source" type="link" id="https://ile-tany.kz/2025/03/04/chto-proishodit-s-vozduhom-v-almaty/?utm_source">emissions</a>.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The government is aware of the problem</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In November 2022, President Kassym-Jomart <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/kassym-jomart-tokaiev-le-diplomate-devenu-president/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/kassym-jomart-tokaiev-le-diplomate-devenu-president/">Tokayev</a>, addressing Almaty residents, <a href="https://www.zakon.kz/politika/6376943-tokaev-ozvuchil-osnovnuyu-problemu-almatintsev.html" type="link" id="https://www.zakon.kz/politika/6376943-tokaev-ozvuchil-osnovnuyu-problemu-almatintsev.html">raised</a> the issue of air pollution in the city. He noted that the state of the environment has a direct impact on people’s health and lives.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">During a meeting with residents of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jetisu_Region" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jetisu_Region">Zhetysu</a> district, Almaty akim Yerbolat Dossayev <a href="https://ratel.kz/kaz/kak_sobirajutsja_uluchshat_kachestvo_vozduha_v_almaty?utm_source" type="link" id="https://ratel.kz/kaz/kak_sobirajutsja_uluchshat_kachestvo_vozduha_v_almaty?utm_source">explained</a> how the city intends to address environmental problems. According to him, the full modernisation of Combined Heat and Power Plant 2 will be completed in 2026, which should reduce emissions by 90%.</p>





<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Transport is also being actively developed. By the end of 2026, the city has promised to replace all public transport with environmentally friendly vehicles.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Waste disposal</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Waste and rubbish are also among Almaty’s main environmental problems. A large number of illegal dumps have accumulated in the city, and waste recycling remains difficult. During a meeting with residents of the Almaty region in October 2022, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev <a href="https://informburo.kz/novosti/tokaev-neobxodimo-resit-problemy-s-utilizaciei-musora-v-almatinskoi-oblasti?utm_source" type="link" id="https://informburo.kz/novosti/tokaev-neobxodimo-resit-problemy-s-utilizaciei-musora-v-almatinskoi-oblasti?utm_source">called</a> for all tourist routes to be equipped with rubbish bins and for waste collection and sorting to be organised. He also instructed the Ministry of Internal Affairs to step up efforts to bring those responsible for illegal dumps to justice.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Plans are being <a href="https://bizmedia.kz/2023-08-09-ezhegodno-v-almatinskoj-oblasti-obrazuetsya-430-tonn-musora-iz-kotoryh-pererabatyvaetsya-100-tonn/?utm_source" type="link" id="https://bizmedia.kz/2023-08-09-ezhegodno-v-almatinskoj-oblasti-obrazuetsya-430-tonn-musora-iz-kotoryh-pererabatyvaetsya-100-tonn/?utm_source">discussed</a> to build a waste recycling plant in the Ile <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ile_District,_Kazakhstan" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ile_District,_Kazakhstan">district</a> and another facility in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karasay_District" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karasay_District">Karasay</a> district, which would recycle waste and produce electricity from greenhouse gases.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Also read on Novastan : <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/environnement/decharges-sauvages-au-kazakhstan-dou-viennent-elles-et-comment-lutter-contre/">Décharges sauvages au Kazakhstan : d’où viennent-elles, et comment lutter contre ?</a></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As early as 26 February 2022, a <a href="https://informburo.kz/stati/kazaxstancam-nuzno-ne-prosto-slysashhee-no-vidyashheei-deistvuyushhee-gosudarstvo-cego-trebovali-ucastniki-mitinga-v-almaty?utm_source">rally</a> for clean air was organised in Almaty. Participants called on the authorities to take urgent and comprehensive measures, arguing that the city was on the brink of an ecological disaster. Among the participants were activists, experts, students and families with children.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the rally, expert Aiymgul Kerimray accused the authorities of manipulating emissions data and called for a transition to European standards for assessing pollution. Activist Asiya Tulesova called on the state not only to listen, but also to act.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong><strong>The drying up of the Aral Sea</strong></strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Until 1960, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aral_Sea" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aral_Sea">Aral</a> Sea was the fourth-largest lake in the world. But because of Soviet irrigation projects, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syr_Darya" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syr_Darya">Syr</a> Darya and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amu_Darya" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amu_Darya">Amu</a> Darya rivers, which fed the basin, were diverted.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As a result, over the past 60 years, the Aral Sea has shrunk by a factor of three, while its volume has decreased fifteenfold. Its water level has fallen by 29 metres. In the 1980s, the sea split into two parts: the northern Small Aral and the southern Large Aral. This tragedy led to the migration of most of the region’s wildlife, the disappearance of fish, and the emergence of the Aralkum Desert.