{"id":42199,"date":"2022-12-10T14:22:18","date_gmt":"2022-12-10T13:22:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/?p=42199"},"modified":"2023-03-30T17:12:03","modified_gmt":"2023-03-30T15:12:03","slug":"pressure-from-russia-increases-on-central-asian-media-outlets","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/kazakhstan\/pressure-from-russia-increases-on-central-asian-media-outlets\/","title":{"rendered":"Pressure from Russia increases on Central Asian media outlets"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Ever since February 24, 2022, coverage of the war in Ukraine has been complicated for Central Asia.&nbsp; Between voluntary omission by official media and pressure on those who dare call the \u201cspecial operation\u201d a war and invasion, the independent press in Central Asia is being tested by the Kremlin and its restrictive federal agency Roskomnadzor.<\/strong><strong>With significant dependence on Russian network infrastructure, as well as the dominance of Russian content in information distribution, what kind of space do Central Asian media agencies have to exercise digital sovereignty?&nbsp; <\/strong><strong>An analysis of the Central Asian media landscape under persistent Russian influence.<\/strong><strong>This article was originally published on Novastan\u2019s <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/novastan.org\/fr\/decryptage\/pour-les-medias-centrasiatiques-les-pressions-de-la-russie-saccentuent\/\"><strong>French website<\/strong><\/a><strong> on 14 October 2022.<\/strong>\n\nIt is a turnaround of events that speaks volumes about the freedom of speech in Kazakhstan. Beeline, the main Kazakh operator, had announced the withdrawal of certain Russian channels broadcasting on national territory, including <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Channel_One_Russia\">Channel One Russia<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/NTV_(Russia)\">NTV<\/a>, Kremlin propaganda machines. However, the group went back on their decision on 3 October, says Kazakh media outlet <a href=\"https:\/\/vlast.kz\/novosti\/51938-beeline-kazakhstan-ne-stanet-prekrasat-translaciu-rossijskih-kanalov.html\">Vlast<\/a>, following an interview with the Russian Ministry of Digital Development.\n\n<em>\u201cIn Astana, the interruption of Russian television channels broadcasting is keenly discussed, and the majority is in favour. But the thing is that nothing changes,\u201d<\/em> explains Kazakh political commentator <a href=\"https:\/\/cabar.asia\/ru\/author\/dimashalzhanov\">Dimash Alzhanov<\/a> to Novastan. Despite pressure from civil society, Kazakh television remains under Russian influence, something which is also true of written press media.\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\t\t\t<div class=\"hp-newsletter col-span-3 lg:col-span-1 flex flex-col bg-primary-100 border-t-8 border-secondary-500 rounded-lg justify-center items-center lg:items-stretch px-6 py-6 gap-4 box-border\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"flex\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"enveloppe\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<i class=\"far fa-envelope text-5xl text-secondary-300\"><\/i>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"formulaire_nl\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class=\"font-bold text-xl block\">The whole of Central Asia in your inbox\n<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\tSubscribe to our free weekly newsletter\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t<form class=\"flex w-3\/4 lg:w-full\" action=\"https:\/\/us4.list-manage.com\/subscribe?u=6a15a2256d412b041fdec39e8&amp;id=d479236523\" method=\"post\" id=\"mc-embedded-subscribe-form\" name=\"mc-embedded-subscribe-form\" class=\"validate\" target=\"_blank\" novalidate=\"\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input class=\"flex-grow py-2 px-3 border border-primary-300 rounded-l\" type=\"email\" placeholder=\"Email\" name=\"EMAIL\" id=\"mce-EMAIL\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<button class=\"bg-secondary-500 py-2 px-3 text-white rounded-r-md border border-secondary-500\" type=\"submit\" value=\"\" name=\"subscribe\">Register<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/form>\n\n\t\t\t\t\t<a href=\"#\" class=\"underline text-secondary-700\">Click here for the latest issue\n<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\t\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div><!-- newsletter -->\n\t\t\n\n\n\n<p>\n\nIndeed, an investigation by <a href=\"https:\/\/mediazona.ca\/article\/2022\/10\/03\/rknkz\">MediaZona<\/a> revealed that Moscow blocked certain independent Central Asian media websites by means of the federal agency <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Roskomnadzor\">Roskomnadzor<\/a>. The state censorship agency sent warning letters to Russian-speaking Kazakh and Kyrgyz press services, demanding that they remove various articles related to the war in Ukraine. This specifically affected <a href=\"https:\/\/kloop.kg\/\">Kloop<\/a> in Kyrgyzstan, in addition to <a href=\"https:\/\/katel.kz\/\">Katel<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/newtimes.kz\/\">NewTimes<\/a> in Kazakhstan.