From Kazakhstan’s pine-covered lakes to Kyrgyzstan’s walnut groves and the tugai forests of the Amu Darya, Central Asia is considerably greener than its international image suggests. But fires, mass tourism and development are testing whether landscapes designated as protected are also protected in practice.

In the height of summer, a spark can be enough.

It may come from a campfire left smouldering beneath the trees, a cigarette discarded beside a road or machinery operating in dry grass. Heat, wind and vegetation do the rest. For the foresters and rangers responsible for Central Asia’s protected landscapes, the first sign may be a thread of smoke rising behind a mountain ridge. By the time a fire is visible from the nearest village, reaching it may already require hours on rough tracks with limited equipment.

Wildfires have made forests an urgent political issue far beyond Central Asia. Yet the region is rarely included in international conversations about them. To many outsiders, Central Asia remains a land of steppe, high mountains and desert: spectacular, certainly, but largely treeless.

The reality is more complicated.

Spruce forests climb the slopes of the Tian Shan. Walnut and wild-fruit trees cover parts of southern Kyrgyzstan. Pine and birch grow among the lakes and granite formations of northern Kazakhstan. Juniper woodlands survive in the mountains of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Along the Amu Darya and other rivers, fragments of tugai forest still provide shelter to deer, wild boar and migratory birds. Turkmenistan’s mountains and deserts contain pistachio woodland, juniper, tamarisk and saxaul adapted to some of the harshest conditions in Eurasia.

These landscapes store water, stabilise soil, support rural livelihoods and shelter wildlife. They are also being asked to perform another function: attract a rapidly growing number of visitors.

The result is a regional dilemma. Central Asian governments are creating and expanding protected areas, promoting ecotourism and announcing ambitious restoration targets. At the same time, their forests and parks face hotter conditions, fires, grazing, construction, waste and, in several countries, limited enforcement capacity.

Read more on Novastan: From the Pamirs to the Aral Sea: Following the Amu Darya Through Central Asia

The important question is therefore not only how many national parks Central Asia has. It is how effectively they are protected.

A region greener than its reputation

Central Asia’s forests are not the continuous temperate woodlands found elsewhere. Many are fragmented, highly localised and adapted to mountain, river or desert environments. Their relative scarcity makes them particularly valuable.

In eastern Kazakhstan, Katon-Karagay National Park reaches from forest and meadow to alpine tundra in the Altai Mountains. Siberian larch, fir, spruce, birch and cedar pine provide habitat for maral deer, brown bears, lynx, ibex and the elusive snow leopard. Kazakhstan describes Katon-Karagay as its largest national park and one of its most intact protected landscapes.

Read more on Novastan: How Central Asia is trying to protect the snow leopard

Farther west, the pine forests of Burabay and Bayanaul emerge almost unexpectedly from the surrounding steppe. Their lakes and accessible landscapes have made them popular tourist destinations, but accessibility brings pressure: more vehicles, more informal campsites, more rubbish and a greater likelihood that human activity will start a fire.

In Kyrgyzstan, the walnut-fruit forests around Arslanbob are among the region’s most distinctive human landscapes. Walnuts grow alongside wild apple, pear, plum and hawthorn. Local families have long depended on collecting nuts and fruit, meaning that conservation cannot be separated from questions of access, income and community rights. Forests cover only a small proportion of Kyrgyzstan’s territory, but they remain an important ecological and economic asset.

Higher in the Tian Shan, Schrenk spruce and juniper forests surround parks such as Ala-Archa, Chong-Kemin and Besh-Tash. Camera traps in Besh-Tash recorded snow leopards, argali, Siberian ibex, wolves and foxes in 2025, a reminder that protected areas contain living ecosystems rather than simply scenic backdrops for visitors.

Read more on Novastan: Artists and activists raise awareness for Bishkek’s waste problem

Uzbekistan’s mountain parks protect juniper woodland, wild-fruit species and habitats used by bears, ibex, lynx, vultures and other birds of prey. In the west, the newly created Aralkum National Nature Park represents a very different experiment: protecting life emerging in and around the former bed of the Aral Sea. Uzbek authorities report that the park contains 25 animal species, including four listed in the national Red Book.

Tajikistan’s forests cover only a small part of the country, but their ecological function is disproportionate to their area. Juniper, pistachio, almond and riverine vegetation help hold mountain soils together and regulate water. Our media partner Asia-Plus has reported that forest cover is now approximately three percent of Tajikistan’s territory and that the country’s once-extensive tugai forests have contracted dramatically under agricultural pressure.

Turkmenistan relies less on the designation “national park” than its neighbours. Its conservation system is organised largely around state reserves, including Badkhyz, Köýtendag, Repetek, Kaplankyr and Syunt-Hasardag. These protect ecosystems ranging from pistachio woodland and mountain habitat to saxaul desert, along with species such as kulan, goitered gazelle, urial and markhor.

Together, these landscapes dismantle the idea of Central Asia as an ecologically uniform expanse of empty land.

How many parks does Central Asia have?

The simple answer is that no simple regional figure is entirely reliable.

Kazakhstan consistently identifies 14 state national nature parks. In Kyrgyzstan, however, published totals vary according to whether sources count only parks administered by the principal protected-areas department or include additional sites under different arrangements. Uzbekistan distinguishes between national parks, national natural parks, natural parks and other protected categories. Tajikistan uses several park and reserve classifications, while Turkmenistan’s system centres on state nature reserves and sanctuaries.

A regional total can therefore be misleading unless the legal categories are harmonised.

This is more than a technical problem. It demonstrates how governments can report growth in protected territory without necessarily making clear what each designation permits. A strict reserve may substantially limit human activity, while a national or nature park can contain zones for tourism, roads, grazing or other forms of use.

All five countries have framework legislation governing specially protected natural territories. Kazakhstan’s principal law dates from 2006, Kyrgyzstan’s current framework from 2011, Uzbekistan’s from 2004, Tajikistan’s from 2011 and Turkmenistan’s from 2012. But these laws operate alongside forest codes, land legislation, fire regulations and individual decisions establishing or rezoning particular parks.

The legal designation is therefore only the beginning. The practical questions are more revealing: Can a hotel be built inside the park? Can livestock graze there? How many rangers patrol it? Who responds when it burns? Can its boundaries be altered to accommodate development?

When ecotourism becomes mass tourism

Kazakhstan illustrates the contradiction particularly clearly.

Its national parks have become central to the country’s domestic-tourism strategy. New roads, visitor centres, accommodation and marked routes can make nature more accessible and generate income for remote regions. But growing visitor numbers also produce waste, soil erosion, traffic and fire risk.

Research and regional reporting have already raised concerns about damage to vegetation and soils along heavily used routes. Kazakhstan is now developing a new biodiversity framework for 2026-2035, under which the total area of specially protected natural territories is expected to increase from approximately 31 million to 33.2 million hectares.

The expansion is significant. Yet adding hectares does not by itself solve overcrowding in the most accessible parks or guarantee that tourism revenue is reinvested in conservation.

Kyrgyzstan faces a similar tension. More than 250,000 people visited the country’s protected zones in 2025, generating 38 million soms in revenue. Environmental specialists interviewed by 24.kg warned that roads and hotels were increasingly reaching previously undisturbed forests.

This raises an uncomfortable question: when a protected landscape becomes economically valuable as a destination, which institution is strong enough to say that no further construction should be allowed?

Tourism is not inherently hostile to conservation. Visitor fees can fund rangers, waste collection, trail maintenance and ecological monitoring. Guides and guesthouses can give local communities an economic reason to preserve wildlife and forests.

But this requires rules based on ecological carrying capacity rather than the assumption that every increase in visitor numbers represents success.

A park can receive more tourists and earn more money while becoming less capable of fulfilling the ecological purpose for which it was established.

New parks, old capacity problems

Uzbekistan is moving rapidly in the opposite direction: rather than confronting only the overcrowding of established destinations, it is significantly enlarging its protected-area system.

On 25 March 2026, the government created the Ovjazsoy-Moviy Toglar, Pskem and Fergana national natural parks, covering a combined 188,800 hectares. It also expanded Pop National Natural Park from 10,000 to 135,300 hectares.

The expansion follows earlier decisions enlarging the Nurata and Surkhan reserves and Zarafshan National Natural Park.

These measures could protect important mountain, forest and riverine habitats before roads, settlement or intensive tourism fragment them further. Uzbekistan is also working with UNDP and the Global Environment Facility on landscape restoration in the Western Tian Shan, Nuratau and Kugitang. The programme aims to improve the management of 1.3 million hectares of forests and rangelands.

Yet rapid territorial expansion produces its own challenge. New parks require trained staff, vehicles, fire equipment, ecological inventories, zoning plans, community consultations and reliable budgets. Without them, a park may exist immediately in law but only gradually on the ground.

The distinction between planting trees and restoring ecosystems is equally important. A plantation can increase an official forest indicator while providing less biodiversity than naturally regenerating native woodland. Saxaul planted to stabilise exposed soil has a different purpose from restoring juniper forest, walnut groves or riverine tugai.

The central question is not whether tree planting is valuable. It is what kind of landscape is being created, for whom and for how long.

Fire as the test of protection

Wildfire is perhaps the clearest test of whether a protected area functions beyond paper.

In Tajikistan, more than 430 hectares of forest were reportedly affected by fires across nine regions in 2025. Extreme heat and human carelessness were identified among the causes.

For a heavily forested country, that area might appear limited. In Tajikistan, where woodland is scarce and often protects vulnerable mountain soil, every burned hectare can have wider consequences. The loss of vegetation can accelerate erosion, damage pasture, reduce water retention and expose nearby settlements to landslides and flooding.

Across the region, remoteness complicates fire response. Protected forests may be separated from the nearest equipment by poor roads or mountain terrain. Rangers are expected to monitor tourists, prevent poaching, manage relations with local communities and respond to fire, often across vast areas.

Technology can improve early detection through cameras, satellite monitoring, drones and automated alerts. But an alert only helps when someone has the equipment, personnel and access needed to act on it.

Climate change further narrows the margin for error. Central Asia is already experiencing land degradation, water scarcity and stress on mountain and desert ecosystems. A hotter, drier landscape turns ordinary negligence into a potentially devastating event.

Who is supporting conservation?

Central Asian states are not dealing with these pressures alone.

The World Bank’s RESILAND initiative supports landscape restoration and climate resilience across the region. It also promotes transboundary protected areas and ecological corridors, recognising that watersheds and wildlife do not stop at political borders.

In Tajikistan, a World Bank investment of $45 million supports landscape restoration, sustainable natural-resource management and climate resilience. In Uzbekistan, the Bank has backed a much larger programme for forest and degraded-land restoration. Regional and national projects are also financed through the Global Environment Facility and implemented by UNDP, FAO and government agencies.

IUCN works with members and state partners in all five Central Asian countries, focusing on biodiversity, protected areas and conservation policy. UNESCO supports natural World Heritage sites and biosphere reserves, while the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund has channelled support towards civil-society organisations in the Mountains of Central Asia biodiversity hotspot.

In April 2026, the five Central Asian countries signed a regional declaration on biodiversity conservation in Astana. The declaration is politically important, but its value will ultimately be judged in less ceremonial settings: a ranger station with working equipment, a forest where illegal cutting has stopped, a tourism project relocated away from a fragile habitat, or a village given a meaningful role in managing nearby land.

International projects can provide money, expertise and technology. Their lasting contribution depends on whether they build institutions that continue functioning after a project cycle ends.

Protection with people, not against them

Forests are rarely empty spaces.