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Also read on Novastan : <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/environnement/le-totalitarisme-de-lirrigation-a-tue-la-mer-daral/">Le totalitarisme de l’irrigation a tué la mer d’Aral</a></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2023, the akim of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyzylorda_Region" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyzylorda_Region">Kyzylorda</a> region, Nurlybek Nalibayev, <a href="https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/chto-proishodit-s-aralskim-morem-rasskazal-akim-oblasti-501349/?utm_source" type="link" id="https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/chto-proishodit-s-aralskim-morem-rasskazal-akim-oblasti-501349/?utm_source">stated</a> that tens of millions of tonnes of salt and dust are carried by the wind every year from the dried-up bed of the Aral Sea. They travel thousands of kilometres. “The only way to prevent salt from spreading beyond the sea area is to plant saxauls,” a type of Central Asian tree, he said.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the akim, 350,000 hectares of saxaul were planted on the dried-up bed of the Aral Sea between 2021 and 2022.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A full restoration of the sea is impossible</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, scientists have <a href="https://www.nur.kz/society/2216177-zhitelyam-rekomenduetsya-nosit-maski-ekologicheskaya-situaciya-v-almaty-stala-kriticheskoy-zayavil-deputat/?utm_source" type="link" id="https://www.nur.kz/society/2216177-zhitelyam-rekomenduetsya-nosit-maski-ekologicheskaya-situaciya-v-almaty-stala-kriticheskoy-zayavil-deputat/?utm_source">expressed</a> doubts about the possibility of fully <a href="https://www.nur.kz/society/2216177-zhitelyam-rekomenduetsya-nosit-maski-ekologicheskaya-situaciya-v-almaty-stala-kriticheskoy-zayavil-deputat/?utm_source" type="link" id="https://www.nur.kz/society/2216177-zhitelyam-rekomenduetsya-nosit-maski-ekologicheskaya-situaciya-v-almaty-stala-kriticheskoy-zayavil-deputat/?utm_source">restoring</a> the Aral Sea. Ecologist Yevgeny Simonov has said that the region’s water deficit is increasing and that it is more realistic to speak of preserving delta water bodies and wetlands than of fully restoring the sea.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mels Yeleusizov, president of the environmental movement Tabigat, <a href="https://www.zakon.kz/obshestvo/6466530-vozrozhdenie-aralskogo-morya-kak-kazakhstan-vosstanavlivaet-ekosistemu-severnogo-arala.html" type="link" id="https://www.zakon.kz/obshestvo/6466530-vozrozhdenie-aralskogo-morya-kak-kazakhstan-vosstanavlivaet-ekosistemu-severnogo-arala.html">notes</a> that the drying up of the Aral Sea leads to the spread of salty dust, which settles on glaciers and accelerates their melting. He stresses that the disappearance of this body of water has a negative impact on Kazakhstan’s ecosystem, contributing to desertification and the deterioration of the region’s environment.</p>


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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At the expense of the state and regional budgets, 101,000 <a href="https://kyzylorda-news.kz/ru/politika/153-mln-sazhencev-saksaula-vysadili-na-dne-aralskogo-morya-08-04-2024" type="link" id="https://kyzylorda-news.kz/ru/politika/153-mln-sazhencev-saksaula-vysadili-na-dne-aralskogo-morya-08-04-2024">hectares</a> were planted in 2021. In 2022, phytoremediation work was carried out over an area of 250,000 hectares, and in 2023 over an area of 193,200 hectares. From 2024 to 2025, these phytoremediation efforts targeted 556,200 hectares.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Thanks to agreements reached with neighbouring countries, a total of 1.6 billion cubic metres of water had been <a href="https://kapital.kz/gosudarstvo/134213/k-kontsu-goda-ob-yem-vody-v-aral-skom-more-vyrastet-do-23-4-mlrd-kubometrov.html" type="link" id="https://kapital.kz/gosudarstvo/134213/k-kontsu-goda-ob-yem-vody-v-aral-skom-more-vyrastet-do-23-4-mlrd-kubometrov.html">sent</a> to the northern part of the Aral Sea by the end of March 2025. In April of the same year, the total volume of water in the northern Aral Sea stood at 22.1 billion cubic metres, 3.2 billion cubic metres more than at the beginning of 2022.</p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong><strong>Daniyar Beisembayev and Sultan Temirkhan</strong><br>Journalists for <em>The Village</em></strong></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Translated from <a href="https://www.the-village-kz.com/village/city/situation/40339-gryaznyy-vozduh-vysyhanie-vodoemov-i-vybrosy-himikatov" type="link" id="https://www.the-village-kz.com/village/city/situation/40339-gryaznyy-vozduh-vysyhanie-vodoemov-i-vybrosy-himikatov">Russian</a> by Sophie Combaret and from <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/tour-dhorizon-problemes-environnementaux-kazakhstan/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/tour-dhorizon-problemes-environnementaux-kazakhstan/">French</a> by Mathieu Lemoine</strong></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Proofread by Elise Medina (French version)</strong></p>


