In recent years, Turkish drones such as the Bayraktar TB2 have become household names, owing to their successful deployment in multiple conflicts around the globe, including Ukraine. The drones have also popped up in Central Asia, with Kyrgyzstan being one of the main customers of Turkish kit.

On April 6, Turkish media outlet Defence Turk reported that Kyrgyzstan had received a Turkish defence system to counter small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), more commonly known as drones. Two days later, the Kyrgyz media outlet Kloop explained that Kyrgyz operators were being trained in Turkey, along with their Azerbaijani counterparts, by Turkish drone producer Baykar. Yet, Turkey’s role in Central Asia with regard to military technology is not new.

The first Bayraktar TB2 drones, manufactured by Turkish Baykar, already entered service with the Kyrgyz Air Force in 2021. Ever since, other Turkish defence contractors have also started operating in Kyrgyzstan. For example, after the clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in September 2022, Bishkek not only ordered TB2 drones, but also Aksungur and Anka drones that are produced by Turkish Aerospace Industries. Although it is safe to say that Turkish drones are gaining ground in Kyrgyzstan, other countries in the region have shown interest in this equipment as well. The question is if this trend will continue.

Deployment in regional conflicts

Border tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan escalated in September 2022. Following an exchange of fire between border guards, the conflict spread along the entire border and spilled over into Kyrgyzstan proper. The intensity of the clashes was unprecedented and the Tajik government soon accused the Kyrgyz army of using Turkish drones, according to Reuters.

Tajik media Asia-Plus reported that prior to this escalation, Baykar had also offered Tajikistan its drones during the visit of a Turkish delegation in early 2022. Kyrgyzstan was quick to express discontent with the looming deal. The Turkish company replied that the offer was business as usual, as per 24.kg news.

Read more on Novastan: Can relations between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan improve?

Soon after, Dushanbe signed an agreement with Iran instead, that would allow Tajikistan to build a drone factory for the production of Iranian drones, including the Ababil 2. For Tehran, this project is an attempt to expand the market share of Iranian drones in Central Asia and compete with Turkish drones.

Turkish drones seem superior

The global drone market has been growing rapidly since the 2010s and Central Asia too has become an increasingly important sales market, Forbes reports. According to Global Voices, China and the United States are clearly ahead of the curve in market penetration, while Russia lags behind.

The reason for this is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has cast doubt on Moscow’s intentions in Central Asia. According to researcher Suleyman Ozeren, the war was an important consideration for Astana to purchase drones from Turkey instead.

Turkish drone technology also was rather effective during the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020. Moreover, Chinese drones are faulty, which is why the Turks have come out as a clear winner in the battle for Central Asian defence contracts.

Different geopolitical strategies

In 2020, Turkmenistan was the first country in the region to buy drones from Baykar. Lately, other regional players have also demonstrated interest in purchasing Turkish systems. The Diplomat reported that Kazakhstan, like Kyrgyzstan, has opted for other Turkish brands, as well as Russian and Israeli drones. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have bought American drones, in addition to Chinese and Russian machinery.

Read more on Novastan: Turkey’s new push into Central Asia

Aside from diversifying their respective inventories, Central Asian republics are seeking more autonomy in drone production as well. Some have decided to invest in domestic production, signing agreements with drone-producing countries such as Tajikistan did with Iran. Kazakhstan has negotiated a similar deal with Turkey about the production of the Anka combat drones, as reported by Turkish media TRT World.

Others seek to strengthen their own military industry, such as Uzbekistan. According to Uzbek media Kun.uz, Tashkent has shown interest in designing drones of their own, rather than being dependent on foreign manufacturers.

Future Turkish moves in the region

Drone diplomacy runs parallel to other Turkish initiatives in the region, such as the Organisation of Turkic States, as well as other cooperation in certain areas. In some circles, the seeming effectiveness of Turkish drones in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war reinvigorated ideas about some sort of pan-Turkic military alliance, as Turkish researcher Can Kasapoğlu explains.

Read more on Novastan: the Great Turkestan – myth or prospect

However, the military culture of post-Soviet Central Asian republics remains largely unchanged, despite Ankara’s proven willingness to provide state-of-the-art military equipment to countries in the region.