People collect walnuts and fruit, graze livestock, gather medicinal plants, work as guides and heat their homes with wood. Restricting access without creating alternatives can turn conservation into a source of conflict. Allowing unrestricted extraction, on the other hand, can gradually destroy the ecosystem on which those livelihoods depend.

This is why the human future of Central Asia’s protected areas matters as much as their legal status.

A family collecting walnuts in southern Kyrgyzstan, a guide leading visitors through the Tian Shan and a ranger watching for smoke may have different immediate interests. But all depend on the forest surviving.

Effective conservation requires communities to receive tangible benefits, participate in decisions and understand why some uses must be restricted. It also requires governments to resist projects that promise quick tourism revenue at the expense of long-term ecological stability.

Central Asia is creating more parks, restoring land and placing biodiversity higher on its regional agenda. Those are real developments. But the coming years will show whether the region is building resilient ecosystems or accumulating protected-area designations.

When smoke rises above a forest, the distinction becomes impossible to ignore.

A boundary drawn on a map cannot stop a fire. A law cannot patrol a mountain trail. A declaration cannot remove rubbish, prevent illegal cutting or persuade a developer to build elsewhere.

For that, a protected area needs people, resources and the political authority to remain protected.

By Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief of Novastan English.

The post Central Asia’s Forests Under Pressure appeared first on Novastan English.

Thousands of kilometres before rusting fishing boats appear in the sands of Muynak, the Amu Darya begins as mountain water.

Its headwaters descend from the Pamirs and northern Hindu Kush through the Panj and Vakhsh river systems. The Panj marks much of the Afghan-Tajik border before meeting the Vakhsh; downstream of their confluence, the river takes the name Amu Darya.

From there, it leaves the mountains and enters an entirely different world of deserts, irrigated plains, ancient cities and modern international frontiers.

For centuries, the Amu Darya – the Oxus of antiquity – has helped determine where people could settle and where political power could flourish. Irrigation drawn from its waters sustained some of Central Asia’s great civilizations. Changes in its channels could nourish one settlement while depriving another of water. In the twentieth century, Soviet planners attempted to engineer the river on a vastly greater scale.

Read more on Novastan: The Caspian Sea Is Retreating. Central Asia Is Not Ready

Following it today from the mountains towards the Aral Sea means travelling through many of the defining questions facing contemporary Central Asia: hydropower and climate resilience, Afghanistan’s growing use of the river, cross-border trade, irrigation, agricultural dependence and the ecological legacy of the Aral disaster.

The river changes character repeatedly along the way.

In the mountains it is born. Along the Panj it becomes a frontier. On the Vakhsh it becomes electricity. At Termez it both divides and connects Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. In Khorezm it becomes the hidden infrastructure of civilization.

And near Muynak, its story ends in a landscape transformed by water that stopped arriving.

Before the Amu Darya: mountain water

There is no single spectacular spring at which the Amu Darya suddenly begins.

Its origins are dispersed across an immense mountain system. The Panj drains highland areas of Afghanistan and Tajikistan and forms a large part of their border. The Vakhsh descends through Tajikistan before joining it. From their confluence, the combined river flows westward as the Amu Darya.

The landscape is almost the inverse of what waits downstream.

Steep valleys, snow and glaciated mountains ultimately feed a river that will later cross some of the driest inhabited territory in Eurasia. Water falling or freezing high in the mountains will eventually irrigate fields hundreds of kilometres away.

That physical connection is one reason climate and water management upstream matter so much farther downstream. The Aral basin itself ultimately depends heavily on river systems fed by mountain snow and glacial melt.

The Vakhsh: turning water into electricity

Before joining the Panj, the Vakhsh has acquired another role: energy.

Tajikistan has built much of its electricity system around hydropower, and the enormous Rogun project now under construction on the Vakhsh sits at the centre of that strategy.

In June 2026, the World Bank approved a further $300 million in financing for Rogun. Once fully operational, the plant is expected to generate around 14,400 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually – equivalent to roughly 60 percent of Tajikistan’s current electricity generation – while also allowing greater electricity exports to neighbouring countries.

This illustrates one of the recurring complexities of Central Asian water politics.

For Tajikistan, mountain rivers represent energy security, winter electricity and potential exports. Downstream, the same waters sustain irrigated agriculture.

These interests are not necessarily incompatible. Reservoirs can regulate flows as well as store water. But they mean that water cannot be understood simply in terms of quantity.

When it is stored and when it is released matter too.

Already, before the name Amu Darya even appears on the map, the river has become economic infrastructure.

Then the mountains recede.

Termez: Afghanistan across the water

At Termez, the geopolitics of the Amu Darya become tangible.

The river marks the boundary between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Beyond the Uzbek bank lies Balkh Province, while near the Friendship Bridge the Afghan border town of Hairatan forms one of Afghanistan’s principal gateways to Central Asia.

Here, Afghanistan is not an abstract subject of regional diplomacy.

It is physically across the water.

The Friendship Bridge carries road and railway connections across the Amu Darya. For decades it has accumulated political symbolism – Soviet troops crossed it during the withdrawal from Afghanistan – but today Uzbekistan increasingly wants Termez to represent something different: commerce, logistics and connectivity.

That shift is visible a short distance away at Airitom.

The Airitom Free Zone began operating in August 2024 near the Afghan border. It was explicitly created to promote international and cross-border trade and includes retail, logistics, hotel, medical and other facilities. Afghan citizens can enter the zone without an Uzbek visa for stays of up to 15 days.

The geography is striking: the zone sits beside the Amu Darya itself.

The same river that functions as a state boundary is therefore increasingly being treated as the edge of an economic corridor between Central and South Asia.

Afghanistan returns to the river

Trade is not the only way Afghanistan is reshaping the politics of the Amu Darya.

For most of the Soviet period, water allocation downstream was managed within a single political system. Afghanistan was never fully integrated into the institutional arrangements inherited by the Central Asian republics after 1991.

That asymmetry is now becoming much harder to ignore.

Afghanistan is constructing the 285-kilometre Qosh Tepa Canal across the country’s northern provinces, with the stated objective of bringing Amu Darya water to drought-prone agricultural areas.

From Afghanistan’s perspective, the argument is straightforward: the country has substantial agricultural needs and an interest in using a river flowing along its northern frontier after decades during which its ability to exploit those waters remained comparatively limited.

From downstream Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the same project looks different.

Every substantial withdrawal upstream potentially reduces what continues towards their irrigated regions. The project has therefore become one of the most consequential new questions in Central Asian water politics.

Yet portraying Qosh Tepa simply as an approaching “water war” would be misleading. The issue is better understood as the emergence of another major water user on an already intensely exploited river.

It reinforces the central fact of the Amu Darya basin:

Everyone has reasons to use more water.

Nobody can manufacture another river.

Turkmenabat: engineering the desert

Farther west, the Amu Darya enters Turkmenistan and passes Turkmenabat.

Here the relationship between water and human settlement becomes even more engineered.

Near the city, Amu Darya water enters the enormous Karakum Canal system, which carries it westwards through Turkmenistan.

The project embodied one of the defining ambitions of Soviet hydraulic planning: rather than accept the constraints imposed by aridity, engineers would move water across the desert.

And physically, they succeeded.

Water could sustain farms, settlements and industries hundreds of kilometres away from the river.

But the same logic was being applied across the basin. Irrigated agriculture expanded dramatically in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, while increasing quantities of water were removed before the Amu Darya reached its delta.

Yet large-scale irrigation itself was hardly a Soviet invention.

Downstream, communities had been redirecting the river for thousands of years.

Khorezm: a civilization built by canals

Few landscapes make that clearer than Khorezm.

Visitors arriving in Khiva encounter one of Central Asia’s most concentrated historic cityscapes: mud-brick walls, turquoise tiles, minarets and courtyards rising from an intensely arid environment.

What they do not encounter is the Amu Darya itself.

Khiva does not stand on the modern riverbank.

That apparent contradiction tells us almost everything about the historical relationship between Khorezm and water.

The city exists because the river was brought to it.

Khiva lies near the edge of cultivated land and historically received Amu Darya water through one of the major canals of the Khorezm oasis.

Long before modern states or Soviet hydraulic projects, inhabitants of Khorezm had learned to transform desert into an oasis through irrigation.

UNESCO’s documentation of the ancient towns and fortresses of the Aral Sea region dates irrigated agriculture in the lower Amu Darya to the end of the second millennium BC and directly links irrigation canals to the emergence of early cities in the region. Novastan has also explored the fortresses and historic landscapes of Khorezm, where the relationship between settlement and water remains visible across the region.

This history is not simply archaeological. The irrigation networks help explain why generations of people could live, farm, trade and build cities in an otherwise extremely arid landscape.

The lower river itself has never been completely stable.

Its channels shifted repeatedly. Canals silted up or were redirected. Settlements prospered and declined as their access to water changed. The Amu Darya still structures movement across Khorezm today, including crossings such as the pontoon bridge near Urgench previously featured by Novastan.

UNESCO’s documentation of ancient Khorezm explicitly notes that changes in the direction of the Amu Darya affected urban centres and that the region’s settlements were closely connected to the river’s shifting courses.

In Khorezm, controlling water meant controlling the geography of civilization itself.

Nukus: downstream of everyone

Approaching Nukus, the Amu Darya has travelled through an extraordinary accumulation of human interventions.

Upstream reservoirs regulate it.

Afghanistan is constructing new irrigation infrastructure from it.

Agricultural regions in Uzbekistan depend upon it.

Turkmenistan diverts part of it westwards.

By the time it reaches Karakalpakstan, the river represents the cumulative result of decisions made across an international basin.

Near Nukus, the Amu Darya spreads through a broad, flat landscape, its channel interrupted by exposed banks and low islands. It looks very different from the mountain water with which the journey began.

Nukus is downstream not simply geographically, but politically.

Communities near the end of a river do not determine their water supply alone. They receive the cumulative result of decisions made everywhere upstream.

That reality remains highly contemporary.

In June 2026, Uzbekistan, UNDP and the Global Environment Facility signed the concept for an Integrated Water Resources Management Plan for the Lower Amu Darya Basin. The initiative is intended to create a more coordinated and science-based framework for managing water resources and ecosystems in the lower river and Aral Sea region.

It represents an attempt to think of the lower Amu Darya increasingly as a connected hydrological system rather than simply as water divided between administrative territories.

But the scale of the historical damage becomes clearer farther north.

Muynak: a port without a sea

At Muynak, one of Central Asia’s most familiar images has almost become too familiar.

Fishing boats sit in sand.

Visitors photograph their rusting hulls. What was once evidence of economic collapse has acquired the strange afterlife of a tourist attraction.

But the boats matter because of what is absent around them.

Water.

The Aral Sea was once the world’s fourth-largest inland lake. Its hydrological balance depended heavily on the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Massive diversion of river water for irrigation caused inflows to collapse and the sea to shrink and fragment.

For Muynak this was not simply an environmental statistic.

It meant the disappearance of the economic geography around which the town had developed.

Fishing and fish processing depended upon a shoreline that progressively moved away. As Oktyabr Dospanov recalled in Novastan’s interview, “My Childhood Was Spent on the Shore of a Sea That No Longer Exists,” Muynak was once a living port rather than the symbol of ecological catastrophe it has since become.

The rusting boats can be read almost as the final objects in a chain that begins in the mountains.

Reservoirs, canals, irrigation systems and agricultural decisions made hundreds or thousands of kilometres upstream all influence how much water ultimately reaches the lowest part of the basin.