<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/environment/overview-of-environmental-issues-in-kazakhstan/">Overview of environmental issues in Kazakhstan</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>Kazakhstan continues to assert itself as the “key link” in the Middle Corridor</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-key-link-middle-corridor/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:51:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Context]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kazakhstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle Corridor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Transport]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=48539</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-key-link-middle-corridor/">Kazakhstan continues to assert itself as the “key link” in the Middle Corridor</a></p>
<p>Kazakhstan strengthens its role as a key link in the Middle Corridor</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-key-link-middle-corridor/">Kazakhstan continues to assert itself as the “key link” in the Middle Corridor</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-key-link-middle-corridor/">Kazakhstan continues to assert itself as the “key link” in the Middle Corridor</a></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Last month, Kazakhstan hosted the 40th Conference of Directors General of Railways, bringing together representatives from more than thirty countries. It was an opportunity for Astana to showcase its ambitions for the “Middle Corridor”, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and the reshaping of global trade routes.<br></strong></p>


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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">From Monday 20 April to Monday 24 April 2026, the 40th Conference of Directors General of Railways brought together more than thirty countries in the heart of the Kazakh capital, against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The Organisation for Co-operation between Railways, known as the OSJD, is an intergovernmental organization that brings together a network of more than <a href="https://en.osjd.org/api/media/resources/c/68/121/258" type="link" id="https://en.osjd.org/api/media/resources/c/68/121/258">320,000 kilometres</a> of railway tracks, carrying around 5.5 billion passengers and nearly 5 billion tonnes of freight each year. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Founded in 1956, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_for_Co%E2%80%91operation_between_Railways" type="link" id="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_for_Co%E2%80%91operation_between_Railways">OSJD</a> &#8211; the main forum for railway coordination between Europe and Asia and a legacy of technical cooperation from the Soviet era &#8211; has gradually expanded to include new members. It currently has 27 members, ranging from Albania to Vietnam.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This year, the 40th <a href="https://www.transportcorridors.com/20350" type="link" id="https://www.transportcorridors.com/20350">Conference</a> of Directors General of Railways brought together more than 300 officials and representatives of railway companies. Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister, Olzhas <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/le-kazakhstan-se-dote-dun-nouveau-gouvernement/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/le-kazakhstan-se-dote-dun-nouveau-gouvernement/">Bektenov</a>, spoke in person, a sign of the political importance attached to the event.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He recalled that “Kazakhstan’s railway sector, which plays a crucial role in economic development, aims to improve the population’s quality of life and ensure sustainable growth”. The Prime Minister also announced strong <a href="https://primeminister.kz/en/news/kazakhstan-to-build-5000-km-of-new-railways-in-the-next-four-years-olzhas-bektenov-at-osjd-conference-31306" type="link" id="https://primeminister.kz/en/news/kazakhstan-to-build-5000-km-of-new-railways-in-the-next-four-years-olzhas-bektenov-at-osjd-conference-31306">ambitions</a> for the coming years, declaring that he wanted to “build an additional 5,000 kilometres of railway tracks” over the next four years and to “increase transit volumes to 100 million tonnes per year by 2035”, thereby underlining his desire to strengthen Kazakhstan’s pivotal role in trade between Europe and China.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An Afghan delegation representing the Islamic Emirate met Kazakh and Azerbaijani officials to discuss the strengthening of the Hairatan and Torghundi ports and regional transit, according to the Afghan news agency <a href="https://pajhwok.com/2026/05/01/afghan-delegation-attends-osjd-rail-conference-in-kazakhstan/" type="link" id="https://pajhwok.com/2026/05/01/afghan-delegation-attends-osjd-rail-conference-in-kazakhstan/">Pajhwok</a> Afghan News. This presence, like the joint <a href="https://en.osjd.org/en/8821/page/106072?id=262551" type="link" id="https://en.osjd.org/en/8821/page/106072?id=262551">presence</a> of Ukraine and Russia, shows that railway cooperation can sometimes go beyond conventional diplomatic logic.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In addition to financial management issues, the conference also focused on the OSJD’s future work programme and the organization of the next meeting. Emphasis was placed on increasing volumes, modernizing infrastructure and transitioning towards more advanced technologies to improve the efficiency and fluidity of rail transport, reports the <a href="https://www.transportcorridors.com/20350" type="link" id="https://www.transportcorridors.com/20350">media</a> outlet Transport Corridors.