{"id":49538,"date":"2026-09-15T01:30:52","date_gmt":"2026-09-14T23:30:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/?p=49538"},"modified":"2026-09-15T01:30:56","modified_gmt":"2026-09-14T23:30:56","slug":"afghanistan-central-asia-trans-afghan-railway","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/uzbekistan\/afghanistan-central-asia-trans-afghan-railway\/","title":{"rendered":"Can Afghanistan Become Central Asia\u2019s Bridge to the South?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\n\t
\n\t\t
\n\t\t\t

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSupport Novastan, the European Central Asia magazine \n\t\t\t<\/h2>\n\t\t\t\tBy supporting Novastan, you are supporting the only English, French and German-language media specialising in Central Asia. We’re independent and we need your help to stay that way! \n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t
\n\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSupport Novastan<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Uzbekistan has increasingly treated Afghanistan not only as a security concern but as a potential trade and transit bridge linking Central and South Asia. In this interview, Aziza Mukhammedova, Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies at Uzbekistan\u2019s Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS<\/a>), discusses the rapid growth of bilateral trade, the future of the Termez-Hairatan corridor and Trans-Afghan railway, the risks posed by Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions, and what would need to happen for Afghanistan to become a genuine regional economic connector.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For years, Afghanistan was discussed in Central Asia primarily through the language of security, instability and border risk. Uzbekistan has increasingly tried to change that framing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, Tashkent has pursued an increasingly pragmatic relationship with Kabul, expanding trade, energy links and transport cooperation while promoting Afghanistan as a potential bridge between Central and South Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The economic relationship has grown quickly. Uzbekistan\u2019s trade turnover with Afghanistan rose from around $674 million in 2021 to almost $1.68 billion in 2025, while Afghanistan became one of the most important markets for Uzbek exports. Cross-border infrastructure has expanded through the Termez International Trade Centre, cooperation on the Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif railway has continued, and Uzbekistan has continued to promote the much more ambitious Trans-Afghan railway towards Pakistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the larger ambition remains uncertain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Trans-Afghan railway is still under development, financing remains unresolved, and the economic viability of the project will depend on whether substantial and reliable freight flows actually materialise. At the same time, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, water disputes around the Amu Darya and questions over whether Afghanistan itself would benefit economically from transit all complicate the picture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To understand what is changing, and what remains aspirational, Novastan Editor-in-Chief Mathieu Lemoine spoke with Aziza Mukhammedova<\/strong>, Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies at Uzbekistan\u2019s Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS). Her research focuses on Afghanistan and regional connectivity between Central and South Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Novastan: Uzbekistan has invested heavily in the idea of Afghanistan as a connector rather than simply a source of security risks. Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, what has actually changed in Uzbekistan-Afghanistan economic relations? Which developments would you identify as the clearest evidence that this approach is producing tangible results?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aziza Mukhammedova:<\/strong> I would separate the bilateral economic results, which are already quite visible, from the broader idea of Afghanistan as a regional transit connector, which is progressing but has not yet been fully realised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 2021, the most important change has been that Uzbekistan has moved from simply preserving economic ties with Afghanistan to systematically building economic infrastructure around those ties. Engagement has become much more institutionalised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The clearest evidence is trade. Uzbekistan\u2019s trade turnover with Afghanistan stood at roughly $674 million in 2021, but increased to $1.14 billion in 2024 and almost $1.68 billion in 2025. Bilateral trade has therefore grown by approximately two and a half times compared with 2021. Afghanistan also became one of Uzbekistan\u2019s most important export markets, with Uzbek exports reaching around $1.5 billion in 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A second tangible result is the creation of physical and institutional infrastructure for cross-border commerce. The Termez International Trade Centre, formally opened in August 2024, is particularly significant because it is not simply another political initiative. It provides Afghan entrepreneurs with simplified access to Uzbekistan, including a special visa regime, commercial facilities and access to services. According to Uzbek government figures, more than 800,000 Afghan citizens visited the centre in 2025, while exports through it reached about $320 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We can also see growing institutionalisation of bilateral trade. Uzbekistan opened trade houses in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif in May 2025, and the two sides signed a preferential trade agreement in June 2025. Cooperation on the Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif railway has also continued, with the Uzbek operator remaining responsible for servicing the line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Energy is another important dimension. Uzbekistan exported around 1.8 billion kWh of electricity worth more than $90 million to Afghanistan in 2024, and the relationship is now moving beyond electricity sales towards infrastructure development, including the long-discussed Surkhan-Pul-e-Khumri 500 kV line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, I would distinguish these achievements from the larger claim that Afghanistan has already become a fully functioning connector between Central and South Asia. That transformation is still incomplete.