{"id":49438,"date":"2026-09-10T14:31:15","date_gmt":"2026-09-10T12:31:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/?p=49438"},"modified":"2026-09-10T14:31:19","modified_gmt":"2026-09-10T12:31:19","slug":"kyrgyzstan-sadyr-japarov-politics-china-2027-election","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/kyrgyzstan\/kyrgyzstan-sadyr-japarov-politics-china-2027-election\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cA Fourth Political Reset?\u201d: An Interview with Kyrgyz Political Scientist Emil Dzhuraev"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

An assessment of President Sadyr Japarov\u2019s tenure, the political realignment following the dismissal of the head of the security services, and growing economic dependence on China… For Novastan, prominent Kyrgyz political scientist Emil Dzhuraev looks back at the political, economic and geopolitical upheavals facing Kyrgyzstan.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Emilbek Dzhuraev is a Kyrgyz political scientist and analyst who holds a PhD in political science from the University of Maryland. His areas of expertise include political regimes and democratization in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia, as well as constitutional development and regional geopolitics. He is currently a Senior Lecturer at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, a regular commentator on Kyrgyz and Central Asian political developments, and co-founder of Crossroads Central Asia, a Bishkek-based think tank.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this interview with Novastan, conducted in collaboration with IFME (Institut fran\u00e7ais des mondes eurasiatiques), he discusses Kyrgyzstan\u2019s current political situation in light of the forthcoming presidential election scheduled for January 2027.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Novastan: Since Sadyr Japarov came to power in 2020-2021, following the October revolution, Kyrgyzstan has undergone major constitutional and institutional transformations. How would you broadly describe the political system that has emerged under Japarov?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Emil Dzhuraev:<\/strong> With the arrival of the new government in early 2021 and Sadyr Japarov\u2019s accession to the presidency, a process of constitutional reform was also set in motion, culminating in the adoption of a new Constitution in May 2021. In a sense, this represented a radical and decisive break with the Constitution that had been in force for ten years. The 2010 Constitution had established a form of semi-parliamentary system: Parliament had significant legislative powers, as well as powers to appoint and dismiss the government, while the president\u2019s powers were much more limited. In 2010, this had itself represented a major departure from the much more presidential system that had prevailed previously.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2021, we therefore saw the return of a very strong and centralized presidential system. Unlike earlier versions of the presidential system, in the early 2000s or even the 1990s, the president\u2019s powers are now more firmly established at the constitutional level. They are no longer simply de facto powers arising from political circumstances: they are explicitly enshrined in the Constitution. The president is both the head of the executive branch and the highest representative of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Constitution also grants the president extensive executive powers. For instance, Parliament now has only a limited role in appointing and dismissing members of the government. In most cases, it is the president who appoints and dismisses them, and dismissals can take place without parliamentary involvement. The president also participates in the appointment of judges, all the way down to courts of first instance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If you look at the current Constitution, the provisions concerning the rights and powers of the president probably constitute the longest section devoted to any state institution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kyrgyzstan was long considered the most politically pluralistic country in Central Asia, to the point of being nicknamed the \u201cisland of democracy.\u201d Based on what you have said, is the country now moving towards a form of autocracy?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many observers have noted that Kyrgyzstan has moved towards greater autocracy in recent years and away from democratic norms and principles. Unfortunately, this is also happening against the backdrop of a global democratic retreat and democratic backsliding. The authoritarian shift in Kyrgyzstan is therefore not a unique phenomenon, and there is currently no particularly favorable international environment for a return to democracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The question now is whether political pluralism in Kyrgyzstan can be rebuilt. This has proved very difficult under the current Constitution, which gives the authorities significant repressive powers. Political parties, different political groups and the various currents within society have been heavily constrained in their ability to exert any meaningful influence on politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Parliamentary elections were brought forward from 2026 to November 2025. What did this early election actually change in the balance of power between the presidency, Parliament and the political elites?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The parliamentary elections were brought forward by one year, and the exact reasons for this decision are not fully understood. The official explanation put forward by the government was that it was related to the proximity of the 2027 presidential election. Even if one views this explanation with some skepticism, I think it is nevertheless grounded in an obvious reality: by the time the country would have elected its Parliament, it would also have been entering the presidential campaign and electoral process. There would have been a two- or three-month period beginning with the parliamentary electoral cycle during which Kyrgyzstan\u2019s political life would have been very open and vulnerable to all kinds of shocks, with a potential risk of instability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the elections, and looking at their results, a second explanation can also be considered, in which the president may or may not have played a role. The new Parliament includes a number of figures promoted by Mr. Tashiev who are likely to support his initiatives and main political priorities. And that is precisely what we have begun to see.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Once the new Parliament was installed, at the very beginning of 2026, rumors and a kind of public campaign began suggesting that the presidential election should also be brought forward. There is indeed a debate linked to the discrepancy between the old and new Constitutions: the old Constitution provided for a single six-year presidential term, while the new one provides for two five-year terms. Mr. Japarov\u2019s first term falls between the two systems and, according to some reports, Tashiev\u2019s supporters wanted the election to take place this year, after five years in office.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kamchybek Tashiev, who played a central role in the Japarov regime, was dismissed in February 2026 as head of Kyrgyzstan\u2019s State Committee for National Security. What were the reasons for and consequences of this decision?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I think the real reason is that the president and his closest circle – although it is difficult to say exactly who belongs to that circle or how large it is – felt that Mr. Tashiev was moving rapidly towards a presidential bid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