The river’s history can almost be read backwards from Muynak.

The sea that did not entirely disappear

Popular descriptions often say simply that the Aral Sea “disappeared.”

The reality is more complicated.

The sea fragmented into separate bodies of water. Large parts of its former seabed are now exposed, while significant differences have developed between the remaining northern and southern water bodies. The ecological catastrophe has been immense, but the Aral is not literally gone.

That distinction matters.

It prevents the region from being reduced to a single image of irreversible apocalypse. The northern Small Aral has, for example, demonstrated that deliberate water-management interventions can produce at least partial ecological recovery.

On the Uzbek side, however, the landscape around the southern remnants conveys the scale of what has been lost.

One river, competing futures

It would be easy to tell the history of the Amu Darya solely as a story of environmental destruction.

That would also be incomplete.

The river continues to sustain millions of people and several very different development strategies.

Tajikistan wants electricity.

Afghanistan wants irrigated farmland.

Uzbekistan needs water for agriculture while attempting to make irrigation more efficient.

Turkmenistan remains deeply dependent on water transported away from the river through its canal system.

Karakalpakstan needs sufficient flows to sustain communities and ecosystems at the end of the basin.

All of these demands are understandable.

The difficulty is that they exist simultaneously.

Qosh Tepa therefore matters not because competition for the Amu Darya is new, but because the political geography of that competition is changing.

Afghanistan is becoming a far more significant water user in a system whose post-Soviet institutions were largely built without it. Tajikistan’s hydropower development, downstream irrigation, ecological restoration and climate pressures meanwhile have to coexist within the same hydrological system.

There is no single technological solution that eliminates that basic constraint.

More efficient irrigation can help. Better canals can help. Improved regional coordination can help. Basin-level management can help.

But none can make the Amu Darya infinite.

From ice to sand – and water again

The extraordinary thing about following the Amu Darya is how many different worlds can belong to a single river.

In the mountains, its water begins among snow and glaciers.

Along the Panj, it separates Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

On the Vakhsh, it becomes electricity.

At Termez, the river forms Uzbekistan’s frontier with Afghanistan while Airitom attempts to turn that frontier into a commercial gateway.

In Khorezm, canals carried the river towards cities that could never have survived without it.

Near Nukus, the consequences of decisions taken across the basin accumulate.

At Muynak, ships remain stranded where water once stood.

And farther beyond them, parts of the Aral Sea remain.

Central Asia’s cities are usually explained through monuments, rulers and empires – the walls of Khiva, Buddhist Termez, Nukus’s museums.

Another history runs beneath all of them.

It is a history of glaciers, channels, dams and canals.

The Amu Darya has determined where settlement was possible, where agriculture could flourish and where political power could accumulate for thousands of years.

High in the mountains, water still begins its journey towards the plains.

At the other end of that journey, ships stand in the desert while a diminished sea survives beyond them.

Between those two landscapes lies much of Central Asia’s past – and one of the defining questions of its future.

By Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English.

The post From the Pamirs to the Aral Sea: Following the Amu Darya Through Central Asia appeared first on Novastan English.

Sunset over a Tajik village overlooking Lake Alaudin. Nestled in the heart of the Fann Mountains in southwestern Tajikistan, this lake is a popular hiking destination.

Photo: Etienne de Vaumas (France)

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The post Dusk appeared first on Novastan English.

In Queens, a few words can contain the history of an entire community. A guest may be welcomed with xush omaded, an expression immediately recognisable to Tajik speakers. At the table may be osh, the regional rice dish better known internationally as plov, while grandparents move between Bukhori and Russian and their grandchildren answer in English.

The scene belongs unmistakably to New York. Its vocabulary, food and social rhythms, however, lead back to Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent and Dushanbe.

Read more on Novastan: How Central Asia became home for the Koryo-Saram

Over the final decades of the Soviet Union and the turbulent years that followed its collapse, most Bukharan Jews left Central Asia. Large communities developed abroad, most visibly in the New York neighbourhoods of Forest Hills and Rego Park. Others took root in Vienna, Toronto and a number of smaller centres. The result is an unusual geographical reversal: a culture bearing the name of Bukhara now has some of its most dynamic institutions thousands of kilometres away from the city itself.

Novastan has previously explored the debated origins of the Jewish presence in Central Asia and the historical importance of Bukhara and Khwarezm. The contemporary story begins where those histories leave off. How does a community remain Bukharan after leaving Bukhara? And what links do Bukharan Jews still maintain with the Central Asian societies from which they emerged?

A community whose centre moved

Despite their name, Bukharan Jews did not come exclusively from Bukhara. Communities developed across the territories that today constitute Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with important centres in Samarkand, Tashkent, Kokand, the Ferghana Valley and Dushanbe. “Bukharan” gradually became a collective designation for a wider Central Asian Jewish civilisation shaped by Persian-speaking urban culture, Jewish religious traditions and long interaction with Uzbek, Tajik and other neighbouring populations.

Migration began well before the Soviet collapse, but accelerated dramatically from the 1970s onwards. By the 1990s, the economic uncertainty accompanying independence, the weakening of Soviet-era professional and social structures, and the opportunity to reunite with relatives abroad encouraged much of the remaining population to depart.

The community did not simply disperse. In several cities, Bukharan Jews recreated dense networks of synagogues, schools, businesses, newspapers, restaurants, cultural organisations and family associations. Queens became the most visible North American example: a place where Central Asian food, music and communal life remained present not only inside private homes, but in streets, shops, banquet halls and religious institutions.

Bukhara had not been reproduced exactly. The new community was increasingly American, urban and outward-looking. Yet it retained practices and relationships that distinguished it from both the surrounding population and other Jewish communities.

Bukhori: a Central Asian language abroad

Perhaps no element expresses this complicated identity better than Bukhori, also called Bukharian or Judeo-Tajik.

Bukhori belongs to the Iranian family of languages. It is closely related to Tajik and, more distantly, to modern Persian. It developed among the Jewish communities of Central Asia, incorporating Hebrew and Aramaic terms associated with religion and communal life, while also absorbing vocabulary and influences from Uzbek and, during the Soviet period, Russian.

To a Tajik speaker, much of Bukhori may sound familiar. Words connected with everyday life, hospitality and family reflect a shared Persian linguistic environment. But religious vocabulary, pronunciation, expressions and the historical experience carried by the language make it distinct.

Read more on Novastan: Les Juifs de Boukhara : comment sont-ils arrivés en Asie centrale ?

Everyday Bukhori contains many words immediately recognisable to Tajik and Persian speakers. A guest may hear xush omaded, “welcome,” while osh evokes both the wider Central Asian rice tradition and specifically Bukharan Jewish dishes such as oshi sabo. Such vocabulary reflects the community’s roots in a Persian-speaking Central Asian environment. Its specifically Jewish dimension is more apparent in religious terminology derived from Hebrew and Aramaic, although the precise vocabulary and pronunciation vary between speakers and communities.

Bukhori’s alphabets tell another story. It was traditionally written in Hebrew characters. Soviet language reforms subsequently introduced Latin and then Cyrillic scripts. Today, the language may appear in Hebrew, Cyrillic or adapted Latin spelling, depending on the speaker, country and intended readership.

Each script points towards a different cultural horizon: Hebrew towards Jewish religious and literary life, Cyrillic towards the Soviet experience, and Latin increasingly towards younger generations living in English-speaking countries. The lack of a single universally accepted contemporary spelling system also complicates efforts to teach the language.

Bukhori remains spoken, particularly among older and middle-aged members of the community. But it is considered endangered. Migration has strengthened Bukharan communal identity in some respects while weakening the transmission of its traditional language. In Queens, children may grow up surrounded by Bukharan food, weddings, religious institutions and family networks without becoming fluent Bukhori speakers. Russian may remain the language used with parents and grandparents, while English dominates education, work and friendships.

This produces one of the central paradoxes of the modern diaspora: Bukharan identity may be surviving more successfully than Bukhori.

Language loss does not automatically mean the disappearance of the community. A person can identify strongly as Bukharan through family, religion, food, music and social relationships. Yet language carries forms of humour, intimacy and memory that are difficult to reproduce through translation. When grandparents speak Bukhori but grandchildren understand only fragments, more than vocabulary is lost. A particular way of describing Central Asian Jewish life begins to recede.

The question is therefore not simply whether Bukhori will survive. It is also what being Bukharan will mean if it does not.

Queens: a new Bukhara?

Forest Hills and Rego Park are sometimes described as a “new Bukhara.” The expression is evocative, but incomplete.

Queens did not preserve Bukharan culture in a frozen form. It transformed it. Religious practices changed in contact with other Jewish traditions. Businesses adapted to the opportunities and demands of New York. Young people combined family expectations with American education and professional life. Community institutions became more formalised, visible and politically engaged.

Nevertheless, the density of Bukharan life remains remarkable. Synagogues and schools coexist with restaurants, food shops, newspapers, wedding halls and social organisations. Weddings and religious celebrations bring together extended families and reinforce connections that can also support professional advancement, philanthropy and mutual assistance.

The community’s economic visibility has sometimes encouraged outsiders to describe Bukharan Jews principally through wealth or influence. Such language requires caution. It can reproduce old stereotypes about Jews, money and hidden power while obscuring the ordinary work through which immigrant communities build stability.

The more interesting story is institutional. Bukharan Jews in Queens developed strong family and community networks, created businesses, funded religious and cultural organisations and became active in local civic life. Their prominence is less a mystery than the result of geographic concentration, entrepreneurship, mutual support and sustained investment in communal institutions.

Elements of Central Asian social organisation also travelled with them. Family reputation, obligations between relatives, elaborate hospitality and neighbourhood-based mutual assistance recall aspects of the mahalla, the local community structure found across Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. These practices have inevitably changed in New York, but they have not disappeared.

Queens is therefore not a replica of Bukhara. It is a new diaspora city in which selected elements of Central Asian life have been reorganised to meet American conditions.

Vienna: a Central Asian Jewish crossroads

Vienna offers a different version of the Bukharan Jewish journey.

The Austrian capital became an important transit point for Jews leaving the Soviet Union during the 1970s. Many continued towards other destinations, but some Bukharan Jewish families remained. Over time, they created one of the most substantial and active Bukharan communities in Europe.

The city now contains Bukharan synagogues, religious and social organisations, businesses and cultural initiatives. Bukhori and Russian continue to be used among parts of the community, while German increasingly dominates among younger generations. Research on Bukharan Jews in Vienna describes a community shaped simultaneously by Central Asian origins, Soviet migration, Jewish religious life and integration into a German-speaking European city.

Vienna’s experience resembles Queens in some respects, but differs in scale and urban setting. Its community is smaller and exists within a European Jewish landscape marked by its own historical sensitivities. It also remains geographically closer to the former Soviet world, potentially facilitating travel and continued personal connections.

Here too, language is an indicator of generational change. Older residents may move between Bukhori and Russian. Their children and grandchildren increasingly use German. The community remains visible, but the balance between religious affiliation, family heritage and specifically Central Asian culture is continually renegotiated.

Toronto: preserving culture through organisation

Toronto represents a third model.

Its Bukharan Jewish population is smaller and less geographically concentrated than that of Queens. The Jewish Bukharian Community of Toronto was formally established in 2003, building on earlier efforts to bring together families dispersed across the Greater Toronto Area. Cultural preservation was explicitly presented as part of its mission.

A smaller community cannot rely on neighbourhood concentration alone. Maintaining cultural life requires deliberate organisation: religious services, family gatherings, youth programmes, celebrations and spaces in which people can meet others with the same background.