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The Middle Corridor at the heart of global challenges</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By speaking of “transforming Eurasia into a single, fully functioning transport mechanism”, the Kazakh Prime Minister is directly referring to the trade route that has been developing in the region for around twenty years, particularly since China’s Belt and Road <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/region-ouighoure/comment-la-nouvelle-route-de-la-soie-peut-metamorphoser-lasie-centrale/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/region-ouighoure/comment-la-nouvelle-route-de-la-soie-peut-metamorphoser-lasie-centrale/">Initiative</a> in 2013.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Middle <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/lasie-centrale-defi-realisation-corridor-median/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/lasie-centrale-defi-realisation-corridor-median/">Corridor</a>, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), is a 4,000-kilometre multimodal transport corridor linking Chinese factories to European markets via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus and Turkey.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is also the shortest overland route between China and Europe, provided the necessary infrastructure is in place, which was long <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/lasie-centrale-defi-realisation-corridor-median/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/lasie-centrale-defi-realisation-corridor-median/">not</a> the case. Delivery times, which once took several weeks, have now fallen to around 18 days, according to <em>The Astana Times</em>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read also on Novastan : <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/lasie-centrale-defi-realisation-corridor-median/">L&#8217;Asie centrale face au défi de la réalisation du corridor médian</a></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This reduction was made possible in part by digital transformation and the introduction of the <a href="https://globaldtc.com/products/tez-customs" type="link" id="https://globaldtc.com/products/tez-customs">TezCustoms</a> system, which has reduced processing time at the borders with China from 8 hours to 30 minutes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr Bektenov emphasized Kazakhstan’s pivotal <a href="https://primeminister.kz/en/news/kazakhstan-to-build-5000-km-of-new-railways-in-the-next-four-years-olzhas-bektenov-at-osjd-conference-31306" type="link" id="https://primeminister.kz/en/news/kazakhstan-to-build-5000-km-of-new-railways-in-the-next-four-years-olzhas-bektenov-at-osjd-conference-31306">role</a>, with around 85% of Middle Corridor traffic passing through the country. He also announced the construction of 5,000 kilometres of new railway lines over the next four years, with the aim of reaching a transit capacity of 100 million tonnes per year by 2035.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A route that has grown rapidly since the geopolitical crises&#8230;</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This Eurasian route has been one of the main beneficiaries of the global geopolitical situation of the past four years, with two successive shocks having propelled its importance.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The first is the war in Ukraine since 2022: Western sanctions imposed on Russia caused westbound freight volumes on Russian routes to <a href="https://www.transportcorridors.com/20350" type="link" id="https://www.transportcorridors.com/20350">fall</a> by 51% in 2023, according to Transport Corridors. The Middle Corridor has thus established itself as the only practical land bridge between China and Europe that bypasses Russian territory.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read also on Novastan : <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/le-corridor-sud-menace-pour-le-transport-kazakh/">Le corridor sud, une menace pour le transport kazakh ? </a></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second is the war in the Middle <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/decryptage/quelles-sont-les-repercussions-de-la-guerre-en-iran-pour-l-asie-centrale/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/decryptage/quelles-sont-les-repercussions-de-la-guerre-en-iran-pour-l-asie-centrale/">East</a> and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, which began in late 2023. According to the Qatari <a href="https://www.gulf-times.com/article/673811/region/houthi-red-sea-attacks-force-rerouting-of-vessels-disrupting-supply-chains" type="link" id="https://www.gulf-times.com/article/673811/region/houthi-red-sea-attacks-force-rerouting-of-vessels-disrupting-supply-chains">media</a> outlet <em>Gulf Times</em>, amid uncertainty in the region, some companies redirected their traffic from the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal towards the Cape of Good Hope, making land-based alternatives all the more attractive.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2024, the volume of goods transiting along the Eurasian route <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/04/middle-corridor-transport-prospect" type="link" id="https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/04/middle-corridor-transport-prospect">increased</a> by more than 63% year-on-year, according to the US think tank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, reaching 4.1 million tonnes compared with only 500,000 tonnes before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On the China-Europe segment alone, the number of containers transported increased <a href="https://cebri.org/revista/en/artigo/220/middle-corridor-connecting-brazil-to-eurasia-via-azerbaijan" type="link" id="https://cebri.org/revista/en/artigo/220/middle-corridor-connecting-brazil-to-eurasia-via-azerbaijan">twenty</a>-fivefold between 2023 and 2024, according to the journal <em>CEBRI</em>.