Citizens from Central Asia now represent the largest group of foreign nationals fighting in the Russian army. Novastan spoke with several of them after their capture by Ukrainian forces. Their accounts reveal how Central Asian migrants have become an especially vulnerable recruitment pool for Moscow.

In the yard of a military prison in Lviv region, West Ukraine, dozens of prisonners silently head towards the dining hall. The walls surrounding them are filled with portraits of Ukrainian prominent nationalist figures such as Daniel of Galicia or Stepan Bandera. In the largest prisoner camp in the whole country, everything is in Ukrainian, from the inscriptions to orders given to prisoners.

“There is no trouble here, they are pretty calm and do not brawl much” says a prison guard. In front of him, prisonners start entering the lunchroom, their faces blank. Some of them have already been detained for four years. Many prisonners clearly appear to have Asian features. Among them, some Russian citizens from Siberian republics of Buryatia and Yakutia, where mobilisation rates are particularly high.

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Many others come from the five former Soviet republics in Central Asia. “From what I saw, a majority of foreigners in the Russian army come from this region”, explains Khushbakht Peruzaliev. In spring 2024, the 47-year old Tajikistani citizen signed a contract to serve the Russian Army : “I was told that I would not have to go to the front or anything of this kind. They said I would only be working in a warehouse, so I accepted”, he remembers. But soon, these promises revealed to be lies. Few weeks later, the man was captured by Ukrainian forces after being injured in a frontal assault in Donetsk oblast.

Far beyond the 1,400 Africans or 200 Indian citizens that the Russian army recruited since the beginning of the war, more than 12,000 soldiers from Central Asia have already participated in the “special military operation”, according to public data published in April 2026 by the Ukrainian war prisoners coordination. More than half of foreign soldiers serving Russia are originally from Central Asia.

Passport promises amid raids and deportations

In Mykolaiv penitentiary, all Central Asian soldiers that Novastan met were already in Russia before 2022. “Recruitment efforts towards foreigners were targeting on both migrant workers and people who were in jail”, according to an officer of the Ukrainian coordination of war prisonners.

Ilyas, a 40-year old Kyrgyz citizen, worked as a drink retailer in Moscow since 2007. He signed his contract in April 2025. “During the hiring process, they didn’t directly promise me citizenship, but I knew I would have the possibility to obtain it after” he says.

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Indeed, in January 2024, a decree was signed by Vladimir Putin, allowing certain foreigners to obtain Russian citizenship under the condition that they served the army, especially during the “special military operation”. The number of foreigners who benefited from this process remains unknown.

In Ukraine, most prisoners from Central Asia mention that they were sent to the front only after a short training, which caused heavy casualties. “We were moving to a village, when on the road, drones already started appearing and targeting us”, Ilyas remembers. He barely escaped, only to be taken prisoner shortly after.

Khushbakht Peruzaliev, a prisoner whose wife and children still live in Ryazan, 200 kilometers south east of Moscow, was harmed during an intense artillery bombing, while he was moving towards Ukrainian lines. “Half of the group was killed immediately, all 200 [Russian military code for death, Editor’s note]”. 

He describes a general climate of fear that began to appear “right after the Crocus City Hall attack”. This terrorist attack committed by Tajikistani citizens was claimed by the Islamic State of Khorasan, and killed 149 people. Following this tragedy, living conditions of Central Asian migrants in Russia got tougher. “Raids against Tajiks” became frequent, during which migrants were “barred from Russian territory”, according to Khushbakht Peruzaliev.

The Tajik migrant abandoned plans to renew his expired passport, for fear of being arrested on his way to the embassy in Moscow. “Eventually, special police forces started checking the construction site where I was working”, he explains. During police controls, he was promised to obtain citizenship if he accepted to join the army.

Caress Schenck, a political science professor at Nazarbayev University in Astana, acknowledges that “Tajiks were indeed more targeted than other ethnic groups from Central Asia, after the Crocus City Hall attack”. According to the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners, Tajiks represent the second most represented nationality in the Russian army, with more than 3,400 recruits, while 4,800 Uzbeks and 2,400 Kazakhs also joined the army.

Caress Schenck reminds that, however, in Russia “migration control policies, raids and pressure to join the army are still highly influenced by the news cycle”.

Other ethnic groups have also been targeted since the beginning of the war, depending on the context : “Sometimes, anyone with Asian features can be perceived as suspicious”, according to the researcher.

Since November 2025, some foreigners in Russia are required to present a commitment contract in the army to obtain Russian citizenship or a residency permit. People from Central Asia are particularly impacted by these policies, as they make up more than 40% migrants living in Russia in 2020.

Despite that, all prisoners met by Novastan explain that they signed the contract by their own will to obtain a Russian passport, Caress Schenck mentions a strong administrative pressure on migrants that “reduces their ability to act and make their own decisions, rather than offering them a real choice”

The ideological vulnerability of migrants

In addition to the precarious administrative status of Central Asian migrants, the Russian army bases its mobilization stategy on shared ideological patterns. “As for me, I wanted to live in Russia. I considered that I had the right to obtain citizenship, so to earn it, I had to serve the homeland” says Jasur Islamov with a detached voice. After a year and a half in the army, in March 2025, the 38-year old man was promised he would obtain citizenship if he continued serving. A few weeks later, Jasur Islamov was captured, after being wounded by a drone strike.

Ilyas, Islamov and Khushbakht never tried to surrender on purpose, unlike accounts from other foreign prisoners of war fighting for Russia, such as African recruits. This behaviour at war could be explained by the fact that parts of migrant populations in Russia are already “Russian speakers, born in the 1970s or 1980s, under the Soviet Union”, according to the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners.

Prisoners met by Novastan also state that they wish to go back to Russia, hoping to be included in a prisoner exchange. “We have nothing against an exchange of prisoners from Central Asia”, says the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners. However, among the 7,000 Russian soldiers already exchanged, those originally from Central Asia remain a small minority. 

When Novastan asked them about their experience with racism in Russia, before or after serving, all assert that they “never” faced it. They are confident in their ability to rejoin Russian society after their detention, once they obtain a passport. “Could you imagine that I risked my life to obtain citizenship, and they would send me back to my country, when I have nothing left there ? It would be a huge betrayal” says Jasur Islamov, bitterly.

However, it would not be the first time that these war prisoners face disappointments related to their migrant experience in Russia. Despite being married to a Russian woman for years, Ilyas failed to obtain a passport : “I submitted all documents to apply for citizenship, a long time ago, but it was refused”. Jasur Islamov admits that he “did not even receive any money from the contract”, with only two months paid out of the eighteen months he spent in the army.

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“I believe it would take years to dismantle internalized discriminations” Caress Schenk explains. The researcher reminds that in the Soviet imagery, racism was seen as inherent to capitalism and the Western bloc.

Citing the Geneva convention, the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners explains that Central Asian citizens are treated the same as other prisoners. In the courtyard, on the weight training benches, Central Asian prisoners exercise alongside their Russian cellmates.

“We never thought we would end up here”, says Jasur Islamov. When he is reminded that he signed consciously and was aware of risks, the Uzbek detainee bristles : “You are talking as if I specifically signed to kill people… I only needed a place to live, a passport, to work and feed my family”. After a silence, he adds, regretfully : “I’m not saying we made the right decision. Everyone makes mistakes. Everyone”.

Driss Rejichi,
Contributor for Novastan France

Translated by Elea Muresan

Thank you for reading this article! If you have time, we would appreciate your feedback, either through this anonymous form or by email at editorial@novastan.org. Thank you very much!