This may make cultural preservation simultaneously more fragile and more conscious. In Queens, Bukharan identity can be reinforced through daily proximity. In Toronto, it may depend more heavily on people choosing to participate.

This is not a contradiction. It is the normal result of a history marked by migration, coercion and adaptation.

Vienna and Toronto therefore broaden the story beyond a simple journey from Uzbekistan to New York. They show that there is no single Bukharan diaspora experience. The survival of language and culture depends on community size, urban geography, religious institutions, migration history and the language of the surrounding society.

Is Central Asia still a homeland?

For the first generation of migrants, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan may remain associated with childhood, education, neighbours and professional life. For their descendants, Central Asia is more likely to be encountered through family stories, food, music, photographs and occasional journeys.

Diaspora visits to Bukhara and Samarkand often include former homes, synagogues, schools and cemeteries. These are not always journeys towards a place of possible return. They are journeys towards evidence: proof that the family history described by parents and grandparents belonged to real streets and neighbourhoods.

Read more on Novastan: Khwarezm et Boukhara, deux foyers anciens des Juifs d’Asie centrale

This raises a subtle distinction. Central Asia can remain emotionally important without functioning as a contemporary homeland. Bukhara may be remembered as a place of coexistence, hospitality and belonging, even when the family’s departure was driven by uncertainty or the conviction that its future lay elsewhere.

The process can also idealise the past. Nostalgic accounts may emphasise close relationships with Muslim neighbours and minimise discrimination, political restrictions or the difficulties of late Soviet and post-Soviet life. Other families may remember exclusion and see departure as liberation rather than loss.

There is no single Bukharan Jewish memory of Central Asia. The diaspora contains different generations, migration routes and political experiences.

A living community or a heritage landscape?

Jewish life has not completely disappeared from Uzbekistan. Synagogues and small communities remain, including in Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara. But the demographic contrast is striking: the historic centres now contain only a fraction of the population found in diaspora cities.

This creates a risk that Jewish life in Central Asia becomes treated principally as heritage.

The old Jewish quarter of Bukhara, its synagogues, cemeteries and traditional houses attract visitors and preservation initiatives. The city’s Jewish houses form part of Bukhara’s distinctive architectural landscape, although many have changed ownership or function. Some have become guesthouses, workshops or tourism businesses.

Preservation is necessary, but it raises difficult questions. Who determines how the history of a departed community is presented? Do restored buildings communicate the complexity of Jewish life, or merely provide an attractive setting for tourism? What remains of a neighbourhood when its architecture survives but most of its former inhabitants live abroad?

The remaining Jewish residents should not be reduced to guardians of monuments. Their lives, concerns and choices are part of the contemporary story. Their relationship with the diaspora may include family contacts, religious support, philanthropy and visitors, but it may also contain differences of perspective. Those who stayed did not experience the same transformation as those who rebuilt their lives abroad.

Uzbekistan rediscovers its diaspora

The relationship is not maintained only through private memory. Uzbekistan has increasingly engaged Bukharan Jewish communities abroad as part of its cultural diplomacy.

Official and academic initiatives have highlighted the historical contribution of Jews to Central Asian society. A major conference on Bukharan Jewish heritage was held at Samarkand State University in September 2025. In February 2026, another conference examined the role of Bukharan Jews in the region’s socioeconomic and cultural life, including diaspora investment, tourism and educational exchange.

For Uzbekistan, the diaspora offers several potential advantages. Bukharan Jews can promote the country as a tourist destination, support heritage projects, facilitate business contacts and reinforce an international narrative of religious coexistence.

For the diaspora, official recognition may validate a history that was sometimes marginalised. It may also create opportunities to protect cemeteries, synagogues and family heritage.

But the relationship should not be romanticised. State-sponsored celebration of Jewish history can serve contemporary political objectives. It allows Uzbekistan to present itself internationally as tolerant, open and connected to a successful global diaspora. The decisive question is whether this engagement also supports the remaining local community and permits complex discussion of the past.

Bukharan Jews may be approached as former citizens, cultural ambassadors, investors, tourists or intermediaries. They may see themselves in all of these roles – or reject some of them.

Can Bukhara survive outside Bukhara?

The Bukharan Jews remain a meaningful community. Their institutions are active, their family and religious networks are visible, and their cultural traditions continue to distinguish them across several countries.

But what is being preserved is changing.

Bukhori is weakening even where Bukharan identity remains strong. Central Asia is becoming, for many younger members of the diaspora, an inherited landscape rather than a lived one. Cuisine, weddings and family solidarity may survive more easily than language. Religious identity may grow stronger even as specifically Central Asian knowledge recedes.

The Bukharan Jewish story is therefore not simply one of disappearance or successful preservation. It is a story of selection. Every generation decides, consciously or otherwise, which elements of Bukhara to carry forward.

In Queens, Vienna and Toronto, the answer is still being negotiated – between Bukhori and English, Russian and German, memory and modernity, inherited obligations and individual choices.

Most Bukharan Jews no longer live in Central Asia. Yet they remain one of Central Asia’s most distinctive communities abroad. Their global journey has not ended their relationship with the region. It has transformed Bukhara from a place into a language, a family memory, a social world – and a question passed from one generation to the next.

Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English

The post From Bukhara to Queens: The Global Journey of the Bukharan Jews appeared first on Novastan English.

From Kazakhstan’s Kurultai to Uzbekistan’s Mahalla, governments across Central Asia are increasingly framing political reform through institutions rooted in local history rather than imported political models.

For much of the three decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, discussions about political reform in Central Asia were conducted using a familiar international vocabulary. Elections, constitutions, political parties, decentralisation, civil society and good governance became the dominant language through which both governments and international organisations described political development.

Also read on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s Next Elections: Between Reform and Managed Competition

Increasingly, however, another vocabulary is emerging.

Across the region, governments are reviving concepts such as the Kurultai, the Mahalla, the Halk Maslahaty and councils of elders. These institutions are rarely presented as alternatives to constitutional government. Rather, they are increasingly portrayed as ways of making governance more legitimate, more participatory and more deeply rooted in national history.

This raises an important question. Are Central Asian governments simply giving traditional names to modern institutions? Or are they gradually developing a distinct political vocabulary through which reform itself is imagined?

Also read on Novastan: The Lexicon of Kazakh Decolonisation

Political reform is not only about changing institutions. It is also about changing the language through which those institutions are understood and legitimised.

Beyond Imported Models

All political systems derive legitimacy from history as much as from law. France invokes the Revolution and the Republic. Britain draws upon Parliament and Magna Carta. The United States continues to frame politics through the language of its Founding Fathers.

Central Asia is increasingly doing the same.

Rather than presenting reform exclusively through concepts inherited from the Soviet period or borrowed from international governance discourse, governments across the region increasingly anchor their legitimacy in historical narratives that resonate more directly with domestic political traditions.

This does not necessarily represent a rejection of constitutionalism or modern statehood. Instead, it reflects an attempt to reconcile contemporary governance with locally meaningful historical references.

Also read on Novastan: “Alaqan”: Aida Adilbek’s decolonial documentary cinema

Kazakhstan: The Kurultai and the Listening State

Kazakhstan perhaps best illustrates this evolution.

Since the January 2022 events, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has promoted the idea of a “Listening State”, constitutional reform and the National Kurultai as central elements of the “New Kazakhstan”. Alongside referendums, electoral reform and strengthened consultative mechanisms, the Kurultai has become part of a broader effort to redefine how political authority is presented.

The Kurultai is neither a parliament nor an opposition forum. Rather, it functions as a consultative platform bringing together selected representatives of public life, academics, experts and civil society to deliberate on questions of national identity, reform and long-term development.

Whether viewed as meaningful consultation or carefully managed participation, the Kurultai illustrates an important point. It seeks legitimacy not only through elections or representative institutions, but also through an institution whose historical roots reach back to the political culture of the Eurasian steppe.

Also read on Novastan: Manas and the Making of Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan: The Mahalla Between Community and State

Uzbekistan offers a different but equally important example through the Mahalla.

Often translated simply as a neighbourhood community, the Mahalla is in practice much more than a local tradition. It plays a role in social assistance to families in need, neighbourhood mediation, community mobilisation, welfare delivery and the administrative interface between citizens and the state, including in sensitive areas such as the registration and monitoring of religious communities.

It also intervenes in family life, including disputes concerning marriage, divorce and domestic violence. In many cases, Mahalla-level mediation provides rapid community support. Yet it has also been criticised for encouraging reconciliation in situations of gender-based violence, discouraging divorce or prioritising family cohesion over the protection and autonomy of women experiencing abuse.

Under the banner of the “New Uzbekistan”, the Mahalla has been presented not as a relic of the past but as a cornerstone of modern governance. Its strength lies precisely in this dual nature: deeply embedded in everyday community life while simultaneously serving as an important interface between society and the state.

Kyrgyzstan: Contesting the Meaning of the Kurultai

If Kazakhstan presents the Kurultai as a consultative institution, Kyrgyzstan illustrates how the same historical concept can become an object of democratic contestation.

Successive debates over the People’s Kurultai have revolved around fundamental constitutional questions. Should it merely advise elected institutions? Should it exercise oversight? Does it strengthen democratic participation or risk creating a parallel source of political legitimacy?

Rather than providing definitive answers, Kyrgyzstan demonstrates that historical institutions themselves become arenas of political debate when adapted to modern constitutional systems.

Turkmenistan: Tradition as State Legitimacy

Turkmenistan represents perhaps the most institutionalised version of this regional tendency.

The Halk Maslahaty, together with councils of elders and the symbolic authority of aksakals, presents political authority through the language of continuity, wisdom and national consensus. These institutions are not designed as arenas of political competition. Instead, they frame presidential authority within narratives of collective consultation and historical legitimacy.

Their significance therefore lies less in electoral politics than in the symbolic vocabulary through which political authority is justified.

Tajikistan: Statehood, Unity and the Persianate Legacy

Tajikistan follows a different path.

Its political vocabulary is less centred on Turkic or nomadic traditions than on national unity, statehood and the Persianate cultural heritage. References to the Samanid dynasty, the Tajik language and the country’s civil war increasingly serve to anchor contemporary political authority within a narrative of historical continuity and national resilience.

At the local level, elders and community mediation continue to play important social roles. While these traditions are not usually presented as formal instruments of political reform, they nevertheless perform a similar function: linking governance to ideas of continuity, cohesion and collective identity.

A Region Reimagining Its Past

Taken together, these examples suggest a broader regional phenomenon.

Central Asia is not abandoning elections, constitutions or representative institutions. Nor is it simply returning to pre-modern forms of governance.

Instead, governments are increasingly combining modern constitutional structures with institutions, concepts and symbols drawn from selectively reinterpreted historical traditions. The result is neither a rejection of international governance norms nor a simple revival of the past. It is a process of institutional hybridisation.

Also read on Novastan: Dead in the Water: Has the Common Turkic Alphabet Failed to Boost Turkish Influence in Central Asia?

This trend also intersects with a wider romanticisation of Turkic, steppe and nomadic heritage. Institutions such as the Kurultai or the authority of aksakals are often presented as evidence of an ancient political culture rooted in consultation, consensus and collective wisdom. Such narratives can offer valuable alternatives to the assumption that political modernity must always be expressed through imported institutional models. Yet they also carry risks. Complex historical realities can be simplified into reassuring myths, while diverse and sometimes hierarchical political traditions become reimagined as timeless expressions of participatory governance.