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>&#8230;but remains constrained</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, according to an article by Friedrich Conradi published on the Carnegie Politika website, despite its potential to become a major competitive route, it could prove limited by <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/04/middle-corridor-transport-prospect" type="link" id="https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/04/middle-corridor-transport-prospect">structural</a> problems. “The Middle Corridor is still far from competitive. It handles only around 6% of the annual capacity of the Northern Corridor via Russia, which stands at 100 million tonnes, and while many Western actors expect it to continue growing, several indicators instead suggest a slowdown,” the researcher explains.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Middle Corridor’s infrastructure remains insufficient, with ports often saturated, particularly in Georgia, and an inherently fragmented route, since it relies on a succession of transport modes, making it slower, more expensive and less seamless than alternative routes via Russia or by sea.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Added to this is persistent geopolitical <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/corridor-zanguezour-projet-ambitieux-obstacles-politiques/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/economie/corridor-zanguezour-projet-ambitieux-obstacles-politiques/">instability</a> in the Caucasus and around Iran, as well as environmental challenges, particularly the falling level of the <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/la-baisse-du-niveau-de-la-mer-caspienne-risque-de-mener-a-des-consequences-dramatiques/" type="link" id="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/la-baisse-du-niveau-de-la-mer-caspienne-risque-de-mener-a-des-consequences-dramatiques/">Caspian</a> Sea, which directly affects port capacity and the continuity of maritime transport.</p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Lorenz Uberti<br>Contributor for Novastan</strong></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Edited by Elise Medina (French version) and Mathieu Lemoine (English version)</strong></p>


<p>Thank you for reading this article! If you have time, we would appreciate your feedback, either through this anonymous form or by email at <a href="mailto:editorial@novastan.org"><em>editorial@novastan.org</em></a>. Thank you very much!</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-key-link-middle-corridor/">Kazakhstan continues to assert itself as the “key link” in the Middle Corridor</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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		<title>In Uzbekistan, one family wants to support the revival of wine production</title>
		<link>https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-family-revive-wine-production/</link>
					<comments>https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-family-revive-wine-production/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mathieu Lemoine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 00:01:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy and Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uzbekistan]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://novastan.org/en/?p=48535</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-family-revive-wine-production/">In Uzbekistan, one family wants to support the revival of wine production</a></p>
<p>Once known for its grapes, Uzbekistan saw many vineyards destroyed after the fall of the USSR. The Akhunov family is now helping revive the country’s wine culture.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-family-revive-wine-production/">In Uzbekistan, one family wants to support the revival of wine production</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-family-revive-wine-production/">In Uzbekistan, one family wants to support the revival of wine production</a></p>

<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Renowned for the quality of its grapes, Uzbekistan nevertheless saw its vineyards massively destroyed after the fall of the USSR, as part of measures aimed at limiting alcohol consumption. It took years of work for the Akhunov family to rebuild a wine collection that is now unique in Central Asia. </strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>A report on the still-emerging renaissance of Uzbekistan’s wine industry.<br></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A few turns of the key are enough. And already, through the half-open door, they begin to appear: touches of purplish colour diluted among the foliage. The oldest of these vines come from cuttings dating back nearly 80 years. Planted side by side, they rise towards the sky until they almost block it out. Over time, they have woven their web, forming a green setting around the precious bunches of grapes.<br></p>