Most importantly, the case of Kyrgyzstan shows that despite previous claims by Turkish drone producer Baykar, political considerations matter when it comes to defence procurements. Indeed, when Kyrgyzstan expressed dissatisfaction with the Turkish drone deal with Tajikistan, Ankara’s Central Asia policy was thrown out of balance.

That is because the current situation undermines Turkey’s position as a mediator in regional affairs, especially since Kyrgyzstan used Turkish drones against Tajikistan during the 2022 clashes. Ankara will hence likely seek to strengthen its ties with Dushanbe, so as to remain one of the region’s primary and most respected interlocutors.

Written by Lucas Morvan 

Translated from French by Julian Postulart

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Isolated on the international scene and weakened domestically, Turkey seeks support. Turkish powers have chosen a proactive foreign policy in Central Asia and enjoy good relations with countries of the region.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 13 April 2021. As Turkey is increasingly breaking away from its European and American allies, the country seeks to strengthen its partnership and alliance networks. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu met each of his five Central Asian counterparts in March. After visiting Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic from 5-10 March, the Turkish head of diplomacy hosted his Kazakh counterpart, Mukhtar Tileuberdi, in Ankara on 17 March. Afterwards, he went to Tajikistan from 28-30 March. Each of these were opportunities to signal to the world that Turkey must be taken into account in Central Asia.

The challenge of transportation

Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s Central Asian agenda is indeed political but also commercial and economic. The Turkish lira has dropped and the economy of the country is not performing well. The Turks seek to develop trade in Central Asia by creating outlets for their businesses and ease the transit of goods coming from China through the “Middle Corridor” fulfilment. On 5 March, the Turkish chief of diplomacy chose Ashgabat, with its immaculate white marble, to begin his diplomatic Central Asia tour. According to the Anadolu agency (AA), the priority for the Turkish delegation dealt with logistics and transport in Turkmenistan. Turkish trucks will be allowed to transit during a time in which they would otherwise be banned due to the Covid-19 pandemic – provided that drivers take a test prior to their arrival at Turkmenbashi port near the Caspian Sea shore, explains Anadolu.

Diversifying Turkey’s energy supply

Transportation is an important topic for Turkey because it may enable access to more energy resources. Bayram Balci, the director of the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, said in an interview with Novastan that “Turkey is an industrial country which only produces 3% of its energy needs.” Turkmenistan, possessing the fourth largest natural gas reserves in the world, could become a key player for Turkey if Turkmen gas could be pumped into the country. Read more on Novastan: Turkmenistan became China’s number one gas supplier Therefore, the joint project between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding the exploration and use of hydrocarbon deposits in the Dostluk field in the Caspian Sea is a topic of interest to Turkish leaders. It is estimated that this hydrocarbon field may hold natural gas and up to 59 million tons of oil, reported Anadolu. Turkey considers this project as an opportunity to diversify its energy intake and desires to involve its public businesses.

A Turkish general consulate in Samarkand

After his visit to Turkmenistan, Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu spent three days in Uzbekistan. He visited Samarkand to underline the significance of Turkish-Uzbek relations before continuing to Tashkent. Çavuşoğlu and his Uzbek counterpart Abdulaziz Kamilov inaugurated the new Turkish general consulate on 7 March. This marks an improvement in Turkish-Uzbek relations since 2016, when Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev came into office. Unlike his predecessor, Islam Karimov, the current Uzbek president champions an open foreign policy which is friendly towards Turkey and its Central Asian neighbours.

In Uzbekistan, Çavuşoğlu underlined the symbolic importance of diplomatic representation opening in what is considered to be the birthplace of Turkish civilisation. While he was paying tribute to the transformation in Samarkand, he recalled that Turkey had been the first country to establish an embassy in Uzbekistan in 1991. As the historical heart of the Silk Road, Turkey did not hesitate to consider its touristic potential.  The Anadolu agency (AA) reports that since March 2018, Turkish Airlines has offered direct flights between Istanbul and Samarkand.

