Central Asia is often described as the next frontier in the global race for rare earths. The reality is both more promising and more complicated. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and their neighbours do hold major reserves of critical raw materials, from uranium and copper to chromium, manganese, tungsten, antimony, graphite and rare earth elements. But much remains uncertain: some deposits are still under exploration, processing capacity is limited, and the most valuable parts of the supply chain remain outside the region.

What is already clear, however, is that governments, state mining companies and foreign investors are moving fast. The European Union has signed critical raw materials partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. American investors are looking at tungsten and rare earths. France is active in uranium. Development banks are financing graphite and mining governance. China remains the unavoidable reference point, because it dominates global refining and processing.

For Central Asia, the question is not only what lies underground. It is whether the region can avoid becoming simply another supplier of raw materials for richer industrial powers.

Why these minerals matter

Also read on Novastan: Carbon neutral by 2060? Kazakhstan’s green pledge faces a reality check

The term “critical raw materials” can sound technical, but the products they make possible are familiar. A smartphone contains copper, tungsten, rare earth elements and other metals. An electric vehicle depends on lithium, graphite, copper and sometimes cobalt. Wind turbines require steel, copper and powerful permanent magnets. Satellites, missiles, semiconductors and aircraft all need specialised metals.

Rare earths are only one part of the story. They include elements such as neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, cerium, lanthanum and yttrium. Some are used in permanent magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines, drones, missiles and electronic devices. Others are used in polishing, catalysts, lasers or specialised industrial applications.

But Central Asia’s strategic importance is wider than rare earths. Uranium is essential for nuclear power. Copper is needed for electrical grids, renewable energy infrastructure, electric vehicles and data centres. Graphite is used in battery anodes. Tungsten hardens steel and is used in cutting tools, aerospace and defence. Antimony is used in flame retardants, ammunition, batteries and semiconductors. Chromium and manganese are essential for steel. Titanium is used in aircraft, spacecraft and medical implants. Molybdenum strengthens steel used in pipelines, industry and defence. Gallium is important for semiconductors, radar systems and advanced electronics.

In other words, the issue is not only about “green energy”. It is also about industrial power, military technology, digital infrastructure and geopolitical dependency.

What is actually known

According to the OECD, Central Asia holds a significant share of global reserves of several critical raw materials. The region accounts for around 39% of global manganese ore reserves, 31% of chromium, 20% of lead, 13% of zinc, 9% of titanium, 6% of aluminium, and about 5% each of copper, cobalt and molybdenum.

Kazakhstan is the strongest player. It is already the world’s largest uranium producer and can export many of the materials included in the European Union’s critical raw materials list. Its known strengths include uranium, chromium, manganese, copper, titanium, tungsten, beryllium, gallium and rare earth potential.

Uzbekistan is also increasingly visible. The country has large copper resources, uranium, molybdenum, tungsten, gold-associated metals and rare metals. Its mining sector is dominated by national champions such as Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex, Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company and Navoiyuran.

Kyrgyzstan has a smaller mining sector, but it is important for antimony, gold and rare earth occurrences. Tajikistan is also relevant for antimony, silver and rare metals. Turkmenistan remains the least transparent case, with public information still much thinner than for the rest of the region.

Kazakhstan’s rare earth moment

The strongest recent rare earth story comes from Kazakhstan. In 2025, the Kazakhstani authorities announced the discovery of the Zhana Kazakhstan deposit, reportedly containing more than 20 million metric tons of rare earth metals. The deposit is said to include neodymium, cerium, lanthanum and yttrium, with an average content of about 700 grams per ton.

The announcement attracted attention because neodymium and related elements are central to permanent magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines and defence technologies. But it should be treated with caution. A deposit is not the same as a mine. A mine is not the same as a processing industry. And processing rare earths is technically difficult, expensive and environmentally sensitive.

This is one of the main problems in the global rare earth race. China does not dominate only because it has resources. It dominates because it controls refining, separation and manufacturing capacity. For Central Asia, the real challenge is therefore not only geological. It is industrial.

The companies entering the race

In Kazakhstan, several national and foreign actors are already positioning themselves.

Tau-Ken Samruk, the state mining company, is expected to play a central role in exploration and strategic mineral projects. Kazatomprom remains the key uranium actor, while Eurasian Resources Group is important for aluminium, copper, cobalt and gallium. ERG has announced plans to produce gallium in Kazakhstan, a metal used in semiconductors, radar systems and missile guidance.

