Citizens from Central Asia now represent the largest group of foreign nationals fighting in the Russian army. Novastan spoke with several of them after their capture by Ukrainian forces. Their accounts reveal how Central Asian migrants have become an especially vulnerable recruitment pool for Moscow.

In the yard of a military prison in Lviv region, West Ukraine, dozens of prisonners silently head towards the dining hall. The walls surrounding them are filled with portraits of Ukrainian prominent nationalist figures such as Daniel of Galicia or Stepan Bandera. In the largest prisoner camp in the whole country, everything is in Ukrainian, from the inscriptions to orders given to prisoners.

“There is no trouble here, they are pretty calm and do not brawl much” says a prison guard. In front of him, prisonners start entering the lunchroom, their faces blank. Some of them have already been detained for four years. Many prisonners clearly appear to have Asian features. Among them, some Russian citizens from Siberian republics of Buryatia and Yakutia, where mobilisation rates are particularly high.

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Many others come from the five former Soviet republics in Central Asia. “From what I saw, a majority of foreigners in the Russian army come from this region”, explains Khushbakht Peruzaliev. In spring 2024, the 47-year old Tajikistani citizen signed a contract to serve the Russian Army : “I was told that I would not have to go to the front or anything of this kind. They said I would only be working in a warehouse, so I accepted”, he remembers. But soon, these promises revealed to be lies. Few weeks later, the man was captured by Ukrainian forces after being injured in a frontal assault in Donetsk oblast.

Far beyond the 1,400 Africans or 200 Indian citizens that the Russian army recruited since the beginning of the war, more than 12,000 soldiers from Central Asia have already participated in the “special military operation”, according to public data published in April 2026 by the Ukrainian war prisoners coordination. More than half of foreign soldiers serving Russia are originally from Central Asia.

Passport promises amid raids and deportations

In Mykolaiv penitentiary, all Central Asian soldiers that Novastan met were already in Russia before 2022. “Recruitment efforts towards foreigners were targeting on both migrant workers and people who were in jail”, according to an officer of the Ukrainian coordination of war prisonners.

Ilyas, a 40-year old Kyrgyz citizen, worked as a drink retailer in Moscow since 2007. He signed his contract in April 2025. “During the hiring process, they didn’t directly promise me citizenship, but I knew I would have the possibility to obtain it after” he says.

Novastan est le seul média en français et en allemand spécialisé sur l'Asie centrale. Entièrement associatif, il fonctionne grâce à votre participation. Nous sommes indépendants et pour le rester, nous avons besoin de vous ! Vous pouvez nous soutenir à partir de 2 euros par mois (défiscalisé à 66 %), ou en devenant membre actif par ici.

Indeed, in January 2024, a decree was signed by Vladimir Putin, allowing certain foreigners to obtain Russian citizenship under the condition that they served the army, especially during the “special military operation”. The number of foreigners who benefited from this process remains unknown.

In Ukraine, most prisoners from Central Asia mention that they were sent to the front only after a short training, which caused heavy casualties. “We were moving to a village, when on the road, drones already started appearing and targeting us”, Ilyas remembers. He barely escaped, only to be taken prisoner shortly after.

Khushbakht Peruzaliev, a prisoner whose wife and children still live in Ryazan, 200 kilometers south east of Moscow, was harmed during an intense artillery bombing, while he was moving towards Ukrainian lines. “Half of the group was killed immediately, all 200 [Russian military code for death, Editor’s note]”. 

He describes a general climate of fear that began to appear “right after the Crocus City Hall attack”. This terrorist attack committed by Tajikistani citizens was claimed by the Islamic State of Khorasan, and killed 149 people. Following this tragedy, living conditions of Central Asian migrants in Russia got tougher. “Raids against Tajiks” became frequent, during which migrants were “barred from Russian territory”, according to Khushbakht Peruzaliev.

The Tajik migrant abandoned plans to renew his expired passport, for fear of being arrested on his way to the embassy in Moscow. “Eventually, special police forces started checking the construction site where I was working”, he explains. During police controls, he was promised to obtain citizenship if he accepted to join the army.

Caress Schenck, a political science professor at Nazarbayev University in Astana, acknowledges that “Tajiks were indeed more targeted than other ethnic groups from Central Asia, after the Crocus City Hall attack”. According to the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners, Tajiks represent the second most represented nationality in the Russian army, with more than 3,400 recruits, while 4,800 Uzbeks and 2,400 Kazakhs also joined the army.

Caress Schenck reminds that, however, in Russia “migration control policies, raids and pressure to join the army are still highly influenced by the news cycle”.

Other ethnic groups have also been targeted since the beginning of the war, depending on the context : “Sometimes, anyone with Asian features can be perceived as suspicious”, according to the researcher.

Since November 2025, some foreigners in Russia are required to present a commitment contract in the army to obtain Russian citizenship or a residency permit. People from Central Asia are particularly impacted by these policies, as they make up more than 40% migrants living in Russia in 2020.

