An assessment of President Sadyr Japarov’s tenure, the political realignment following the dismissal of the head of the security services, and growing economic dependence on China… For Novastan, prominent Kyrgyz political scientist Emil Dzhuraev looks back at the political, economic and geopolitical upheavals facing Kyrgyzstan.

Emilbek Dzhuraev is a Kyrgyz political scientist and analyst who holds a PhD in political science from the University of Maryland. His areas of expertise include political regimes and democratization in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia, as well as constitutional development and regional geopolitics. He is currently a Senior Lecturer at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, a regular commentator on Kyrgyz and Central Asian political developments, and co-founder of Crossroads Central Asia, a Bishkek-based think tank.

In this interview with Novastan, conducted in collaboration with IFME (Institut français des mondes eurasiatiques), he discusses Kyrgyzstan’s current political situation in light of the forthcoming presidential election scheduled for January 2027.

Novastan: Since Sadyr Japarov came to power in 2020-2021, following the October revolution, Kyrgyzstan has undergone major constitutional and institutional transformations. How would you broadly describe the political system that has emerged under Japarov?

Emil Dzhuraev: With the arrival of the new government in early 2021 and Sadyr Japarov’s accession to the presidency, a process of constitutional reform was also set in motion, culminating in the adoption of a new Constitution in May 2021. In a sense, this represented a radical and decisive break with the Constitution that had been in force for ten years. The 2010 Constitution had established a form of semi-parliamentary system: Parliament had significant legislative powers, as well as powers to appoint and dismiss the government, while the president’s powers were much more limited. In 2010, this had itself represented a major departure from the much more presidential system that had prevailed previously.

In 2021, we therefore saw the return of a very strong and centralized presidential system. Unlike earlier versions of the presidential system, in the early 2000s or even the 1990s, the president’s powers are now more firmly established at the constitutional level. They are no longer simply de facto powers arising from political circumstances: they are explicitly enshrined in the Constitution. The president is both the head of the executive branch and the highest representative of the state.

The Constitution also grants the president extensive executive powers. For instance, Parliament now has only a limited role in appointing and dismissing members of the government. In most cases, it is the president who appoints and dismisses them, and dismissals can take place without parliamentary involvement. The president also participates in the appointment of judges, all the way down to courts of first instance.

If you look at the current Constitution, the provisions concerning the rights and powers of the president probably constitute the longest section devoted to any state institution.

Kyrgyzstan was long considered the most politically pluralistic country in Central Asia, to the point of being nicknamed the “island of democracy.” Based on what you have said, is the country now moving towards a form of autocracy?

Many observers have noted that Kyrgyzstan has moved towards greater autocracy in recent years and away from democratic norms and principles. Unfortunately, this is also happening against the backdrop of a global democratic retreat and democratic backsliding. The authoritarian shift in Kyrgyzstan is therefore not a unique phenomenon, and there is currently no particularly favorable international environment for a return to democracy.

The question now is whether political pluralism in Kyrgyzstan can be rebuilt. This has proved very difficult under the current Constitution, which gives the authorities significant repressive powers. Political parties, different political groups and the various currents within society have been heavily constrained in their ability to exert any meaningful influence on politics.

Parliamentary elections were brought forward from 2026 to November 2025. What did this early election actually change in the balance of power between the presidency, Parliament and the political elites?

The parliamentary elections were brought forward by one year, and the exact reasons for this decision are not fully understood. The official explanation put forward by the government was that it was related to the proximity of the 2027 presidential election. Even if one views this explanation with some skepticism, I think it is nevertheless grounded in an obvious reality: by the time the country would have elected its Parliament, it would also have been entering the presidential campaign and electoral process. There would have been a two- or three-month period beginning with the parliamentary electoral cycle during which Kyrgyzstan’s political life would have been very open and vulnerable to all kinds of shocks, with a potential risk of instability.

After the elections, and looking at their results, a second explanation can also be considered, in which the president may or may not have played a role. The new Parliament includes a number of figures promoted by Mr. Tashiev who are likely to support his initiatives and main political priorities. And that is precisely what we have begun to see.

Once the new Parliament was installed, at the very beginning of 2026, rumors and a kind of public campaign began suggesting that the presidential election should also be brought forward. There is indeed a debate linked to the discrepancy between the old and new Constitutions: the old Constitution provided for a single six-year presidential term, while the new one provides for two five-year terms. Mr. Japarov’s first term falls between the two systems and, according to some reports, Tashiev’s supporters wanted the election to take place this year, after five years in office.

Kamchybek Tashiev, who played a central role in the Japarov regime, was dismissed in February 2026 as head of Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security. What were the reasons for and consequences of this decision?

I think the real reason is that the president and his closest circle – although it is difficult to say exactly who belongs to that circle or how large it is – felt that Mr. Tashiev was moving rapidly towards a presidential bid.