American interest is also growing. Cove Capital has been linked to tungsten projects in Kazakhstan, including Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty, in partnership with Tau-Ken Samruk. Tungsten is strategically important because it is used in hard metals, defence and industrial tools, while Western countries are trying to reduce dependence on China.

Sarytogan Graphite, active in Kazakhstan’s Karaganda region, is another example. Graphite is essential for battery anodes, especially in electric vehicles. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development acquired a stake in the company in 2024, showing that development banks are also entering the critical minerals field.

In Uzbekistan, the main actors are domestic state companies. Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex is central for copper, molybdenum and other metals. Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company remains one of the country’s major mining giants. Navoiyuran, the Uzbekistani uranium company, has signed with France’s Orano to develop a new uranium mining venture.

These examples show that the critical minerals race is not only a matter of abstract geopolitics. It is already visible in company strategies, financing decisions and bilateral agreements.

Europe, China, Russia and the United States

For Europe, Central Asia is attractive because it offers potential diversification. The European Union signed a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan in 2022 on sustainable raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen value chains. In 2024, it signed a similar memorandum with Uzbekistan. The first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand in 2025 also placed critical raw materials within a broader agenda of trade, transport, energy and connectivity.

For the United States, Central Asian minerals are part of a larger attempt to reduce dependence on China in strategic supply chains. Interest in tungsten, rare earths, gallium and other materials fits into this broader competition.

Also read on Novastan: L’héritage de Tabochar : l’extraction d’uranium au Tadjikistan et ses conséquences

China remains the central actor, even when it is not directly mentioned. It is the world’s dominant processor of rare earths and many other critical minerals. Any Western strategy on Central Asian resources is therefore, implicitly or explicitly, about reducing China’s leverage.

Russia still matters through legacy infrastructure, Soviet-era geological knowledge, uranium links and regional influence. But Moscow is no longer the only external actor able to shape Central Asia’s mineral future. This is one reason why the topic is becoming politically sensitive.

The real bottleneck: processing

The most important part of the story is not extraction. It is processing.

A country can have uranium, copper, tungsten or rare earth deposits and still capture only a small part of the value. The highest profits and strategic leverage often come from refining, separation, metallurgy, battery components, magnets and advanced manufacturing.

This is where Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are trying to change the model. Both countries want more local value creation, not only raw exports. Uzbekistan is promoting mining reform and industrial processing. Kazakhstan is trying to position itself as a partner for value chains rather than just a supplier of ore.

Also read on Novastan: En Ouzbékistan, la percée saoudienne dans le secteur de l’énergie

The risk is obvious. Central Asia has already experienced extractive economic models: cotton, oil, gas, uranium and metals have often generated revenue without creating diversified, high-value economies. Critical minerals could reproduce the same pattern under a greener label.

Environmental and social risks

Critical minerals are often presented as tools of the green transition, but their extraction can be environmentally damaging. Mining requires water, energy, chemicals and waste management. Rare earth processing can be particularly polluting if not properly regulated. In a region already facing water stress, desertification and fragile ecosystems, this matters.

There are also governance questions. Who benefits from new mining projects? How transparent are contracts? Are local communities consulted? Are environmental standards enforced? Do projects create skilled employment, or mainly export raw materials?

Also read on Novastan: En Asie centrale, le marché des véhicules électriques fait ses débuts

For Central Asian governments, the opportunity is real. But so is the danger of a “green resource curse”, where global demand for clean technologies reinforces old patterns of dependency, opacity and environmental damage.

A starter pack for readers

The simplest way to understand the issue is this:

• Rare earths such as neodymium and dysprosium are used in magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines and defence technologies.
• Uranium is used for nuclear power.
• Copper is used in electrical grids, renewable energy, electric vehicles and data centres.
• Graphite is used in battery anodes.
• Lithium is used in rechargeable batteries, though Central Asia is not yet a major global lithium centre.
• Cobalt is used in batteries and aerospace alloys.
• Tungsten is used in hard metals, cutting tools, aerospace and military equipment.
• Antimony is used in flame retardants, ammunition, batteries and semiconductors.
• Chromium and manganese are used in steelmaking.
• Titanium is used in aircraft, spacecraft and medical implants.
• Molybdenum is used in high-strength steel.
• Gallium is used in semiconductors, radar and advanced electronics.
• Beryllium is used in aerospace, satellites, telecommunications and defence systems.