Despite that, all prisoners met by Novastan explain that they signed the contract by their own will to obtain a Russian passport, Caress Schenck mentions a strong administrative pressure on migrants that “reduces their ability to act and make their own decisions, rather than offering them a real choice”

The ideological vulnerability of migrants

In addition to the precarious administrative status of Central Asian migrants, the Russian army bases its mobilization stategy on shared ideological patterns. “As for me, I wanted to live in Russia. I considered that I had the right to obtain citizenship, so to earn it, I had to serve the homeland” says Jasur Islamov with a detached voice. After a year and a half in the army, in March 2025, the 38-year old man was promised he would obtain citizenship if he continued serving. A few weeks later, Jasur Islamov was captured, after being wounded by a drone strike.

Ilyas, Islamov and Khushbakht never tried to surrender on purpose, unlike accounts from other foreign prisoners of war fighting for Russia, such as African recruits. This behaviour at war could be explained by the fact that parts of migrant populations in Russia are already “Russian speakers, born in the 1970s or 1980s, under the Soviet Union”, according to the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners.

Prisoners met by Novastan also state that they wish to go back to Russia, hoping to be included in a prisoner exchange. “We have nothing against an exchange of prisoners from Central Asia”, says the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners. However, among the 7,000 Russian soldiers already exchanged, those originally from Central Asia remain a small minority. 

When Novastan asked them about their experience with racism in Russia, before or after serving, all assert that they “never” faced it. They are confident in their ability to rejoin Russian society after their detention, once they obtain a passport. “Could you imagine that I risked my life to obtain citizenship, and they would send me back to my country, when I have nothing left there ? It would be a huge betrayal” says Jasur Islamov, bitterly.

However, it would not be the first time that these war prisoners face disappointments related to their migrant experience in Russia. Despite being married to a Russian woman for years, Ilyas failed to obtain a passport : “I submitted all documents to apply for citizenship, a long time ago, but it was refused”. Jasur Islamov admits that he “did not even receive any money from the contract”, with only two months paid out of the eighteen months he spent in the army.

Novastan est le seul média en français et en allemand spécialisé sur l'Asie centrale. Entièrement associatif, il fonctionne grâce à votre participation. Nous sommes indépendants et pour le rester, nous avons besoin de vous ! Vous pouvez nous soutenir à partir de 2 euros par mois (défiscalisé à 66 %), ou en devenant membre actif par ici.

“I believe it would take years to dismantle internalized discriminations” Caress Schenk explains. The researcher reminds that in the Soviet imagery, racism was seen as inherent to capitalism and the Western bloc.

Citing the Geneva convention, the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners explains that Central Asian citizens are treated the same as other prisoners. In the courtyard, on the weight training benches, Central Asian prisoners exercise alongside their Russian cellmates.

“We never thought we would end up here”, says Jasur Islamov. When he is reminded that he signed consciously and was aware of risks, the Uzbek detainee bristles : “You are talking as if I specifically signed to kill people… I only needed a place to live, a passport, to work and feed my family”. After a silence, he adds, regretfully : “I’m not saying we made the right decision. Everyone makes mistakes. Everyone”.

Driss Rejichi,
Contributor for Novastan France

Translated by Elea Muresan

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The post “I only needed a passport” : In Ukraine, Central Asian prisoners of wars caught between loyalty and regret appeared first on Novastan English.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has issued a strong statement condemning the presence of Central Asian presidents at the May 9 parade held in Moscow to commemorate Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War. The parade saw the participation of the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, along with the Prime Minister of Armenia.

In its official statement, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs underscored that Russian President Vladimir Putin, who led the parade, is currently wanted internationally for committing war crimes due to the Russian military’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

“The participation of foreign leaders in a public event alongside a war criminal, who proudly instigated a war in Europe on an unprecedented scale since World War II, is viewed as an immoral and unfriendly act towards Ukraine. It demonstrates a disregard for the Ukrainian people who are fighting for their survival and freedom,” stated the ministry.

Moreover, the ministry emphasized the invaluable contributions made by the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus to the victory over Nazism 78 years ago. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly believes that these nations should not be exploited by the Kremlin for participating in an event that lacks any connection to the heroic acts of the victorious nations over Nazism.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan: commemorating Victory Day without military parade

Russia initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which was met with condemnation from countries within the European Union and the United States. As a response, these nations implemented unprecedented economic sanctions against Russia.

In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Putin, specifically for war crimes committed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Despite the arrest warrant and warnings from Western countries, including the European Union, President Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan extended an invitation to Putin for an official visit to Bishkek, which Putin accepted.

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Ukraine criticizes Central Asian presidents’ participation in Moscow’s May 9 parade appeared first on Novastan English.

Russian president Vladimir Putin has invited his counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to attend the annual Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 9. The occasion marks the first time the Central Asian presidents will meet Putin after the latter’s indictment by the International Criminal Court.

On April 25, the office of the Kyrgyz president issued a press release stating that Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov would attend the annual military parade on Red Square on May 9 as a “guest of honour”. Several days later, on May 5, Putin also invited Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon to Moscow.