The renewal of educational foreign aid service in Kyrgyzstan

For his last stop in Kyrgyzstan on 10 March, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs chose to visit Manas University, a contemporary building situated in Bishkek’s city centre. Founded in 1995 through an agreement between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan, it educates more than 5000 students from 14 different countries. The university courses are free of charge and are taught in Turkish and Kyrgyz, with classes in English and Russian also offered. Besides being a symbol of Turkish soft power, Ankara desires to influence Kyrgyz educational policy as in 2018. Anadolu reports that the Turkish diplomatic chief reminded his counterpart that ”FETO” – Fethullah Gülen’s organisation – was a threat to Turkey and its allies since it is regarded as terrorist group by Turkish authorities. Gülenist networks were once conduits of Turkish soft power in Central Asia via their schools. Fethullah Gülen is in open conflict with Turkish authorities since being accused of plotting a coup in July 2016. Consequently, the authorities requested all partners to close Gülenist schools. Kyrgyzstan denied that request in 2018 due to sovereignty issues and “attachment to these schools which train Kyrgyzstan’s upper class,” an analyst at the Institute of Applied Geopolitics Studies, Magomed Beltouev, explained to Novastan. The Kyrgyz government focused on increasing its power over these schools by changing their status, according to the researcher in this article. The Turks have not seemed to come to terms with this choice. However, the Kyrgyz government has consented to the establishment of a new Turkish organisation, Maarif. Founded by the Turkish state, this new organisation is intended to take over activities previously led by Gülenist schools. Maarif schools, ranging from nursery schools to high schools, should open soon, says the Anadolu Agency (AA).

The premise of a defense cooperation with Kazakhstan

The progress of regional integration with Turkey allows Central Asian republics to diversify partnerships and display to their great neighbouring countries – Russia and China – that they can develop other connections and agreements, declares Balci. However, a Turkish defense cooperation has never materialised, as Russia finds it difficult to accept interference by external actors in what it considers its “near abroad.” Nevertheless, Turkey seems to have new ambitions in Central Asia, bolstered by its success in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turks have provided combat drones of their own making to their ally Azerbaijan, which have been key to Azerbaijani military superiority. Discussions with Kazakhstan have taken place in order to begin cooperation with the Turkish defense industry, as reported by the Anadolu Agency (AA) in February. Furthermore, Daily Sabah reported the testing of combat vehicles and weapons systems made by two Turkish firms – Otokar and Aseldam – in the Karadanga region in March. Official communications also announced that a defense collaboration has been discussed between Turkey and Uzbekistan. This first step between the two countries resulted in the signing of a military financial cooperation agreement in October 2020. During his tour stop, the Kazakh Minister of Foreign Affairs Mukhtar Tileuberdi had a discussion with his Turkish counterpart and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 17 March. They jointly discussed the “high investment potential” of Turkey but also opportunities to extend cooperation into various fields such as medicine, information technology and energy.

The great ambitions of the past

More broadly, Turkish ambitions in Central Asia have evolved considerably; they are shaped as much by the interests of other states as by the means available to achieve its goals. The five Central Asian republics declared their independence and initiated relations with other sovereign states after the fall of Soviet Union in 1991. Balci explains that Western powers dreaded the possibility of these predominantly Muslim societies yielding to the influence of Iran or Saudi Arabia. “Therefore we thought that Turkey, inspired by a European model, should be a model for these countries as they open up internationally,” adds the researcher. At the same time Pan-Turkism, an ethnic movement advocating the cohesion of nations with Turkic culture and language, was well received by the Turkish elite according to Beltouev. Initially, Central Asian republics agreed to the principle of a Turkish leadership but the Turkey of 1991 is not the same as Turkey today, explains Balci. Less wealthy and less powerful, it proved unable to offer protection and economic opportunities expected by some Central Asian leaders.

A modest cooperation

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia looked unfavourably on foreign incursions into its sphere of influence. The country quickly created regional institutions in order to reaffirm its ascendency over the new Central Asian republics. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) first saw the light of the day in 1991, while the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) was founded in 2000, which became the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2014. Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia Turkish leaders had to lower their ambitions; Turkey could not become a protective power in Central Asia. As a result, Turkic solidarity developed mostly around cultural, educational and linguistic cooperation. Aware of the need to respect the cultural and political features of each of their partners, the Turks have focused on the development of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, Turkey has pursued its Turkic integration project. The International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) began in 1993 in Almaty, the then capital of Kazakhstan. Many years later, the Turkic Council, initiated in an informal manner in 1992, was officially established in 2009. This intergovernmental forum now includes all Turkic-speaking states except for Turkmenistan, which is strongly attached to its neutrality policy.