More than that, it was not simply a matter of preparing for the scheduled election: Tashiev\u2019s group was pushing for an early election. More seriously, the president\u2019s entourage apparently believed that Tashiev\u2019s team could secure a majority in Parliament that would allow it to launch impeachment proceedings against Mr. Japarov on the grounds that he had exceeded the five-year term provided for under the current Constitution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There have therefore been all kinds of allegations, rumors and suspicions which are, of course, very difficult to confirm at this stage, because nothing has been officially documented in a way that would establish that such plans or statements actually existed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Judicial proceedings are currently underway against Mr. Tashiev and some of his closest associates. They are accused of preparing to overthrow the government. This is essentially the charge they are defending themselves against. At first instance, the district court found them guilty. But the evidence is very limited, and this obviously raises serious concerns about our judicial system and judicial practices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Japarov has now publicly confirmed his intention to seek a second presidential term in January 2027. At this stage, do you see any political actor capable of seriously challenging him? Could the political break between Japarov and Tashiev ultimately turn into an electoral confrontation?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At this stage, it is very difficult to imagine serious competition against Mr. Japarov when he seeks re-election. No one doubted that he would seek a second term. Recently, in an interview, he said that he had wanted to give up a second term in favor of Mr. Tashiev, but I do not think anyone really takes that statement seriously.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After five years of an extremely intolerant and repressive political environment in Kyrgyzstan, I think we have exhausted our pool of potential competitors – or at least the most important and capable political opponents of Mr. Japarov are currently not in a position to challenge him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among other things, a law was also passed – and I think it was strongly motivated by political considerations – during Parliament\u2019s last session. It provides that anyone convicted of certain serious or particularly serious crimes, even after serving their sentence and even after being rehabilitated, will be barred from running for elected office. Of course, this currently applies to almost all of the major figures in the political opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kyrgyzstan has experienced strong economic growth in recent years. To what extent is this growth actually translating into improved living conditions for ordinary Kyrgyz citizens, and is this likely to become a political issue during the 2027 election campaign?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indeed, President Japarov\u2019s government strongly emphasizes macroeconomic results – the positive ones, of course, rather than the negative ones – particularly the fact that GDP has recorded very high growth over the past four or five years, often among the highest rates in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But recently, a great deal of public discussion, mainly online – Kyrgyzstan\u2019s political space has shifted to the Internet because it is now almost impossible to engage in political debate offline – has focused on the deterioration or stagnation of living standards, particularly the cost of living and inflation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some incomes may be rising, but the cost of living is rising even faster. Inflation is significant. The prices of basic goods and the consumer basket are genuinely increasing. According to Kyrgyzstan\u2019s official economic statistics, the inflation rate may be below 10 percent, and perhaps even slightly below the GDP growth rate. But many people feel that inflation is much higher when it comes to essential goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the election approaches, it will therefore not be enough for President Japarov to say that we have built so many kilometers of roads, so many schools or so many factories, because for a large proportion of ordinary citizens, the day-to-day cost of living will be the main issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kyrgyzstan experienced major political upheavals in 2005, 2010 and 2020, the year you described as a \u201cthird departure.\u201d What remains today of the political conditions that produced these revolutions?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, the economic slowdown resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic, combined with the very difficult state of public finances and government obligations, particularly the payment of pensions, had practically emptied Kyrgyzstan\u2019s budget. Repayment of the external debt was also a major problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, large-scale political corruption and, linked to it, organized crime were very significant factors. The parliamentary elections – which triggered this third political crisis – were also heavily dominated by money and corruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third, I think there was simply a weakness on the part of the government in implementing decisions and effectively exercising its electoral mandate. This notably showed that the president at the time, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, was a very weak president who had surrendered much of his power to corrupt elements within his entourage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If we look back at that period and compare it with the current situation in 2026, I think President Japarov\u2019s government has eliminated many of these problems. The economy is very different from what it was in 2020, and organized crime is no longer present in the same way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of course, some people now argue that law-enforcement agencies within the government itself have become comparable to a form of organized crime, but that represents a different way of exercising power. The presidential apparatus is very powerful, and the state\u2019s capacity to govern has increased considerably compared with 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So I think those conditions are largely no longer present today. And, of course, one of the factors that made the October 2020 movement possible was the existence of elections and political pluralism that allowed parties to mobilize effectively. That is precisely what no longer exists under this highly centralized and hyper-presidential system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If there were to be a \u201cfourth departure,\u201d it would therefore have to emerge under very different conditions and from different triggers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Geopolitically, Kyrgyzstan is deeply tied to Russia, increasingly economically dependent on China, and seeking closer relations with the European Union and other external partners. How much room for maneuver does Bishkek have today?