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most ambitious project, the Trans-Afghan Railway linking Uzbekistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan, remains under development. There has nevertheless been concrete progress: in July 2025, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a trilateral framework agreement to prepare a feasibility study for the Termez-Naibabad-Maidanshahr-Logar-Kharlachi route.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So I would say Uzbekistan\u2019s strategy is already producing tangible results, but primarily at the bilateral and cross-border level. The next test will be whether these achievements can be converted into genuine regional connectivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Termez and Hairatan already form the most developed physical connection between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. How much further could this corridor realistically be developed without waiting for the Trans-Afghan railway?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is considerable room to develop the Termez-Hairatan corridor further even without waiting for the Trans-Afghan railway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the short term, relatively modest improvements in border management, terminals and logistics may generate a higher return than building entirely new infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The corridor already has the basic assets: the Friendship Bridge, road and rail connections, the Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif railway and a growing logistics cluster on the Uzbek side. Traffic is already increasing. In July 2026, the governor of Surkhandarya stated that freight transportation with Afghanistan by road, rail and river had doubled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I would identify four areas where practical measures could have a substantial impact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first is customs and border processing. Reducing the time a truck or wagon spends at the border can be almost as important as increasing physical railway capacity. Uzbekistan has proposed a \u201cone-stop\u201d principle at border crossings, greater integration with its E-logistics platform, electronic vehicle registration and online cargo monitoring.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second is railway-terminal capacity. The Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif line already provides a functioning 1,520-mm-gauge connection into northern Afghanistan. Capacity can still be increased through additional sidings, better loading and unloading equipment, faster wagon turnaround and terminal rehabilitation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third is developing Termez and Hairatan as a single logistics ecosystem. More bonded warehouses, cold storage, container handling, consolidation facilities and predictable truck scheduling could reduce both costs and congestion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fourth is road-transport regulation and fees. Harmonising charges, permits, documentation and vehicle requirements could make the route more commercially attractive without laying a single kilometre of new track.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So I would not see the choice as Termez-Hairatan versus the Trans-Afghan railway. Improving Termez-Hairatan now is probably the best way to prepare for the larger corridor later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Trans-Afghan railway is often presented as transformative. At this stage, which route and financing model appear most credible? Is there a risk that political enthusiasm is running ahead of demonstrated freight demand?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At this stage, the eastern route through northern and central Afghanistan to Kharlachi on the border with Pakistan appears to be the most realistic option, primarily because formal trilateral technical work is already under way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2025, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to prepare a joint feasibility study for the Naibabad-Maidan Shahr-Logar-Kharlachi route.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Financing is much more complicated. The project is expected to cost several billion dollars, and a purely commercial PPP or BOT model would be difficult because a private investor would have to assume construction, political, security and demand risks simultaneously.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A more credible option would be blended financing combining state participation, concessional finance from international financial institutions, and private investment in terminals, rolling stock and operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The key question is the freight base.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The railway is unlikely to be economically sustainable if it relies only on trade between Uzbekistan and Pakistan. Its viability would require substantial transit flows from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, potentially Russia, stable Afghan export volumes and reliable access to Pakistani ports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is therefore a real risk that political enthusiasm could run ahead of demonstrated commercial viability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The project has a strong strategic rationale because it would diversify Central Asia\u2019s access to seaports and significantly shorten southbound routes. But a strategically important project is not automatically a financially viable one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The current feasibility study needs to demonstrate that realistic freight volumes, tariffs and operating costs can support the project without simply assuming that large cargo flows will appear once the railway is built.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Could Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions now represent a greater obstacle to the corridor than insecurity within Afghanistan itself?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Potentially, yes, but I would distinguish between security risk inside Afghanistan and geopolitical risk at the corridor\u2019s southern gateway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pakistan is not simply another transit country. It provides the connection to the ports that gives the entire railway much of its geoeconomic value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even if the Afghan section operates normally, prolonged disruption at the Afghan-Pakistani border could affect the corridor as a whole. The experience of 2026 illustrates this clearly: border closures significantly disrupted Afghanistan\u2019s external trade, raised logistics costs and forced part of the traffic to seek alternative routes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, I would be cautious about describing bilateral tensions as a fundamental obstacle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fact that Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a trilateral agreement on the feasibility study and continued political consultations on regional connectivity demonstrates that all three sides recognise a substantial shared economic interest in keeping this direction open.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The railway should therefore not only be seen as dependent on political stability. It can also contribute to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Once significant commercial interests, transit revenues and access to regional markets become tied to the corridor, the economic cost of prolonged disruptions increases for all parties. That creates an incentive to insulate transport cooperation, as far as possible, from fluctuations in bilateral relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