Türkiye’s recent decision to replace “Central Asia” with “Turkestan” in parts of its school curriculum reflects this wider intellectual shift. Increasingly, the region is being described through historical and cultural concepts associated with the Turkic world rather than Soviet-era geography or externally imposed terminology. Whether one views this as decolonisation, cultural revival or geopolitical symbolism, it illustrates the growing importance of historical narratives in shaping contemporary political identities.

More Than Words

The emergence of this vocabulary reflects deeper transformations.

A generation with little or no memory of the Soviet Union has reached adulthood. Nation-building has entered a more mature phase. Governments increasingly seek legitimacy not only through economic development or institutional reform but also through narratives that resonate with national history and collective identity.

This does not mean these institutions necessarily produce more accountable governance. Traditional concepts can broaden participation, but they may also reinforce hierarchy, exclude dissenting voices or provide new symbolic foundations for existing power structures.

The question facing Central Asia is therefore not whether it is returning to its past. It is not. Nor is it simply reproducing Western constitutional models. Increasingly, the region appears to be constructing something in between: modern states that seek legitimacy through institutions inspired as much by their own historical narratives as by international governance norms.

Whether these hybrid models ultimately strengthen accountability, broaden participation or merely repackage existing political authority remains an open question. What is already clear, however, is that Central Asia is no longer only reforming its institutions. It is also reinventing the language through which political legitimacy itself is imagined.

Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English

The post The Vocabulary of Reform: Why Central Asia Is Reimagining Its Political Traditions appeared first on Novastan English.

High in the mountains of Tajikistan, two young girls lead their small herd of cows to pasture.

Photo credit: Cyril Caldero (France)

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The post Shepherdesses appeared first on Novastan English.

Some books are interesting because they tell a story. The Sands of Oxus: Boyhood Reminiscences of Sadriddin Aini is interesting because it captures an entire world at the moment before it disappears.

Through the eyes of a clever, frightened and observant boy in late nineteenth-century Bukhara, Sadriddin Aini turns childhood into history. Village schools, sandstorms, canals, cholera, hunger, superstition, poetry, cruelty and humour all pass through the same narrow lanes.

The result is more than a memoir: it is a portrait of old Central Asia, and a quiet explanation of why that world could not remain unchanged.

Why the past refused to become propaganda

Originally published in Tajik as Yoddoštho / Ёддоштҳо between 1949 and 1954 in Stalinabad (now Dushanbe), The Sands of Oxus: Boyhood Reminiscences of Sadriddin Aini, appeared in English in 1998. Published at a time when Soviet writers were often expected to celebrate factories, production and Stalinist progress, Aini instead returned to childhood. That choice matters because the book is not a nostalgic retreat into the past. It is Aini’s attempt to explain how a child of old Bukhara became a modern writer, reformer and Soviet-era national figure.

Also read on Novastan: “Hafiz Saifullaev’s prose marks a fruitful turning point in Russian-language Tajik literature”

The book begins in rural Bukhara, among village celebrations, halva workshops, shifting sands, irrigation canals, family disputes, religious lessons, fasting, fairs, harvests and death. Aini writes about the physical struggle of everyday life: villagers fighting sandstorms, digging canals, enduring hunger and disease. But he also captures the mental universe of the time: fear of demons, belief in exorcism, the authority of religious teachers, the prestige of Persian poetry and the weight of inherited customs.

One of the most striking things about the book is that it does not read like simple Soviet propaganda. Aini certainly condemns the old order. Poverty, superstition, arbitrary power, clerical abuse and social cruelty appear throughout the book. However, the book does not present history as a clean march from darkness to socialism. Lenin is absent; Saadi is present. Poetry often matters more than ideology.

That ambiguity made Aini’s work powerful, but also politically delicate. Aini was not an anti-Soviet dissident, and Yoddoštho was published in the Soviet Union. The memoirs could be read as anti-feudal, anti-clerical and pro-enlightenment, which made them acceptable to Soviet editors. Yet his writing sat uneasily within Soviet nationality policy. It preserved a Persianate world of Islamic learning, village ethics, oral memory and Bukharan social complexity. It helped build modern Tajik identity while also describing a shared Central Asian past that did not fit neatly into Soviet national borders.

Bukhara between Tajik and Uzbek memory

The renewed relevance of The Sands of Oxus lies in the fact that Central Asia is once again debating its past. Jadidism, Bukhara, colonialism, Soviet modernisation, Islamic heritage, national identity and the relationship between Uzbek and Tajik cultural histories are all being reconsidered.

Aini stands exactly at that intersection. He was born in what is now Uzbekistan, wrote across Tajik and Uzbek contexts, and described Bukhara, a city central to both national narratives. His memoirs are therefore not only personal recollections. They are an archive of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Central Asian life: village customs, schools, professions, beliefs, family structures and social hierarchies.

This is why the book speaks so strongly today. It recalls a Central Asia before national borders hardened, when Persianate culture, Turkic speech, Islamic education, local identities and imperial pressures overlapped in complicated ways.

In Tajikistan: a national classic

In Tajikistan, Aini is foundational. He is not simply a writer, but a national institution: the father of modern Tajik prose, a builder of the literary language, and a figure through whom Tajik Soviet and post-Soviet identity have been narrated.

For Tajik readers, Yoddoštho is more than an autobiography. It is almost a national archive. Through Aini’s childhood, Bukhara becomes part of a recoverable Tajik past. Village life, old schools, artisans, religious figures, intellectuals and reformers all become elements of a literary homeland.

The book therefore carries emotional and cultural weight. It preserves a world that Tajik national memory claims as central to its own formation.

In Uzbekistan: a shared but sensitive legacy

In Uzbekistan, Aini’s reception is more layered. He belongs to Uzbek literary history as well: he lived in Bukhara and Samarkand, wrote in Uzbek contexts, and engaged with the Jadid and Soviet transformations of the region.

Yet his legacy is sensitive because his work also helped define a distinct Tajik literary identity, often by presenting Persian-speaking Bukhara as a central part of Tajik cultural history. In a country where Bukhara is one of the great symbols of Uzbek heritage, this creates a complex overlap rather than a simple national ownership.

Today, as Uzbekistan revalorises Jadidism and revisits its early modern intellectual history, Aini can be read in a new way: not only as a Soviet Tajik monument, but as a Bukharan intellectual whose life crossed the Uzbek-Tajik divide.

Before borders hardened

Beyond Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, The Sands of Oxus is less of a national classic, but it remains an important regional text. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, Aini does not occupy the same canonical place as national literary figures such as Abai, Chingiz Aitmatov or Makhtumkuli. Yet his memoirs illuminate a shared Central Asian problem: how traditional authority, religious education, rural poverty, imperial pressure and Soviet modernisation interacted before borders and national canons became fixed.

Also read on Novastan: Central Asia through the lens of… Behzod Boltayev

The book is therefore valuable not only for Tajik or Uzbek readers, but for anyone interested in how Central Asia entered the twentieth century.

A past too complex for Soviet ideology

The Sands of Oxus is not a fast book, but it is a rewarding one. Its power lies in detail: a schoolroom, a sandstorm, a canal, a death, a rumour, a poem, a beating, a feast. Through these fragments, Aini turns childhood into a map of pre-Soviet Central Asia.

The book refuses to belong neatly to one category. It is Tajik and Bukharan, Persianate and Soviet, autobiographical and political, nostalgic and accusatory. That refusal is exactly what makes it so relevant today. At a time when Central Asian states are reassessing Jadidism, Soviet rule, colonial legacies and the ownership of cities such as Bukhara, Aini’s memoirs are a reminder that the region’s past cannot be divided cleanly into today’s national narratives. They show a world where Persianate culture, Islamic learning, rural poverty and early reformist politics overlapped before Soviet borders turned shared histories into competing national legacies.

Maya Ivanova, Author for Novastan-English and Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan-English

The post Bukhara Before the Border: Aini and the Politics of Tajik-Uzbek Memory appeared first on Novastan English.

Citizens from Central Asia now represent the largest group of foreign nationals fighting in the Russian army. Novastan spoke with several of them after their capture by Ukrainian forces. Their accounts reveal how Central Asian migrants have become an especially vulnerable recruitment pool for Moscow.

In the yard of a military prison in Lviv region, West Ukraine, dozens of prisonners silently head towards the dining hall. The walls surrounding them are filled with portraits of Ukrainian prominent nationalist figures such as Daniel of Galicia or Stepan Bandera. In the largest prisoner camp in the whole country, everything is in Ukrainian, from the inscriptions to orders given to prisoners.

“There is no trouble here, they are pretty calm and do not brawl much” says a prison guard. In front of him, prisonners start entering the lunchroom, their faces blank. Some of them have already been detained for four years. Many prisonners clearly appear to have Asian features. Among them, some Russian citizens from Siberian republics of Buryatia and Yakutia, where mobilisation rates are particularly high.

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Many others come from the five former Soviet republics in Central Asia. “From what I saw, a majority of foreigners in the Russian army come from this region”, explains Khushbakht Peruzaliev. In spring 2024, the 47-year old Tajikistani citizen signed a contract to serve the Russian Army : “I was told that I would not have to go to the front or anything of this kind. They said I would only be working in a warehouse, so I accepted”, he remembers. But soon, these promises revealed to be lies. Few weeks later, the man was captured by Ukrainian forces after being injured in a frontal assault in Donetsk oblast.

Far beyond the 1,400 Africans or 200 Indian citizens that the Russian army recruited since the beginning of the war, more than 12,000 soldiers from Central Asia have already participated in the “special military operation”, according to public data published in April 2026 by the Ukrainian war prisoners coordination. More than half of foreign soldiers serving Russia are originally from Central Asia.

Passport promises amid raids and deportations

In Mykolaiv penitentiary, all Central Asian soldiers that Novastan met were already in Russia before 2022. “Recruitment efforts towards foreigners were targeting on both migrant workers and people who were in jail”, according to an officer of the Ukrainian coordination of war prisonners.

Ilyas, a 40-year old Kyrgyz citizen, worked as a drink retailer in Moscow since 2007. He signed his contract in April 2025. “During the hiring process, they didn’t directly promise me citizenship, but I knew I would have the possibility to obtain it after” he says.

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Indeed, in January 2024, a decree was signed by Vladimir Putin, allowing certain foreigners to obtain Russian citizenship under the condition that they served the army, especially during the “special military operation”. The number of foreigners who benefited from this process remains unknown.

In Ukraine, most prisoners from Central Asia mention that they were sent to the front only after a short training, which caused heavy casualties. “We were moving to a village, when on the road, drones already started appearing and targeting us”, Ilyas remembers. He barely escaped, only to be taken prisoner shortly after.

Khushbakht Peruzaliev, a prisoner whose wife and children still live in Ryazan, 200 kilometers south east of Moscow, was harmed during an intense artillery bombing, while he was moving towards Ukrainian lines. “Half of the group was killed immediately, all 200 [Russian military code for death, Editor’s note]”. 

He describes a general climate of fear that began to appear “right after the Crocus City Hall attack”. This terrorist attack committed by Tajikistani citizens was claimed by the Islamic State of Khorasan, and killed 149 people. Following this tragedy, living conditions of Central Asian migrants in Russia got tougher. “Raids against Tajiks” became frequent, during which migrants were “barred from Russian territory”, according to Khushbakht Peruzaliev.

The Tajik migrant abandoned plans to renew his expired passport, for fear of being arrested on his way to the embassy in Moscow. “Eventually, special police forces started checking the construction site where I was working”, he explains. During police controls, he was promised to obtain citizenship if he accepted to join the army.