More than that, it was not simply a matter of preparing for the scheduled election: Tashiev’s group was pushing for an early election. More seriously, the president’s entourage apparently believed that Tashiev’s team could secure a majority in Parliament that would allow it to launch impeachment proceedings against Mr. Japarov on the grounds that he had exceeded the five-year term provided for under the current Constitution.

There have therefore been all kinds of allegations, rumors and suspicions which are, of course, very difficult to confirm at this stage, because nothing has been officially documented in a way that would establish that such plans or statements actually existed.

Judicial proceedings are currently underway against Mr. Tashiev and some of his closest associates. They are accused of preparing to overthrow the government. This is essentially the charge they are defending themselves against. At first instance, the district court found them guilty. But the evidence is very limited, and this obviously raises serious concerns about our judicial system and judicial practices.

Japarov has now publicly confirmed his intention to seek a second presidential term in January 2027. At this stage, do you see any political actor capable of seriously challenging him? Could the political break between Japarov and Tashiev ultimately turn into an electoral confrontation?

At this stage, it is very difficult to imagine serious competition against Mr. Japarov when he seeks re-election. No one doubted that he would seek a second term. Recently, in an interview, he said that he had wanted to give up a second term in favor of Mr. Tashiev, but I do not think anyone really takes that statement seriously.

After five years of an extremely intolerant and repressive political environment in Kyrgyzstan, I think we have exhausted our pool of potential competitors – or at least the most important and capable political opponents of Mr. Japarov are currently not in a position to challenge him.

Among other things, a law was also passed – and I think it was strongly motivated by political considerations – during Parliament’s last session. It provides that anyone convicted of certain serious or particularly serious crimes, even after serving their sentence and even after being rehabilitated, will be barred from running for elected office. Of course, this currently applies to almost all of the major figures in the political opposition.

Kyrgyzstan has experienced strong economic growth in recent years. To what extent is this growth actually translating into improved living conditions for ordinary Kyrgyz citizens, and is this likely to become a political issue during the 2027 election campaign?

Indeed, President Japarov’s government strongly emphasizes macroeconomic results – the positive ones, of course, rather than the negative ones – particularly the fact that GDP has recorded very high growth over the past four or five years, often among the highest rates in the region.

But recently, a great deal of public discussion, mainly online – Kyrgyzstan’s political space has shifted to the Internet because it is now almost impossible to engage in political debate offline – has focused on the deterioration or stagnation of living standards, particularly the cost of living and inflation.

Some incomes may be rising, but the cost of living is rising even faster. Inflation is significant. The prices of basic goods and the consumer basket are genuinely increasing. According to Kyrgyzstan’s official economic statistics, the inflation rate may be below 10 percent, and perhaps even slightly below the GDP growth rate. But many people feel that inflation is much higher when it comes to essential goods.

As the election approaches, it will therefore not be enough for President Japarov to say that we have built so many kilometers of roads, so many schools or so many factories, because for a large proportion of ordinary citizens, the day-to-day cost of living will be the main issue.

Kyrgyzstan experienced major political upheavals in 2005, 2010 and 2020, the year you described as a “third departure.” What remains today of the political conditions that produced these revolutions?

First, the economic slowdown resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic, combined with the very difficult state of public finances and government obligations, particularly the payment of pensions, had practically emptied Kyrgyzstan’s budget. Repayment of the external debt was also a major problem.

Second, large-scale political corruption and, linked to it, organized crime were very significant factors. The parliamentary elections – which triggered this third political crisis – were also heavily dominated by money and corruption.

Third, I think there was simply a weakness on the part of the government in implementing decisions and effectively exercising its electoral mandate. This notably showed that the president at the time, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, was a very weak president who had surrendered much of his power to corrupt elements within his entourage.

If we look back at that period and compare it with the current situation in 2026, I think President Japarov’s government has eliminated many of these problems. The economy is very different from what it was in 2020, and organized crime is no longer present in the same way.

Of course, some people now argue that law-enforcement agencies within the government itself have become comparable to a form of organized crime, but that represents a different way of exercising power. The presidential apparatus is very powerful, and the state’s capacity to govern has increased considerably compared with 2020.

So I think those conditions are largely no longer present today. And, of course, one of the factors that made the October 2020 movement possible was the existence of elections and political pluralism that allowed parties to mobilize effectively. That is precisely what no longer exists under this highly centralized and hyper-presidential system.

If there were to be a “fourth departure,” it would therefore have to emerge under very different conditions and from different triggers.

Geopolitically, Kyrgyzstan is deeply tied to Russia, increasingly economically dependent on China, and seeking closer relations with the European Union and other external partners. How much room for maneuver does Bishkek have today?

Russia’s war in Ukraine has given Kyrgyzstan more room for maneuver in pursuing this multi-vector foreign policy. At certain points during these four and a half years of war, it did seem that things were becoming more difficult.