A desire to carry regional influence

For Balci, the institutionalisation of the Turkic Council is an ongoing process. The accession of Uzbekistan to the council in 2019 was made possible only thanks to warming relations after the passing of Islam Karimov in 2016. At this point, the only Turkic country not represented in the council is Turkmenistan. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared his desire to see Turkmenistan become a member “as soon as possible” in December 2020,says Anadolu. The myth of Turkic unity remains strong even today. The Turkic Council held a videoconference on 31 March, where various leaders discussed a roadmap for the future called “2040 Turkish world vision.” Baghdad Amreyev, the general secretary of the Turkic Council, discussed this roadmap with the Anadolu Agency (AA). The document aims to establish “better coordination in terms of foreign policy, cooperation in the field of security, free-trade agreements, open borders for transit, as well as the reinforcement of linguistic and alphabet cooperation,” explains Amreyev. He also underlines that it is the “first summit of Turkic leaders after the Azerbaijani victory in Nagorno-Karabakh” in November 2020. It is also a victory for Turkey which seeks to extend its reach beyond the Caucasus. According to Balci, “Turkey’s approach to the Karabakh war has been closely observed by Central Asian states.” Besides the desire to see its power recognized by Russia and the West, Turkey has also “displayed its capacity to militarily support its partners,” adds the researcher. In addition, Turkey desires to play a part in the Afghan issue. The Tadjik capital, Dushanbe, hosted the ninth ministerial meeting of the Istanbul process in late March; it is the fruit of a 2011 Turkish initiative aimed at creating a regional dialogue to support the economic development of Afghanistan. A summit meeting devoted to the Afghan peace process between the Kabul government and the rebels will take place in Istanbul on 16 April, describes the American media The Diplomat. Russia, China, Pakistan and the United States will be present according to the Anadolu Agency (AA).

Beyond talk, few concrete actions

Diplomats and official media tend to highlight Turkey’s good relations with its Central Asian “brothers.” The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs also emphasizes the assistance Turkey has been providing to its Central Asian partners during the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic.  For instance, Anadolu claims that Turkey is providing Tajikistan with the third highest amount of aid. In a seemingly favourable regional context, Turkey desires to increase its presence in Central Asia. However, Beltouev encourages a nuanced approach. “The economic importance of these countries for Turkey is marginal,” he says. The link with Asia is, more than anything else, symbolic. “Speeches about Turkish brotherhood and Silk Roads are always grandiloquent but there is a clear difference between the discussions which take place and their subsequent translation into bilateral agreements, which are not very ambitious,” concludes the general secretary of the Turkic Council.  

Written by Guillaume Gérard

Translated from French by Emma Bekrine

Edited by Mari Paine

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The post Turkey’s new push into Central Asia appeared first on Novastan English.

In the far east of Turkey, not far from Lake Van, lies a small town called Ulupamir. Here 4,000 ethnic Kyrgyz maintain their cultural traditions and strive to preserve their connection to the Kyrgyz language.

This article is a translation of Как живут ванские кыргызыby which was originally published on Kloop.kg in November 2016. All photos were taken by Atilla Guven and are used with permission.

In 1978, the April (Saur) Revolution brought a Soviet-backed government to power in Afghanistan. This precursor to the Soviet-Afghan war prompted large numbers of the Pamir Kyrgyz community to leave their villages in Afghanistan’s Wakhan region and seek resettlement abroad.

The Pamir Kyrgyz first fled to Pakistan, but they were unaccustomed to the harsh, hot climate and soon sought to be resettled elsewhere. After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain American visas and move to Alaska, efforts by community leader Rahmankul Khan to find resettlement in another country paid off. In 1983, the Pamir Kyrgyz were accepted by Turkey and were provided with land in Van Province. The village of Ulupamir was founded soon after, and with it, the Van Kyrgyz community.

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Ulupamir resident Atilla Guven spoke to Kloop about the daily life of the Van Kyrgyz community while on a visit to Kyrgyzstan. The story hereafter is as told by Atilla Guven.

Around 4,000 Pamir Kyrgyz live in Turkey nowadays, approximately 3,000 of them in the Van region and 1,000 in Turkey’s bigger cities. There are 550 families in Ulupamir. The most elderly resident is 90 years old. The number of women and men is equal.