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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With a determined step, 30-year-old Kamila Akhunova enters this green space, located just a few steps from the family property. The Akhunovs own a 21-hectare estate in the town of Qibray, Uzbekistan, about 20 kilometres from the capital, Tashkent. On this remote land, nearly 15 hectares are devoted to grape production. Their company, UzumFermer, produces 100,000 litres of wine per year.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Hidden from view, a veritable treasure cave of grape varieties is revealed. Here, grapes of every shape and kind grow side by side. Among them is a unique treasure: a Japanese grape variety called “Ruby Roman”, sold for nearly 10,000 dollars per bunch. A little further on, Kamila Akhunova presents another variety: “Jupiter”. “It is also a treasure because only five countries in the world have it. And on our continent, we are the only ones to have it.”</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A unique collection in Central Asia</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This unique sample of vine plants was “collected all over Uzbekistan, and is the only one that exists in the country,” Kamila Akhunova insists. “We went to former laboratories and old gardens to recover all these grapes.” It was a painstaking quest to build up this collection, after many years spent travelling across Uzbek soil. Today, she proudly looks over the 125 different vine varieties: “100 are for table grapes and 25 for standard wine.”</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="https://novastan.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2026/04/4-2-1024x768.jpeg" alt="" class="wp-image-74812"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">“Ruby Roman”, a Japanese grape: the rare pearl of this collection of grape varieties. © Louise Simondet</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Behind this initiative is her father, Rachid Akhunov. Now 57, after studying physics in Russia and leaving behind laboratories and pipettes, this vine and grape enthusiast decided to dedicate himself to rebuilding this heritage. “For me, it was a real quest. During my travels, I began collecting all kinds of grapes,” he says proudly. “My father,” Kamila Akhunova stresses, “received the gold medal from the Uzbek president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in 2016, as thanks for the revival of vine cultivation. We do not make wine with them; we simply present our collection to tourists.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Although their quest to rebuild this collection is now complete in Uzbekistan, Kamila would like it to continue abroad. “We are waiting for the law to change so that we can import other varieties from all over the world, from France, Germany, Chile, Africa, Australia, New Zealand…” the young woman explains. In Uzbekistan, many regulations drastically limit the import of vines — plants and cuttings — by subjecting them to very strict health controls.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A family busines</strong>s</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kamila Akhunova’s passion for wine dates back to her teenage years. In 2015, at the age of 20, she decided to leave for Spain, to Barcelona, drawn by its crowded summer beaches and, above all, by the vineyards of the surrounding region. These are spread out less than an hour from the city centre, on hillsides. There, she immersed herself in the study of oenology at the Sant Ignasi Faculty of Tourism and Hotel Management, part of Ramon Llull University.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“It was a very enriching experience for me. I discovered a profession that really interested me.” Her mother’s dream was for her to settle permanently abroad. “She wanted me to marry a foreigner and open my own business in another country.” But with her diploma in hand, and feeling nostalgic, she eventually returned to Uzbekistan. Back on her home soil, the young woman had only one goal in mind: to continue this adventure around wine.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="https://novastan.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2026/04/7-1-1024x768.jpeg" alt="" class="wp-image-74813"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Kamila Akhunova with her parents, Zimfira and Rachid Akhunov, at the family estate, UzumFermer. © Louise Simondet</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It was around this time that her parents decided to look for land away from Tashkent. After travelling around the region, they settled on a wasteland a few kilometres from the Uzbek capital. “We found this place and rented it. Because in Uzbekistan, you cannot buy land; you lease it from the government, for a lease that can run from 15 to 55 years,” she explains. “There was nothing here at the time. No trees, no vines… It was abandoned land,” Kamila Akhunova recalls. The family’s objective was to build their holiday home here, their “dacha”, to rest away from the Uzbek capital.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It was her mother who first decided to plant vines. “As a landscape designer, she loves nature. At first, when she began planting them, it was just for the family. We also exported a little grape to Russia, but just for pleasure.” The year 2019 marked a turning point, when a new law allowed them to expand their land to 21 hectares, Kamila explains. Shortly afterwards, another law stipulated that “if you have a vineyard, regardless of the type of vine, you have the right to make wine.” No licence or documents were needed.</p>