But because the war has lasted much longer than expected – much longer than Putin anticipated – it has given countries that are highly dependent on and closely tied to Russia more room for maneuver.

First, this is because Russia has had to devote far more of its resources, including diplomatic resources, to the war itself and to dealing with Western sanctions and isolation.

Second, China, Russia’s main partner and supporter, has also sought to gain more room for maneuver in regional geopolitics, and it is gradually obtaining that space.

Amid all of this, I think Mr. Putin has understood that, in order to meet Moscow’s own needs – particularly given the disruption of transport, logistics and trade networks – and in Russia’s own interests, it was important, even necessary, to give the Central Asian countries, including Kyrgyzstan, more space to pursue their own foreign policies.

I think much of the space left by Russia has been occupied by China. But Kyrgyzstan is also actively pursuing other directions in its foreign relations, particularly with the European Union and certain Middle Eastern countries, which have become very important, as well as, of course, with Turkey and its Central Asian neighbors.

The recent peace agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ended years of tensions and border conflicts and was signed in March 2025. How could this agreement affect Kyrgyzstan’s domestic politics and Japarov’s political legitimacy? Could it also strengthen Bishkek’s position within the broader regional balance in Central Asia?

From the perspective of Kyrgyzstan’s position in Central Asian politics, this is clearly a positive development: no longer having political disputes with your neighbors is a good thing.

At the same time, we were negotiating and resolving these disputes with both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. With Tajikistan, this included two episodes of open and violent conflict, in 2021 and 2022.

In terms of the legitimacy of Mr. Japarov’s government, however, this remains one of the most difficult issues to assess. The border question had remained unresolved for 30 years because whenever we faced these disputes, it was obvious that they could not be resolved without exchanging territory, without giving something up in order to obtain something else.

This is partly why previous governments and leaders had failed to resolve the issue. Japarov and his partner Tashiev clearly had both a popular mandate in 2021 and the political capacity needed to implement these kinds of decisions, including reaching certain compromises with neighboring countries.

In the long term, things will of course become clearer, because many aspects of the new borders and territorial exchanges are not yet widely understood, and most people in Kyrgyzstan do not know precisely where the border now runs.

However, I think that over time this will probably cease to be a major political issue. Some things could nevertheless retain symbolic importance, such as the large water reservoir. It is an obvious feature that everyone has heard about, that appears on maps and that everyone can see: it has, de facto, been ceded to Uzbekistan.

In practice, the water from this reservoir was already primarily intended for Uzbekistan because that is where the relevant economic activity is located. But the population eventually became aware of this situation.

If we look beyond the 2027 election, what do you see as the main political trends in Kyrgyzstan over the next six years?

Compared with most stable political systems, it is very difficult to predict anything in Kyrgyzstan because things can change very dramatically.

If we follow the current trajectory, several major challenges and questions arise for the future. The first concerns succession. Five years will pass quickly, and the question will be whether President Japarov will be prepared to relinquish power peacefully and openly to whoever wins the election, since he is legally entitled to only two terms. There are already rumors that his son could seek to succeed him.

Another major challenge, frequently raised by government critics and activists, concerns the evolution of our geopolitical relationship with China. Beijing’s activities in many countries, including Kyrgyzstan, are tied to numerous geopolitical interests. Anti-Chinese sentiment can easily be inflamed, and it is easy to mobilize such sentiment among the Kyrgyz population. The issue is all the more important because Kyrgyzstan has taken out numerous loans and entered into many financing agreements with China, and has therefore accumulated considerable debt.

The third major challenge in the coming years will be servicing our debt. Can the Kyrgyz economy continue to grow and increase its revenues over the next few years? The past three or four years have been very successful – at least for the government – but can this momentum continue?

Economic data and broader historical experience suggest that it is very difficult to sustain growth rates of 9, 10 or 11 percent a year for such a long period: growth will eventually slow. But when it does, what will that look like? Will the country enter a recession, experience a collapse, or face some other form of crisis? Economic growth has been heavily driven by sectors and sources of revenue that are not necessarily sustainable in the long term. Construction cannot continue growing at this pace indefinitely.

If that happens, Kyrgyzstan’s debt could become a very serious problem. That is precisely what the Kyrgyz government needs to be concerned about.

Interview by Roman Fuster,
Contributor to Novastan

The post “A Fourth Political Reset?”: An Interview with Kyrgyz Political Scientist Emil Dzhuraev appeared first on Novastan English.

Almost every year, countries in Central Asia are placed at the bottom of NGO Reporters Without Borders’, annual ranking for the freedom of press. Every country has dropped in ranking, compared to the previous year.

The position of media coverage in Central Asia has never been renowned for its freedom. However, it seems that this year marks a turning point. 

In the NGO Reporters Without Borders’, new report as published on the 3^rd May 2023, it is noted that if ‘the Russian invasion in Ukraine and the deployment of the Kremlin’s propaganda […] has darkened the whole region [of Eastern Europe]’, Central Asian countries have also seen a sharp decline in their freedom of press since last year.