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Tajikistan has one of the highest emigration rates globally, with most Tajiks migrating to Russia for work. One million Tajiks are estimated to reside in Russia at any given time, sending crucial remittances back home. However, migration is not just about money. Novastan interviewed Dr Elena Borisova who, in her book, argues that social expectations related to what it means to be a ‘good’ person play a crucial role in motivating Tajiks to move to Russia.

Tajikistan’s economy is highly dependent on remittances. Approximately one million Tajiks reside in Russia, mostly for work. When in Russia, Tajiks face xenophobia, an increasingly restrictive migration regime and even the risk of being drafted into the Russian army to fight in Ukraine. What then motivates Tajiks to continue to move to Russia, despite the growing risks involved?

Read more on Novastan: Moscow attacks highlight Tajikistan’s radicalisation problem

To discuss the paradoxes of migration from Tajikistan to Russia, Novastan spoke to Dr Elena Borisova, a social anthropologist based at the University of Sussex. Originally from Russia, Elena has studied migration since 2012. While doing her first research inside Russia, she there met an ethnically Uzbek woman who invited Elena to join her on a trip to her native village in the north of Tajikistan. Later, in 2017-2019, Borisova spent fourteen months conducting ethnographic fieldwork as part of her PhD research there. Based on this research, she published her book ‘Paradoxes of Migration in Tajikistan: Locating the good life’, which is freely available at the website of UCL Press.

Common misconceptions about migration from Tajikistan

Elena Borisova highlights two common misconceptions about migration in Russia, which also apply to migration in general. First, migration is often seen as a ‘new’ phenomenon, without a history. As her colleagues Malika Bahovadinova and Isaac Scarborough showed, in the late Soviet period, there were programs to resettle Central Asians to Russia. These were often unsuccessful, as Central Asians did not want to move. Russian ethnographers and sociologists explained this failure as the result of inherent traditionalism in Central Asia. However, when the Central Asian republics experienced deep economic crises after the fall of the Soviet Union, many Central Asians did migrate to Russia, which caught many Russian researchers by surprise.

Second, migration is often explained with the help of economic theories, in which migrants are exclusively seen as rational actors trying to maximise their economic benefits. This is coupled with ‘push-pull’ logic: Central Asia has a ‘labour excess’, which leads to a ‘flow’ of migrants that is ‘absorbed’ by Russia’s economy. This obscures the motivations and experiences of the individual migrants, and the obstacles they face. Why do Tajiks feel they need to migrate? Motivations vary.

Migration as a way to live the ‘good’ life

Elena Borisova’s work shows that migration is intimately linked with people’s pursuit of living a ‘good’ life. This is not just about getting ahead economically, but also about being recognised as a good person by your community. To achieve this status, one must engage in major life projects, such as getting married, building a house, getting children and caring for the elderly, in a good and timely manner. After the Soviet Union collapsed it became practically impossible to achieve these things while working in Tajikistan. So, migration emerged as an alternative way to fulfil social expectations.

The village where Elena Borisova lived and conducted her ethnographic fieldwork, in Sughd province in the north of Tajikistan, was transformed by the Soviet modernisation project in the 1950s. A factory was built, which provided work and infrastructure. Schools, kindergartens, libraries and even a House of Culture were built, which gradually transformed people’s lifestyles. Goods produced at the local factory were shipped all the way to Moscow, and the local youth travelled throughout the USSR for education and military service. Graduates from around the Soviet Union also moved to Tajikistan to work, and people with different ethnicities mingled at work in the factory and during social activities. Russian became the lingua franca as it was seen as an integral part of this modernity.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ‘modernity’ that had emerged came under pressure. The movements of goods and people throughout the Soviet space came to a standstill, and infrastructure gradually degraded. These changes were experienced as isolating the village. Interethnic social relations declined when the factory and social facilities shut down. Migration to Russia slowly started in the 1990s but really took off in the early 2000s, after the border with Uzbekistan had closed. Going to Russia was an attempt of retaining modernity, which was already linked to mobility since the very emergence of the new industrialised place on the map. It was not just about closing a financial gap, but also about perceiving the ideal of being a modern, cultured person.

Retaining modernity

A tragic paradox arises in that when Tajiks come to Russia, these modes of self-fashioning are not relevant in Russian society. The Russian migration regime sees Central Asians as unskilled, disposable labour migrants. The Tajiks are there to create modernity for the Russian middle classes but are never recognised by the Russians as being modern themselves.

While the conceptions of the ‘good’ life in different parts of Tajikistan might vary, they are always bound up with social expectations that can be contradictory. In her book, Borisova highlights the example of a man who is a single child and does not have a son himself. This requires him to simultaneously care for his immediate family and his elderly parents, for which he needs to be physically present in his village. However, he is also expected to provide for them financially, to build a house and to organise important festivities. This forces him to move to Russia to work and make money. These contradictory social expectations make him move back and forth between Russia and Tajikistan constantly, which puts a lot of pressure on him.

Weddings are particularly important social events that mark the creation of a new family, and a person’s gender and place in the extended family. To be perceived as a good person you need to have your wedding in a timely manner, before you are considered too old. Weddings then create social obligations between people and are important in establishing social networks. If you invite someone to your wedding, they ‘owe’ you and you can turn to them for future help.

The scope of festivities has differed over time, and some research suggests that they were the largest in late Soviet times. Festivities shrank during the post-Soviet economic downturn and the civil war in the 1990s but have increased in size again due to migration. Working in Russia has given people access to more financial means, and this has exacerbated competition when it comes to feasts. People feel pressured to organise larger and larger family events and are often forced to go to Russia to make enough money to pay for them.

Another paradox relates to citizenship. Russia has tightened its migration regime since 2012, and in 2016 introduced a blacklist of Tajiks who are not allowed to enter Russia. To avoid being blacklisted, many Tajiks have tried to obtain Russian citizenship. However, this should not be seen as them ‘belonging’ to Russia, but rather as an attempt to facilitate meeting social obligations and expectations at home. This, rather than ‘legality’, is their main concern. People are concerned with entry bans and illegal status only as far as it troubles the temporalities of their social being.

The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Dr Borisova’s current research together with Dr Malika Bahovadinova examines how Russia weaponizes the institute of citizenship to attract manpower for its war in Ukraine. The regime grants citizenship as a reward for doing military service and threatens with police violence or revoking citizenship when naturalised citizens fail to meet military expectations. The Tajiks are using their decades worth of knowledge about Russia’s bureaucracy and changing migration laws to navigate these new existential risks.

Read more on Novastan: How Russia is recruiting Central Asian soldiers for its war in Ukraine

In Russian media, this has resulted in a new popular construct – that of a ‘migrant with a Russian passport’. This concept shows how the distinction between a migrant and a citizen is obfuscated. Developments like these change the perception that Tajiks have of Russia, and of migrating there. That is why many Tajiks are looking to move elsewhere. Yet, this is often easier said than done. Tajiks have established themselves in Russia for decades. They often own property there, and their children often only speak Russian.

Central Asian governments are also exploring new destinations for their citizens to work. For example, Uzbekistan signed agreements with different countries, including with Germany, which has recruited Uzbek care workers. Uzbekistan also seeks to strengthen cooperation with Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, and the UK as potential recipients of migrant workers.