This is why Central Asia’s mineral base is suddenly being watched so closely. The region is not only sitting on obscure metals. It may hold some of the materials needed for the energy transition, digital technologies and modern defence industries.

More than a mine?

The coming years will show whether Central Asia can turn critical minerals into a development opportunity. The region has the resources. It has growing diplomatic attention. It has national mining companies and foreign investors willing to engage.

But the decisive question is whether Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and their neighbours can move beyond extraction. Without processing, transparency, environmental standards and local value creation, the new critical minerals boom could simply repeat older patterns of dependency.

Also read on Novastan: Le Kazakhstan renforce son emprise sur son uranium face à une demande mondiale croissante

Central Asia is not yet the next rare earth superpower. But it is becoming an important region in the global competition for critical raw materials. For the region itself, the challenge is to ensure that what lies beneath the ground helps build something above it.

Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English

The post What lies beneath Central Asia? Rare earths, critical minerals and the new race for resources appeared first on Novastan English.

Between 2019 and 2020, poverty in Kyrgyzstan increased by 5.2% as more and more Kyrgyz people found themselves in extreme poverty. One of the causes of this rise in poverty was the closure of borders due to Covid-19, which prevented the people of Kyrgyzstan from working abroad and providing for their families at home. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the study is flawed: a great number of workers from Kyrgyzstan work informally, making official statistics unreliable.  This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on February 8, 2022. While poverty in Kyrgyzstan steadily decreased from 2016 to 2019, between 2019 and 2020 it jumped by 5.2%, from 20.1% to 25.3%. Consequently, one in four families lives below the poverty line, as reported in November 2021 by the Kyrgyz media agency 24.kg. These statistics come from the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (NSC), which conducted a study on a sample of 4 993 households. The results show stark disparities between regions. Poverty increased by 10.3% in north-western Jalal-Abad region, compared to 4.9% in Bishkek, the capital. In Osh, the nation’s second-largest city, it fell by 6%.

Before 2020, the poverty rates reported by the NSC were in decline: from 2017 to 2019, the percentage of Kyrgyz citizens in poverty fell from 25.6% to 20.1%. In 2020, the number of people in poverty in Kyrgyzstan returned to levels close to those of 2016 at 25.3% on average. However, in this period some regions, such as Bishkek, saw huge change: poverty almost doubled from 9.8% in 2016 to 16.8% in 2020. Conversely, the Talas region in the northwest of the country saw its poverty rate drop from 18.1% in 2016 to 12.5% in 2020, the lowest in Kyrgyzstan.

“Poverty Gap” and “Extreme Poverty”

To calculate the “rate of extreme poverty” in the country, experts at the NSC “estimated a sum of money that should match the “base consumption basket,” meaning the amount of food necessary for someone to live off,” explains Illiias Mamadiiarov, researcher at the French Institute for Central Asian Studies (IFEAC). He adds that “all those with a salary below 38 000 som (£355.42) are considered to be poor, and those who have less than 19 000 som (£177.71) are in extreme poverty.” While the rate of extreme poverty fell from 0.8% of the population in 2017 to only 0.5% in 2019, by 2020 it had reached 0.9%.

The Mobility of Migrant Workers Has Been Greatly Reduced

The closure of borders in March 2020 due to the growing Covid-19 pandemic could explain the increase in the level of poverty for the same year. As most Kyrgyz live off agricultural production, it is common to work abroad once the harvest season is over. “Poverty is seasonal, there are more residents from rural areas who decide to travel to Russia after autumn in search of work”, claims Illiias Mamadiiarov. From abroad, these migrants send money to their families in Kyrgyzstan, who depend on it to survive. According to data from the World Bank, such transfers of money from abroad accounted for 31.3% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020. Kyrgyzstan ranks third in the world among countries dependent on remittances. Read more on Novastan:More Russian passports, fewer labour migrants: Central Asian migration to Russia in 2020 However, with the closure of borders in March 2020, Kyrgyz people forced to stay in Kyrgyzstan have been unable to support their loved ones, as Roman Mogilevski, a researcher at the University of Central Asia (UCA) explains in a study on the impact of Covid-19 on migration in December 2020. Moreover, those stranded abroad found themselves in a similar position. “The isolation enforced in Russia and Kazakhstan at the end of March 2020 has led to a decrease in the jobs available for migrants, including those coming from Kyrgyzstan”, Illiias Mamadiiarov highlights.