The day before the parade, on May 8, a rapid fire of invitations sent the presidents of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan all flying to Russia. It will be the first time in years that all five Central Asian presidents will take part in the Victory Day celebrations.

Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has paid significantly more attention to Central Asia. In 2022 alone, Putin visited all five countries in the region – something that had not happened in a long time. While the Russian president is increasingly cornered internationally, Moscow clearly holds on tight to its few remaining allies.

Yet, this will be the first time for Central Asian leaders that they share the stage with the Russian president after he was charged with war crimes.

A wanted man

Recently, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president on allegations relating to the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied areas to Russia.

Last week, South African authorities warned that Putin risks being arrested during the upcoming BRICS summit in August, should the Russian president decide to make an appearance. South Africa has ratified the founding treaty of the ICC and hence obligated to act should Putin set foot in the country.

In Central Asia, Tajikistan is the only state party to the treaty and thus – in theory – bound to cooperate with the Court. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan both signed the treaty some twenty years ago, but have so far failed to ratify it. By contrast, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are non-signatory states. Hence, should the Russian president decide to visit the region, as he did so often last year, chances of Central Asian authorities refusing Putin entry because of the arrest warrant are slim.

An offer one can’t refuse

In many ways, Central Asia still is highly dependent on Russia. According to political analyst Arkady Dubnov, who was interviewed by Kyrgyz news outlet Kloop about the Kremlin’s invitation to Japarov, Bishkek had no choice but to accept.

Kyrgyzstan still has deep economic ties with Russia. Although China is making significant inroads in Central Asia as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, Russia remains incredibly important in terms of trade and remittances.

Read more on Novastan: Effects of sanctions on Russia strongly felt in Dushanbe

The most recent data from the World Bank show that over 30 percent of Kyrgyz GDP consists of remittances. 97 percent of these remittances are sent by Kyrgyz migrants working in Russia. Hence, it is safe to say that economic ties with Russia are highly asymmetrical and Moscow is well aware of this.

In the case of Tajikistan, economic dependence on Russia is just as significant. As Tajik news media Asia Plus reported that last year, remittances from Russia reached a record high. Russian authorities also registered a post-pandemic spike in migrant inflow. In 2022, nearly one million people from Tajikistan travelled to Russia for work.

Central Asia as a sanctions loophole

The war in Ukraine, however, has somewhat tilted the balance in favour of Central Asian economies. Countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have transformed into important hubs for reexporting goods to Russia.

Radio Azattyk, the Kyrgyz service of Radio Liberty that was recently forced to shut down, interviewed Temir Shabdanaliev, head of a Kyrgyz lobbying group, about this trend. He explained: “If goods from Europe were previously sent to Russia, now they are registered as deliveries to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. But as soon as they are unloaded here, they are immediately taken to Russia.“

As a result, trade to and from Central Asia has boomed since the start of western sanctions. In Kyrgyzstan, there has been a remarkable uptick in trade of “shampoo, toothpicks, soap, and car parts”, according to RFE/RL.

Read more on Novastan: Turkey continues exporting drones to Central Asia

Relevant authorities in Tajikistan also signalled an increase in trade with Russia. Last year Tajik authorities were even accused of supplying Moscow with Iranian-designed drones for its war in Ukraine. These accusations were based on a recent deal Dushanbe signed with Tehran to produce drones under license in Tajikistan. However, US-based magazine The Diplomat found no visual evidence to support claims that Tajik-manufactured drones were roaming Ukrainian skies.

Risky business

But there is a certain risk in reexporting goods to Russia. The EU has warned the Central Asian republics that it could impose secondary sanctions on businesses helping Russia dodge sanctions.

For countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, there is little room for manoeuvre. Economic dependence on Russia often outweighs western pressure. However, the invasion of Ukraine has made many in Central Asia aware of existing neo-colonial power relations.

Several weeks ago, Eurasianet reported about a Russian ban on the import of Kyrgyz dairy products after Bishkek moved to adopt a law to promote the Kyrgyz language. The Kremlin sees this development as an attempt to curb its cultural influence in Central Asia.

Patronage to Putin

May 9 is yet another important reminder of the region’s colonial past. That is why over the past decades, most Central Asian countries have gradually said goodbye to Soviet-imposed Victory Day. 

In Kazakhstan, military parades have been scrapped “to maintain the required level of combat readiness”, press agency Kazinform reported. In Turkmenistan, May 9 has not been a public holiday since 2018. Victory Day in Uzbekistan has been transformed into a ‘Day of Remembrance and Honour,’ emphasizing commemoration over military pomp.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan: commemorating Victory Day without military parade

Although Victory Day in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan still bears significant resemblance to the Soviet era, times are changing there as well. In many places, celebrations are scaled down or rescheduled to both countries’ respective independence days. Owing to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this process will likely accelerate.

Yet, nation-building and symbolism remain subject to real-world constraints. As long as economic dependence continues, regional leaders have no option but to pay patronage to where the money comes from: Putin’s Russia.