Time will tell whether the diversification of Central Asian migrant workers’ destinations will continue.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

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Russian authorities have charged four Tajiks for their involvement in the deadly terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow on March 22 that cost the lives of at least 140 people. The men were allegedly recruited by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional branch of Islamic State. The events in Moscow have highlighted Tajikistan’s struggle with radicalisation.

On the evening of 22 March, gunmen attacked the Crocus City concert hall near Moscow, killing at least 140 people. The following day, TASS reported that 11 people were arrested for their involvement in the attack. Among them were four citizens of Tajikistan, who later appeared in court with signs of torture. Although many details about the attacks are still unclear, experts suggest the involvement of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional branch of Islamic State that is actively recruiting among Tajiks.

The events at the Crocus City Hall have spurred a xenophobic backlash in Russia. Eurasianet reported about a 35-year old Tajik who was summarily evicted from his home in Moscow following the attack. According to the independent Russian media outlet Meduza, Russians have started refusing taxis with Tajik drivers. Moreover, security services are increasingly profiling people based on ‘Asian features’. Not only Tajiks are affected by the current wave of xenophobia in Russia. Kyrgzystan has urged its citizens not to travel to Russia and 24.KG writes that forty Kyrgyz were denied entry into the country at a Moscow airport.

ISKP and Tajikistan

Hours after the attack, Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack through its central communication channels on Telegram. Later, the terrorist group published photos of the perpetrators and first-person footage of the attack on Telegram to substantiate their claim. However, analysts point to Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) as the main suspect. This regional affiliate of IS was founded back in 2015 in Afghanistan and initially recruited dissenters from the Taliban.

Khorasan refers to the idea of Greater Khorasan, the historical region that extends from eastern Iran to Badakhshan in Tajikistan, and from Tashkent to southern Afghanistan. ISKP hopes to establish a caliphate there, with the ultimate goal of expanding it beyond the region. After the fall of Kabul in 2021, the Taliban is engaged in a counterinsurgency against ISKP. Regularly, ISKP carries out terrorist attacks in Kabul and elsewhere in the country. The Diplomat writes that these attacks are primarily executed by ethnic Tajiks.

Read more on Novastan: The Taliban at the gates of Central Asia: what are the consequences?

Since its formation, ISKP has forged alliances with militant Islamist groups in Central Asia and started recruiting volunteers there as well. Edward Lemon, a researcher specialising in Central Asia and president of the Oxus Society, claimed on X that “while the threat within the country has been minimal, Tajikistan had the third highest per capita recruitment to Syria in the world, it’s citizens took on key roles in IS and have been involved in attacks or foiled plots in Iran, Afghanistan, Germany and Turkey this past year.” There is little information on the number of Tajiks recruited into its regional affiliate, ISKP.

Indeed, on July 6 last year, German news website Tagesschau reported that seven men from Central Asia were arrested in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia for alleged membership of ISKP, as well as for preparing a terrorist attack in Europe. They included five Tajiks, one Kyrgyz and one Turkmen. The arrests were the result of a joint investigation by the German and Dutch authorities. In the Netherlands, a further two suspects were apprehended: a man from Tajikistan and a woman from Kyrgyzstan.

Radicalisation in Tajikistan

Research has shown that Tajik militants are being recruited among Central Asian migrant workers in Russia, as well as in impoverished communities in Tajikistan itself. Tajikistan is highly dependent on the money that is being sent home by the migrant workers abroad. The World Bank estimated that 51 per cent of the country’s GDP consists of remittances. But faced with xenophobia, racism and marginalisation in Russia, Islamic fundamentalism makes for an appealing alternative.

Mélanie Sadozaï, a researcher specialising in the Tajik-Afghan border, explained to Novastan: “There are many reasons why these individuals are recruited: search for a better life, rejection of the state and its institutions, desire to practise Islam without discrimination, financial motivations, denunciation of Russian involvement in Syria, where IS itself is based, etc.” According to Sadozaï, “the decision to join IS is often more complex than a deepfelt belief in the radical Islam advocated by the terrorist group.“

That said, radicalisation can also be a reaction to Tajikistan’s ultra-secular politics. Dushanbe is currently implementing a “National Strategy for Combating Extremism and Terrorism.” As part of this strategy, the government has adopted 35 laws aimed at restricting activities described as “terrorist”. This legislation has led to restrictions on individual and religious freedoms and freedom of association. The documents are rooted in the Tajik government’s desire to combat the practice of Islam in general, not Islamic extremism alone.

The politicisation of extremism

The problem of radicalisation is exploited by the Tajik government to push through its secular political agenda and silence opposition. As reported by the Institute for War and Peace, women and minors in Tajikistan are not allowed to pray in mosques. Similarly, the wearing of hijabs by women and beards by men is often considered extremist. The fight against terrorism therefore has a major impact on the role of Islam in society.

Practising Muslims are under greater scrutiny. Since the repression of a series of demonstrations in May 2022 in Gorno-Badakhshan, an autonomous region that makes up the eastern half of Tajikistan, the local Shiite minority has been further affected by restrictions on freedom, particularly in religious matters.

Read more on Novastan: In Tajikistan, repression continues

According to Roustam Azizi, a member of the Islamic Council of the Presidency, the definition of the terms ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ is vague. This makes it possible to classify various opponents of the regime, such as political dissidents, but also journalists and lawyers, as ‘terrorists’. In 2023, for example, the independent news outlet Pamir Daily News was declared ‘extremist’.

Considering the repressive policies of the Tajik government, terrorist activities involving Tajik nationals are primarily diffuse and delocalised. In other words, they take place abroad. However, the authorities’ harsh approach feeds into religious and political extremism. According to Mélanie Sadozaï, Dushanbe is “tightening constraints and security measures against religious practices and potential rivals or destabilisers of the current regime, which only serves to fuel frustrations that can take the form of terrorist attacks“.

Tajik-Afghan security cooperation

The border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan is sometimes mentioned as a potential corridor for jihadists. Sadozaï, however, states that there is no evidence for this. On the contrary, Dushanbe seems not very concerned about the situation along the border. For example, the researcher points to the fact that in September 2023, cross-border markets were reopened for commercial activities.

Yet, since the Taliban takeover in 2021, there are no formal diplomatic relations between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The Tajik government remains the Taliban’s fiercest critic. This has to do with the Taliban’s support for Jamaat Ansarullah, a Tajik Islamist militant group operating from Afghan Badakhshan, just across the border with Tajikistan.

At the same time, the Tajik government cooperates with the Taliban authorities in Kabul on certain security issues. For both Dushanbe and Kabul, ISKP is a common enemy. Mélanie Sadozaï states that the terrorist group “undermines the credibility of these regimes in terms of their ability to maintain the security of the countries they govern“. Yet, ISKP is no cross-border organisation, but a transnational terrorist group. Most Tajik militants that join ISKP do so via Russia, Sadozaï concludes.

Julian Postulart, Judith Robert

Editors of Novastan English & Novastan French

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has issued a strong statement condemning the presence of Central Asian presidents at the May 9 parade held in Moscow to commemorate Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War. The parade saw the participation of the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, along with the Prime Minister of Armenia.

In its official statement, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs underscored that Russian President Vladimir Putin, who led the parade, is currently wanted internationally for committing war crimes due to the Russian military’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

“The participation of foreign leaders in a public event alongside a war criminal, who proudly instigated a war in Europe on an unprecedented scale since World War II, is viewed as an immoral and unfriendly act towards Ukraine. It demonstrates a disregard for the Ukrainian people who are fighting for their survival and freedom,” stated the ministry.