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine has given Kyrgyzstan more room for maneuver in pursuing this multi-vector foreign policy. At certain points during these four and a half years of war, it did seem that things were becoming more difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But because the war has lasted much longer than expected – much longer than Putin anticipated – it has given countries that are highly dependent on and closely tied to Russia more room for maneuver.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, this is because Russia has had to devote far more of its resources, including diplomatic resources, to the war itself and to dealing with Western sanctions and isolation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, China, Russia\u2019s main partner and supporter, has also sought to gain more room for maneuver in regional geopolitics, and it is gradually obtaining that space.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amid all of this, I think Mr. Putin has understood that, in order to meet Moscow\u2019s own needs – particularly given the disruption of transport, logistics and trade networks – and in Russia\u2019s own interests, it was important, even necessary, to give the Central Asian countries, including Kyrgyzstan, more space to pursue their own foreign policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I think much of the space left by Russia has been occupied by China. But Kyrgyzstan is also actively pursuing other directions in its foreign relations, particularly with the European Union and certain Middle Eastern countries, which have become very important, as well as, of course, with Turkey and its Central Asian neighbors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The recent peace agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ended years of tensions and border conflicts and was signed in March 2025. How could this agreement affect Kyrgyzstan\u2019s domestic politics and Japarov\u2019s political legitimacy? Could it also strengthen Bishkek\u2019s position within the broader regional balance in Central Asia?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

From the perspective of Kyrgyzstan\u2019s position in Central Asian politics, this is clearly a positive development: no longer having political disputes with your neighbors is a good thing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, we were negotiating and resolving these disputes with both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. With Tajikistan, this included two episodes of open and violent conflict, in 2021 and 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In terms of the legitimacy of Mr. Japarov\u2019s government, however, this remains one of the most difficult issues to assess. The border question had remained unresolved for 30 years because whenever we faced these disputes, it was obvious that they could not be resolved without exchanging territory, without giving something up in order to obtain something else.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is partly why previous governments and leaders had failed to resolve the issue. Japarov and his partner Tashiev clearly had both a popular mandate in 2021 and the political capacity needed to implement these kinds of decisions, including reaching certain compromises with neighboring countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the long term, things will of course become clearer, because many aspects of the new borders and territorial exchanges are not yet widely understood, and most people in Kyrgyzstan do not know precisely where the border now runs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, I think that over time this will probably cease to be a major political issue. Some things could nevertheless retain symbolic importance, such as the large water reservoir. It is an obvious feature that everyone has heard about, that appears on maps and that everyone can see: it has, de facto, been ceded to Uzbekistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In practice, the water from this reservoir was already primarily intended for Uzbekistan because that is where the relevant economic activity is located. But the population eventually became aware of this situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If we look beyond the 2027 election, what do you see as the main political trends in Kyrgyzstan over the next six years?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Compared with most stable political systems, it is very difficult to predict anything in Kyrgyzstan because things can change very dramatically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If we follow the current trajectory, several major challenges and questions arise for the future. The first concerns succession. Five years will pass quickly, and the question will be whether President Japarov will be prepared to relinquish power peacefully and openly to whoever wins the election, since he is legally entitled to only two terms. There are already rumors that his son could seek to succeed him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another major challenge, frequently raised by government critics and activists, concerns the evolution of our geopolitical relationship with China. Beijing\u2019s activities in many countries, including Kyrgyzstan, are tied to numerous geopolitical interests. Anti-Chinese sentiment can easily be inflamed, and it is easy to mobilize such sentiment among the Kyrgyz population. The issue is all the more important because Kyrgyzstan has taken out numerous loans and entered into many financing agreements with China, and has therefore accumulated considerable debt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The third major challenge in the coming years will be servicing our debt. Can the Kyrgyz economy continue to grow and increase its revenues over the next few years? The past three or four years have been very successful – at least for the government – but can this momentum continue?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Economic data and broader historical experience suggest that it is very difficult to sustain growth rates of 9, 10 or 11 percent a year for such a long period: growth will eventually slow. But when it does, what will that look like? Will the country enter a recession, experience a collapse, or face some other form of crisis? Economic growth has been heavily driven by sectors and sources of revenue that are not necessarily sustainable in the long term. Construction cannot continue growing at this pace indefinitely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If that happens, Kyrgyzstan\u2019s debt could become a very serious problem. That is precisely what the Kyrgyz government needs to be concerned about.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Interview by Roman Fuster,
Contributor to Novastan<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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