{"id":49453,"date":"2026-09-07T18:02:40","date_gmt":"2026-09-07T16:02:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/?p=49453"},"modified":"2026-09-07T18:02:45","modified_gmt":"2026-09-07T16:02:45","slug":"mongolia-russia-china-third-neighbour-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/politics\/mongolia-russia-china-third-neighbour-policy\/","title":{"rendered":"Bolor Lkhaajav: \u201cMongolia does not need to choose between Russia and China\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Mongolia\u2019s position between Russia and China is often portrayed as a geopolitical constraint. Researcher and writer Bolor Lkhaajav argues that Ulaanbaatar instead seeks to combine strong ties with both neighbours with an increasingly ambitious \u201cthird neighbour\u201d policy spanning critical minerals, energy, technology, diplomacy and security.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bolor Lkhaajav is a specialist in East and Northeast Asia who has published more than 200 articles and commentaries in multiple languages. She writes regularly on diplomatic history, foreign and security policy, geopolitics, economics, politics and society. She is currently working on Mongolia\u2019s foreign-policy grand strategy and has been accepted to a PhD programme beginning in autumn 2027.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this interview with Novastan, she discusses how Mongolia is navigating the geopolitical consequences of Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the growing importance of South Korea and other \u201cthird neighbours\u201d, the country\u2019s critical-mineral potential, environmental pressures and Mongolia\u2019s distinctive position in a rapidly changing Northeast Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Novastan: You are currently working on Mongolia’s foreign-policy grand strategy. How would you describe the country’s strategic approach today, and how has it evolved in the changing geopolitical environment since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bolor Lkhaajav:<\/strong> In 2011, the Mongolian Parliament adopted the country\u2019s Foreign Policy Concept, a legal document mapping out Ulaanbaatar\u2019s foreign-policy strategy to meet modern-day demands while maintaining a balance between its two neighbours – Russia and China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the important elements of the concept was the formal introduction of the \u201cThird Neighbour\u201d Doctrine. The idea of a \u201cthird neighbour\u201d had long existed in Mongolian history and diplomatic circles, but it had never been explicitly defined and applied in such a transparent way. Since 2011, the policy has become one of the pillars of Mongolia\u2019s foreign-policy grand strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Read more on Novastan<\/strong>: \u201cMongolia cannot be understood through one lens\u201d: Dr. Mendee Jargalsaikhan on democracy, China and Central Asia<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is specifically intended to strengthen Mongolia\u2019s diplomatic, political, economic and cultural links with countries outside Russia and China, while at the same time reinforcing bilateral and trilateral engagement with Moscow and Beijing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, Mongolia has experienced the consequences of Russia prioritising its domestic energy supply. Given Mongolia\u2019s heavy dependence on Russian fuel, intermittent shortages have become a regular occurrence over the past six months. This also highlights why it is crucial for Mongolia to invest in renewable energy and work with third-neighbour partners to strengthen the country\u2019s energy sector. I would not say that Mongolia can achieve energy independence at present, because that is simply not realistic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine has also changed the geopolitical and security dynamics of Northeast Asia. For Mongolia\u2019s foreign-policy grand strategy, it is crucial that its only two neighbours remain free of conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mongolia\u2019s grand strategy seeks to position Ulaanbaatar as a stable, democratic actor on the world stage. It is not dependent on the foreign policies of its neighbours, or of any other country, nor on their global engagements. Mongolia may respond differently to external challenges, but these will not fundamentally alter the country\u2019s foreign-policy grand strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mongolia’s \u201cthird neighbour\u201d policy has been central to its diplomacy for decades. Which relationships do you think have the greatest potential to deepen in the coming years – whether with South Korea, Japan, India, the European Union, the United States or others – and why?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mongolia\u2019s \u201cThird Neighbour\u201d Doctrine provides a much broader framework that envisages mechanisms for cooperation across different sectors and stages of development. It is not restricted to the mining sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At its core, the Third Neighbour Doctrine is both a concept and a foreign-policy practice encompassing multiple mechanisms that support Mongolia\u2019s geopolitical balance between the two major powers surrounding it, Russia and China, while also placing an emphasis on reinvigorating the country\u2019s bilateral and multilateral engagements outside their respective spheres of influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Bolor Lkhaajav.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Within the region, relations between Mongolia and South Korea have certainly expanded tremendously. This is partly because of South Korea\u2019s successful commercial presence in Mongolia and its more recent interest in diversifying its critical-mineral supply chains. Japan\u2019s interest and investment follow, although not to the same extent as South Korea\u2019s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