In a ranking of 180 countries, the nations that are in theory the most liberal in the region, such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, are regressing. Kyrgyzstan is undergoing the most substantial evolution by dropping fifty rankings from 72^nd place to 122^nd place. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan fell twelve lines and is now positioned 134^th. Uzbekistan fell by four points (now at 137^th) due to the rise of attacks against the media.

The Remarkable Fall of Kyrgyzstan 

The deterioration of the freedom of press in Kyrgyzstan is evidenced by multiple attacks against journalists since 2022, as well as the promulgation of the law against false information in summer 2021. Under the scope of this law, the Kyrgyz government is intensifying the campaign against Kyrgyz service of the Radio Free Europe, known locally as Azattyk, in demanding the withdrawal of its licence on the 27^th April. At the end of October 2022, the Ministry of Culture blocked Azattyk as it refused to remove a video addressing the confrontations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, at their border. 

Amnesty International asserts that this decision was a ‘blow to media freedom’, whilst the Committee to Protect Journalists has called it ‘a deeply chilling message.’ Reporters Without Borders speaks of ‘increasingly severe censorship’ in Kyrgyzstan.

Read more on Novastan: Closure of Radio Azattyk sparks discontent from civil society and international human rights activists

Last January, the independent media service Kloop found itself in a similar situation. The Ministry of Culture had threatened to block Kloop’s website if the editors refuse to withdraw an article on the inflating of construction costs by a state agency.

Last November, the journalist Bolot Temirov was extradited to Russia following a politically motivated trial, after he had denounced cases of corruption on his YouTube channel, Temirov Live.

Kazakhstan and Online Censorship

In Kazakhstan, media censorship is issued more discretely by blocking websites that might unsettle power. A report by the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) indicates that authorities are obstructing access to the Azattyq website, the Kazakh service of Radio Free Europe.

Read more on Novastan: “An escalating manifestation of Russophobia” – Kazakhstan at the epicentre of an information war

From the snap presidential election of November last year till this January the access to the websites of Radio Azattyq and Current Time, another branch of Radio Free Europe, was blocked.

Kazakhstan has also promulgated a law ‘on the mass media’, a pretext to regulate, or even censor, the information that is available on the internet and particularly the information spreading in social media.

Pressure on Journalists in Uzbekistan

As in the previous year, Reporters Without Borders notes that in Uzbekistan, ‘the situation for the media has only slightly improved since the death of President Islam Karimov in 2016, and criticism of the government remains difficult.’ Nevertheless, Uzbekistan has gained twenty-four points in 2022.

Notably, the report indicates that the Uzbek authorities have ‘extensive’ control of the media and that many bloggers have close ties to the government. The country enforces ‘repressive’ laws on the media and ‘widespread surveillance, censorship and auto-censorship’, reports Gazeta.uz.

Read more on Novastan: Pressure from Russia increases on Central Asian media outlets

‘The large and medium media platforms, as well as bloggers with an audience of over 5,000 people, are subjected to intense pressures and censorship,’ as reported to Novastan by an Uzbek blogger with a small audience. ‘However, there are exceptions, with some channels having less than 1,000 to 2,000 subscribers who are also now facing pressure’, he continues.

Another Uzbek journalist with a critical stance on the government tells Novastan about the recent pressure imposed by the authorities upon journalists and bloggers, ahead of the constitutional referendum of the 30^th April 2023. ‘I know of at least three examples where managers of Telegram channels and journalists have been summoned to the State Security Service for a conversation’, he testifies.

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, Always Bottom of the Ranking

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, whose political regimes are the most repressive, remain at the bottom of the ranking. Compared to last year, Tajikistan drops one position on the list, now ranking 153^rd place. According to the NGO, the country has transitioned from a ‘difficult’ to a ‘very difficult’ position with regard to its freedom of press. The report notes that more and more journalists are choosing to exile.

Over the past year, repression has intensified against all forms of opposition, particularly in the Gorno-Badakhshan region and against the Pamiris ethnic minority. Certain activists for the community, who have been exiled, have been extradited to their countries of origin and sentenced to long-term prison sentences.

Read more on Novastan: Human rights in Tajikistan: Interview with the UN Special Rapporteur

Turkmenistan ranks 176^th place and remains among the five worst-ranked countries. Reporters Without Borders notes that censorship in Turkmenistan increased after Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow’s son, Serdar Berdimuhamedow, rose to power in March 2022.

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post In Central Asia, the Freedom of Press is in Decline appeared first on Novastan English.

In the far north of Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek, waste piles up every day in what residents call the polygon, a chaotically managed municipal landfill. Men and women work in this heap of plastic and toxic fumes, totally invisible to the general public. Through their initiatives, activists and artists are trying to give these people a voice and dignity.