Moreover, the ministry emphasized the invaluable contributions made by the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus to the victory over Nazism 78 years ago. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly believes that these nations should not be exploited by the Kremlin for participating in an event that lacks any connection to the heroic acts of the victorious nations over Nazism.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan: commemorating Victory Day without military parade

Russia initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which was met with condemnation from countries within the European Union and the United States. As a response, these nations implemented unprecedented economic sanctions against Russia.

In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Putin, specifically for war crimes committed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Despite the arrest warrant and warnings from Western countries, including the European Union, President Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan extended an invitation to Putin for an official visit to Bishkek, which Putin accepted.

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Ukraine criticizes Central Asian presidents’ participation in Moscow’s May 9 parade appeared first on Novastan English.

Russian president Vladimir Putin has invited his counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to attend the annual Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 9. The occasion marks the first time the Central Asian presidents will meet Putin after the latter’s indictment by the International Criminal Court.

On April 25, the office of the Kyrgyz president issued a press release stating that Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov would attend the annual military parade on Red Square on May 9 as a “guest of honour”. Several days later, on May 5, Putin also invited Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon to Moscow.

The day before the parade, on May 8, a rapid fire of invitations sent the presidents of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan all flying to Russia. It will be the first time in years that all five Central Asian presidents will take part in the Victory Day celebrations.

Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has paid significantly more attention to Central Asia. In 2022 alone, Putin visited all five countries in the region – something that had not happened in a long time. While the Russian president is increasingly cornered internationally, Moscow clearly holds on tight to its few remaining allies.

Yet, this will be the first time for Central Asian leaders that they share the stage with the Russian president after he was charged with war crimes.

A wanted man

Recently, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president on allegations relating to the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied areas to Russia.

Last week, South African authorities warned that Putin risks being arrested during the upcoming BRICS summit in August, should the Russian president decide to make an appearance. South Africa has ratified the founding treaty of the ICC and hence obligated to act should Putin set foot in the country.

In Central Asia, Tajikistan is the only state party to the treaty and thus – in theory – bound to cooperate with the Court. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan both signed the treaty some twenty years ago, but have so far failed to ratify it. By contrast, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are non-signatory states. Hence, should the Russian president decide to visit the region, as he did so often last year, chances of Central Asian authorities refusing Putin entry because of the arrest warrant are slim.

An offer one can’t refuse

In many ways, Central Asia still is highly dependent on Russia. According to political analyst Arkady Dubnov, who was interviewed by Kyrgyz news outlet Kloop about the Kremlin’s invitation to Japarov, Bishkek had no choice but to accept.

Kyrgyzstan still has deep economic ties with Russia. Although China is making significant inroads in Central Asia as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, Russia remains incredibly important in terms of trade and remittances.

Read more on Novastan: Effects of sanctions on Russia strongly felt in Dushanbe

The most recent data from the World Bank show that over 30 percent of Kyrgyz GDP consists of remittances. 97 percent of these remittances are sent by Kyrgyz migrants working in Russia. Hence, it is safe to say that economic ties with Russia are highly asymmetrical and Moscow is well aware of this.

In the case of Tajikistan, economic dependence on Russia is just as significant. As Tajik news media Asia Plus reported that last year, remittances from Russia reached a record high. Russian authorities also registered a post-pandemic spike in migrant inflow. In 2022, nearly one million people from Tajikistan travelled to Russia for work.

Central Asia as a sanctions loophole

The war in Ukraine, however, has somewhat tilted the balance in favour of Central Asian economies. Countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have transformed into important hubs for reexporting goods to Russia.

Radio Azattyk, the Kyrgyz service of Radio Liberty that was recently forced to shut down, interviewed Temir Shabdanaliev, head of a Kyrgyz lobbying group, about this trend. He explained: “If goods from Europe were previously sent to Russia, now they are registered as deliveries to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. But as soon as they are unloaded here, they are immediately taken to Russia.“

As a result, trade to and from Central Asia has boomed since the start of western sanctions. In Kyrgyzstan, there has been a remarkable uptick in trade of “shampoo, toothpicks, soap, and car parts”, according to RFE/RL.

Read more on Novastan: Turkey continues exporting drones to Central Asia

Relevant authorities in Tajikistan also signalled an increase in trade with Russia. Last year Tajik authorities were even accused of supplying Moscow with Iranian-designed drones for its war in Ukraine. These accusations were based on a recent deal Dushanbe signed with Tehran to produce drones under license in Tajikistan. However, US-based magazine The Diplomat found no visual evidence to support claims that Tajik-manufactured drones were roaming Ukrainian skies.

Risky business

But there is a certain risk in reexporting goods to Russia. The EU has warned the Central Asian republics that it could impose secondary sanctions on businesses helping Russia dodge sanctions.

For countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, there is little room for manoeuvre. Economic dependence on Russia often outweighs western pressure. However, the invasion of Ukraine has made many in Central Asia aware of existing neo-colonial power relations.

Several weeks ago, Eurasianet reported about a Russian ban on the import of Kyrgyz dairy products after Bishkek moved to adopt a law to promote the Kyrgyz language. The Kremlin sees this development as an attempt to curb its cultural influence in Central Asia.

Patronage to Putin

May 9 is yet another important reminder of the region’s colonial past. That is why over the past decades, most Central Asian countries have gradually said goodbye to Soviet-imposed Victory Day. 

In Kazakhstan, military parades have been scrapped “to maintain the required level of combat readiness”, press agency Kazinform reported. In Turkmenistan, May 9 has not been a public holiday since 2018. Victory Day in Uzbekistan has been transformed into a ‘Day of Remembrance and Honour,’ emphasizing commemoration over military pomp.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan: commemorating Victory Day without military parade

Although Victory Day in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan still bears significant resemblance to the Soviet era, times are changing there as well. In many places, celebrations are scaled down or rescheduled to both countries’ respective independence days. Owing to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this process will likely accelerate.

Yet, nation-building and symbolism remain subject to real-world constraints. As long as economic dependence continues, regional leaders have no option but to pay patronage to where the money comes from: Putin’s Russia.

Correction: in an earlier version of this article it was stated that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are parties to the ICC. Although the two countries have signed the founding treaty of the ICC, both have failed to ratify it as of yet. Hence, neither Tashkent nor Bishkek is legally obligated to cooperate with the Court.

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Written by Julian Postulart

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Since the invasion, Kazakhstan has taken a position of neutrality towards Russia’s war in Ukraine. Yet, Astana has not hindered volunteers from organising humanitarian aid to send to Ukraine. Furious remarks from Russia about this ambiguity have placed Kazakhstan at the epicentre of a targeted (dis)information campaign. The following article appeared 20 August, 2022 in Fergana News. We have translated it with friendly permission from the editors. Recently three ambulances arrived in Ukraine from Kazakhstan. The Telegram channel “Ateo Breaking” reported that the vehicles were sent by authorities from the Central Asian country to help Ukraine, where Russia is conducting a “special military operation.” But in fact, the Kazakh government had nothing to do with this aid package. The vehicles were financed by Kazakh businesspeople, according to information shared by the Ukrainian Ministry of Health and the Ukrainian Embassy in Kazakhstan. Transport to Ukraine was organised by the NGOs “Ukrainian American House,” “Initiative E+,” and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation.