Caress Schenck, a political science professor at Nazarbayev University in Astana, acknowledges that “Tajiks were indeed more targeted than other ethnic groups from Central Asia, after the Crocus City Hall attack”. According to the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners, Tajiks represent the second most represented nationality in the Russian army, with more than 3,400 recruits, while 4,800 Uzbeks and 2,400 Kazakhs also joined the army.

Caress Schenck reminds that, however, in Russia “migration control policies, raids and pressure to join the army are still highly influenced by the news cycle”.

Other ethnic groups have also been targeted since the beginning of the war, depending on the context : “Sometimes, anyone with Asian features can be perceived as suspicious”, according to the researcher.

Since November 2025, some foreigners in Russia are required to present a commitment contract in the army to obtain Russian citizenship or a residency permit. People from Central Asia are particularly impacted by these policies, as they make up more than 40% migrants living in Russia in 2020.

Despite that, all prisoners met by Novastan explain that they signed the contract by their own will to obtain a Russian passport, Caress Schenck mentions a strong administrative pressure on migrants that “reduces their ability to act and make their own decisions, rather than offering them a real choice”

The ideological vulnerability of migrants

In addition to the precarious administrative status of Central Asian migrants, the Russian army bases its mobilization stategy on shared ideological patterns. “As for me, I wanted to live in Russia. I considered that I had the right to obtain citizenship, so to earn it, I had to serve the homeland” says Jasur Islamov with a detached voice. After a year and a half in the army, in March 2025, the 38-year old man was promised he would obtain citizenship if he continued serving. A few weeks later, Jasur Islamov was captured, after being wounded by a drone strike.

Ilyas, Islamov and Khushbakht never tried to surrender on purpose, unlike accounts from other foreign prisoners of war fighting for Russia, such as African recruits. This behaviour at war could be explained by the fact that parts of migrant populations in Russia are already “Russian speakers, born in the 1970s or 1980s, under the Soviet Union”, according to the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners.

Prisoners met by Novastan also state that they wish to go back to Russia, hoping to be included in a prisoner exchange. “We have nothing against an exchange of prisoners from Central Asia”, says the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners. However, among the 7,000 Russian soldiers already exchanged, those originally from Central Asia remain a small minority. 

When Novastan asked them about their experience with racism in Russia, before or after serving, all assert that they “never” faced it. They are confident in their ability to rejoin Russian society after their detention, once they obtain a passport. “Could you imagine that I risked my life to obtain citizenship, and they would send me back to my country, when I have nothing left there ? It would be a huge betrayal” says Jasur Islamov, bitterly.

However, it would not be the first time that these war prisoners face disappointments related to their migrant experience in Russia. Despite being married to a Russian woman for years, Ilyas failed to obtain a passport : “I submitted all documents to apply for citizenship, a long time ago, but it was refused”. Jasur Islamov admits that he “did not even receive any money from the contract”, with only two months paid out of the eighteen months he spent in the army.

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“I believe it would take years to dismantle internalized discriminations” Caress Schenk explains. The researcher reminds that in the Soviet imagery, racism was seen as inherent to capitalism and the Western bloc.

Citing the Geneva convention, the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners explains that Central Asian citizens are treated the same as other prisoners. In the courtyard, on the weight training benches, Central Asian prisoners exercise alongside their Russian cellmates.

“We never thought we would end up here”, says Jasur Islamov. When he is reminded that he signed consciously and was aware of risks, the Uzbek detainee bristles : “You are talking as if I specifically signed to kill people… I only needed a place to live, a passport, to work and feed my family”. After a silence, he adds, regretfully : “I’m not saying we made the right decision. Everyone makes mistakes. Everyone”.

Driss Rejichi,
Contributor for Novastan France

Translated by Elea Muresan

Thank you for reading this article! If you have time, we would appreciate your feedback, either through this anonymous form or by email at editorial@novastan.org. Thank you very much!

The post “I only needed a passport” : In Ukraine, Central Asian prisoners of wars caught between loyalty and regret appeared first on Novastan English.

Wherever you are, when a herd is on the road, cars have to wait. Gharm, Tajikistan. 

Credits: Etienne de Vaumas (France)

Find all of our photos of the day. You can buy some of these and receive them at home: here is the list! If you can't find your picture in the list, mail us to photo@novastan.org.

The post Traffic on the road to Gharm appeared first on Novastan English.

Faced with archaic social expectations, Tajik women are expressing their exhaustion through a new coded language on social media. Built around the phrase “I am Tajik”, many personal testimonies have circulated in recent years.

“I am a Tajik woman and I have an unbreakable strength of spirit that allows me to overcome all of life’s difficulties,” says Madina Nigmatova, who took part in the movement.

With the aim of deconstructing stereotypes deeply rooted in Tajik society, a growing number of women and girls across the country are regularly joining this movement, celebrating a strong image of women through traditional clothing and jewellery.

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Beyond imposed roles

Far from limiting themselves to the domestic roles traditionally imposed on women – cooking, cleaning and caring for the household – which some movements, such as “tradwives” in the United States, are now bringing back into fashion, Tajik women are using the digital sphere to give voice to feminist struggles. Madina Nigmatova, a social media marketing specialist and trainer, says that women not only have the right but also the duty to be visible, fulfilled in their careers, creative and fully active in the business world.

“We know our traditions, we respect them, we pass them on to future generations. But we want to live in our time, as educated and independent women. The modern Tajik woman has learned to combine several roles: taking part in competitions, pursuing any career, while also looking after her children and managing the home,” she says.

Also read on Novastan : Comment les migrants nourrissent le Tadjikistan

This movement is taking place in a context where women and married girls in Tajikistan have limited access to electronic devices and the internet, often because of family control. In households where men work abroad, for example, mothers may receive smartphones instead of wives, thereby limiting the latter’s digital autonomy.

Novastan est le seul média en français et en allemand spécialisé sur l'Asie centrale. Entièrement associatif, il fonctionne grâce à votre participation. Nous sommes indépendants et pour le rester, nous avons besoin de vous ! Vous pouvez nous soutenir à partir de 2 euros par mois (défiscalisé à 66 %), ou en devenant membre actif par ici.

A subtle deconstruction of prejudice

In her version of “I am Tajik”, Madina Nigmatova draws attention to the widespread stereotype of the accomplished woman who, in Tajik society, is often perceived as a divorced woman.

Modern women easily combine family life, professional achievement and personal fulfilment: some make pastries, others create and run online businesses, while others work as makeup artists.

Also read on Novastan : Contrôle de l’habillement des femmes au Tadjikistan : entre tradition et répression

“When the videos were shared in different groups, many comments said that, to reflect the true image of the Tajik woman, they should have shown how to cook, sweep the yard or milk cows. The Tajik woman, the kelinka, is not limited to the role of servant. She is a full person who seeks fulfilment and balance between private life and career. I feel immense admiration for them,” says Madina Nigmatova.

A long-standing trend

This trend emerged last year, when several bloggers shared a joint video in which they said they were Tajik women and that this did not prevent them from “building a career”, “living separately from their parents”, “dressing as they wish”, “running a blog”, “not being married at 32”, “doing business”, or “creating a company”.

Also read on Novastan : Comment l’appareil judiciaire discrimine les femmes au Tadjikistan

The video sparked fierce controversy and a wave of hatred, particularly because the young women spoke in Russian while presenting themselves as Tajik. Yet the negative reactions did not manage to put an end to the trend. On the contrary, the more malicious comments multiplied, the more they increased the feeling of exhaustion with social injunctions. What women once kept silent out of shame, they now express more freely.

Multiple demands

“I am Tajik, I am 26 years old and I am postponing marriage because I am afraid of drastic changes in life; the institution of marriage frightens me because I have seen few successful examples around me,” Leila writes on her page.

“I am Tajik: I got married at 37. My only daughter is four and a half. I am 43. I lived and continued my studies in Italy, in the south to be precise. I have lived in Russia for 18 years. Before becoming an eyebrow specialist, I worked for 12 years as a stylist, buyer and merchandising department manager in major companies in Moscow,” Zarina says.

Also read on Novastan : Faut-il renforcer l’arsenal juridique contre les violences sexistes au Tadjikistan ?

“I am a Tajik woman who finished a Russian school in Tajikistan and I did not get married straight away. I am Tajik and I grew up in a traditional family and no, I was not scolded, we never argued before I left. On the contrary, I was truly supported,” writes Omina.

“I am Tajik and I do not allow myself to give unsolicited advice, such as: ‘One child is not enough, you need to have another one. It is not in your plans? Then your husband will end up leaving you,’” says Shakhzoda.

“I am Tajik, and I deliberately chose to marry a Kazakh, simply because that is what I wanted. When I want something, I refuse to forbid myself from having it,” says Bargigul.

Backlash and masculinist reactions

These posts regularly receive thousands of views and hundreds of comments. Women tend to leave positive and inspiring replies.

By contrast, fuelled by underlying misogyny, comments from men are generally far from encouraging. They include: “your eyes are not those of a Tajik woman”, “you dishonour the nation”, and “marrying a foreigner destroys the Tajik gene”. Many other comments in the same vein seek to discredit the activities and positions taken by many women in Tajikistan.

A simple format

The phrase “I am Tajik” can be personalised by adding something for which one has been criticised, felt shame, or which is, on the contrary, a source of pride.

Examples include: “… and I earn much more than men”, “… and I do not know how to make plov, and that is perfectly fine”, “… and I speak five languages”.

Also read on Novastan : Ces femmes tadjikes qui s’approprient les professions « masculines »

The video is often filmed in a pleasant setting where the women feel safe, with a posture intended to appear authentic. Traditional elements of Tajik culture in clothing or decor are often highlighted, because promoting cultural heritage and traditions is not incompatible with feminist emancipation.

The hashtags #iamtajik, #tajikgirlpower and #ihavetheright often accompany these messages and help them spread more widely.

“We are different, but we are all Tajik”

Many Tajik girls have also taken part in the “duxtari tojik” trend, meaning Tajik girl. In these videos, they embody women from different regions of the country, challenging the boundaries of regionalism — a phenomenon that remains very present in Tajik society.

Accompanied by a song by Tajik singer Nobovar Chanorov, which evokes girls from different regions, the emphasis is placed on cultural richness and regional identity rather than geographical division.

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“I did not know there were so many styles of traditional clothing in our country,” Bahora says in one of her videos. Several moved internet users responded by highlighting friendship between all regions of Tajikistan.

The message is regularly shared in several languages. At the request of her followers, makeup artist Farangis offers looks inspired by different regions of Tajikistan, accompanied by brief explanations in Tajik, Russian and English. The movement goes beyond the country’s borders and more broadly inspires women from neighbouring countries. This is notably the case of an Uzbek blogger who also joined the movement, presenting the wedding dresses of Tajik women from different regions.

This trend unites Tajik women across the continent: from Iran to China, each video brings its own personal touch.

The post Tajik women reveal themselves through the “I am Tajik and…” trend appeared first on Novastan English.

Local historian Gafur Chermatov details how the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic contributed to the war effort during the Second World War, known in the USSR as the Great Patriotic War.

Victory in the Second World War was achieved at the cost of immense suffering for millions of people of different nationalities. During the most difficult trials, both at the front and in the rear, the peoples of the USSR were united and bonded as never before – and probably as never again afterwards.