Correction: in an earlier version of this article it was stated that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are parties to the ICC. Although the two countries have signed the founding treaty of the ICC, both have failed to ratify it as of yet. Hence, neither Tashkent nor Bishkek is legally obligated to cooperate with the Court.

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

Written by Julian Postulart

The post Central Asian presidents invited to attend Russian Victory Day Parade appeared first on Novastan English.

Ever since February 24, 2022, coverage of the war in Ukraine has been complicated for Central Asia.  Between voluntary omission by official media and pressure on those who dare call the “special operation” a war and invasion, the independent press in Central Asia is being tested by the Kremlin and its restrictive federal agency Roskomnadzor.With significant dependence on Russian network infrastructure, as well as the dominance of Russian content in information distribution, what kind of space do Central Asian media agencies have to exercise digital sovereignty?  An analysis of the Central Asian media landscape under persistent Russian influence.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 14 October 2022. It is a turnaround of events that speaks volumes about the freedom of speech in Kazakhstan. Beeline, the main Kazakh operator, had announced the withdrawal of certain Russian channels broadcasting on national territory, including Channel One Russia and NTV, Kremlin propaganda machines. However, the group went back on their decision on 3 October, says Kazakh media outlet Vlast, following an interview with the Russian Ministry of Digital Development. “In Astana, the interruption of Russian television channels broadcasting is keenly discussed, and the majority is in favour. But the thing is that nothing changes,” explains Kazakh political commentator Dimash Alzhanov to Novastan. Despite pressure from civil society, Kazakh television remains under Russian influence, something which is also true of written press media.

Indeed, an investigation by MediaZona revealed that Moscow blocked certain independent Central Asian media websites by means of the federal agency Roskomnadzor. The state censorship agency sent warning letters to Russian-speaking Kazakh and Kyrgyz press services, demanding that they remove various articles related to the war in Ukraine. This specifically affected Kloop in Kyrgyzstan, in addition to Katel and NewTimes in Kazakhstan.

Censorship of the war in Ukraine

According to director of Kyrgyz media outlet Kloop, quoted in the MediaZona article, Roskomnadzor blocks Internet websites employing the word “war” and not “special operation,” the official term to designate the invasion of Ukrainian by the Kremlin. Although these “warnings” only apply to media within Russian borders and do not restrict Central Asian media agencies inside their own countries, Dimash Alzhanov stresses the fact that these gestures are implemented in order to “impose certain sanctions” and to silence them. The director of the Kazakh public foundation Legal Media Center, Diana Okremova, affirmed in an interview with MediaZona that “some of Roskomnadzor’s actions can be qualified as elements of information warfare.” Blocking Central Asian websites dates to before the beginning of the war in Ukraine. According to the MediaZona article, Roskomnadzor has been expanding control over Central Asian media for several years, forcing some to erase content mentioning citizen suicides, something prohibited under Russian law.  This was the case in 2017 with the Kazakh site Rika.tv, and the Tajik website Asia-Plus in 2019.

Central Asia: Russia’s “information space”

Consequently, Central Asia and its media have been commanding Russia’s attention for some time. “They have been influencing us for about ten years. Russia is trying to attract Central Asian countries into its own information space. The Russian Federation uses television channels as a means to disseminate its propaganda,” explains Dimash Alzhanov. In Kazakhstan, some Russian channels will still be broadcasted because both countries have signed an intergovernmental cooperation agreement on the airing of mass information. For Russia, “the idea is to mix information – even disinformation – and entertainment. These shows use Kazakhs in their programmes to make them ‘less Russian,’ and to ensure that society increasingly watches Moscow-made content,” analyses the political scientist.

Information consumption leans heavily towards Russian-language content

In an interview given to Vlast, political scientist Shalkar Nurseitov explains that the real issue in Central Asia is “the ease of access to Russian media. Most citizens have access to media spreading the Kremlin’s agenda, and those who lack critical thinking believe propaganda.” In 2019 and 2021, international organisation Internews led a study in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan about media consumption patterns of the population. The results, reported by Kazakh outlet Masa Media, showed that 30% of respondents receive their news via television in Kazakhstan, while the percentage is higher in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, the vast majority of viewers watch television in Russian, with only 11% watching in Kazakh. Furthermore, over half the respondents read newspapers, magazines, and websites in Russian, while only a little over 8% consumed written material in Kazakh.