Called the polygon, the hill, or simply the dump, the landfill located about ten kilometres from the city centre of Bishkek has been the subject of debate in Kyrgyzstan for many years. This huge dump of about fifty hectares, which concentrates all the capital’s waste, has created an array of political, economic, ecological scandals over the years.

Although a new landfill has been promised since 2013 by the municipality, it has still not been built. This is despite a large loan of 11 million Euros from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, already paid to the state. Since then, the polygon affair has been a regular topic in the Kyrgyz media: almost every few months, new episodes in the administrative soap opera take place, with the date of the landfill’s construction being postponed once again.

Conflicts of interest between the municipality and private companies have also been revealed. The landfill is on private land, and recently a Czech company was chosen to operate the waste without any prior tender.

The invisible workers

The polygon thus symbolises the lack of an effective waste management policy in Kyrgyzstan. But behind this admission of failure, people continue to live in the waste and make a living from it by collecting what they can sell to private recycling companies or intermediaries. The number of people working in the landfill is still unknown, but journalists estimate that it is over 500.

Read more on Novastan: In Kyrgyzstan, one in four families lives below the poverty line

Several activists and artists have taken up the cause and are raising the issue of the landfill from a human perspective, launching social and artistic initiatives to raise awareness of the parallel world where society’s waste is collected.

A “hill society” with a thousand stories.

Next to being a municipal dump, the polygon is the workplace of hundreds of men and women. The landfill has its official employees, but also illegal workers, because the site is not fenced off and anyone can enter. Poor and precarious people spend their day collecting certain types of waste and reselling them. Some have been engaging in this work for decades.

At the entry point, located at the road that leads the trucks and tractors to the dump field, a surveillance post is occupied by a single man. Opposite him, a dozen people, sitting on cardboard boxes, gather their days’ worth of waste in large plastic bags. For Lina Tsrimova, director of the documentary La Colline, which was released in 2022, this place is a real society, with its own hierarchy and organisation. “These people are generally very stigmatised in society,” explains the director, adding that “many of them hide the fact that they work there from their families.”

In this documentary film, selected for the 2022 Cannes Film Festival, extraordinary stories are intertwined. “Many of the new arrivals, mainly from the south of the country, are internal migrants,” explains the landfill’s guard. Due to the lack of jobs, they end up working here, sorting and collecting waste. The documentary particularly focuses on the story of Alexander, a former Russian soldier who fought in Chechnya before working at the dump. The approach of the two directors’, Tsrimova and her colleague Denis Gheerbrant, was to give a voice to these workers, allowing them to tell their stories.

More recently, in 2023, the eco-activist association Move Green set itself the task of making one of these invisible workers visible: Tajikane, 63, lives in the village of Altyn-Kazyk and has been sorting rubbish there for 17 years. She says she moved from the Batken region after the death of five of her children, and has no other choice to earn a living than sorting rubbish.

The neighbours of the landfill in daily contact with the pollution and waste

According to Gheerbrant, the place is an exceptional and visually strong space. Indeed, fires regularly break out on the waste heaps and the toxic fumes that emanate from them give the polygon an apocalyptic atmosphere. Additionally, the area is constantly covered by swarms of crows looking for food and trampled by stray dogs.

In several places on the site there are tents and huts built from debris found in the dump. Houses are located nearby, purchased at an attractive price, in the village of Altyn-Kazyk.

Last December, the Ministry of Ecology stated that “liquid toxic substances are accumulating in the northern part of the dump. A lake has formed there. In recent years, its size has increased five to six times. The toxic substances are getting into the groundwater.”

Read more on Novastan: Kyrgyzstan: Poverty hides behind Bishkek’s smog

Farida is one of the invisible workers, living in the village next to the polygon, on the road leading to the dump, about a hundred metres from it. The woman in her forties has neither a swing nor a toy for her son, only piles of empty plastic bottles, cans, tyres, and glass jars by the hundreds. Every day, trucks from the municipal waste collection service or other individuals and private organisations come to her to bring back these stocks of recyclable waste, which she stores and then resells.

Social and artistic initiatives

To help find solutions for the people living near the landfill, artists and activists are organising the Eco Trash festival with the primary aim to raise awareness. Created by the Bishkek School of Contemporary Arts (BiSCA) collective and the Tazar Association, the festival allows local and international artists to present their projects and initiatives. Last October, one of the themes on which the festival focused was the pollution of the Ala-Archa.

One of the people behind the festival is Bermet Borubaeva, an environmental activist in Bishkek and co-founder of BiSCA. She had the idea of building a library for the children of Altyn-Kazyk. Schoolchildren are among the first to be affected by the presence of the polygon next to their houses: many of them work collecting waste instead of going to school.

“This is the only place where children can read books here,” says Borubaeva. “It is also to give them more cultural and social opportunities in life.”

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Artists and activists raise awareness for Bishkek’s waste problem appeared first on Novastan English.