Learning to speak Kyrgyz is the most important issue for us. When Askar Akaev was the president of Kyrgyzstan there was an agreement that teachers from Kyrgyzstan would come to Turkey and teach us the Kyrgyz language. My brothers and sisters learned Kyrgyz in such a way. They were also taught Kyrgyz history and culture, and they in turn transferred that knowledge to their children. After Akaev stepped down as president, the agreement was terminated. Almost nobody speaks Kyrgyz now.

Some people think that they speak Kyrgyz, but they do not notice how similar Kyrgyz and Turkish are. They speak in Turkish but assure us that they are speaking Kyrgyz. People in the village now only learn Turkish. We hope that the Kyrgyz government will renew the previous agreement and help us preserve our language.

Read more on Novastan: More Russian passports, fewer labour migrants: Central Asian migration to Russia in 2020

In our village, we have one school with about 20 teachers. There is a hospital and a drugstore on the outskirts of town. Every resident has private transport to get to the hospital quickly in the case somebody gets sick.

I notice that many people compare us with the Pamir Kyrgyz and think that we also live in difficult conditions. The reality is the opposite. We live in good conditions; we are economically developed and we have state support.

There is no conflict between us and the Kurds. We seek to live quietly and peacefully. They, in turn, adhere to this principle.

We express our appreciation for state support by working as border guards and consequently maintaining stability in the village. As a rule, border guards live in one place for 10-15 years and earn 350-400 dollars per month in wages. A lot of people do not want to join the military; therefore, they move to big cities.

At the moment in Yozgat (a city in central Turkey) houses are being built specifically for the Van Kyrgyz. The houses will be leased for 10 years and about 100 families are now on the waiting list for housing. This is good news for us because we cannot afford to buy a flat in Istanbul or Ankara. The waiting list for housing includes not just people from Ulupamir but also the ethnic Kyrgyz who moved to Istanbul or Ankara.

The construction of houses for the ethnic Kyrgyz is an initiative of the Yozgat mayor. There are some plans to build a Kyrgyz cultural center, where monuments to Manas and Chinghiz Aitmatov will be erected.

When we arrived in Turkey, nobody was interested in us except for the mayor of Yozgat. He was the first who came to meet us. He mentioned during his visit that the Van Kyrgyz are close relatives of the Turks and that they must live in good conditions. If one compares the standard of living in Ulupamir with villages in Kyrgyzstan, the standard in Ulupamir will be higher. Turkey supports us constantly.

Read more on Novastan: Kyrgyzstan struggling to meet electricity demand this winter

Residents of Ulupamir are involved in cattle breeding and agriculture. Young people study, broaden their horizons. Those who do not study go to Istanbul or Ankara to earn money. They work seven or eight months and come back to the village when it is time to sow crops. Once the sowing is complete, they return to the cities. They generally work in leather manufacturing factories or factories that produce tea.

The young people who study in Istanbul or Ankara find love there and get married. Ten years ago, people in Ulupamir practiced their customs: nobody married strangers. I want to marry a Kyrgyz girl from Kyrgyzstan. I want my son to be Kyrgyz.

If one compares our traditions with Kyrgyz ones they will notice a lot of differences. In Kyrgyzstan, at the start of a meal, a sheep’s head is offered to the youngest person at the table, but in our village it is offered to the oldest one. We try to preserve traditions. We still play national games like Kok-Boru and Ordo Atysh.

There is a game where girls and boys divide into two teams and throw flour at each other. This game embodies purity and spiritual rapprochement. Guys and girls get to know each other through this game. Thus, fun contributes to the creation of new families and unites the residents.

If the Van Kyrgyz moved back to Kyrgyzstan, it would take a lot of time for them to get used to the different conditions, as economically our conditions are better in Turkey. We had a case where some Van Kyrgyz moved to Chong-Alay, became citizens of Kyrgyzstan, and lived there for ten years. But when their sons grew up, they returned to Van.

If members of our community manage to travel to Kyrgyzstan, they will definitely want to visit more than once. And those who cannot visit ask enthusiastically “how is it in Kyrgyzstan?” They ask if they would be accepted as Kyrgyz or if they would be called Turks. They want to know how they would be treated. Our elderly people want to visit Kyrgyzstan. They shed tears when they hear about it.

Written by Almir Almambetov for Kloop.kg
Photos by Atilla Guven

Translated from Russian by Aigeldi Eminova

Edited by Clare Hodgson

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The post From the high Pamirs to the shores of Lake Van: The tale of Turkey’s Kyrgyz community appeared first on Novastan English.