Pressures from within

“If the broadcasting of Russian channels is limited, it does not mean that the problem of freedom of speech will be resolved in Kazakhstan,” said Dimash Alzhanov. “The issue of information manipulation by those in power remains, and therefore freedom of speech may only be guaranteed by a balanced political system.” In April 2022, NGO Reporters Without Borders published a report exposing the pressure that online Central Asian media agencies have been subjected to by national authorities since the beginning of the conflict. Official news websites and state channels in Central Asian republics have avoided using the words “war” or “invasion” since last February, or do not even mention it, as is the case in Tajikistan. This is also what happened in Kazakhstan at the start of the invasion in Ukraine, when, according to Dimash Alzhanov, state media purposely avoided mentioning the subject.  This matches the period in which President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev did not know how to position himself and whether he should support Vladimir Putin or not. RSF also points out that Central Asian countries are not well ranked in terms of freedom of the press.  Uzbekistan is ranked 157^th out of 180 countries on the Press Freedom Index, while Kyrgyzstan is 79^th.  Kazakhstan sits at 155^th, while Tajikistan at 162^nd, and Turkmenistan at 178^th. Dependence on Russian networks The media landscape in Central Asian countries can also be explained by their structural dependency on Russia. In Kazakhstan, for instance, “at least 95% of internet traffic goes through Russia,” explains Talgat Nourlybaiev to Kazakh media site 365.kz. According to Gregory Joubert, former student at the French Geopolitical Institute and specialist on Kazakh cyberspace, it is through data that Russia exerts control in Central Asia first and foremost.  This is done through “Russian Big Tech,” namely Mail.ru, Vkontakte, or Yandex. Therefore, telecommunications in Central Asia remain a major means of influence for Moscow, forming part of its information strategy. “Russia can theoretically interfere in the Central Asian informational sphere by restricting access to certain resources, given that telecommunication operators in Russia are legally bound to respond to demands.”  Thus, as the former student researcher explains, “if Russia had the ambition to attack Kazakhstan for instance, internet structure would be significant.”

Written by Emma Collet for Novastan’s French website.

Translated to English by Emma Bekrine.

Edited by Mari Paine.

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Pressure from Russia increases on Central Asian media outlets appeared first on Novastan English.

The border region of Kostanay has turned into a sanctuary for Russians wanting to flee mobilisation. The journalist Almas Qaısar traveled for Vlast to Kostanay to speak with Russian refugees and local residents about what’s happened in the city.  We have translated the article with permission from the editors.

The closer you go to the city centre of Kostanay – where all the administrative buildings, shopping centres, restaurants, and public offices are found – the more people with suitcases and travel packs appear on the horizon. Aside from their conspicuous clothing and their neatly trimmed hair and beards, the Russians are distinguishable by their confused faces.  They congregate mostly around three places in the city centre: a shopping centre, a service centre, and a McDonald’s.  Even though they’ve already made it across the border, they continue to discuss the situation at the border checkpoint. Russians sit at a table in McDonald’s. Across from them is a group of ethnic Kyrgyz who arrived with them. “A Kalmyk acquaintance of mine was turned back at the border! And that coming from a Kazakh border agent,” says one young Russian in astonishment.  He just received access to the Internet. “He must have tried to cross the border at the wrong place. That or he had his papers messed up,” responds his conversation partner while eating a burger. “I’ll find out in a minute,” he says. Over the next half hour, he chats with his acquaintance over the phone to find out the details of the situation. Each of those who made it to Kostanay has a dozen acquaintances trying to cross the border.

Dostonbek

“We decided to flee from mobilisation and not to wait to be shipped off,” says Dostonbek (all names in this article have been changed), who originally comes from Kyrgystan. “I received Russian citizenship eight years ago. I worked there for more than 15 years in a shopping centre.  My family stayed there.” He explains that they originally wanted to fly from Moscow, but the tickets sold out quickly and the prices were very high. Now he is on his way to Bishkek. “But it is difficult to live there, the salaries are low, credit is unimaginable. Granted, we’re spending a lot of money here. That guy over there – he planned his wedding in 13 days,” he says, pointing to a younger man.  “He invited 300 people!  So much money will be wasted,” Dostonbek laughs.

Stepan

An increasing number of Russians gather in McDonald’s. Some have occupied the seats along the wall to charge their devices and try to work on their laptops. Others attempt to relax. Outside it is cold and dreary: Kostanay has become cold and a frosty wind is blowing. “I am 32 years old and I wasn’t affected by the first wave of mobilisation. They are taking everyone arbitrarily. Why am I here? We started a criminal war which I don’t want to take part in.  I am against this war.  I don’t want to kill any people.  That’s not the reason I studied, built my house, and raised my children,” says Stepan.  He was born in Kazan. Earlier he worked as a software developer at an IT company. As mobilisation was announced, his family stood by in shock. “No one knew what to do.  Many initially thought that it would pass us by. But there was less and less time to think about it. Four days after mobilisation was announced we decided to flee. We were afraid that we wouldn’t make it out in time. People were already being turned away at the border,” he adds. He and his family set off in their car and waited 18 hours at a border checkpoint. They had the possibility to drive through Orenburg but people stood there “for three days without water or food.”  They planned to drive through Georgia, but a military recruitment point had already been set up. Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia“There are people in their 50s and 60s. There are cars full of six young people. Three of them were turned back at border control. There are families with small children and babies. We don’t know why they send people back. Yesterday at the border someone who was recruited, who had served in the army, was let through. But one man who was categorized as disabled, who had never served, and who had no military experience, they didn’t let through,” explains Stepan. He says he made it through Kazakh border security in two hours. “There were no difficulties with them. They laugh and joke.”  Out of the 20 people in his division, 16 have already left Russia. Out of 10 close friends, seven have fled. The rest hope not to be recruited. Thanks to some acquaintances and volunteers, Stepan was able to find accommodation in a holiday camp about one and a half kilometres outside of the city. “It’s only a holiday camp with one oven. We paid 25 000 Tenge (£44.71) for the night. The whole camp is full of Russians. We still have a long way before us – we’re going to Almaty,” he says. Stepan wants to stay in Almaty because he has relatives there. He has his savings, but “no one is going to just sit around,” he says. “Money is always getting tighter. We will help to develop their country. If our country doesn’t need us,” he says with frustration. “Of course we want to return to Russia. Our home is there. My wife and I have discussed trying to move to Europe if the situation worsens – and in my opinion it won’t get better and it will continue for a while.” He adds: “It’s very difficult right now for my wife. I don’t have any time to reflect.”