 Drop in Transfer of Funds to Kyrgyz Families

According to Roman Mogilevski, the drastic decline in the transfer of money into Kyrgyzstan has caused the country’s GDP to plummet by 5%. “The remittances between January and July 2020 were 10% scarcer than those of January to July 2019,” he explains. This situation has brought about a rise in poverty, particularly in rural areas. The study carried out by the NSC confirms this trend. Poverty in rural areas has increased by 6.1%, compared to 3.6% in cities. Although migrations have since restarted, “a mobility problem continues to exist because the only way of entering Russia is via aircraft,” notes Illiias Mamadiiarov. To get to Russia, one must go through Kazakhstan, which is yet to reopen its borders. “Many families cannot afford to travel by plane, tickets are expensive,” he adds.

An Informal Economy that is Difficult to Measure

These statistics must be viewed with caution. Out of 6.7 million inhabitants, the study was carried out on just 4 993 households. Moreover, it is very difficult to produce representative statistics because of the informal nature of Kyrgyzstan’s economy, as outlined by Kanat Tilekeïev, researcher at UCA, in a study published in June 2021. According to the NSC, approximately 23.5% of the national economy was affected by this phenomenon in 2019. Consequently, almost 71.8% of workers in 2019 were undeclared, a proportion that was likely to be similar in 2020. Read more on Novastan: Kyrgyzstan: Poverty hides behind Bishkek’s smog Therefore, a portion of the revenue circulating in Kyrgyzstan is not counted in official economic statistics. However, Kyrgyz people who work off the books remain in a precarious position. More than half do not have access to fundamental rights in the workplace and will not be able to benefit from state welfare after retirement. Kanat Tilekeiev is clear that “due to a low pension, the fraction of the population that will have to work longer than the age of retirement in order to survive will most likely increase.”

 The Government is Committed to Reducing Poverty

Responding to these developments, the Kyrgyz government announced the introduction of a new system to fight poverty this year. At a meeting on 28 January, Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Development Nurdoolot Bazarbaev declared that Kyrgyzstan wanted to move from passive to active measures as reported in the Ministry’s press release. “The current social system is expensive but not efficient enough,” he acknowledged. This model is based on the “Food for Work” system, as 24.kg explains. “Poor and low-income families and unemployed citizens will have the opportunity to improve their family’s quality of life by learning new, more efficient farming practices for their farms, as well as development of self-entrepreneurship,” declared Nurdoolot Bazarbaev. How effectively this plan will be implemented remains to be seen.  

Written by Romane Haquette

Edited for Novastan

 Edited by Emma Jerome and Timur Khan

 Translated from French by Elise Lloyd

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The post In Kyrgyzstan, one in four families lives below the poverty line appeared first on Novastan English.

The effects of sanctions against Russia are being strongly felt in Tajikistan. The Central Asian post-Soviet republic’s economy has been stagnant for years and many had left to find work in Russia. The instability in reaction to Russia’s activities in Ukraine is affecting almost every aspect of daily life. In Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital city, life is getting expensive. As American media Eurasianet remarks, Tajikistan is highly dependent on Russia economically, and many families count on remittances from relatives working there. According to World Bank data, remittances consisted of 26.7 % of Tajikistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, which makes it the third most dependent country in the world. With the increasing sanctions being placed on Russia following the on-going conflict in Ukraine, and the subsequent boast to the dollar, almost everything has become more expensive in the past weeks. Feruza, a teacher working at a private university, spoke to Novastan of the impact the changing dollar price has had on her family. “I had to pay the fees for my son’s school a few days ago. Now the somoni is so weak against the dollar; it’s like I’m paying an extra 100 dollars in the previous rate”, she explains.

The fees for international schools can generally be paid in dollars or somoni, but the price is, like most expenses, set by the dollar. “I wanted to pay in dollars but when I went to the bank, they told me that they are not allowed to pay out dollars. I explained it was to pay for my son’s school fees but they said, ‘No, we can only give you dollars with permission from the bank manager, and only if your account is in dollars.’ There were others there with a similar problem”, describes Feruza.