European partners will continue to play a crucial role in Mongolia\u2019s democracy and development. Building on strong bilateral relations with European partners, Ulaanbaatar aims to increase cooperation on climate change, renewable energy and sectors that align both with Mongolia\u2019s development priorities and with European standards and regulations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Read more on Novastan<\/strong>: \u201cHeritage is something alive\u201d: Ganzorig Miimaa reimagines Mongolia through photography<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the United States, however, environmental and renewable-energy cooperation is unlikely to be a central focus under Donald Trump\u2019s administration. In many respects, the current administration\u2019s priorities do not align with Mongolia\u2019s core values at present.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The US has shown interest in Mongolia\u2019s critical minerals. However, given Washington\u2019s posture towards both Moscow and Beijing, Ulaanbaatar is not particularly confident about the prospects of concluding a major deal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the largest US contributions to Mongolia<\/a> to date has been the successful implementation and launch of the Water Compact funded by the US Millennium Challenge Corporation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

You have written extensively on Mongolia’s relationship with South Korea, as well as on India and the European Union. How far can these partnerships help Mongolia translate diplomatic diversification into real economic diversification, given the constraints of geography, infrastructure and export routes?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mongolia\u2019s partnerships with South Korea, India, the European Union and others vary considerably according to the kinds of investment each partner is interested in pursuing. These are not all equivalent partners, and each can offer something different.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, India\u2019s $1.7 billion soft loan for Mongolia\u2019s first major greenfield oil refinery is a major boost for the country\u2019s domestic supply and also has potential for exports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU, on the other hand, is more interested in investing in human capital and civil society, promoting democratic values, and supporting the green transition, forestry and governance. Mongolia has a great deal to gain from its relations with the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, the Mongolian government can learn from the EU\u2019s Artificial Intelligence Act as the country moves towards establishing data centres and becoming a more digital nation. These ambitions will in turn create a need for greater cybersecurity capabilities, which countries such as South Korea, India and the United States can provide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The logistical challenge involved in exporting Mongolian goods is obvious, and there are no magical solutions. All exports ultimately need to transit through Russia or China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is therefore strategically important for Mongolia to maintain the strongest and most stable possible bilateral and trilateral relations with both neighbours. Mongolia-China railway connections, as well as Mongolia-Russia transit corridors, are equally important for expanding Mongolian exports to Europe and elsewhere in the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Critical minerals and uranium are attracting growing international attention to Mongolia. What opportunities does this create, and what would Mongolia need to do to turn this interest into durable economic and strategic benefits?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mongolia\u2019s exploration and export of critical minerals and uranium form part of the country\u2019s diversification strategy, even though they remain within the mining sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mongolia holds an estimated $1-3 trillion in untapped mineral reserves<\/a>, including significant deposits of copper, fluorspar, coal and rare earth elements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

South Korea is already working on building a stable supply chain to support its technological development. During South Korean President Lee Jae-myung\u2019s state visit<\/a> to Mongolia in July, Ulaanbaatar and Seoul signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement<\/a> (CEPA), which included the elimination of 2-5 percent tariffs on critical minerals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2025, a South Korean critical-minerals research hub was established in Ulaanbaatar. This was recently followed by the launch of joint scientific research<\/a> between the Mongolian National Rare Earth Corporation and the Korea Basic Science Institute.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Read more on Novastan<\/strong>: What lies beneath Central Asia? Rare earths, critical minerals and the new race for resources<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given South Korea\u2019s advanced manufacturing industries<\/a>, including steel, automobiles and semiconductors, the country has considerable demand for high-purity molybdenum powder. Moreover, South Korea\u2019s growing interest in becoming more active in the defence industry and manufacturing<\/a> makes Mongolia\u2019s natural resources a strategic asset.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

France has also become the first European country to seal a major uranium deal, signing a $1.6 billion investment agreement in 2025. These interests can be mutually beneficial: France requires uranium for its nuclear-energy sector, while Mongolia can use the partnership to diversify its exports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Mongolia to continue attracting investment from global partners, however, the country\u2019s political system needs to be stable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

More than anything else, I think the constant changes of government, government plans and budgets, changes to the taxation system, and corruption are among the main obstacles to Mongolia\u2019s development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mongolia recently hosted UNCCD COP17 in Ulaanbaatar, a subject you have also written about. Beyond the diplomatic visibility of hosting a major UN conference, what could COP17 realistically mean for Mongolia in areas such as desertification, land restoration, water security and environmental finance?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This year\u2019s COP17 included discussions on finance, water, land and people, and food systems. Each of these issues has direct implications for Mongolia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Water security, water pollution and land restoration in particular are closely linked to major mining operations in the country. Over the years, we have come to understand that environmental-protection clauses must be included as part of responsible mining. These requirements are understandably costly, but they are something the Mongolian side needs to demand regardless.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Read more on Novastan<\/strong>: From the Pamirs to the Aral Sea: Following the Amu Darya Through Central Asia<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