Solidarity with Ukraine from below

From the beginning of the “special operation,” Kazakh authorities distanced themselves from any involvement in the conflict. The acting Minister of Defence Sultan Kamaletdinov made clear remarks in this regard: “We do not support any side. There can be no questions about this.” However, not all Kazakhs agree with his point of view. Since the beginning of the war, hundreds of volunteers and those sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause have sent humanitarian aid to areas in need via the Ukrainian Embassy in Kazakhstan and collected donations for victims. What is important to emphasise is that these are citizens’ initiatives that are not supported by the government. Reception centres for Ukrainian refugees are currently active in 11 cities: Karaganda, Oral, Semei,Oskemen, Aktau, Turkistan, Atyrau, Ekibastuz, Aktobe, Almaty and Astana.

At the beginning of June, Kazakhs sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine via several planes and 11 trucks. The total volume of this delivery was over 200 tons and included toiletries, food, medicine, and more. Within Kazakhstan itself, charity concerts in support of Ukraine have been organised. But since these have unsettled local authorities, gaining permission for such initiatives is difficult. During a charity run on 24 August 2022, money was collected to rebuild schools in Chernihiv Oblast. Officially, Astana has not involved itself in such activities. In spring last year, the Kazakh authorities only sent three cargo planes to Ukraine with medicine, food, and bedding. So far, the government’s policy of neutrality has resulted in a ban on rallies in support of Ukraine, while prosecuting people who display Z or V stickers (letters which are signs of support for the “special operation”). Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia The longer the “special operation” continues, the harder maintaining such balance will be. The “big neighbour” is making it increasingly clear that it expects a different, preferably more supportive stance from Kazakhstan with regard to the military conflict. In spring 2022, well-known media personalities accused Astana of Russophobic policies and treason. Now dozens of popular Telegram channels have become involved in fuelling anti-Russian sentiment by publishing either outright lies or distorted information on the daily, that are picked up by Russian media without any fact-checking. For example, the story about the ambulances mentioned above was run by the state-run online newspaper Gazeta.ru. They even stated on Twitter that the vehicles were sent by Kazakh authorities for use by the Ukrainian armed forces.

Purported weapons’ sales

Another news article claimed that Kazakhstan was selling weapons to the United Kingdom, for them to be subsequently shipped to Ukraine. Documents related to this story were published at the beginning of August by the pro-Russian hacker group Beregini. The deal was supposedly carried out thanks to the mediation of the company “Technoexport”. First this “news” was picked up by Russian Telegram channels, after which mainstream media started publishing about it. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry and Development of Infrastructure denied the accusations immediately and shared that neither “Technoexport” nor any other company had been licensed for the export of weapons to the UK. The permit necessary for the re-export of weapons was also not issued by the ministry. The Russian Telegram channel “Rybar”, however, described the ministry’s statement as “unfounded” and after “digging” through the Technoexport documents, discovered that the company – contrary to the Kazakh rebuttal – was indeed in the possession of the licenses and permits required for export to the UK. Read more on Novastan: The war in Ukraine and its consequences for Central Asia“It does not matter if the official representatives of the Kazakh government are defending themselves by saying that they could not export Soviet weapons without the producer’s – that is, Russia’s – permission. They are doing it all behind closed doors,” wrote the authors of the Telegram channel, which boasts over a million followers. In other words, the Kazakh authorities were being accused of lying not by Russian law enforcement agencies, neither by government leaders, nor by popular media, but instead by a Telegram channel whose anonymous editors know that they will not be prosecuted for their allegations.

“Wild Mambets”

A painful story of child abuse in Kazakhstan developed along similar lines. A group of teenagers in Almaty abused two brothers, aged four and nine, by forcing them to perform oral sex. The mother of the boys turned to the foundation NeMolchi.kz and journalists to receive help, in addition to filing a report with the police. Later, however, a video of the mother appeared on the Telegram channel “Mnogonational” under the title “In Kazakhstan wild Mambets [editor’s note: Mambet is derogatory slang for an uncultivated, uneducated person of Central Asian heritage] forced small Russian children […] to perform oral sex on the playground and recorded it with a camera.”  The story was taken up by Russian TV station Tsargrad, which announced it was “another case of the escalating manifestation of Russophobia in Kazakhstan. This time Russia-haters took their dirty deeds to the limit – Russian children have suffered.” The twisted story was broadcasted on the station and later similarly referenced to by other Russian media outlets. Read more on Novastan: Mambet – The Central Asian N-word: Where it comes from and what it means Then the mother of the victims stepped forward with a counterstatement. The woman called the publication and broadcast a provocation. “All of those involved in the incident were of European ethnicity, but you cannot give this any interethnic stain. I have lived in Kazakhstan since birth and have many friends of other ethnicities. We all live in peace,” she said. Who is responsible for the provocation remains unclear, since the Telegram channel “Mnogonational,” which first spoke of “wild Mambets,” is anonymous. The authors of the channel claimed multiple times that the mother of the children was forced to make a counterstatement. Of course, they did not provide any proof for this claim.

The hot topic of language

The government-friendly Russian public has seized upon yet another hot topic in the relationship between the two countries: language. Messages started circulating on social media stating that Russian-language instruction in Kazakhstan’s schools would disappear in the next six to seven years. Media outlets such as Glas.ru and Tsargrad reported about this as well. As it turned out, these messages were based on a wrong interpretation of a two-year-old report from the Kazakh Channel 31. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Education denounced the fake news, but several days later the problem of Russian language in schools resurfaced. After a statement from Minister of Education Ashat Aimagambetov on 16 August, social media and Telegram channels spread the news that starting in 2022, Kazakh pupils in first grade would not be taught Russian, while learning Kazakh remained obligatory. In fact, the minister only referred to schools with Kazakh as the language of instruction. This important detail was deliberately left out by a number of media outlets. Large Russian media agencies, such as TASS, published about the correct version of the announcement, but the fake story had already received considerable media attention. Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s slow yet determined transition to the Latin alphabet Furthermore, in an interview with Nur.kz in early June, Minister Aimagambetov reemphasized that starting with trilingual classes in the first grade might be too difficult for pupils. Therefore, he added, was decided to introduce the different languages at Kazakh-language primary schools one at a time. “We made a decision on this issue and are already working to ensure that a child in a school with Kazakh as the language of instruction is only learning one language in first grade: Kazakh. That means they learn to read and write in their native language. In second grade, Russian is introduced, and in third grade, English,” explained the minister. This important nuance was omitted in Russian media.

A (dis)information campaign

There are many more examples of Russian disinformation in Kazakhstan, but these stories stand out with regard to the amount of media attention they have received. There was also a deleted post on the social media site Vkontakte by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who currently is deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia. In this post, he claimed that Kazakhstan was an “artificial state,” whose authorities pursue a policy of “Russian genocide.” (The post was deleted 10 minutes after publication and was said to be the result of a hack, as stated by the press service of Vkontakte and Medvedev himself.) There is a lot of disinformation floating on Telegram channels and Russian news websites, such as the story about the alleged murder of a Russian boy in Astana by Kazakh children. The article was accompanied by a video of a fight from last year in which no one was killed. The amount of fake news has grown exponentially in recent months. Hence, it is best to speak of a planned (dis)information campaign. Russian officials reject such accusations outright. President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly referred to Kazakhstan as a “strategic partner” and his press secretary called the country a “friendly state.” On 19 August, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met Vladimir Putin in Sochi. At the meeting, the two presidents hugged. Later Tokayev said that he was satisfied with the development of cooperation between the two countries. Tokayev was quoted saying: “We are bound by the entire border – the longest fully demarcated land border in the world.We cannot allow any pessimistic prognoses over the future of our cooperation! As President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, I am personally dedicated to giving additional impetus to our bilateral cooperation in all areas.”