Igor

A stream of people weaves through the centre. Suddenly a megaphone at the crosswalk announces that Beeline (a TV and internet provider) will be cutting access to Russian television stations. Nearby, between suitcases and bags, stands Igor. He speaks with a friend from Kostanay. “Here there’s a collapse of arriving Russians,” he jokes.  Igor didn’t take it very seriously at the beginning of mobilisation. But as rumours began to spread in Russia about the borders being shut, he decided to flee. In the span of a couple of days, he and his friends thought through the options and decided on Kazakhstan. Before mobilisation he lived in Vologda and worked, like many other Russians, as an IT specialist. In his opinion, the popularity of the profession lies in the fact that they can work from anywhere in the world. The most important thing is to have internet, electricity, and a laptop. “Even as I sat in traffic in Chelyabinsk Oblast along the border, I worked,” says Igor. First he had taken a high-speed train to Moscow, then a flight to Chelyabinsk. His daughter and wife remain in Vologda. “We had a certain amount of luck. We met a Kazakh citizen who, for a relatively high amount of money, helped us to cross the border. On the 27^th he queued on the Russian side. We were in Chelyabinsk and he stood in the queue. When we arrived at the border, he was already close to the checkpoint. Instead of waiting 15 hours, we only waited seven. We halved our waiting time,” Igor says. He’s sitting with his things and is searching for accommodation. There were problems with his Russian bank cards, which don’t work here. Now Igor is on the hunt for an employer abroad, especially in Europe or the USA. “Depending on the offer, you can either stay in Kazakhstan, make yourself legal, and bring your family here, or, if your employer offers a relocation programme, then you go where you’re moved.  There’s also an option in Poland – I have a job interview on Monday,” he said. Igor would enjoy staying in Kostanay, but he can see that the city’s economy can’t handle the influx. “It’s going to get even bigger. And it will become more difficult,” he says with certainty.  He’s going to go to Almaty, as some of his friends from Vologda already fled there and are looking for a large flat. “To be honest, I hope that things improve for the better in Russia. It’s all so sad. I didn’t want to leave. I want things to change. We hope for the best, but are preparing ourselves for the worst,” he concludes.

David

When Russians talk about their country, you can sense their internal conflict. But many of them are also confident that they can come to terms with life outside Russia’s borders. Part of this is due to the fact that mainly people with savings have come to Kostanay. David met the requirements for mobilisation and therefore decided to flee the country. “I’m not going to go there and solve someone else’s problems in another country under the pretext that someone attacked us. Everyone understands that no one attacked us,” he said. David lived in Yekaterinburg and was self-employed. He had a management position and saved his money. His wife and child stayed in Russia. His path is leading him to Almaty, where he has friends. He intends to stay in Kazakhstan, but must first acquire legal status. He says that he’s felt welcome wherever he’s gone. He has heard from various people how they handed out fruit to those stuck in traffic at the Kazakh border, and how patrolling police officers approached them and asked if they had food and lodging. “We couldn’t imagine something like that in Russia,” he adds. “My family is there. I hope that there will be some improvement. It’s difficult to talk about. The situation in Russia wasn’t particularly rosy. Overnight they announced it. People are leaving everything and going abroad. At the border with Kazakhstan there’s a huge influx. I understand the strain on Kazakhstan. I hope that there won’t be any conflicts between Russians and Kazakhs. It’s important to be understood. And that our people remain conscientious about everything,” David concludes.

Vasily

Vasily is a musician who studied computer science, and he was about to begin his first job. Prior to mobilisation, he participated in various protests and was active as an observer at voting stations. “I fought as hard as I could. When mobilisation was announced, it was clear to me that I had a choice: prison or moving. I don’t want to kill anyone in Ukraine,” says Vasily. He bought tickets on the first day of mobilisation. Together with a friend, they walked through the traffic to the border control point. There they spent an hour in the rain. Out of 300 people, only 10 got through. Then they paid money to someone driving a car who was already close to the border, and they drove with him. “As we arrived in Kazakhstan, we were welcomed with open arms. The taxi driver was a very nice man. He told us how to move forward and what we should do. Then my friend was able to contact an acquaintance who helped us to find a flat for the night. Now we’ve found a place that we can stay at for longer. Originally I thought I had money for six months. I had saved up for years and years. I had other plans for the money, but what’s a person to do?  My wife stayed behind to work, so maybe she’ll chip in if something happens. I’ll probably stay in Kostanay for four months – if the hustle and bustle settles and it’s not so expensive,” he adds. Afterwards he doesn’t plan on staying in Kazakhstan longer. He believes that the political situation in Russia has entered a critical phase: “Either it’s going to come to a worst-case scenario or something will solve itself.”