Sending money home becomes more expensive

Generally, people often opt to exchange money on the black market, rather than go to the bank. “You can find a better rate if you shop around, but it’s very dangerous,” Nagina, an office worker from Gorno-Badakhshan, in eastern Tajikistan, explained to Novastan. “My children are living in Moscow and we don’t usually need them to send money home. But if it’s needed, right now it is better to find someone travelling from Russia to Tajikistan, rather than using the bank”, she says. When payments are sent from Russia, they are paid in ruble and received in somoni. Due to the ruble’s depreciation following the sanctions, people working in Russia need to pay extra to reflect the changing price and secure the needed amount of somoni. It is therefore easier and more cost-effective to send dollars in cash with someone making the journey. This current instability is nothing new, as Nagina highlights. “We are experienced. During the financial crisis, it was the same so we know how to prepare. We buy food to store, things like oil or flour which last for a long time. We don’t know when the prices will change again, so we have to be prepared”, she describes. Food insecurity is already a major issue in Tajikistan with up to 27 % of the population living on 1.90 dollars (£1.44) or less per day, according to USAID. While many families received a one-time payment of 500 somoni (£29.16) during the Covid-19 pandemic, it is yet to be announced how the Tajik government will respond to current price hikes.

Prices heavily rely on the dollar

“For me, it has affected my day-to-day costs of course, and my business a little,” import-middleman Alisher explained to Novastan. “People are shopping less. For example, see this iPhone case. Before it was maybe 10 somoni (£0.58), now it’s 16 (£0.93)”, he says. Around the capital, businesses have increased their prices to reflect the new cost of living. A small portion of oshi pilau, Tajikistan’s national dish, typically cost 16 somoni (£0.93) but has risen to as high as 20 somoni (£1.16). Most significantly, the price of petrol from the Russian supplier Gazprom has risen from 10.30 somoni (£0.60 per litre) to 12 somoni (£0.70). “Everything here is connected to the price of the dollar,” Alisher concluded. “The dollar is everything in Tajikistan.”

Fiona Katherine Smith Editor and writer for Novastan in Dushanbe

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On May the 3rd 2021, the two ministers spoke about the future of the Franco Uzbek cooperation, the possible prospects and the actual obstacle. Their telephone conversation demonstrates a new step towards a partnership already robust.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 10 May 2021.

As reported by Uzbek media Uzbekistan Daily, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, Abdulaziz Kamilov, rang his French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian on 3 May 2021.

The two ministers discussed the current situation and the perspective of the Franco-Uzbek cooperation in political, commercial, economic, cultural, and humanitarian areas among others.

A full schedule for Uzbekistan and France

The joint events to come between both countries were inspected, such as the next meeting of the Franco-Uzbek intergovernmental committee on commercial and economic cooperation. The latter was held on May 10 at Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s capital, as described by the French minister of Foreign Affairs. Both counterparts also mentioned the second ministerial meeting as part of the France-Central Asia format.

Abdulaziz Kamilov and Jean-Yves Le Drian discussed some local problems in Central Asia regarding security. Afghanistan’s situation was part of the discussion, together with the recent confrontation at the Tajik-Kyrgyz border that has caused about fifty deaths. In such circumstances, both ministers expressed the necessity of a local stability.

Read more on Novastan: What are the underlying reasons for the deadly Kyrgyz-Tajik border clashes?

At the end of the discussion, Abdulaziz Kamilov expressed his will to see France be part of the International Conference “Central and Southern Asia: Regional Connectivity. Challenge and opportunity.” This conference, which will take place in July 2021 in Tashkent, will be welcoming the involvement of Russia, as declared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Serguey Lavrov.

This event should allow Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan to talk about the development of the transport network between the three countries. This is a major issue which is part of a tourism development project announced by Uzbek government in late February. In late April, a railway line between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has been provided with electricity, showing the ambition of developing the railway network.

Read more on Novastan: Russia commits to railroad corridor China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan

Jean-Yves Le Drian already had the will to strengthen the relationship of France and Uzbekistan. During a conference held on July 20 2018, the minister delivered a speech describing the willpower of France to reinforce the commercial and economic relationships with Uzbekistan. “I deeply wish France to become a partner in Uzbekistan. To achieve this goal, I know that administration and businesses […] are not sparing themselves.”, he concluded in his speech.