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Censorship of the war in Ukraine<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>\nAccording to director of Kyrgyz media outlet Kloop, quoted in the MediaZona article, Roskomnadzor blocks Internet websites employing the word &#8220;war&#8221; and not &#8220;special operation,&#8221; the official term to designate the invasion of Ukrainian by the Kremlin. Although these &#8220;warnings&#8221; only apply to media within Russian borders and do not restrict Central Asian media agencies inside their own countries, Dimash Alzhanov stresses the fact that these gestures are implemented in order to \u201cimpose certain sanctions\u201d and to silence them.\n\nThe director of the Kazakh public foundation <a href=\"https:\/\/lmc.kz\/ru\/news\/legal-media-center-won-case-against-kazakhstan-un-human-rights-committee\">Legal Media Center<\/a>, Diana Okremova, affirmed in an interview with MediaZona that <em>\u201csome of Roskomnadzor\u2019s actions can be qualified as elements of information warfare.\u201d<\/em>\n\nBlocking Central Asian websites dates to before the beginning of the war in Ukraine. According to the MediaZona article, Roskomnadzor has been expanding control over Central Asian media for several years, forcing some to erase content mentioning citizen suicides, something prohibited under Russian law.&nbsp; This was the case in 2017 with the Kazakh site <a href=\"http:\/\/www.rikatv.kz\/\">Rika.tv<\/a>, and the Tajik website <a href=\"https:\/\/www.asiaplustj.info\/\">Asia-Plus<\/a> in 2019.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Central Asia: Russia\u2019s \u201cinformation space\u201d<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>\nConsequently, Central Asia and its media have been commanding Russia\u2019s attention for some time. <em>\u201cThey have been influencing us for about ten years. Russia is trying to attract Central Asian countries into its own information space. The Russian Federation uses television channels as a means to disseminate its propaganda,\u201d<\/em> explains Dimash Alzhanov.\n\nIn Kazakhstan, some Russian channels will still be broadcasted because both countries have signed an intergovernmental cooperation agreement on the airing of mass information. For Russia, <em>\u201cthe idea is to mix information \u2013 even disinformation<\/em><em> \u2013 <\/em><em>and entertainment. These shows use Kazakhs in their programmes to make them \u2018less Russian,\u2019 and to ensure that society increasingly watches Moscow-made content,\u201d <\/em>analyses the political scientist.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Information consumption leans heavily towards Russian-language content<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p>\nIn an interview given to Vlast, <a href=\"https:\/\/vlast.kz\/politika\/52046-nasi-grazdane-daze-ne-osoznaut-cto-oni-zertvy-propagandy.html\">political scientist Shalkar Nurseitov<\/a> explains that the real issue in Central Asia is <em>\u201cthe ease of access to Russian media. Most citizens have access to media spreading the Kremlin\u2019s agenda, and those who lack critical thinking believe propaganda.\u201d<\/em>\n\nIn 2019 and 2021, international organisation <a href=\"https:\/\/ru.internews.kz\/\">Internews<\/a> led a study in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan about media consumption patterns of the population. The results, reported by Kazakh outlet <a href=\"https:\/\/masa.media\/ru\/site\/okolo-30-kazakhstantsev-sovsem-ne-doveryayut-smi-glavnyy-istochnik-informatsii-v-strane-sotsseti\">Masa Media<\/a>, showed that 30% of respondents receive their news via television in Kazakhstan, while the percentage is higher in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.\n\nIn Kazakhstan, the vast majority of viewers watch television in Russian, with only 11% watching in Kazakh. Furthermore, over half the respondents read newspapers, magazines, and websites in Russian, while only a little over 8% consumed written material in Kazakh.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Pressures from within<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p><em>\u201cIf the broadcasting of Russian channels is limited, it does not mean that the problem of freedom of speech will be resolved in Kazakhstan,\u201d <\/em>said Dimash Alzhanov. <em>\u201cThe issue of information manipulation by those in power remains, and therefore freedom of speech may only be guaranteed by a balanced political system.