You have also examined the possibility of extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor into Afghanistan and towards Central Asia. Would integration with CPEC complement the Trans-Afghan railway, or risk creating new dependencies?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From Uzbekistan\u2019s perspective, I would see integration with CPEC primarily as a complement to the Trans-Afghan railway rather than an alternative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The two projects perform different functions. The Trans-Afghan railway is intended to create the north-south link from Central Asia through Afghanistan, while CPEC could provide access to an already developing network of transport, logistics and port infrastructure inside Pakistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Uzbekistan, however, the key principle is not dependence on a single corridor, but multiplication of connectivity options.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is consistent with Uzbekistan\u2019s broader transport strategy. Tashkent is simultaneously promoting the Trans-Afghan Corridor, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway and routes towards the Caspian and Europe. CPEC should therefore be understood as one component of a diversified regional network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Read more on Novastan<\/strong>: China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway: Who wins from Central Asia\u2019s new trade route?<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The optimal outcome would be interconnection without exclusivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Central Asian states have developed different relationships with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Do you see their policies gradually converging<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I do see gradual convergence, but I would describe it as convergence in practice rather than convergence in perception.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Central Asian states increasingly accept that Afghanistan under the Taliban is a long-term regional reality and that economic isolation is neither practical nor conducive to regional stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

New regional formats are significant in this regard. In February 2026, Central Asian representatives discussed Afghanistan collectively in Astana, and in April the first Central Asia-Afghanistan Consultative Dialogue was held in Kabul, focusing on trade, transit, connectivity and regional cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, national approaches remain distinct.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Uzbekistan has gone furthest in conceptualising Afghanistan as part of the region\u2019s economic architecture. Turkmenistan\u2019s approach is similarly pragmatic but more infrastructure- and energy-driven. Kazakhstan has moved rapidly towards economic normalisation, while Tajikistan remains more security-sensitive, although even Dushanbe has become considerably more pragmatic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So I would not say Central Asia is developing a single policy towards the Taliban.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What is emerging is a common regional minimum: engagement with Kabul, preservation of security dialogue, expansion of economic relations and an interest in Afghanistan\u2019s greater regional integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How much leverage does Uzbekistan\u2019s pragmatic engagement give Tashkent on issues beyond trade and security, particularly women\u2019s education and political inclusion?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Uzbekistan\u2019s engagement gives Tashkent a certain degree of influence, but I would describe it as access-based rather than coercive leverage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Uzbekistan has maintained regular political contacts with the Taliban authorities, expanded economic cooperation and positioned itself as a constructive regional partner. This creates channels through which sensitive issues can be discussed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the limits of this influence should also be recognised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Issues such as women\u2019s education and political inclusion are closely connected to the Taliban\u2019s internal ideological and institutional calculations and are therefore much less responsive to bilateral economic incentives than trade, infrastructure or border security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Read more on Novastan:<\/strong> Nilofar Ayoubi on Afghan women, gender apartheid and rebuilding life in exile<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fact that restrictions on women\u2019s secondary and higher education remain in place in 2026 demonstrates how limited sustained international engagement has been on this issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Uzbekistan\u2019s comparative advantage lies elsewhere: maintaining trust, keeping difficult issues on the agenda and encouraging gradual change without sacrificing the channels of communication that make such influence possible in the first place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Water is becoming increasingly important in Afghanistan\u2019s relations with its neighbours. Could the Qosh Tepa Canal reshape Afghanistan\u2019s relationship with Central Asia?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yes, but I would be cautious about drawing a direct parallel with Afghanistan-Pakistan hydropolitics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The common factor is that Afghanistan is becoming a much more active upstream water user.