However, this speech was the last connection between Uzbekistan and Jean-Yves Le Drian before the telephonic talk with his counterpart on 3 May.

France and Uzbekistan, a long-time cooperation

The relations between the two countries are not new. Since the ratification of the friendship and cooperation treaty between Uzbekistan and France in 1993, both demonstrate a strong bond and work together in several fields.

French companies are particularly involved in Uzbekistan’s business. In December 2020, an agreement was signed to allow French company Rungis to set up in Uzbekistan. And vice versa, Uzbek businesses collaborate with France. In late April, Uzbek society Global Exports furnished thousands of tons of beans to Bonduelle, a massive vegetable distribution company in France.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan is not the first minister from Central Asia with whom Jean-Yves Le Drian talked recently. This establishing contact with Abdulaziz Kamilov is reminiscent of the conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Kazakhstan, Mukhtar Tleuberdi on late April 28, as reported by the French ministry’s website. In the same fashion, the two ministers discussed relationships between both countries and expressed their desire to strengthen cooperation.

Léonard Dillies Writer for Novastan

Translated from French by Flavie Deschamps

Edited by Emma Bekrine

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Being far ahead of the other regional gas suppliers, Turkmenistan became the first energy partner of China in late January 2021, ahead of Russia. In the context of generally rising gas prices at the beginning of 2021, the roles seem to be redistributed in the world of gas producers.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on the 29th of March 2021.

Turkmenistan, a country with gas wealth in no need to prove, is the leader in gas supply on the Chinese energy market since the beginning of 2021, according to the Turkmen media Orient. In January 2021, a total of 2,786 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas were delivered to China, out of the 4,685 billion cubic meters imported by the Chinese authorities. For the first months of the year, almost 60% of the Chinese gas is supplied by Turkmenistan, according to the Russian agency Interfax.

Turkmenistan is thus ahead of Russia, which supplied only 916 million cubic meters of gas to China through the “Power of Siberia” pipeline. Apart from Russia and Turkmenistan, China gets its resources from other Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which export 319 million cubic meters and 307 million cubic meters accordingly.

Turkmen gas prices at their highest

The official figures of Turkmenistan’s exportations are difficult to find: president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov is usually very discreet about the country’s economic performance, so it is hard to obtain them.

Yet the data of the General Administration of Customs (GAC) of China reveals the price of Turkmen gas which appears to be one of the most expensive on the Chinese energy market. Indeed, the price of a thousand cubic meters comes to 187 dollars (£138), whereas Kazakh price is up to 162 dollars (£119.5), and Uzbek price is up to 151 dollars (£111).

Blue gold prices on the rise

The high price of Turkmen gas can be explained by the rise of gas prices on international markets. Indeed, in North-East Asia, a cold wave led to the high demand for liquefied gas. The cooling in the region had for consequences a rapid increase of gas prices on the international market: the maximum value of JKM Platts, which measures the price of liquefied gas in Asia, jumped to 1 160 dollars (£856) for a thousand cubic meters at the beginning of January 2021, according to Interfax.

The rise of energy’s value is also to be seen in Europe where the average price of gas is up to 257 dollars (£190) for a thousand cubic meters in late January, according to the Interfax agency.

Turkmenistan’s dependence on gas exportations

The fourth exporter of gas in the world strengthens its commercial relationship with China, which remains the first trade partner for Turkmenistan. In 2019, according to data furnished by the Observatory of Economic Complexity, China accounted for 82% of Turkmen exports, far ahead of Uzbekistan (4%). Regarding importations, China is second with 14,3% behind Turkey (24,7%).

This new position also strengthens Turkmenistan’s dependence on exportation. Close to being a windfall economy, the state’s incomes are based on hydrocarbon sales. According to the specialized website Oilcapital.ru, 15% of consumed gas in China was Turkmen in 2020. Although economic repercussions are satisfactory nowadays, as soon as the price and foreign demand will decrease, the Turkmen economy will drop as was the case at the beginning of the pandemic. Indeed, while China’s gas suppliers are diversified, Turkmenistan’s customers are not: the country mainly exports to China and Russia.