Fergana News

 Translated from Russian into German by Robin Roth

 Translated from German into English by Mari Paine

 Edited by Julian Postulart

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On April 27 of this year, the Russian Minister of Defence announced the creation of a joint aerial defence system between Russia and Tajikistan. This decision is driven by the deterioration of the situation of its neighbouring countries, such as Afghanistan.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 4 May 2021. The military cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan is growing stronger. Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s Minister of Defence, announced on April 27 that an aerial defence system shared between Russia and Tajikistan is in the making. The decision was taken in Dushanbe, on the occasion of meetings with his Tajik counterpart, Sherali Mirzo.

As TASS, the Russian press agency reported, Sergei Shoigu elucidated on the aims and reasons of such an endeavour. He declared: “In order to increase the reliability of the protection of our state’s airspace, we came up with an agreement regarding the creation of a regional joint aerial defence system between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan”, before putting forward the signature of this agreement at the end of the meeting.

A security issue for Tajikistan

The growing threat of the situation in Afghanistan pushed to the realisation of such a project. The Russian Minister of Defence explained that “In the midst of the degradation of Afghanistan’s condition, we plan on repelling any possible threats”. He then added, “We pay increased attention to a bilateral communication regarding defence, as well as to the functioning of the Russian 201st military base.”. The 201st military base is the main Russian installation on Tajik’s soil. Read more: Hardening Positions on Afghanistan following Summit in Dushanbe Tajikistan should not only be worried about the Afghan threat, since the country also has thorny relations with Kyrgyzstan. Deadly struggles between Tajiks and Kyrgyz groups are all too common, the latest, dating from the 28th of April, claimed over 30 Kyrgyz and 10 Tajik lives. This is a twofold challenge for Tajikistan: the country has everything to gain by reinforcing its security. The Russian Minister of Defence also stated that Russia and Tajikistan are working on the “questions of practical interactions during exercises”. Indeed, from April 19 to 23, Russian and Tajik troops carried out a large-scale, joint military exercise, as reported by the TASS. In total, 50,000 soldiers have been mobilized, and administrative heads of the Khatlon region (south-east of Tajikistan) took part in the operation. The latter aimed at reproducing the collapse of a border where a hypothetical enemy would invade Tajikistan, hence reflecting the country’s concerns regarding its security.

Russian-Tajik military cooperation

Sergei Shoigu has also declared that Russia is ready to increase the number of Tajik soldiers within Russian Military Universities and is expecting the participation of Tajik’s military contingent during strategic manoeuvres West-2021. The name of the operation, coined by Russian general Valery Gerasimov, designates the large-scale Russian-Belarusian military exercises scheduled for September 2021, as reported by the Russian journal Rossiskaya Gazeta. In keeping with the military partnership with Tajikistan, Russia provides the latter with weapons and equipment as well as free training for the students enrolled in Russian military universities, as detailed by Sergueï Choïgou. “Over 5% of Tajik soldiers are currently being trained in Russia, and up to a thousand are being trained each year at the 20th Russian military base. We are expecting to increase the number of recruits”.

An old-established Russian involvement

This is actually not the first proposal for a military partnership between Russia and Tajikistan. On September 12, 2020, a decree enacting the creation of a joint military aerial defence system had already been agreed upon by Emomali Rahmon, President of Tajikistan, as reported by Asia Plus, an independent Tajik media. Unlike the agreement announced on the 27th of April, this one is part of the unified air defence system of the Commonwealth of Independent States, of which all Central Asian countries are members. Read more: Central Asia and Russia: an ever-changing relationship Russia’s involvement in Central Asia’s military sector is expanding. On 26 May 2020, Russia offered Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan the role of a mediator to resolve the frontier dispute. Russia also signed an “unprecedented” military cooperation agreement with Kazakhstan in October 2020. Yet, Russia is competing with China in the development of Tajikistan. The Middle Empire operates several gold mines on Tajik’s soil, which benefits both countries, although the ledge is running out. Besides this, the construction of a Chinese airport on Tajik’ border was initiated in April 2020. It was also revealed, in 2019, that China has a secret military base in the country.  

Leonard Dillies Editor of Novastan

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The effects of sanctions against Russia are being strongly felt in Tajikistan. The Central Asian post-Soviet republic’s economy has been stagnant for years and many had left to find work in Russia. The instability in reaction to Russia’s activities in Ukraine is affecting almost every aspect of daily life. In Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital city, life is getting expensive. As American media Eurasianet remarks, Tajikistan is highly dependent on Russia economically, and many families count on remittances from relatives working there. According to World Bank data, remittances consisted of 26.7 % of Tajikistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, which makes it the third most dependent country in the world. With the increasing sanctions being placed on Russia following the on-going conflict in Ukraine, and the subsequent boast to the dollar, almost everything has become more expensive in the past weeks. Feruza, a teacher working at a private university, spoke to Novastan of the impact the changing dollar price has had on her family. “I had to pay the fees for my son’s school a few days ago. Now the somoni is so weak against the dollar; it’s like I’m paying an extra 100 dollars in the previous rate”, she explains.

The fees for international schools can generally be paid in dollars or somoni, but the price is, like most expenses, set by the dollar. “I wanted to pay in dollars but when I went to the bank, they told me that they are not allowed to pay out dollars. I explained it was to pay for my son’s school fees but they said, ‘No, we can only give you dollars with permission from the bank manager, and only if your account is in dollars.’ There were others there with a similar problem”, describes Feruza.

Sending money home becomes more expensive

Generally, people often opt to exchange money on the black market, rather than go to the bank. “You can find a better rate if you shop around, but it’s very dangerous,” Nagina, an office worker from Gorno-Badakhshan, in eastern Tajikistan, explained to Novastan. “My children are living in Moscow and we don’t usually need them to send money home. But if it’s needed, right now it is better to find someone travelling from Russia to Tajikistan, rather than using the bank”, she says. When payments are sent from Russia, they are paid in ruble and received in somoni. Due to the ruble’s depreciation following the sanctions, people working in Russia need to pay extra to reflect the changing price and secure the needed amount of somoni. It is therefore easier and more cost-effective to send dollars in cash with someone making the journey. This current instability is nothing new, as Nagina highlights. “We are experienced. During the financial crisis, it was the same so we know how to prepare. We buy food to store, things like oil or flour which last for a long time. We don’t know when the prices will change again, so we have to be prepared”, she describes. Food insecurity is already a major issue in Tajikistan with up to 27 % of the population living on 1.90 dollars (£1.44) or less per day, according to USAID. While many families received a one-time payment of 500 somoni (£29.16) during the Covid-19 pandemic, it is yet to be announced how the Tajik government will respond to current price hikes.

Prices heavily rely on the dollar

“For me, it has affected my day-to-day costs of course, and my business a little,” import-middleman Alisher explained to Novastan. “People are shopping less. For example, see this iPhone case. Before it was maybe 10 somoni (£0.58), now it’s 16 (£0.93)”, he says. Around the capital, businesses have increased their prices to reflect the new cost of living. A small portion of oshi pilau, Tajikistan’s national dish, typically cost 16 somoni (£0.93) but has risen to as high as 20 somoni (£1.16). Most significantly, the price of petrol from the Russian supplier Gazprom has risen from 10.30 somoni (£0.60 per litre) to 12 somoni (£0.70). “Everything here is connected to the price of the dollar,” Alisher concluded. “The dollar is everything in Tajikistan.”