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For decades, limited irrigation infrastructure meant that the Central Asian water balance developed largely without significant Afghan withdrawals. The Qosh Tepa Canal changes this reality. Afghanistan is not party to the existing regional water-sharing arrangements, while the canal could substantially increase its use of the Amu Darya.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Water also becomes more politically sensitive when supply is already under pressure from climate change, glacier loss, population growth and agricultural demand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, I think the Central Asian response is developing in a different direction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Uzbekistan has deliberately framed Qosh Tepa as an issue for dialogue rather than confrontation. President Mirziyoyev has proposed involving Afghanistan directly in regional discussions on Amu Darya water use and establishing a joint working group to assess the canal\u2019s impact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The key challenge is to move from a system in which Afghanistan was largely outside regional water governance towards one in which it becomes an integrated participant in transparent, data-based basin management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What would Afghanistan itself gain from becoming a major transit country? Is there a risk that corridors could cross the country without producing much local development?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Afghanistan could gain substantially, but the benefits should not be reduced to transit fees alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The more important opportunity is to use connectivity to lower Afghanistan\u2019s own transport costs, expand access to regional markets and stimulate economic activity along the corridor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is a real risk of what I would call a \u201ctransit without transformation\u201d<\/strong> scenario: trains cross Afghanistan, revenues are collected at the border, but relatively little value remains in the Afghan economy. Railways by themselves do not automatically create development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To avoid this, the Trans-Afghan Corridor should be developed not simply as a transport line but as an economic corridor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That means creating logistics centres, dry ports, warehouses and processing facilities around key nodes; connecting agricultural and mining areas through feeder infrastructure; encouraging Afghan companies to participate in transport and logistics services; and developing industrial or export-oriented zones along the route.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The distinction is between Afghanistan as a transit territory and Afghanistan as a participant in regional value chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first generates some revenue. The second can generate jobs, investment, exports and new centres of economic activity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, looking towards 2030, what indicators should we examine to determine whether Afghanistan is genuinely becoming a bridge between Central and South Asia?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By 2030, I would look at several concrete indicators rather than at the number of agreements or political declarations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first is actual transit volume: how much cargo is moving through Afghanistan between Central and South Asia, and what share of that traffic is genuine through-transit rather than bilateral trade with Afghanistan itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second is commercial reliability. A functioning bridge requires regular freight services, predictable transit times, competitive costs and the ability to move cargo throughout the year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If businesses begin choosing the Afghan route because it is commercially rational rather than politically encouraged, that would be a very important indicator of success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third, I would look at network integration: whether Afghan routes are effectively connected northward to Uzbekistan and the wider Central Asian railway system and southward to Pakistan\u2019s transport network and ports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fourth is Afghanistan\u2019s own economic participation. If logistics hubs, processing industries, services, employment and Afghan exports grow around these corridors, Afghanistan would be becoming part of regional value chains rather than simply territory crossed by foreign cargo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, I would examine whether connectivity has become institutionalised enough to survive political fluctuations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So by 2030, the decisive question should be very practical: are goods moving through Afghanistan regularly, competitively and in growing volumes, and is Afghanistan itself capturing part of the economic value created by that movement?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the answer is yes, then the idea of Afghanistan as a bridge between Central and South Asia will have moved from geopolitical aspiration to economic reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan English.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Uzbekistan has increasingly treated Afghanistan not only as a security concern but as a potential trade and transit bridge linking Central and South Asia. In this interview, Aziza Mukhammedova, Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies at Uzbekistan\u2019s Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), discusses the rapid growth of bilateral […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":358,"featured_media":49544,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4665,5],"tags":[406,4087,5061,5059,3974],"coauthors":[358],"class_list":["post-49538","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics","category-uzbekistan","tag-afghanistan","tag-central-asia","tag-south-asia","tag-trans-afghan-railway","tag-uzbekistan"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49538","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/358"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=49538"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49538\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":49546,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49538\/revisions\/49546"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/49544"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=49538"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=49538"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=49538"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=49538"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}