As trade routes between Europe and Asia undergo profound changes, the Middle Corridor is attracting growing attention as an alternative to transit through Russia. Yet infrastructure bottlenecks, limited shipping capacity across the Caspian Sea and coordination problems continue to undermine its reliability. Christian Hirschmann of Azurite Logistics discusses the challenges facing the route, Kazakhstan’s growing importance and what would make the corridor commercially sustainable.

The Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, connects China and Europe through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus. Its strategic importance has increased considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as businesses seek to diversify their supply chains and reduce exposure to geopolitical risks.

The route’s potential is substantial. In a report published in September 2026, the World Bank estimated that targeted investments could more than triple trade volumes along the corridor and halve travel times by 2040. Further regulatory and operational reforms could produce even greater gains.

However, translating that potential into reliable commercial services remains a major challenge. Limited vessel capacity across the Caspian Sea, overloaded rail networks and fragmented coordination between national operators continue to affect transit times and costs.

To better understand these challenges from an industry perspective, Novastan spoke with Christian Hirschmann of Azurite Logistics, a European logistics company active in transport between Europe and Central Asia.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan continues to assert itself as the “key link” in the Middle Corridor

Novastan: How much has the Middle Corridor changed over the past three or four years? Are we seeing a structural shift in freight flows, or is demand still largely dependent on geopolitical disruptions?

Christian Hirschmann: The Middle Corridor has become one of the most important routes for Eurasian trade, and also one of the most volatile. Geopolitical developments affect it immediately, from the Iran conflict to the Russia-Ukraine war spreading into the Black Sea region. With alternative Eurasian routes increasingly restricted, freight volumes are shifting to the Middle Corridor at a growing rate.

Infrastructure has not kept up. Capacity on the Caspian crossing is limited, rail capacity in Turkey is constrained, and extensive track maintenance across Europe causes further disruption. Together these create bottlenecks along the corridor, and shippers should expect longer and less predictable lead times.

For Azurite, these challenges are part of day-to-day operations. With in-depth knowledge of the corridor and a close watch on every critical node, Azurite anticipates disruptions early and adjusts routings before delays reach its customers.

The company is currently developing new block train services connecting Antwerp with Halkalı (Istanbul) and Halkalı with Alat (Baku). It is also building its own railway operations, making it independent of market capacity and giving customers dependable access to the Middle Corridor.

What are the main bottlenecks today? Which parts of a journey between Europe and Central Asia create the greatest uncertainty?

The biggest single source of uncertainty is still the Caspian crossing. Ferry and vessel capacity between Alat/Baku and Aktau/Kuryk is limited, departures are irregular, and weather can stop operations for days. Once a backlog builds at the ports, it spreads quickly along the whole corridor. Containers wait, storage and demurrage costs rise, and planned connections are missed.

The second factor is rail capacity on the approach routes. Turkey’s rail network is under heavy pressure, and extensive track maintenance across Europe keeps reducing available train paths. Together these cause delays before cargo even reaches the Caspian.

What is often underestimated is coordination between the many parties involved. A single shipment passes through several national railways, port operators, ferry lines and customs authorities. Each has its own schedules, tariffs and priorities. Changes in rail gauge and transloading points add more handovers. Every interface is a possible point of delay, and when information isn’t shared in real time, small problems turn into big ones.

Border crossings and customs have improved noticeably thanks to digital transit documents and closer cooperation between the corridor countries. They remain a risk when paperwork is incomplete or regulations change at short notice.

Finally, the corridor reacts to geopolitics, often within days. When other Eurasian routes are restricted, volumes shift to the Middle Corridor and put even more strain on existing bottlenecks.

Read more on Novastan: The Caspian Sea Is Retreating. Central Asia Is Not Ready

The World Bank has highlighted the corridor’s potential for significant growth. Does it currently have the capacity to absorb a major increase in traffic? Where is investment most urgently needed?

Not yet, at least not without longer and less predictable transit times. The corridor has grown significantly in recent years, but infrastructure hasn’t kept up. It already runs close to its limits at several points. A further sharp rise in traffic, for example from new geopolitical disruptions on other Eurasian routes, would mostly mean more congestion rather than more throughput.

Investment is most urgently needed in four areas.

First, the Caspian crossing. This is the corridor’s biggest bottleneck. It needs more and larger vessels, regular scheduled departures, and expanded berth and terminal capacity in Alat, Aktau and Kuryk. As long as the sea leg stays the weakest link, improvements elsewhere along the route have limited effect.

Second, rail infrastructure and rolling stock. In Türkiye and the Caucasus, extra track capacity, modernised lines and efficient transloading points are essential. Equally important is enough wagons and locomotives to run more trains on a reliable schedule.

Third, digitalisation and harmonisation. Many delays are caused by processes, not infrastructure. Shared digital transit documents, real-time information exchange between railways, ports and customs, and harmonised tariffs would raise capacity noticeably, with comparatively little investment.

Fourth, terminals and hubs. Inland terminals with storage, consolidation and handling capacity help absorb peaks and keep cargo moving when one section of the corridor is disrupted.

How commercially competitive is the Middle Corridor today? For which types of cargo does it make economic sense, and where does it still struggle?

The Middle Corridor makes most economic sense where sanctions and risk exposure narrow the alternatives, and that applies in both directions.

Eastbound, many European shippers can no longer use the northern route through Russia, or no longer want to. Sanctions, compliance rules and reputational risk rule out Russian transit for a large share of exports to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the wider region.

For machinery, industrial equipment, automotive parts, chemicals and project cargo for the energy and infrastructure sectors, the Middle Corridor is often the only practical land option. For landlocked Central Asian destinations, it is usually also faster than a long sea route followed by an expensive inland leg.