Read more on Novastan: Agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan paves the way for Trans-Caspian Pipeline

Nevertheless, some projects are underway to diversify exportations: the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (TAPI), which has been stalled since 2015, should be relaunched soon. Besides, with the rapprochement of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, the project of the Trans-Caspian pipeline is about to become reality, which means Turkmen gas will reach the European market.

Emma Collet Writer for Novastan

Translated from French by Flavie Deschamps

Edited by Anna Wilhelmi

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According to official statistics the number of tourists visiting Tajikistan fell by 72 per cent from 2019 to 2020.

A version of this article was published on Novastan’s French website on 23 February 2021.

Tajikistan’s latest tourism statistics reveal an undeniable conclusion: the sector has collapsed and the country’s economy is on the brink. On 12 February 2021, Tajik news outlet Asia-Plus reported that the number of visitors to the country fell to 350,000 in 2020, down 72% from 1,254,000 in 2019. The tourism sector, which in 2019 accounted for 2-2.5% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), represented only 1% of GDP in 2020.

The official statistics do not provide a breakdown of people’s reasons for visiting the country, and therefore do not distinguish between business trips and tourism. In 2019, the Tajik authorities used this loose definition to their advantage, announcing statistics that were 10 times higher than in reality. Nevertheless, the 2020 statistics represent a steep decline.

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While Tajikistan has recorded the lowest number of COVID-related deaths in Central Asia—90 registered deaths compared to 1,450 in Kyrgyzstan and 3,150 in Kazakhstan—strict measures imposed in response to COVID have taken a toll. Despite receiving $400 million in aid funding, Tajikistan has failed to indicate clear economic measures to protect against the impact of COVID-19, according to Radio Ozodi (the Tajik branch of Radio Free Europe). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has estimated that overall economic growth was 1% in 2020, compared to a rate of 7.5% in 2019.

Signs of an exhausted economy

The collapse of the tourism industry in Tajikistan is, in reality, just one visible signpost of the country’s suffering economy. One of the poorest countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Tajikistan was already heavily dependent on foreign aid before the COVID crisis and is now facing staggering financial difficulties.

The revenue that contributes to Tajikistan’s GDP can be divided into three main economic sectors. According to 2019 World Bank statistics, agriculture generated 19% of the country’s wealth, industry and manufacturing accounted for 27%, and the “services” industry generated over 42% of GDP. In reality, the majority of the “services” category is represented by money sent home by Tajik workers living abroad—mainly in Russia.

These remittances represented 28.6% of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2019, with 70% of the Tajik population relying on these funds to survive. But with successive COVID lockdowns—particularly in Russia—the amount of money sent back to the country has drastically declined. At the same time, foreign direct investment diminished by nearly 47% in one year, as reported by Radio Ozodi. In light of these difficulties, the collapse of the tourism sector has devastated an already weakened economy.

A sector in need of development

For several years, the Tajik government has expressed the intention of developing the country’s tourism industry. Designating 2018 “the year of tourism”, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon hoped his country could overcome some of the structural difficulties that limit Tajikistan’s ability to cater to and attract foreign visitors.

Issues such as the lack of transport facilities, banking services, and high-quality accommodation outside big cities prevent Tajikistan from becoming a mainstream tourist destination. Unfortunately, these challenges are yet to be addressed by the Tajik government.

However, in April 2018, the Tajik president extended the visa-free period for foreign visitors from three to ten working days in an effort to attract tourists. Large hotel chains such as the Hyatt Regency, Hilton Hotels and Serena Hotels have established hotels in the capital Dushanbe, and 2020 saw the creation of 22 new tourist agencies in Tajikistan (now totalling 224).

Tajikistan’s high geographical elevation—with mountain peaks between 6,000 and 8,000 metres­—represents opportunities for the further development of adventure tourism, which has rapidly expanded over the past few years. The richness of Tajik poetry and folklore, and the fantastic natural landscape along the Pamir Highway also represent great tourist potential. 

Domestic tourism presents opportunities

On 26 January, the Tajik authorities announced that the country had beaten coronavirus. Health Minister Jamoliddin Abdullozoda attributed this success to government health measures, claiming that the absence of a lockdown in favour of a home quarantine program assisted in the eradication of COVID-19. This “victory” led Emomali Rahmon to announce the reopening of mosques from 1 February and may signal a wider reopening of the country.

Read more on Novastan: Is Tajikistan really free from coronavirus?