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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It was an opportunity the Akhunov family seized. Kamila Akhunova’s father then planted more vines on the property, this time to produce wine and sell it. At first, “it was not professional wine, but rather homemade wine, table wine. It was ‘Rizamat’, made from a local grape. We also had ‘Jupiter’” &#8211; a wine made from a seedless muscat-type grape variety popular in domestic vineyards. Building on this momentum, the family business continued to develop, launching event organization and tastings for tourists alongside the vineyards.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A climate suited to vines</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Then, very quickly, the Akhunov family decided to professionalize its activity. In 2020, they invested in highly sophisticated equipment from Italy. To train on these new machines, they brought in an expert for six months. “We found a professional oenologist in New Zealand, the director of a large vineyard there, who had a lot of experience in the field. She was Ukrainian, so she spoke Russian. It was perfect for us. She came here and lived with us. She was our teacher: she taught us everything.” After she left, other specialists, including some from France, took over to share their experience. It was also that year that Kamila’s family decided to create its own company.<br></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="https://novastan.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2026/04/vignes-1-1024x765.png" alt="" class="wp-image-74814"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">The UzumFermer estate covers 21 hectares. Nearly 15 hectares are dedicated to more than a hundred grape varieties. © Louise Simondet</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If they chose to invest in vines, it is because in this Central Asian country, the climate is favourable to grape production. With more than 200 days of sunshine per year, Uzbek wines are distinguished by the intensity of their flavour. “It is very hot in summer and very cold in winter, but our temperatures are not too low. It is therefore an ideal climate for vines. Grapes like heat,” Kamila Akhunova says.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cabernet Sauvignon, Jupiter, Pinot Noir, Bayanshiri, Riesling… Their production remains diverse. As for their vines, they are spread over two plots of land. One is near their property, the other in Parkent, a town about 30 kilometres from Tashkent. There, the vines cling to the mountainside. “What is very different in Parkent is the soil: the earth is black and rich, with many minerals. There is also a difference in temperature: it reaches a maximum of 28 degrees in summer, whereas here, in the plain, it gets very hot in summer.” </p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>“Reviving the culture of the vine”</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In this Muslim-majority country, viticulture nevertheless occupies an important place. Currently the leading wine producer in Central Asia, its earliest traces date back to Antiquity. “Uzbekistan is one of the countries that has preserved an indigenous grape variety — a vine variety originating from a specific region, where it has adapted over the centuries. Vines have been present there for a very long time. This dates back to the sixth century BC. There is therefore a long history between this country and wine. One could say it is a true heritage,” explains Benoist Simmat, a specialist in the history and economy of wine and author of the book <em>The Incredible History of Wine</em>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet through the vicissitudes of history, this tradition experienced turbulent periods. In the nineteenth century, at the beginning of the Tsarist period, viticulture developed at an industrial level in the country. Dmitry Filatov, a Russian merchant, founded the country’s first winery in Samarkand in 1868, and trade developed around it. Factories multiplied, but this upturn was slowed by the advent of the Soviet Union.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read also on Novastan : <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/tadjikistan/la-vodka-tadjike-produit-dexportation-oublie/">La vodka tadjike, un produit d&#8217;exportation oublié</a></strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Measures were then taken to combat alcohol consumption among the population. In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, launched an awareness campaign. This was accompanied by the destruction of many vineyards across the Soviet republics, including in Uzbekistan. It was not until the fall of the communist bloc and the country’s independence in 1991 that they began to be revived. “They were replanted after the country’s independence. The objective was to revive the culture of the vine,” Kamila Akhunova explains.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet the economic isolation promoted by former president Islam Karimov placed another brake on wine production. In 2016, the arrival in power of Shavkat Mirziyoyev marked a turning point, triggering the modernization of viticulture. He introduced measures encouraging the growth of this culture, such as increasing vineyard areas, rational land use and the promotion of wine tourism.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, the import of vine plants remains restricted in the country. “They are afraid of phylloxera. It is an insect that eats vines, especially their roots,” Kamila Akhunova explains. “And because it would also attack cotton, which is one of our main crops, the import of vine plants is very limited. During the Soviet Union, it was completely prohibited.”</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The first wine festival in Uzbekistan</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alongside wine production, the Akhunov family wanted to diversify. Tastings, cellar visits and estate tours… Many events are organized throughout the year on the property. “We do all kinds of events: weddings, conferences, photo shoots, Uzbek film shoots. Sometimes even Uzbek stars come here!” Kamila Akhunova exclaims. Navruz, Halloween, Victory Day, Christmas… major holidays are also celebrated on the estate.