Westbound, the drivers are similar, plus a second factor: missing insurance coverage for sea freight. Because of conflicts along key maritime routes, war-risk cover is in some cases unavailable or only available at very high premiums. Shippers who can’t insure their cargo at sea are moving it to land routes.

Exporters from Central Asia and China who want to avoid Russian transit choose the Middle Corridor for the same reason. As a result, westbound volumes have risen noticeably.

The corridor is particularly competitive for medium- to high-value goods where capital tied up in transit and speed matter, time-sensitive supply chains, customers with strict compliance requirements, and project and energy cargo bound for Central Asia.

It still struggles in three areas.

Price: for low-value bulk and commodity cargo, sea freight stays clearly cheaper wherever it is available and insurable.

Speed: transit times are competitive in theory, but in practice they are held back by bottlenecks at the Caspian crossing, in Turkey and on European rail sections.

Predictability: this is the biggest weakness. Many handovers between operators, irregular sailings on the Caspian, and fast reactions to geopolitical events lead to fluctuating transit times. For shippers running just-in-time production, that is often more critical than price.

For shippers who aren’t restricted by sanctions, the northern route still has an advantage in price and transit time. The Middle Corridor’s strength is that it is the reliable, compliant alternative when that option isn’t available. Its long-term success depends on making transit times more predictable.

Read more on Novastan: Gwadar, Karachi and the Central Asian Dream of the Sea

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are emerging as important logistics markets. How evenly are the benefits of the Middle Corridor spreading across Central Asia?

The benefits are not spread evenly yet. Kazakhstan is clearly becoming the main logistics hub for Central Asia. It is the only country in the region that links China, the Caspian Sea and the rest of Central Asia within its own borders.

With the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk, the border crossings to China at Khorgos and Dostyk, and the largest rail network in the region, most Middle Corridor flows pass through Kazakhstan.

Investment in port capacity, dry ports, terminals and rail lines is reinforcing that position, and more consolidation, warehousing and distribution for the whole region is moving there.

Uzbekistan is developing into the second centre, but with a different profile. With the largest population in the region and a growing industrial base, it is above all a strong origin and destination market rather than a transit hub. Being double landlocked, it depends on its neighbours for transit, especially Kazakhstan. That makes Kazakhstan’s hub role even stronger.

New opportunities are emerging elsewhere too.

Kyrgyzstan could gain considerably from the planned China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, which would create a direct southern link between China and Central Asia.

Turkmenistan, with the port of Turkmenbashi, offers an additional Caspian crossing and could ease pressure on the bottlenecks in the future.

Tajikistan is still mostly a destination market, but needs better connections for its growing trade with China and Europe.

For logistics providers, this means Kazakhstan is the strategic anchor point for Central Asia. Anyone who wants to serve the region reliably needs a strong operational presence there. From that base, the neighbouring markets can be reached efficiently.

Read more on Novastan: Can Afghanistan Become Central Asia’s Bridge to the South?

How important is sanctions compliance in customers’ decisions? Has this permanently changed how European businesses approach supply-chain risks?

Sanctions compliance is now one of the deciding factors in route choice, and for many customers it is the first filter. Before price or transit time are even discussed, they want to know whether a route is fully compliant and legally secure.

For European companies, the risks of breaching sanctions are simply too high: fines, personal liability for management, blocked payments, losing access to banks and insurers, and lasting reputational damage.

On top of the sanctions themselves, there is the economic risk of doing business in Russia. Many European companies have seen how quickly assets can be frozen, payments blocked or businesses placed under state control. As a result, they have not only rerouted their transport flows, they have also rethought their entire regional set-up.

Moscow used to be the natural hub for Central Asia and the wider CIS region. Today, European companies are moving regional distribution, warehousing and in many cases regional management to Kazakhstan. It offers political stability, an investor-friendly environment, a central location and direct access to the Middle Corridor.

This shift is a major reason why Kazakhstan is developing into the leading logistics hub for Central Asia, serving as the base from which European companies supply Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and neighbouring markets.

The change is lasting. European companies have learned that relying on one corridor or one transit country is a strategic risk. Supply-chain risk is now part of board-level decisions. Route diversification, alternative scenarios and full transparency along the transport chain have become standard. Even if the political situation changes, few companies will go back to their old dependencies.

That’s why sanctions-compliant routing is one of Azurite’s core Middle Corridor services. We plan routes that avoid sanctioned territories completely. We screen goods, parties and end users, and we provide full documentation for every shipment.

Looking five years ahead, what would make the Middle Corridor a genuinely mature and reliable trade route? What is the biggest obstacle to achieving this?

In five years, I would call the Middle Corridor mature when shippers no longer treat it as an emergency alternative but as a fixed part of their supply-chain strategy. The key is this: the corridor will only be reliable if shippers secure transport capacity in advance.

Today, many shippers still book on a spot basis, when other routes are blocked or when rates look attractive. That behaviour creates the very volatility everyone complains about. Railways, port and ferry operators and logistics providers can only invest in rolling stock, vessels and terminals if they can count on stable, plannable volumes. Without long-term commitments, there is no long-term capacity.

A mature corridor would therefore show these features:

• Shippers sign long-term capacity agreements and plan the corridor into their supply chains as a fixed route.
• Scheduled block trains and regular sailings across the Caspian run to fixed timetables.
• Transit times are predictable, with limited variation.
• Operators along the route share data and work together as one integrated chain.

The decisive shift is in mindset: reliability and available capacity matter more than price. A slightly cheaper rate is worth little if the container waits two weeks in Aktau or misses its production slot.

The companies that succeed on this corridor will be the ones that see secured capacity as an investment in supply-chain security, not as a cost factor.

By Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan English.

The post The Middle Corridor is growing, but can it deliver? A logistics operator’s perspective appeared first on Novastan English.