Three French-Korean brothers have set themselves the challenge of driving from their native Alsace in France to South Korea − a family adventure they share on their Youtube channel. Novastan went to meet them in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek, where they are working on a number of documentaries on nomadic culture and traditions.

It was in April 2021 that the Philippe brothers hit the road. “The three of us did reunite at our parents’ place, in Alsace, and it hadn’t been the case for a long time“, the eldest of the trio, François Phillipe, explains. At that time, Michel had just completed his studies, François was back from his trip to Turkey and Stéphane left his job.

The plan is to cross part of the globe aboard their 4×4 Nissan Pathfinder to reach Korea, the land of their ancestors. It was an idea that ran over François’ mind, who then had already hitched his way to Turkey one year prior, joined by his brother Stéphane up until Greece.

In Bishkek, while they are busy editing several videos for their YouTube channel, Novastan went to meet them. It has been four months since they arrived in Central Asia. After several months spent in Turkey, Georgia and Iran, they went through Russia to cross Kazakhstan and undertook a journey through Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. But it is in Kyrgyzstan that the three siblings stayed for the longest time, appealed by nomadic life and Kyrgyz culture.

A childhood dream for the family

“We always told ourselves that someday, we would go round the world,” Stéphane Philippe explains. “And today, it is finally really happening!”

“Sons of East and West”, like they nickname themselves on their YouTube channel, felt the need to reconnect with their identity. As dual citizens, they discuss at length the hurdle of identifying themselves at the crossroads of two cultures, but also the richness this situation brings them.

To them, one of the most exciting aspects of this journey is to undertake it with family. “In the future, we will have children, a family of our own, and we will not be able to do it between siblings ever again, so it is now or never,” Michel Philippe discloses. The vlog format on YouTube also seems to them to be a way to create lasting memories.

Nomadic culture and traditions

Indeed, the siblings want to highlight both lifestyles and ancestral traditions. “We can see how the world is modernising, so we want at any cost to film traditions, nomadic life, because it actually is an emergency“, François explains. While passing through Georgia for several months, they dwelled on transhumance practice on a mostly little known to tourists road, even unknown, which earned them recognition from the locals. In Iran, the three brothers spent several weeks in contact with the nomads, in an attempt to discover specificities of their culture.

It is sometimes challenging in countries which gradually open themselves to mass tourism. But through “random” encounters, they nevertheless reach inhabitants who show them the way to their unique history.

Central Asia, a must-see

What is better than Central Asia to discover nomadic lifestyles? Since the beginning of this journey, this is the region they dreamed about − a step they did not want to miss at all cost, as they explain in videos while facing the camera, although it would have been easier to cross Asia Minor in order to reach Eastern Asia. Kazakh and Kyrgyz steppes were worth the travel for the three siblings.

“We really craved to discover Central Asia and its nomadic culture, it was very important for us,” explain the brothers almost in unison. On the programme: a documentary on eagle hunting in Kyrgyzstan, on transhumance, and on the mythical game of kok-boru.

Another milestone − to meet the Korean Diaspora of Kazakhstan, deported since the Stalin era: a very important identity matter. A teaser of the reporting was posted on their YouTube channel, which will deal with Korean traditions that continue to live on in Kazakh steppes.

Not always a simple journey

The travellers-youtubers also open up about their daily challenges to travel. “We are far from being professionals“, one of them discloses. With the journey itself to be organised, the idea to produce full-length documentaries may be constraining. “But we are attempting to progressively become professionals to have a good video rhythm and qualitative content.”

In their videos, the YouTubers do not hesitate to share occasional challenges they meet on the road. Their car breaking down atop a mountain range in Kyrgyzstan, the failure to meet a snow panther, or the struggle to cross terrestrial borders, which sometimes are closed or packed.

“To cross the border between Russia and Kazakhstan took us three days!” Arriving a few days after September 21, 2022, the Philippe siblings were on the border at the same time as thousands of Russians fleeing partial mobilisation. In a video, they describe daily life in the line to the border control, but also the anxiety of these thousands of Russians attempting to escape war.

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

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Every year, the recruitment of Tajik soldiers, young people of age to perform their compulsory two-year military service, is a real problem for the authorities. In addition to the obsolete and corrupt recruitment campaign, there is a growing reluctance among young men to serve their country, even if it means emigrating to avoid it.

“Deserting” military service means fleeing the bad treatment in the ranks of the army: hazing, deplorable sanitary conditions, violent recruitment, and bribery to be declared unfit. We analyse the structural problems of the Tajik army, itself to blame for its lack of manpower.

It usually starts in the first days of spring and autumn. Conscript soldiers are called to register with the offices of the authorities to undertake their military service, which is mandatory for men aged 18 to 27 in Tajikistan, and will last two years. According to official data for 2019, there are about 600.000 young men of conscription age, of whom 150.000 are unfit for service and 100.000 are out of the country, according to Tajik media outlet Asia-Plus. Each year, only 15.000 to 16.000 recruits are actually called up for the needs of Tajikistan’s armed forces.