Tojiddin Jurazoda, the head of Tajikistan’s Tourism Development Committee, told Asia-Plus that reviving the tourism industry is both an opportunity and a necessity. To achieve this, new projects are being planned for 2021, including the reconstruction of the Yamchun Fort, which once guarded a strategic passage along the Silk Road between India and Iran, and the restoration of the majestic Hulbuk citadel, located in the Vose District in the south-west of the country. The Khoja Mashkhad complex, a major pilgrimage destination tentatively listed for consideration of UNESCO World Heritage status in 1999, will also be renovated in 2021 in an effort to attract believers and visitors.

Jurazoda also discussed the Committee’s plans to expand rural tourism through the establishment of hostel-style accommodation and homestays. Whether these initiatives will be enough to revive the Tajik tourist industry­—and the country’s economy with it—remains to be seen.

Caroline Deschamps
Novastan.org

Translated from French by Alice Coveney

Edited by Clare Hodgson

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The post Tajikistan’s tourism industry collapses in the wake of COVID appeared first on Novastan English.

The artemia, or brine shrimp, a small crustacean that lives in salt water, has become the main product of the Aral Sea in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek government has recently centralised artemia production into a single company, a plan which did not seem to please everyone on the ground.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 21 July 2020.

The Aral Sea was the fourth largest lake in the world 60 years ago. Today, it has almost completely been dried out due to human activities, causing the disappearance of millions of fish and reducing the number of species by five. However, despite this environmental disaster, one species has survived: the artemia. With the sea now dried up, local fishermen have turned to this saltwater shellfish to generate the majority of their income. The fishermen of Moynaq, in western Uzbekistan, have thus started collecting and processing these shrimps due to the shortage of fish.

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The shrinking of the Aral Sea has increased the salinity of the water which explains the growing numbers of artemia, which thrive in very salty water. The 1 millimetre-long crustacean is generally used to feed fish but also has uses in science, fishkeeping, medicine, pharmacy and cosmetics. The larvae (known as cysts) can be stored for years and can withstand extreme differences in temperature.

Towards a monopoly

But the future of the artemia industry has been a source of controversy since since 2019. On 31 October 2019, the Uzbek government proposed that the 23 or so companies involved in the artemia industry be centralised into just one.

Despite the Antimonopoly Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan’s protests and the recommendations against the project it published on 15 June 2020, Uzbekistan’s prime minister Abdulla Aripov signed a decree on 14 July of the same year creating a state-owned company responsible for the capture, processing and export of artemia cysts. The new structure, Orol Artemia Sanoat, is also meant to support the scientific, technical and technological development of the industry.

The Antimonopoly Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan deemed this centralization ill-advised, an opinion it supports through a text recommending the Uzbek government be less involved in the economy. This point of view is in line with the political philosophy of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who says he wants to privatise the domestic economy by limiting state intervention.

Lack of data

It is difficult to measure the impact such a decision has had and will continue to have on the market. In 2020, Novastan attempted to obtain information locally but very few people were willing to talk about it. In fact, the lack of transparency and the strained context surrounding the negotiations over the last few weeks meant the fishermen of Muynaq did not wish to comment.

Only the press office of the Antimonopoly Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan agreed to answer Novastan’s questions, stressing the importance artemia represents for the country. The head of its press service, Manzura Khasanova, said that data regarding the selling price and volume of export of artemia and industry wages did not exist. As for the land and sea portions where artemia is collected, they are under the supervision of the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Geology and Mineral Resources.

Although instinctively artemia collection doesn’t seem to be a very sensitive industry, it remains opaque and very closed off in Uzbekistan. The only available data come from the international trade association Global Aquaculture Alliance, which ranked Uzbekistan among the world’s leading suppliers of artemia in 2017, with over 20 tons produced per year.

From the Uzbek side, little information is available to the public. Muynaq-based producers created an association in 2018 to lobby for transparency as well as promote export, but without providing much more detail so far.

The fishermen of Muynaq have been gathering, processing and selling artemia larvae since the early 2000s, when the world’s demand totalled 2,000 tons per year, according to scientific research. A small shellfish, then, but a major economic lifeline for the fishermen of Muynaq.

Malaurie Le Bail
Novastan.org

Translated from French by Manon Montant

Edited by Alice Coveney

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post The Aral Sea artemia: small shrimp, high stakes appeared first on Novastan English.