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The family is also behind the Tashkent Wine Festival. It has now been held every year on their land for six years. “We were the first to create this kind of festival in Uzbekistan. At first, we only had 200 people,” the young woman says proudly. Last September, they gathered nearly 1,000 people on the lawns of their property. Crowded among the vines and bunches of grapes were politicians, doctors, business leaders and ordinary tourists, each strolling around with a glass of wine in hand.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="https://novastan.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2026/04/Capture-decran-2026-04-27-064810-1-1024x763.png" alt="" class="wp-image-74815"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">The restaurant where the different wines produced on the estate are served. It is located inside the Akhunov property. © Louise Simondet</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Among this year’s participants, Irina, a psychologist working in the capital, came specifically to discover the vineyard and enjoy the tasting. “It is a very good way to discover the different wines they produce here,” she explains. “I did not know that wine was produced in Uzbekistan. Some friends told me to come. It is a good discovery.” A little further away, a group of Russians working in Tashkent sing songs while tasting the precious beverage. What they appreciate is “the slightly sweet taste”. Their preference is for “Jupiter”.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“For us, this festival is a huge showcase for our products,” Kamila stresses. Over the years, the Akhunovs have managed to develop partnerships with companies, but also with the embassies present in the capital, such as the French embassy in Tashkent. “We were present at the 14 July ceremony. We also had people taste our wine during the Independence Day celebration at the American embassy.”</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A “micro-market” seeking expansion</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Today, the objective of the young woman and her family is to continue “developing wine culture in Uzbekistan and its export”. “We focus on quality, not quantity,” she explains. “We produce 200,000 bottles per year; that is not much. We do not want to increase production, because we want to control it. The large factories in Uzbekistan produce much more, but the quality is not exceptional. They sell bottles for 85 euro cents for export to China or Russia, whereas our prices range from 12 to 50 euros.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Read also on Novastan : <a href="https://novastan.org/fr/kazakhstan/kazakhstan-les-vignes-des-routes-de-la-soie/">Au Kazakhstan, découverte des vignes des routes de la soie</a> </strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“Wine exports and production in Uzbekistan remain fairly low. There are micro-markets: a local micro-market, a Russian micro-market which also includes the countries of Central Asia, and a tourism micro-market. Does that make it a market in its own right? Currently, no. Especially since globally, there is overproduction, particularly of red wine,” says specialist Benoist Simmat.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet year after year, wine production continues to increase in the country. In January 2024, Uzbekistan’s large wine companies produced 708,400 litres of grape wine — an increase of 26.4% compared with the same period in 2023, according to official figures from the National Statistics Committee.</p>


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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For now, the Akhunov family has only a few partnerships with Uzbek restaurants in Russia, Kazakhstan and Malaysia. “It is not a large quantity in terms of exports. They just buy a few boxes for their restaurants,” Kamila Akhunova explains. As for France, their bottles are displayed at the wine museum in Bordeaux, where a special section is dedicated to Uzbekistan. They are currently in discussions to supply an Uzbek restaurant in Lyon and would like to develop partnerships with Uzbek restaurants in Paris.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="https://novastan.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2026/04/cave-1-1024x772.png" alt="" class="wp-image-74816"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Kamila Akhunova contemplating all her vintages in the cellar of the UzumFermer estate. © Louise Simondet</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In this desire for international recognition, reforms aim to position Uzbekistan as a major player in the international wine market. Initiated in August 2023, one of them aims to establish a system of agro-industrial wine clusters. At the same time, the state has committed to strengthening financial support in this sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“Our objective is to take our country to a higher level in terms of production and export,” Kamila emphasizes. “Now that our quest to rebuild a collection of grape varieties in Uzbekistan is complete, this is our new mission.”</p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Louise Simondet, <br>Correspondent in Uzbekistan for Novastan</strong></p>



<p class="has-text-align-right wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Translated by Mathieu Lemoine</strong></p>


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<p>The post <a href="https://novastan.org/en/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-family-revive-wine-production/">In Uzbekistan, one family wants to support the revival of wine production</a> appeared first on <a href="https://novastan.org/en">Novastan English</a>.</p>
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