But the process never goes as planned. On April 1, local media reported problems with the way the young men are recruited. Radio Ozodi, the Tajik service of the American media outlet Radio Free Europe, explains, for example, that in the Vakhsh region a random “lottery” was held to select those who were to go into the army. The provinces of Sughd, Khatlon and the regions of the Rasht Valley also report pressure on the parents of young people of military age.

A resident of the Khorog region was sentenced to a year in prison on April 1 for running away from his obligation to serve, the Central Asian media outlet Kokshetau reported. “Having received a summons from the military commissariat and repeated invitations from the relevant administrations, he deliberately evaded conscription for fixed-term military service,” the prosecutor’s office said.

Every year, such problems occur, causing a wave of panic among young Tajiks of military age. Recruitment campaigns are conducted quietly and often arbitrarily, and never treat all citizens equally, which has a serious impact on the country’s military forces.

Fear of hazing and poor conditions

The reluctance of Tajik citizens to go and serve in the army is based on the poor living conditions that await them, such as lack of food, problems with military uniforms, poor quality clothes from which it is difficult to choose a size. But the most serious problem repeatedly pointed out by NGOs, especially by the Tajik organisation No Torture, is the practice of hazing.

The NGO has documented 59 cases of torture against military personnel between 2014 and 2016. 11 of them succumbed to the injuries, according to an article by Radio Ozodi, and there are also significant numbers of suicides among conscripts during their service.

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The Tajik government itself said in a report sent to the UN Human Rights Committee that more than 100 soldiers were killed between 2019 and 2021, mainly due to hazing in the army, the report says.

Faced with violence in the ranks of the army, however, the Tajik state does not compensate the victims or their relatives. For example, in 2014, a 22-year-old soldier was mistreated by his comrades, leaving him disabled. His lawyer then demanded that the army pay about 278.000 somoni (about 23.000 euros), but less than one-fifth of that sum was received by the victim, Russian media outlet Sputnik reported.

Violent recruitment methods

The violent recruitment for Tajik military service culminates in the organisation of raids by the authorities, suddenly taking young men away to their place of service. Eurasianet confirms this, describing young citizens who have just left school being taken away by cars waiting for them. Cabar Asia reports that the cars in which the young men are crammed often have no signs of belonging to the military registration and enlistment office or other state institutions.

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The authorities sometimes go even further, asking the families of young people who have left for Russia to bring them back to Tajikistan to serve in the army, or face sanctions. Tajik migrants represent a numerous diaspora in Russia, reaching 2 million in 2021.

According to the Tajikistan Prosecutor General’s Office, cited by Radio Ozodi, in 2022 alone, 108 young men were prosecuted for evading military service. Radio Free Europe reports that, late last year, Tajikistan’s military call-up season reignited discontent following power cuts and mosque closures by local authorities to force families to let their sons enlist in the military.

Legal uncertainty and administrative corruption

The call to the army in Tajikistan highlights each year the problems that plague the Tajik Republic, namely corruption and inequality. Indeed, the authorities in charge of recruiting young men are suspected of demanding bribes to declare them unfit.

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The Cabar Asia article shows that it is people struggling against poverty who find themselves massively recruited into the Tajik army, unlike men from the elite who escape more easily. The author points out that: “If the conscription season were truly fair, i.e., if it included all young men without exception, the country’s elite would solve the problem in a matter of weeks. But too great a gap between the elite and young men from ordinary families only exacerbates the problem of poor communication and resentment.”

Numbers of military personnel in Tajikistan are the lowest in Central Asia

Among of the weak points of Tajikistan’s military are the deplorable conditions for pre-call-up and conscripts. The country seems to be paying a price for this, with the lowest number of personnel among Central Asian countries, according to the Global Fire power indicator. Indeed, in 2023, the number of military personnel was only 15,000, while its Kyrgyz neighbor, although less populated, posts a much higher number, with a total of 25,000.

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The more intense flaring-up of conflicts with Kyrgyzstan in recent years is also deterring more and more Tajik citizens from serving in the military, for fear of being mobilised to defend sensitive borders. Border clashes between the two countries have indeed become more frequent since 2021, due to the militarisation of the borders on both sides. In May 2021, a 19-year-old Tajik border guard was injured, and the latest clashes between the two countries in September 2022 were the deadliest so far, with more than 100 deaths on both sides.

Although Tajikistan is part of the regional military organisation of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO). together with Armenia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, this set-up has proved to be ineffective with the recent resumption of conflicts on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. Finally, proximity to Afghanistan and the Islamic threat on Tajikistan’s borders heightens tensions, which does not increase the enthusiasm of citizens to join the army.

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Written by Emma Collet, editor for Novastan

Translated by Robert Willams from French

The post Recruitment in the Tajik army: a headache for the authorities and hell for the recruits appeared first on Novastan English.