\u201d<\/em>\n\nIn April 2022, NGO Reporters Without Borders <a href=\"https:\/\/rsf.org\/sites\/default\/files\/russie_-_ukraine_-_eeac_2022_04_14_guerre_en_ukraine_pressions_sur_les_journalistes_en_asie_centrale_rus_0.pdf\">published a report<\/a> exposing the pressure that online Central Asian media agencies have been subjected to by national authorities since the beginning of the conflict. Official news websites and state channels in Central Asian republics have avoided using the words \u201cwar\u201d or \u201cinvasion\u201d since last February, or do not even mention it, as is the case in Tajikistan.\n\nThis is also what happened in Kazakhstan at the start of the invasion in Ukraine, when, according to Dimash Alzhanov, state media purposely avoided mentioning the subject.&nbsp; This matches the period in which President <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Kassym-Jomart_Tokayev\">Kassym-Jomart Tokayev<\/a> did not know how to position himself and whether he should support Vladimir Putin or not.\n\nRSF also points out that Central Asian countries are not well ranked in terms of freedom of the press.&nbsp; Uzbekistan is ranked 157<sup>th<\/sup> out of 180 countries on the <a href=\"https:\/\/rsf.org\/en\/index\">Press Freedom Index<\/a>, while Kyrgyzstan is 79<sup>th<\/sup>.&nbsp; Kazakhstan sits at 155<sup>th<\/sup>, while Tajikistan at 162<sup>nd<\/sup>, and Turkmenistan at 178<sup>th<\/sup>.\n\n<strong>Dependence on Russian networks<\/strong>\n\nThe media landscape in Central Asian countries can also be explained by their structural dependency on Russia. In Kazakhstan, for instance, <em>\u201cat least 95% of internet traffic goes through Russia,\u201d<\/em> explains Talgat Nourlybaiev to Kazakh media site <a href=\"https:\/\/365info.kz\/2022\/03\/esli-rossiyu-otklyuchat-ot-interneta-chto-budet-s-kazahstanom-obzor-kazsmi\">365.kz<\/a>. According to Gregory Joubert, former student at the French Geopolitical Institute and specialist on Kazakh cyberspace, it is through data that Russia exerts control in Central Asia first and foremost.&nbsp; This is done through \u201cRussian Big Tech,\u201d namely Mail.ru, Vkontakte, or Yandex.\n\nTherefore, telecommunications in Central Asia remain a major means of influence for Moscow, forming part of its information strategy. <em>\u201cRussia can theoretically interfere in the Central Asian informational sphere by restricting access to certain resources, given that telecommunication operators in Russia are legally bound to respond to demands.\u201d <\/em>&nbsp;Thus, as the former student researcher explains, <em>\u201cif Russia had the ambition to attack Kazakhstan for instance, internet structure would be significant.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-right\"><strong>Written by Emma Collet for Novastan\u2019s <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/novastan.org\/fr\/decryptage\/pour-les-medias-centrasiatiques-les-pressions-de-la-russie-saccentuent\/\"><strong>French website<\/strong><\/a><strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-right\"><strong>Translated to English by Emma Bekrine.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-right\"><strong>Edited by Mari Paine.<\/strong>\n<p><em>For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on <a href=\"http:\/\/twitter.com\/Novastan_Eng\">Twitter<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/Novastan.org\/\">Facebook<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/telegram.me\/novastan\">Telegram<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/company\/fondation-novastan\/\">Linkedin<\/a> or <a href=\"https:\/\/www.instagram.com\/novastanorg\/\">Instagram<\/a>.<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ever since February 24, 2022, coverage of the war in Ukraine has been complicated for Central Asia.&nbsp; Between voluntary omission by official media and pressure on those who dare call the \u201cspecial operation\u201d a war and invasion, the independent press in Central Asia is being tested by the Kremlin and its restrictive federal agency Roskomnadzor.With [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1567,"featured_media":42201,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4,3],"tags":[3990,1698,1105,4541],"coauthors":[4518,4598],"class_list":["post-42199","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-kazakhstan","category-kyrgyzstan","tag-censorship","tag-media","tag-propaganda","tag-war-in-ukraine"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42199","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1567"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=42199"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42199\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":43484,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42199\/revisions\/43484"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/42201"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=42199"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=42199"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=42199"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/novastan.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=42199"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}