“We never had a single case of defection to the enemy. The Tajiks were always distinguished by their modesty, courage and unconditional respect for the commander’s combat orders. I will always keep the best memories of my Tajik comrades-in-arms,” recalled Lieutenant General Andrei Vedenin, who took part in the Battle of Rzhev, in his memoirs.

The 118th Rifle Division, which he commanded, was made up of almost 80% Central Asian fighters, mainly Tajiks.

Volunteering in the name of victory

On 22 June 1941, the terrible echo of war reached Tajikistan. One of the first reactions of Tajiks to the announcement of the war was to volunteer en masse to go to the front. In June-August 1941 alone, more than 5,857 applications to volunteer for the front were submitted to the Tajik military committee. By August 1945, more than 200,000 people from Tajikistan had been mobilised into the active army during the war. More than 15,000 other Tajiks served in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army between 1938 and 1940.

More than 45,000 conscripts from Tajikistan were assigned to the defence industry and military construction sites. As a result, the total number of conscripts in the army and industry stood at 245,000. Tajik workers worked in defence industry enterprises in the Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk regions.

At the beginning of the war, 8,874 motor vehicles, 1,115 tractors, 19,326 horses, 1,791 carts and the necessary equipment were transferred from Soviet Tajikistan to Red Army units and formations. During the war years, versatile military specialists were trained in Tajikistan for the Red Army and Navy. Female specialists were also trained: snipers, telephone operators and radio operators, while 3,000 nurses and military nurses were trained in a short period of time.

Thousands of riflemen, tank crews, machine-gunners, paratroopers and others were trained. Later, tens of thousands of workers, representatives of the collective-farm peasantry and intellectuals who had undergone military training in the republic were mobilised into cavalry divisions and other military units formed on the territory of Tajikistan.

For the defence of Stalingrad

On 17 July 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad, now Volgograd, began. It was one of the most important and fiercest battles of the war, and radically changed its course. For six and a half months, bloody and intense fighting raged relentlessly across the vast steppes of the Don and the Volga.

In May 1942, the formation of the 104th Cavalry Division was under way in Tajikistan. Conscripts came from all corners of the republic. In the shortest possible time, thousands of horses, guns, mortars, hundreds of carts, vehicles, ammunition, engineering equipment, food and fodder were loaded onto wagons at railway stations near Stalinabad, now Dushanbe.

The defenders of Stalingrad offered firm and persistent resistance to German troops, showing unparalleled courage. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers distinguished themselves there, including many Tajiks. More than 7,000 soldiers recruited in Tajikistan later received the medal “For the Defence of Stalingrad”.

A reliable reserve for the front

Having rapidly shifted towards the production of military goods, Tajikistan had already been rebuilt on a wartime footing by the end of 1942. The republic supplied the front primarily with light industry and food products, as well as non-ferrous and rare metals needed for the production of military equipment.

Also read on Novastan : Au Kazakhstan, des passionnés cherchent à identifier des soldats morts pendant la Deuxième guerre mondiale

In total, during the war years, agricultural workers delivered 500,000 tonnes of raw cotton, more than 100,000 tonnes of meat, and tens of thousands of tonnes of vegetables and fruit to the state. Thanks to their selfless labour, in 1944 the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic became one of the first in the Soviet Union to fulfil the grain procurement plan and, in addition, handed over thousands of quintals of grain to the Red Army.

Huge funds were collected in the republic for military equipment. During the war years, Tajikistan’s workers contributed more than one billion roubles to the defence fund and the weapons construction fund, including in the form of loans and cash lotteries.

An aircraft repair plant

In June 1943, the USSR People’s Commissariat of the Aviation Industry decided to create an aircraft repair plant in the village of Novobad, located in Tajikistan’s Hissar Valley, on the basis of the existing military airfield.

For this purpose, the 217th stationary aviation workshop arrived in Hissar. Construction of production buildings and workshops immediately began at the new site. By December 1943, the repair of aircraft and engines had multiplied compared with October. By January 1944, the number of employees had also increased severalfold compared with October.

The workshops supplied 12 aviation regiments during their formation and deployment to the front, as well as almost all aviation schools in the district, including those evacuated from the front line.

In total, 468 aircraft, 1,219 aircraft engines and 352 vehicles were repaired during the war. Thousands of units of complex combat and navigation equipment were returned to the front after repair: cannons, machine guns, radio equipment and measuring instruments.

Seeking shelter

Fleeing the enemy, residents of the western regions of the USSR found shelter in Tajikistan. From August 1941 to September 1942, more than 140,000 Soviet citizens evacuated from Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Moscow and Leningrad arrived in the republic. The war did not only deprive these people of shelter. Most of them, fleeing the invaders, left their homes without even taking the most basic household items. In Tajikistan, they were welcomed with warmth and care.

The construction of new houses began. In Stalinabad, 3,600 square metres of housing were built for evacuees in just eight months. More than 12,000 families were housed. To help the evacuees, money in addition to that allocated by the state, warm clothes, necessary furniture and kitchen utensils were collected.

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In the summer and autumn of 1941, a contingent from 14 orphanages arrived in Tajikistan. Among them were two orphanages for Polish children. The republic’s leaders faced the extremely difficult task of developing a network of orphanages in towns and villages. Collective farmers in the Shahrinav district of the Stalinabad region took the initiative to create orphanages for 20 to 30 children on collective farms.

Gafur Chermatov
Historian, for Asia-Plus

Translated from Russian by Sophie Combaret and from French by Mathieu Lemoine

The post Tajikistan’s contribution to the war effort during the Second World War appeared first on Novastan English.

The short story collection Hold Me in Your Arms, by Hafiz Saifullaev, has been nominated for the Sadriddin Ayni Literary Prize.

The book Hold Me in Your Arms (Moscow, 2024), by Tajik writer Hafiz Saifullaev, was nominated by the Sughd branch of the Writers’ Union of Tajikistan for the Sadriddin Ayni Literary Prize. This undoubtedly represents an important milestone in the landscape of contemporary Russian-language Tajik literature.

At first glance, the writer’s short stories may evoke a sense of ambivalence. Some find them highly personal, intimate and linguistically simple, yet complex in terms of perception and the depth of thought they convey. Others see in them a rather cerebral, rational form of writing, driven by the need to express the words of the soul, emotional fractures. In any case, by grasping the subtleties of the subtext, it becomes clear that a prosperous future awaits this Russian-language writer, a true sculptor of words.

Tajik media outlet Asia-Plus has read Hold Me in Your Arms, published in 2024 by Pero publishing house in Moscow, and has drawn the following conclusions.

A lyrical writer

Hafiz Saifullaev is a lyrical writer, in whom East and West intertwine naturally. His prose is imbued with the world around him. Trees, mountain rivers and high peaks all appear in his work in a philosophical and poetic form.

Also read on Novastan : Hymnes de sang, un recueil de nouvelles tadjikes de l’époque de la perestroïka

The most essential feature of his short stories is the absence of any distortion in his ideas about the world, people and their lives. Hafiz Saifullaev expresses his thoughts and feelings with such sincerity that his words seem to emerge in a moment of pure truth, without any artifice:

“I was sitting on a bench in the park. In the orange flames of autumn, wrapped in my black jacket, I looked like a piece of coal that had not yet caught fire. I had opened my laptop and was staring at the screen. I was searching for the Word. A cat distracted me from these useless ramblings, having crept up close without my noticing. It was grey, speckled with white, almost transparent. Floating, perhaps…”

Stories imbued with sincerity

The writer is fully aware that the loss of sincerity and inner truth is fatal to literature. And yet Hafiz Saifullaev’s short stories are not limited to a simple account of what he has seen or experienced: they take the form of philosophical meditations, reflections on life and death, the past and the future, the irreconcilable struggle between good and evil, joy and sorrow, the moment and eternity:

“Seeing my mother lying in bed, strangely stern, I went up to her and took her cold hand in mine. Her chin was held up by a bandage. ‘It’s over,’ I told myself, ‘Mama is dead.’ I looked at her, trying to imprint her features in my memory. But instead, her young face came back to me, her laughter. I stayed like that until I placed the pillow back under her head. Under the pillow was a folded velvet waistcoat, the one I loved. I could not hold back my sobs and leaned towards her, taking her in my arms. It was then that I heard her voice: ‘Do you love me?’ I began breathing again. My mother’s light flowed into my chest. No one saw it. It remains a secret between my mother and me.”

Like a return to childhood

Hafiz Saifullaev’s prose stands out for the richness of its vocabulary and the variety of its rhythm.

The language of his works is rich, metaphorical and simple, “almost materially tangible”, according to critic Sanoat Azizova. His thought is both visual and philosophical. The absence, in his miniature stories, of grandiloquence or declarative tone, often characteristic of more conventional prose writers, reveals the combination of genuine artistic talent and deep intelligence.

Reading Hafiz Saifullaev’s miniatures gives rise to a poignant feeling of nostalgia: the memory of one’s own childhood. In many of his stories, the colours are more vibrant, the snow whiter, the sky more azure and unfathomable. In the short story Hold Me in Your Arms, this is exactly the case: one’s breath is taken away by the brilliance of its wonderful, colourful epithets.

It is a rare thing to read a text of such coherence and density, written in a single breath, to the point that one almost regrets that the memories of childhood come to an end, that they are interrupted…

Music and thought

These are only a few sketches of impressions born from reading, or listening to, these musical stories by a talented writer who has brilliantly established himself in Tajikistan’s Russian-language literature. Reading his miniature stories, the reader perceives both music and thought, wrapped in the garment of his poetic imagination:

“There is the Word. The one whose function is to awaken man. And there it suddenly appears in the context of a sentence, of a story.”

This is exactly what happens in the short stories of the collection Hold Me in Your Arms.

Also read on Novastan : « Un thème éternel » : entretien avec l’autrice kazakhe Roza Mouqanova

Hafiz Saifullaev is moving through literature seriously and confidently. He must continue to remain always close to people, to live events fully alongside his characters. For this is what matters most for a writer, a poet, a creator. And there is no greater happiness than to be understood by those for whom one creates.

A sculptor of words

As the Kabardino-Balkar poet Tanzilia Zumakulova writes:

“And to dry someone’s tears,
To soften pain, O poet, you must be
Not an actor playing a role,
But shed bitter tears yourself,
And not suppress true suffering.”

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To conclude these reflections on Hafiz Saifullaev’s book Hold Me in Your Arms, a work that can rightly be described as poetic prose, it is possible to say that its author, a true sculptor of words, undoubtedly deserves to be awarded the prestigious Sadriddin Ayni Literary Prize.

His prose, as poet Nizom Kosim states, “brings together all that is best: the pull of plot and imagery, the brilliance of imagination and fantasy, the subtlety of themes and characters, a rich and vivid language. How could one not appreciate such prose?”

Azim Aminov and Kamila Mulloyeva
Journalists for Asia-Plus

Translated from Russian by Lisa D’Addazio and from French by Mathieu Lemoine

The post “Hafiz Saifullaev’s prose marks a fruitful turning point in Russian-language Tajik literature” appeared first on Novastan English.

A recent report by a UN group reveals that the Taliban have sharply reduced the number of their security forces, disproportionately so in the region bordering Tajikistan. These budget cuts coincide with a resurgence of attacks along the border between the two countries. These developments are helping to reshape the previously strained relations between Kabul and Dushanbe.

Haibatullah Akhundzada, Afghanistan’s de facto leader, has ordered a 20% reduction in the number of security forces in response to budgetary constraints. This is according to a report by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, submitted to the UN Security Council Committee last December.