Fiona Katherine Smith Editor and writer for Novastan in Dushanbe

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In a book focusing on Central Asia’s relationship to Russia, researcher Michaël Levystone provides a careful insight into ties whose nature keep on changing. As they perform a balancing act between historical closeness and desire for independence, Central Asian countries strive to tip the scales in their favor in regards to their relationship to the “Russian older brother”.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 22nd September 2021.

A specialist in political, economic and cultural relations between Russia and Central Asia, Michaël Levystone has published in May 2021 “Russia and Central Asia at a crossroads”, a book which tackles the stakes concerning Central Asia vis-à-vis neighboring world powers Russia and China.

Michaël Levystone is working as a researcher at the Russian / CIS center within the French institute for International relations (Institut français des relations internationales). In the past, he worked at the French embassy in Kazakhstan and at the French Russian observatory of Moscow. His latest book provides analysis of an area which remains largely uncharted territory. His desire to develop knowledge of this region came from the years he spent studying at the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques), when he wrote a dissertation on bilateral relations between Russia and Kazakhstan.

Military, political and cultural Russian influence on shaky ground

Michaël Levystone’s book offers a better understanding of economic, political and cultural relations which link Russia and the five Central Asian countries. Not only does it highlight the way these countries stand in relation to Russia, it also deals with the strategic role they play regarding China.

Answering Novastan’s questions, Michaël Levystone states that his book, although focusing on Russia’s both economic and security-related role in Central Asia, “could not exclude China from the realm of analysis, given its all-pervasive influence. A lot is at stake when it comes to Beijing.”

Read more on Novastan: More Russian passports, fewer labour migrants: Central Asian migration to Russia in 2020

The takeaway here is the fact that Russia has been relentlessly trying to maintain control and influence over those countries ever since they gained independence in 1991. It has notably been aiming to remain their major partner in energy and military issues. Further into the book, Michaël Levystone however emphasizes Central Asians’ late attempts not to be overpowered by their age-old Russian inquisitor.

Read more on Novastan: Russia tries new diplomatic approach with “Central Asia + Russia” format

However intense this desire can be in a given country, it is bound to be faced with Russian diplomacy’s unwillingness to relinquish such power. As a matter of fact, all of these actors participated in a video conference which took place on 15th October 2020 about a joint declaration “on the strategic directions taken by cooperation”.

Therefore, Central Asian countries try to further their independence from Soviet patterns, especially on the cultural level, as they uphold use of local languages over use of Russian, or as they gradually close down schools that were opened under Soviet rule.

Long-lasting fidelity put to the test

Central Asian countries are also challenging their historical ally by turning towards the Asian market, in particular towards Beijing and what it has to offer. This could lead to rising tensions between China and Russia. However, the book makes it clear that both countries have come to a “tacit agreement”, albeit still fragile.

Although Moscow seems less and less reluctant to let China achieve economic leadership in Central Asia, notably through the advent of the Belt and Road Initiative, Russia keeps on wielding “hard power” when it comes to weaponry and military matters. Its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as its arms supplies at a preferential rate through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) are a testament to this.

China as an actor that can no longer be dismissed

This distinction appears not to be so clear-cut as it used to be. “Nowadays, Chinese influence is gradually but undeniably taking over. Chinese military presence is rising, as shown by their unofficial military base in Tajikistan, but also by strong synergies regarding security”, the author writes. Simultaneously, Beijing is each Central Asian country’s number one economic partner.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan: Huawei to launch 5G network in 2021

China’s growing influence over Central Asia is not a myth. It partakes of Russia’s decline, which is military as well as industrial.

What makes this book fascinating lies in the chapters which explain the nature of different organizations in the region: the CSTO, the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union). Michaël Levystone therein points out that Russian supremacy was fueled by the creation of these institutions which all aim at maintaining control over independent yet formerly Soviet countries.

Read more on Novastan: Russia commits to railroad corridor China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan

Whether such domination be economic or cultural, Moscow’s attempts to keep a tight grip on those five countries – through culture, energy, the economy or military affairs – are clearly put into light in these passages.

Europe and America are nowhere to be seen

Although this may come as a surprise to the reader, the United States and most European countries lack interest towards Central Asia, in spite of this region’s growing challenges. While some effort has been put into developing presence there in the past few years, it remains quite limited.

Read more on Novastan: Uzbek products obtain privileged access to the European Union

Being at a crossroads between two continents which each have strong ambitions makes it a new economic hub. It also makes it vulnerable to threats posed by some neighboring countries’ extremist, if not terrorist aspirations. There is more to Central Asia’s role in diplomatic relations than meets the eye.

Read more on Novastan: Hardening Positions on Afghanistan following Summit in Dushanbe

To put it simply, Michaël Levystone’s book delves into the ties between Russia and Central Asia while pointing out growing indifference towards the former on the latter’s part, for the Russian neighbor regularly and considerably infringes on domestic affairs and capacity for self-determination. Today, this region is of great importance as it is at a crossroads between Europe and Asia.

While it wishes to get rid of the enduring Soviet yoke, Central Asia is no less coveted by China, which brings about new opportunities for those countries, although some fear that they might mean trading subjugation to one world power for subjugation to another.

Michaël Levystone’s book Russie et Asie Centrale à la croisée des chemins (not translated into English yet) was published by L’Harmattan (Paris 2021, 176 pages, €18.50(£15.82)).

Written by Emma Parisien

Translated from French by Andreï Fedorovsky

Edited by Emma Bekrine

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Held on 17 September in Dushanbe, the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) clarified member countries’ positions on Afghanistan. Bringing together China, Russia, and four of five Central Asian countries, the SCO meeting seems to have been a particularly popular occasion for making statements about neighbouring Afghanistan. This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 20 September 2021.In Dushanbe, Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries were able to establish what had been unclear since the Taliban’s seizure of power. On 17 September, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), founded in Beijing in 2001, organised its annual meeting in the capital of Tajikistan. At the table were the majority of the institution’s members: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan. Joining the meeting remotely were China, Russia, and India.Aside from statements vaunting cooperation among the eight member countries, the Dushanbe Summit made possible an in-depth discussion about Afghanistan. Three of the organisation’s countries sharpened their differences concerning Afghanistan, at the same time presenting a superficial impression of being in accord.

The Push for an Inclusive Government

These three members expressed their desire to see an inclusive government in Afghanistan, according to Tajik media outletAsia-Plus. On 21 September, only a few days after that statement was made, the Taliban announced the new members of their government: only one Uzbek and two Tajiks. These new members are essentially in lower-level positions, or are ethnic Hazaras, as reported by Afghan media Tolonews and the American news agency AP.

The humanitarian situation of refugees was also raised, with SCO members expressing a desire for their long-term accommodation, and for the facilitating of a “dignified, safe, and permanent return to their country,” the communal statement declared.

Uzbekistan: the Most Pro-Taliban Country

But that statement did not erase the differences among the heads of state. True to his role as mediator, Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev suggested that business discussions with Afghanistan were more relevant than ever, according to Russian press agency TASS. The leader of the most populous Central Asian country hoped that high-level meetings between the SCO and Afghanistan would be held regularly, which would amount to official recognition of the Taliban government. Shavkat Mirziyoyev also asserted that Afghan assets in foreign banks should be unfrozen.Unfreezing these assets was also supported by Vladimir Putin via video-conference, reported TASS. The Russian president expressed his desire for international aid to be set up, with most of the cost carried by the United States, who he judged as responsible for the Taliban’s seizure of power. In addition, the Kyrgyz and Kazakh presidents affirmed that a security barrier should be set up around Afghanistan to combat drugs trafficking and terrorism, according to Kazakh media site Tengrinews.Sadyr Japarov and Kassym-Jomart Tokaev have also suggested that humanitarian aid be provided to Afghanistan, and said they are prepared to participate but without providing specific details, Russian media site Sputnik reported.