During COP17, mining giants such as Rio Tinto announced<\/a> strategies to contribute to Mongolia\u2019s fight against desertification and water pollution and to restore forests, including planting 5,000 hectares of forest, investing in renewable energy for company use and introducing new technologies to replenish groundwater.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Oyu Tolgoi, one of Mongolia\u2019s largest mining operations, began paying water-pollution fees in 2026, with regular quarterly payments of 150-200 million Mongolian tugrik, or roughly $42,000-$55,000. These practices are intended to set an example for other major mining companies operating in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Water security and water pollution will become even more important issues in the coming years as the construction of data centres is already being discussed at government level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Their environmental impact needs to be studied thoroughly, and Parliament will need to develop appropriate legal and regulatory mechanisms for such projects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

You have also written about the changing geopolitical environment in Northeast Asia. What new opportunities or challenges does this create for Mongolia, particularly as relations among Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan continue to evolve?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Over the last five years, Northeast Asia has become a hotspot of geopolitical transformation, and recent events have only highlighted these shifts in the post-Second World War international order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These are dynamic and complex international-relations issues, but I will mention the most significant ones here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine created tremendous opportunities for North Korea. Pyongyang is moving towards becoming a de facto nuclear state, most likely with the backing of both Russia and China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Mongolia, regional peace and security are crucial, and this includes peace on the Korean Peninsula. Mongolia currently maintains, and will continue to maintain, open diplomatic channels with North Korea regardless of Pyongyang\u2019s actions. There are also some economic incentives for doing so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite Mongolia\u2019s landlocked position in Northeast Asia, one of its geopolitical advantages is that it is the only country in the region without territorial disputes or unresolved historical grievances with neighbouring states. This is a significant advantage for Mongolian diplomacy and creates opportunities for Ulaanbaatar to develop diverse political, economic and cultural engagements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the short to long term, Mongolia\u2019s economic engagement with all regional actors is likely to continue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, in order to diversify its energy sources – a need that has become more pressing because of the consequences of Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine and fuel shortages – Mongolia will require support from China as well as third-neighbour investment in the energy sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

India is currently supporting Mongolia\u2019s first greenfield oil refinery, which is expected to become operational in 2028.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, what aspect of Mongolia’s international position do you think remains most misunderstood outside the country, and looking five to ten years ahead, what would successful diversification actually look like for Mongolia?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I think one of the main misconceptions among observers of Mongolia is the idea that the country somehow has to choose between Russia and China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mongolia\u2019s histories with Russia and China differ, and its diplomatic and economic relations with the two countries also differ tremendously. To think that Ulaanbaatar needs to choose between Russia and China in modern-day diplomacy is therefore not only a misconception, but also something that simply does not apply to Mongolian foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second misconception is that, because of Mongolia\u2019s landlocked position between Russia and China, the third-neighbour policy is unsuccessful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I have come across views that undermine Ulaanbaatar\u2019s third-neighbour approach, arguing that the policy cannot genuinely counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence. But the misconception lies in assuming that this is what the policy is designed to do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mongolia needs robust relations with Russia and China. That is itself a foreign-policy priority. The Third Neighbour Doctrine is an addition to strong relations with Mongolia\u2019s only two neighbours, not an alternative to them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From both a foreign-policy and implementation perspective, since 2011 – over a period of 15 years – Mongolia\u2019s third-neighbour relationships have flourished and will continue to develop through niche partnerships and new mechanisms for cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If one looks at the impact of Mongolia\u2019s third-neighbour policy in its entirety, it becomes clear that it is not limited to economic diversification. It also encompasses culture, education, technology, innovation, modernisation and everything else that a modern society demands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If there is one thing slowing Mongolia\u2019s third-neighbour engagement, it is the country\u2019s political instability, constant changes of government, shifts in investment laws and regulations, and, finally, corruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan English.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Mongolia\u2019s position between Russia and China is often portrayed as a geopolitical constraint. Researcher and writer Bolor Lkhaajav argues that Ulaanbaatar instead seeks to combine strong ties with both neighbours with an increasingly ambitious \u201cthird neighbour\u201d policy spanning critical minerals, energy, technology, diplomacy and security. Bolor Lkhaajav is a specialist in East and Northeast Asia […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":358,"featured_media":49456,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4667,4939,4,4665,5],"tags":[4087,1101,4954,4181,5049],"coauthors":[358],"class_list":["post-49453","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-environment","category-interview","category-kazakhstan","category-politics","category-uzbekistan","tag-central-asia","tag-china","tag-mongolia","tag-south-korea","tag-third-neighbour-policy"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49453","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/358"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=49453"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49453\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":49460,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49453\/revisions\/49460"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/49456"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=49453"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=49453"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=49453"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=49453"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}