However, these staff reductions are disproportionate near the border with Tajikistan. According to the document, out of more than 4,000 commanders and officers dismissed nationwide, around 1,000 were in Badakhshan province, which borders Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region.

Takhar, another province bordering Tajikistan’s Khatlon region, is also among the three other provinces most affected by the measure. These security force cuts, ordered last April, coincided with a resurgence of armed clashes linked to drug trafficking at the border in late 2025. On 26 and 30 November, five Chinese workers were killed and the same number injured on Tajikistani soil in attacks launched from Afghanistan, while two Tajik officers and three attackers were killed on 23 December, according to media outlet Asia-Plus.

A resurgence of border clashes in late 2025

Since then, Taliban representatives have issued several statements of support, accusing “ill-intentioned circles” or “enemies” of seeking to undermine Afghanistan’s relations with Tajikistan and China. Indeed, it is certain that these attacks were not carried out by the Taliban. They have even said they arrested suspects in the border region, without providing details, according to Afghan media outlet Tolo News.

Also read on Novastan : Au Tadjikistan, la mort de cinq Chinois relance les inquiétudes sur l’instabilité à la frontière avec l’Afghanistan

The motives of those behind the attacks are difficult to determine. In the case of the most recent attack, which killed Tajik officers, Afghan media outlet Hasht-e Subh claims that the attackers were members of Jamaat Ansarullah, a terrorist group based in Afghanistan, hostile to the Tajik government and mainly made up of Tajik citizens.

In the case of the attacks against Chinese workers, uncertainty remains. For researcher Mélanie Sadozaï, affiliated with the University of Regensburg’s Department of Interdisciplinary and Multiscalar Area Studies, whose research focuses on the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border, it is impossible to accuse any specific armed group with certainty. Interviewed by Novastan, she suggests that the attacks may have been retaliation by “drug traffickers who do not want China to be present, as this could disrupt their activities”.

“One cannot rule out either that these were ordinary people rejecting China’s activities in the region, as China extracts mineral resources under bilateral agreements with Tajikistan and Afghanistan,” Mélanie Sadozaï continues. “People are well aware that Chinese companies come to ‘plunder’ their resources without redistributing them. It could also be an act of revenge, but again, it is difficult to say,” she adds.

A new forced cooperation

In this context, a reduction in Taliban personnel responsible for maintaining order at the border can only be viewed negatively on the Tajikistani side, as relations between the two countries have taken a new turn in recent months.

After the Taliban seized power in 2021, Tajikistan positioned itself as Afghanistan’s only neighbour openly hostile to Kabul’s new rulers. While other neighbouring countries quickly adopted a pragmatic stance and, without officially recognising the Taliban, maintained ties with them for economic reasons, Tajikistan has continued to stand apart.

Also read on Novastan : L’Afghanistan taliban, un faisceau de menaces sur les pays d’Asie centrale

But open hostility is now turning into forced cooperation. Barely two weeks before the attacks against the Chinese workers, a Tajikistani delegation visited Kabul to meet its counterparts and discuss counterterrorism cooperation, the fight against drug trafficking and the porous shared border, Tolo News reported. Similarly, the governors of Afghanistan’s Balkh and Badakhshan provinces had travelled respectively to the Tajikistani capital, Dushanbe, and to Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan region, although these visits were not publicised.

The latest attacks have accelerated this rapprochement at the highest level: for the first time since 2021, the foreign ministers of Tajikistan and Afghanistan held phone calls, with two taking place in December, Asia-Plus reported.

The political impossibility of recognising the Taliban

The Tajikistani authorities delayed this moment for as long as they could, and are now trying to find a way out of this diplomatic impasse. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has long presented himself as a bulwark against religious extremism: real diplomatic contact with the Taliban would be difficult to legitimise, both within Tajikistan and abroad.

Emomali Rahmon’s clear stance against the Taliban and his support for the Afghan opposition in exile earned him invitations to the European Parliament and to France shortly after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, helping to ensure the continuation of international financial assistance on which Tajikistan heavily depends. Openly collaborating with the Taliban is therefore not an option if it risks jeopardising such important funding.

Domestically, Dushanbe also wants to present itself as the protector of ethnic Tajiks, portraying them as oppressed by the Pashtun Taliban. During the Taliban’s first period in power from 1996 to 2001, the Tajikistani president supported Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Afghan resistance, who visited Tajikistan several times. That support is now extended to his son, who is also effectively based in Tajikistan, and, to some extent, to the Afghan embassy, which has become a stronghold of the former regime.

This animosity is mutual: the Taliban appear to maintain cordial relations with Sharofiddin Gadoev, one of the exiled leaders of the opposition to the Tajikistani regime. He was invited to take part in discussions in Afghanistan last May.

Economic and security emergencies

In reality, economic realities had already forced the hand of the Tajikistani authorities. Electricity exports to Afghanistan have not stopped, showing that discussions, even if purely economic, have taken place between the two sides, Eurasianet reported. Other large-scale projects suggest that completely cutting off communication between the two countries was never truly conceivable, notably the CASA-1000 electricity export project.

But it is the security situation that is genuinely accelerating diplomatic contact. Bruce Pannier, a fellow with the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, notes that it was the launch of a missile towards Tajikistan in May 2022 that prompted the first formal contact between the Taliban and the Tajikistani authorities.

Moreover, ironically, it is the fight against extremism that has pushed Emomali Rahmon to open dialogue with the Taliban. After the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, carried out by Tajikistani citizens recruited by the Islamic State Khorasan Province, or ISKP, it became necessary to combat the involvement of Tajikistani citizens in international terrorism, both for obvious security reasons and for Tajikistan’s international image.

Also read on Novastan : Après l’attentat en Russie, les Tadjiks face à une xénophobie massive

Yet the fight against terrorism requires deeper cooperation with the Taliban, for whom these groups also represent a threat. Tajikistani citizens are sometimes actively recruited from Afghan territory, notably by ISKP.

Following Russia

Finally, Tajikistan’s uncompromising rejection of the Taliban was beginning to entail a level of isolation difficult for a small country to manage. Dushanbe’s gradual shift could be attributed to Moscow’s official recognition of the Taliban last July. Russia may expect an ally that still largely depends on it to follow its lead by also treating the Taliban as acceptable interlocutors.

Tajikistan is thus caught between the importance of Western funding and its relationship with Russia, which it cannot risk weakening. The country is one of the most remittance-dependent in the world: remittances accounted for more than 45% of GDP in 2024, mainly coming from migrant workers in Russia. A deterioration in relations with Moscow would therefore raise fears of even worse conditions for Tajik migrants, followed by catastrophic repercussions for the country’s economy.

A rapprochement with limits

However, Mélanie Sadozaï stresses that this rapprochement has limits. “Although we are beginning to see a few photographs of official meetings between the Taliban and Tajikistani authorities, all of this is taking place in the framework of trade, energy and economic cooperation, but really in the security sphere. It is very likely that this is the maximum Tajikistan can do,” she says.

As for transferring the Afghan embassy into Taliban hands, this remains highly unlikely. Here too, Mélanie Sadozaï believes that “support for the opposition is in fact fairly discreet and was mostly rhetorical. I imagine Tajikistan has no reason to stop supporting it or to expel Mohammad Zahir Aghbar,” the ambassador of the former regime, who remains in office, “and I think it can very well play both sides: maintain its current relations with the resistance while dealing with the Taliban. The two are not incompatible.”

Also read on Novastan : Le Tadjikistan reconnaît une vaste opération d’expulsion d’Afghans

Moreover, while media reports have stated that the Afghan consulate in Khorog, in Gorno-Badakhshan, had passed into Taliban hands, creating a dual authority with the embassy loyal to the former regime, Mélanie Sadozaï says she has always found the Taliban consulate closed and inaccessible since it was damaged by an avalanche in February 2023.

A worrying situation for Tajikistan and its relations with China

The fact remains that the lack of resources on the Afghan side and the latest attacks are a problem for all parties, whether they are directed against the Tajik government or against Chinese workers. A deterioration in relations with China would be extremely problematic for Tajikistan: the country’s infrastructure relies on partnerships or loans linked to China, loans that Dushanbe is struggling to repay.

China has taken the situation very seriously, calling on Tajikistan to shed light on these events and guarantee the safety of Chinese citizens on its territory. In a rare move, the Chinese embassy in Dushanbe asked its citizens to leave border areas and remain cautious.

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“If the Chinese workers who were targeted are indeed employees of road construction companies, this creates an obvious problem for Tajikistan: the possibility that, in the long term, China might end up leaving and not finishing the projects it has started,” Mélanie Sadozaï says.

It is therefore possible that Dushanbe will seek to further protect its border, although no official announcement has been made on the matter. With the war in Ukraine, it seems unlikely that Russia will once again invest resources in the border, which Tajikistan has protected alone since 2004. “As for China, its army does not patrol along the border, but one possibility is that security will be reinforced around Chinese infrastructure, which is now very numerous along the border,” the researcher concludes.

Judith Robert
Author for Novastan

Proofread by Anaïs Boulard

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A classic scene in Tajikistan: at the end of a flower-lined avenue with immaculately trimmed borders, the portrait of President Emomali Rahmon reigns supreme. A former Soviet apparatchik, he carved out a presidential role for himself in the aftermath of the USSR’s collapse. He proved particularly adept at neutralizing opposition forces during the civil war that scarred the country from 1992 to 1997. Since then, he has ruled with a paternalistic iron fist, criminalizing all political opposition. His portrait is plastered across every public space in the country. Post offices, police stations, tennis courts, customs posts, border crossings : all are graced with a likeness of the country’s strongman, tailored, naturally, to the theme of the building. A simple taxi ride is enough for any visitor to get acquainted with President Rahmon: through the window, he’ll catch a glimpse of him here playing tennis, there cradling sheaves of wheat, waving to a crowd, or shaking hands with the leaders of neighboring powers. Here, in the country’s second city, Khujand, he allows himself a bucolic stroll through a field of flowers.

Credits : Marc Brédif (France)

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At an altitude of 3,650 metres, sport—even at a beginner’s level—requires stamina and training. Murghob, the highest town in Tajikistan. 

Credits: Simone Bergonzi (Italy, @simobergz)

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In the Rushon raion, the Bartang River is fed by the waters of its tributaries descending from the Pamir peaks, before flowing into the Panj. Sometimes, these glacial waters spread out at the bottom of the valley to form a small emerald-green lake, ‘Sabzi Kul’. Jisev, Tajikistan. 

Credits: Novastan

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Somewhere along the Pamir Highway… From your jeep, you gaze at the snow-capped peaks, sometimes for eight hours a day, but you never tire of it.

Credit: Etienne Bellard (France, @etienneblld)

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Rivers are usually the meeting point for women and kids during the day. This one is taken outside of Murghob shortly before sunset.

On Wednesday 8 April 2026, INALCO organised a multidisciplinary symposium (covering anthropology, linguistics, archaeology, photography, cartography, musicology, and more) dedicated to the Pamir region, entitled ‘The Faces of Pamir: the mountain lived, inhabited, spoken’.

Credit: Etienne Bellard (France, @etienneblld)

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The government continues to construct new, modern, and elegant buildings to house all branches of government. A huge flagpole with a flag clearly remains a major priority. However, little has been done to preserve the charm of old Dushanbe or to take basic urban planning into account.

Crédit : Maiya Ivanova (Bulgaria, @mhi.mhi.mhi)

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The threshold, a brief moment that lingers – between cultural heritage, tomorrow and independence. Fortress Mug Teppe, Istaravshan, Tadjikistan.

Credits : Petra Lühmann (Germany)

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