{"id":48601,"date":"2026-05-28T01:02:43","date_gmt":"2026-05-27T23:02:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/?p=48601"},"modified":"2026-05-28T01:02:44","modified_gmt":"2026-05-27T23:02:44","slug":"kyrgyzstan-security-apparatus-tashiev-dismissal","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/kyrgyzstan\/kyrgyzstan-security-apparatus-tashiev-dismissal\/","title":{"rendered":"In Kyrgyzstan, after the dismissal of the GKNB chief, the political-security apparatus is reshuffled"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

On 10 February, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov dismissed Kamchybek Tashiev, head of the State Committee for National Security, or GKNB<\/a>, and a central figure in power for several years. His removal, followed by dismissals targeting those close to him in several institutions, brings an end to an alliance that had structured Kyrgyzstan\u2019s political-security apparatus.
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The ruling tandem that had dominated Kyrgyzstan for more than five years has finally cracked. On 10 February, by dismissing Kamchybek Tashiev, head of the State Committee for National Security, by decree, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov<\/a> did not merely end a long-standing collaboration with his closest ally. He also regained control of the coercive apparatus that had until then been one of the pillars of the system established since he came to power in 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n

Faites un don \u00e0 Novastan<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For more than five years, Kamchybek Tashiev<\/a> had been the most powerful man in Kyrgyzstan after the president, overseeing the main anti-corruption investigations. He appeared publicly during spectacular arrests and embodied an increasingly omnipresent security apparatus. A co-founder of the Mekentchil party and a key actor in the political upheavals that brought the tandem to the top of the state, he had gradually turned the security services into a pillar of the regime. In a political system marked by the personalisation of power, his influence extended far beyond the institutional framework of his position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under his leadership, the GKNB became one of the nerve centres of the state. Its prerogatives expanded, its resources increased and its visibility grew. Internal promotions, the allocation of housing to officers, nepotism and direct interventions in the management of sensitive economic cases: Kamchybek Tashiev had gradually built a network of authority and loyalty that structured the regime\u2019s balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kamchybek Tashiev, security architect of Sadyr Japarov\u2019s regime<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Kamchybek Tashiev began his political career in 2007 as minister of emergency situations. After disagreements with former Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov<\/a>, he left his post in 2009, before siding with the opposition during the Kyrgyz revolution<\/a> of 2010. These events enabled him to found his party, Ata-Zhurt<\/a>, in 2006, and to win the early parliamentary elections<\/a> of 10 October 2010 with 15.89% of the vote and 28 seats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He thus returned to political life as a member of Kyrgyzstan\u2019s Supreme Council from 2010 to 2013. In 2014, Ata-Jurt merged with Respublika<\/a> in an attempt to win the 2015 parliamentary elections<\/a>, but this merger<\/a> displeased Kamchybek Tashiev, who left the party and joined Mekenchil<\/a>, which he had co-founded with Sadyr Japarov on 16 June 2010 and which brought together many members of Ata-Jurt.<\/p>\n\n\n

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The parliamentary elections<\/a> of 4 October 2020 once again turned into a conflict extending beyond the political sphere, with major demonstrations<\/a> from 5 to 15 October 2020. Amid this new socio-political chaos, former Prime Minister Sadyr Japarov and his supporters, including Kamchybek Tashiev, increased pressure on former President Sooronbay Jeenbekov<\/a>, who resigned on 15 October 2020. As a result, Sadyr Japarov became acting president and appointed Kamchybek Tashiev head of the GKNB on 16 October that year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also read on Novastan : <\/strong>Condamnation d\u2019Almazbek Atamba\u00efev : retour sur le parcours mouvement\u00e9 des anciens pr\u00e9sidents du Kirghizstan<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

His influence was also visible during the border clashes with Tajikistan in April 2021<\/a> and September 2022<\/a>. As head of the GKNB, the body overseeing the border guards, Kamchybek Tashiev played a central role in managing operations and ceasefire negotiations. These crises strengthened his image as a strongman guaranteeing Kyrgyzstan\u2019s territorial integrity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dismantling extended to several institutions<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Tashiev\u2019s departure has been accompanied by a wider reorganisation. Within the GKNB itself, his deputies for state security were removed, and a new acting head was appointed without delay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

President Japarov then stated<\/a> that an Investigative Committee would be created and would report directly to the president, while the GKNB\u2019s area of competence would be reduced. The agency will henceforth focus on intelligence, counterintelligence, counterterrorism and organised crime, Radio Azattyq noted<\/a>. \u201cIt is necessary to depoliticise the State Committee for National Security and free it from the influence of political parties, ideologies and various stakeholders,\u201d assured<\/a> Jumgalbek Shabdanbekov, the new GKNB chief appointed on 19 February, in an interview<\/a> with the local newspaper Vecherny Bishkek<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the reshuffle goes far beyond the security apparatus alone. The minister of natural resources, ecology and technical supervision, Meder Mashiev<\/a>, as well as his deputy minister, Bolot Jusupbekov<\/a>, were dismissed. In the south of the country, considered Tashiev\u2019s electoral stronghold, mayors, notably in Osh and Manas, are being replaced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also read on Novastan : <\/strong>Les pistonn\u00e9s : portraits au vitriol des enfants des pr\u00e9sidents kirghiz<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even more significantly, people directly close to Kamchybek Tashiev have been targeted. While the parliamentary mandate of his brother, Shaiyrbek<\/a> Tashiev, has not so far been called into question despite rumours of dismissal, the head of the transport prosecutor\u2019s office, Nurgazy Matisakov<\/a>, who is Tashiev\u2019s nephew, has been removed. These decisions reflect a desire to neutralise not only one figure, but an entire family and political network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A shift ahead of the presidential election<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This rupture comes one year before the 2027 presidential election, in a climate marked by criticism of the economic and energy situation, as well as by a petition calling for an early vote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also read on Novastan : <\/strong>Le Kirghizstan s\u2019inqui\u00e8te d\u2019une crise \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique majeure cet hiver<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Presidential statements, however, have sought to ease tensions. On 13 February, the head of state told the state news agency Kabar<\/a><\/em> that there was no division between his supporters and those of his former ally, assuring<\/a> that his \u201cfriendship with Kamchybek Tashiev will continue\u201d. A few days later, he added<\/a>: \u201cWe remain friends. But he will not resume public office. He needs to rest and focus on his health.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n

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The end of the tandem between Sadyr Japarov and Kamchybek Tashiev thus marks a phase of increased concentration of power in the hands of the presidency. It remains to be seen whether this centralisation will durably strengthen the stability of Kyrgyzstan\u2019s system, or whether it will reveal new fault lines within the political elites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lenny Cabrol Noto<\/strong>
Contributor for Novastan<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n

Thank you for reading this article! If you have time, we would appreciate your feedback, either through this anonymous form or by email at editorial@novastan.org<\/em><\/a>. Thank you very much!<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On 10 February, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov dismissed Kamchybek Tashiev, head of the State Committee for National Security, or GKNB, and a central figure in power for several years. His removal, followed by dismissals targeting those close to him in several institutions, brings an end to an alliance that had structured Kyrgyzstan\u2019s political-security apparatus. The […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":358,"featured_media":48602,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,4665],"tags":[4932,2578],"coauthors":[358],"class_list":["post-48601","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-kyrgyzstan","category-politics","tag-government","tag-kyrgyzstan"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/48601","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/358"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=48601"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/48601\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":48604,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/48601\/revisions\/48604"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/48602"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=48601"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=48601"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=48601"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=48601"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}