The locals’ opinion

The local residents have greeted the new arrivals in various ways. Companies have begun to advertise for their offices and businesses to draw in Russians. In shopping centres, signs have gone up advertising shops where you can buy SIM cards and exchange currency. Volunteer initiatives help people to find flats or accommodation in shelters. However, all of them declined to comment. For others, Russians have become synonymous with “cool cars,” traffic, and increasing rent prices. “Yes, they’re coming and coming. Nothing has changed for me. The only thing that’s changed is that the Russians are here now. But that doesn’t make a difference,” say some residents. Others have more understanding for the newcomers. Toktasyn is a pensioner. He lives a couple of kilometres away from Kostanay in an aul, or a type of traditional village. He came to the city for a visit and has noticed the influx of Russians. He believes they need help. “Let them come. They’ve come before. Into the new country [editors’ note: this is a reference to forced resettlement of Russian farmers during Soviet times]. Where else could they go? If they go there, they’ll die. We have to help, it’s getting colder now. Where are they going to go?  They left everything behind and came here,” he says. Andrei, who works as a taxi driver, is also of the opinion that “they’re doing the right thing by fleeing mobilisation.”“No one wants to die and kill. I only drive Russians now. There were guys from Ulan-Ude with us. That means they’re coming from so far away. Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg. Very young guys. 18 to 22 years old. There were also guys who were basically kids. Why should kids die in this war? Better to come over here,” he says. Azamat weaves through the bus station, surrounded by the purple of twilight. There, at a covered bus stop, stand people with suitcases. After a while they make their way to a group of taxi drivers advertising trips to Karaganda, Astana, and Almaty. Azamat doesn’t work as a taxi driver. He merely walks around and helps people. “Look at that girl over there,” he says, pointing at a young girl in a pink coat. “She’s so young, she could be my daughter. So young and what a challenge all this is for her. These are innocent people. Who wants to walk away and leave behind brothers, sisters, parents, and children? No one wants to kill people.” He says that every day about 200 people arrive. According to him, the city benefits from the newcomers. “Everyday necessities, rent, taxis – that’s all profit. They don’t make things worse for Kostanay” he says. A flock of migrating birds cuts through the sky behind the departing Russians.

Originally written in Russian by Almas Qaısar for Vlast

Translated from Russian into German by Amina Akhrorkulova for Novastan

Translated from German into English by Mari Paine

Edited by Maya Ivanova

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The post Destination Kazakhstan – A report from Kostanay, where hundreds of Russians have been taken in appeared first on Novastan English.

Many Central Asian migrants have joined the Russian army since partial mobilisation was announced in Russia.  They are being pulled into Russia’s war in Ukraine against the advice of their countries’ consular organs.This article was oroginally published on Novastan’s French website on 19 October 2022.

On 21 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the mobilisation of 300 000 reservists, called up from a pool of 25 million potential fighters.  Some of these are seasonal workers and precariously employed migrants from Central Asia. Russia amended their federal law “On Conscription and Military Service” in 2013 so that every young person with Russian citizenship is required to perform mandatory military service, even when they have already served it in their land of origin.  According to reports by the Kyrgyz news portal Kaktus, recruitment of Central Asian migrants has taken place in the Sakharovo migration center in Moscow since 21 September. This marks a turning point in the war, as the government is no longer hiding their desire to recruit foreigners to expand the ranks of their army. There are no official figures for how many Central Asian citizens have been recruited to fight in Ukraine.  According to Radio Azattyq, the Kazakh branch of Radio Free Europe, the overwhelming majority of Central Asian migrants come from three countries: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

High salaries and Russian passports as bait

Russian recruitment authorities want to mobilise migrants from Central Asia and do so by promising high salaries and Russian citizenship.  In some cases, the authorities use subterfuge.  “They told us that there was a lot of construction happening in Kherson and that we have to go there.  And that we could expect salaries of 220 000 rubles (£3065.94),” one witness told Eurasianet.  “Some from our group went but it turned out they had been taken along to fight.” The lure of profit and citizenship is an effective mode of manipulation. The use of migrants and refugees in war is, according to an article in the American journal Foreign Affairs, a widespread phenomenon. Their lives are used like chess pieces in the game of war. The Russian human rights activist Valentina Chupik spoke with Central Asian media agency CABAR about her experiences with Tajik migrants in an interview. According to Chupik, many have said that they have received anonymous calls from law enforcement officials with offers to join the Russian army and receive Russian citizenship within three months. Furthermore, one of the Tajik migrants questioned said that some of his friends and relatives had decided to serve in the army in order to earn more money to send home to their families. Even before partial mobilisation was announced, people with a Central Asian background or nationality were recruited. In fact, an investigation by MediaHub discovered that in Uzbekistan, certain online platforms advertising security-related jobs in Russia actually sent workers directly to a military base controlled by the private Wagner Group.  This Russian mercenary group is used in wars worldwide, including in Ukraine.  Ukrainian intelligence agencies say that “Central Asian recruitment campaigns for mercenaries” have been in operation since the beginning of the war.