For nearly a year and a half, the Pamiri minority in Tajikistan, who live mainly in the Gorno-Badakhshan region in the east of the country, have been suffering harsh repressive measures at the hands of the government of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon. But this group is not the only one to suffer from the continued authoritarianism of the regime. NGOs, activists, bloggers and homosexuals have also been targeted by the government in recent months, as shown in this overview of the state of human rights in Tajikistan.

On February 16, Radio Ozodi, the Tajik service of the American media Radio Free Europe, reported that, on the recommendation of the Ministry of Justice, the activities of the Independent Center for the Protection of Human Rights were interrupted. This is yet another obstacle to the protection of human rights in Tajikistan, targeting an organization that has been defending human rights for 13 years in the country. A measure “in line with the tactics of administrative and bureaucratic harassment of NGOs in Tajikistan that have been practised for five to seven years now” according to Syinat Sultanalieva, a researcher at the NGO Human Rights Watch.

Tajik media outlet AsiaPlus comments that the Independent Centre for the Protection of Human Rights was one of the few public bodies where it was possible to seek free legal assistance. It dealt with issues such as access to social housing for the population. According to the Ministry of Justice, some 500 public organizations were closed down in 2022 – 350 more than in 2021.

But censorship of civil society does not stop with shutting down NGOs. Bloggers and activists are also victims of accelerating repression. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, Mary Lawlor, visited Tajikistan from 28 November to 9 December 2022. The crackdown on journalists and bloggers is arbitrary with “little well-founded evidence, following inadequate investigations and trials held behind closed doors,” she told Radio Free Europe journalist Bruce Pannier last December.

Bloggers and journalists targeted by authorities

In recent months, the number of arbitrary arrests of bloggers in Tajikistan has been increasing. Cabar Asia explains that at least three people have been accused of “immorality”. On 18 January, influencer Khabibulo Himmatzoda was detained for five days in Dushanbe for “offensive videos” of a possible sexual nature, reports Radio Ozodi. The same fate befell blogger Saida Latifova, who was fined on similar charges last December. According to the police, she “obscenely insulted other callers during a live broadcast on the social network Tik-Tok”.

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According to Human Rights Watch researcher Syinat Sultanalieva, “it is clear that the regime is becoming more and more restrictive every year. Where there was a vibrant civil society just a decade ago, the very few bloggers and NGOs still in the country have to find ways to continue their work without being arrested.”

LGBT rights still taboo

In Dushanbe, ten members of the LGBT community were arrested on suspicion of infecting citizens with HIV, Radio Ozodi reported on 15 February.

Read more on Novastan: LGBT community harassed in Tajikistan

Sultanalieva comments: “What was interesting about this article was that the police authorities admitted to ‘monitoring’ LGBT communities in some way, which adds to the rumors about the ‘gay lists’ that the police keep.”  Nevertheless, she confirms that there are still LGBT activist groups in Tajikistan working undercover. For their part, Tajik authorities continue to deny harassment or persecution of sexual minorities.

However, Mary Lawlor said that Tajikistan does not follow the recommendations of international organizations on the rights of members of the LGBT community, because according to Tajik law, these people “offend against the norms of morality and human ethics in the country.”

Moralisation of public life

Cabar Asia notes a reinforcement of conservative moral values in Tajikistan, as the reasons for these arrests are not really specified. Indeed, under the guise of “increasing citizens’ awareness of how to use social networks and preserve culture and national identity”, the government’s objective is to reduce the margin of freedom of expression in the public space.

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“The first goal is to increase control over public opinion, specifically those who have the power to shape public opinion,” explains Tajik media expert Abdumalik Kadyrov in the Cabar Asia article. But, by acting this way, he believes that the authorities “have gone so far that they themselves no longer know what they are doing.”

Repression of the Pamiris still continues

Another sign of authoritarian drift is that since May 2022, the Tajik authorities have been targeting members of the Pamiri community, who live mainly in eastern Tajikistan. The government reacted to peaceful protests in this autonomous province by launching a security operation that left dozens dead and hundreds detained.

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According to the Tajik media outlet Pamir Daily, which has been following the trials closely, the president of the Supreme Court described the Pamiri protesters as “leaders of criminal gangs from Khorog and Rushan” [towns in the region where the demonstrations took place]. He said that all suspects had been prosecuted in accordance with the country’s laws. They were sentenced to between one year and life imprisonment. The trials were held behind closed doors, before arbitrary judges and with no transparency.

However, for Syinat Sultanalieva, “it is very difficult to speak of a turning point in the repression. This is probably a brutal show of force to regain control of the region and to send a signal to the rest of the critical people in the country.” But at this very uncertain time in Tajikistan’s history, “the authorities should be held accountable for human rights violations committed by their agencies against ordinary citizens, human rights defenders and others.”

Written by Emma Collet

Translated by William Roberts

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The post In Tajikistan repression continues appeared first on Novastan English.