The embassies react

The embassies from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have called on their citizens not to involve themselves in the war in Ukraine. They claim that involvement is a criminal offense according to the domestic laws of their respective countries. The risk of being sucked into the war is particularly high for young men from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan who have already acquired Russian citizenship. With a diaspora of 650 000 Kazakhstanis, 1.9 million Uzbekistanis, and 104 000 Kyrgyzstanis (numbers from 2002), able-bodied men from these groups could be subjected to forced recruitment. For Turkmen, Tajik, and Uzbek citizens, participation in a foreign conflict can lead to imprisonment upon returning home.  Particularly affected by this are the 1.2 million Tajik migrant workers (number from 2021) in Russia.  

Originally written in French by Matthieu Petrov 

Translated into German from French by Robin Roth 

Translated from German into English by Mari Paine 

Edited by Maya Ivanova

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The post How Russia is recruiting Central Asian soldiers for its war in Ukraine appeared first on Novastan English.

The effects of sanctions against Russia are being strongly felt in Tajikistan. The Central Asian post-Soviet republic’s economy has been stagnant for years and many had left to find work in Russia. The instability in reaction to Russia’s activities in Ukraine is affecting almost every aspect of daily life. In Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital city, life is getting expensive. As American media Eurasianet remarks, Tajikistan is highly dependent on Russia economically, and many families count on remittances from relatives working there. According to World Bank data, remittances consisted of 26.7 % of Tajikistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, which makes it the third most dependent country in the world. With the increasing sanctions being placed on Russia following the on-going conflict in Ukraine, and the subsequent boast to the dollar, almost everything has become more expensive in the past weeks. Feruza, a teacher working at a private university, spoke to Novastan of the impact the changing dollar price has had on her family. “I had to pay the fees for my son’s school a few days ago. Now the somoni is so weak against the dollar; it’s like I’m paying an extra 100 dollars in the previous rate”, she explains.

The fees for international schools can generally be paid in dollars or somoni, but the price is, like most expenses, set by the dollar. “I wanted to pay in dollars but when I went to the bank, they told me that they are not allowed to pay out dollars. I explained it was to pay for my son’s school fees but they said, ‘No, we can only give you dollars with permission from the bank manager, and only if your account is in dollars.’ There were others there with a similar problem”, describes Feruza.

Sending money home becomes more expensive

Generally, people often opt to exchange money on the black market, rather than go to the bank. “You can find a better rate if you shop around, but it’s very dangerous,” Nagina, an office worker from Gorno-Badakhshan, in eastern Tajikistan, explained to Novastan. “My children are living in Moscow and we don’t usually need them to send money home. But if it’s needed, right now it is better to find someone travelling from Russia to Tajikistan, rather than using the bank”, she says. When payments are sent from Russia, they are paid in ruble and received in somoni. Due to the ruble’s depreciation following the sanctions, people working in Russia need to pay extra to reflect the changing price and secure the needed amount of somoni. It is therefore easier and more cost-effective to send dollars in cash with someone making the journey. This current instability is nothing new, as Nagina highlights. “We are experienced. During the financial crisis, it was the same so we know how to prepare. We buy food to store, things like oil or flour which last for a long time. We don’t know when the prices will change again, so we have to be prepared”, she describes. Food insecurity is already a major issue in Tajikistan with up to 27 % of the population living on 1.90 dollars (£1.44) or less per day, according to USAID. While many families received a one-time payment of 500 somoni (£29.16) during the Covid-19 pandemic, it is yet to be announced how the Tajik government will respond to current price hikes.

Prices heavily rely on the dollar

“For me, it has affected my day-to-day costs of course, and my business a little,” import-middleman Alisher explained to Novastan. “People are shopping less. For example, see this iPhone case. Before it was maybe 10 somoni (£0.58), now it’s 16 (£0.93)”, he says. Around the capital, businesses have increased their prices to reflect the new cost of living. A small portion of oshi pilau, Tajikistan’s national dish, typically cost 16 somoni (£0.93) but has risen to as high as 20 somoni (£1.16). Most significantly, the price of petrol from the Russian supplier Gazprom has risen from 10.30 somoni (£0.60 per litre) to 12 somoni (£0.70). “Everything here is connected to the price of the dollar,” Alisher concluded. “The dollar is everything in Tajikistan.”

Fiona Katherine Smith Editor and writer for Novastan in Dushanbe

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The post Effects of Sanctions on Russia strongly felt in Dushanbe appeared first on Novastan English.