Tajikistan: Leader of the Anti-Taliban

These fairly amicable positions towards the Taliban were largely eclipsed by bombastic statements by the Tajiki president. According to Emomali Rahmon, the Taliban movement intends to establish autocracy in Afghanistan by installing an “Islamic emirate based on harsh medieval Sharia law,”asreported by Radio Ozodi, the Tajik branch of the American media Radio Free Europe. In line with earlier statements, Tajikistan’s head of state asserted that the Taliban must allow humanitarian aid to be delivered toPanjshir, a province fighting Afghanistan’s new rulers which has been cut off from the world since late July, reported Radio Ozodi. However, the Tajik president’s assertions were most virulent on the eve of the SCO summit, with Dushanbe hosting a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a militaristic organisation directed by Moscow. “The composition of the interim government announced by the Taliban fails to take into consideration political, ethnic, and linguistic diversity, and equality of the sexes. This means that over the course of the next two or three years the propagation of extreme ideology in Afghanistan will increase, and the likelihood that these destructive ideas will spread into adjacent areas will be multiplied,”stated Emomali Rahmon, as reported by Radio Ozodi.Despite expected tensions in the SCO due to the presence of Pakistan, a strong supporter of the Taliban, no conflict arose when the Tajik head of state met with the Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan away from the main stage of the summit, Asia-Plusreported. The two heads of state expressed their shared readiness to facilitate talks between the Taliban and the Tajiks of Afghanistan, and signedeight agreements. 

Afghanistan, a Double-edged Sword for the SCO

More broadly, disagreements among members seem damaging to the idea that the SCO, under the leadership of China and Russia, can take the upper hand in Afghanistan. “The SCO is a very great organisation with numerous unsolved problems among its members, which makes it imperfect,”Konstantin Kourylev, a professor of international relations at Moscow’s Peoples’ Friendship University, told Novastan. In fact, the 2017 admission of Pakistan and India increased dissent, whereas the SCO officially admitted Iran as a separate full member during the Dushanbe Summit, Asia-Plus reported. “So the SCO ought not to be considered a force capable of influencing the situation in Afghanistan. The [member] states alone can be influential, but they are poorly organised and therefore ineffective,” suggested the Russian researcher.That position is not shared by the director of the Institute for European Perspective and Security, Emmanuel Dupuy. “Afghanistan will be a unifying subject for the SCO, since nearly all of its neighbouring countries are members, except for Turkmenistan. The formal admission of Iran as the ninth member confirms this,” he believes in an interview with Novastan. “Furthermore, the flagship countries of the SCO, like Russia and China, are in the process of taking advantage of the American absence in Central and South Asia. Witness the deployment of Russian troops to Tajikistan, the Rubezh-2021 military exercises in Kyrgyzstan, and the planning of the first communal naval manoeuvres by Iran, China, and Russia,” he added.Expanding on this theme, Emmanuel Dupuy suggests that “the strengthening of the SCO is only the first stage of a rocket that will see the strengthening of the CSTO, and no doubt the removal of obstacles to membership for Central Asian countries that up until now have hesitated to join—for instance, Uzbekistan. All this will occur in a context in which Russia will seem to be the lesser evil to Central Asian countries after the American retreat.”Taking a middle path, Ding Xiaoxing, director of the Institute of Eurasian Studies, published an opinion on theSCO site apparently shared by that organisation. “The SCO is an ideal platform for resolving the Afghanistan problem. The organisation can play a part in coordinating members’ differing positions on Afghanistan and their shared encouragement of the goals of internal peace and stability in that country,”he suggested. It remains to be seen how the Taliban will react to the attempts of the SCO to play humanitarian, protective, and diplomatic roles simultaneously, while at the same time being noticeably divided on how to accomplish these goals.

Etienne Combier Editor-in-chief of Novastan

Translated from French by Judy Harter

Edited by Fiona Katherine Smith

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LIFE BY THE RIVER. More than four million people in Kazakhstan and Russia live in the Ural river basin. They are watching the river grow shallower as time goes by. The main reason for this is human activity, scientists say. Can the Ural River’s fate be altered?

This article was originally published in Russian by the Kazakh media Vlast.kz as part of the “Developing Journalism: Exposing Climate Change” project.

Alexander Chibilev who lives in Orenburg in Russia, is one of the world’s foremost experts on the ecology of the Ural River, which flows from the Ural Mountains in Russia to the Caspian Sea in Kazakhstan. He knows everything about it, or nearly everything. He started studying the river in the 1980s and has written many scientific publications on the subject. But when given such compliments, Chibilev says: “When people ask me what to do, I know more about what not to do, since I can analyse the mistakes of the past.”

And, according to him, there were many mistakes. There’s the development of unproductive, low-yielding land, now damaging the entire river basin. The Iriklinsky Reservoir, approximately 100km north of the Russian-Kazakh border, built for a power plant. The factories that continue to poison the water even now that they have closed.  

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“No one has calculated the cost of these actions. Pollutants have accumulated in the bottom sediments and we do not know how much there are. We have inherited a ticking time bomb. We are now reaping what the twentieth century has sowed. And the additional environmental damage every year only aggravates the situation,” Chibilev says.

There are only preliminary, very inaccurate, estimates of the volume of industrial pollution, published in 2017 in a special report of the preliminary results of research on the Ural River. The report is based on material by scientists from Kazakhstan (A. K. Kenshimov, M. Shortanbaev) and the Russian Federation (Yu. M. Nesterenko, S. V. Levykin), edited by S. K. Akhmetov.

The report states: “20 billion tons of industrial waste have accumulated in the Ural basin. It includes waste from processing plants, overburden, and surrounding rocks. Thousands of hectares of land were reserved for landfill and industrial waste sites.”

The Ural river basin is the area of land where other rivers, known as tributaries or affluents, flow and drain into the Ural, supplying its water. In total, the Ural has 58 tributaries, the largest being the Sakmara, the Elek (or Ilek) and the Shaǵan (or Chagan). Since the construction of the Iriklinsky reservoir in the upper Ural, 80% of the river’s water comes from the Sakmara.

Dams are not the only problem

“Generally, reservoirs do not help preserve a river’s ecosystem. Many reservoirs built in a basin’s upper and middle parts are used inefficiently. Their use should be reviewed,” Alexander Chibilev says.

Do dams and reservoirs really affect the river’s water levels? According to Chibilev, the shallowing of the Ural was first observed in the 1970s. This is when construction of hydroelectric power stations, and therefore of large reservoirs upstream, began. Today, there are 12 large reservoirs in the Ural basin in addition to the Iriklinsky, each of which has a volume of at least 10 million cubic metres.

“There’s a joint commission on transboundary rivers aiming to preserve the river, but how can we preserve it if we build reservoirs in [the Russian republic of] Bashkiria, the very place where the runoff forms?,” Chibilev says. “The Volga barely exists anymore, instead there’s a cascade of reservoirs. A third of the water in the upper Ural basin is now regulated by dams and reservoirs. For many years, the main advantage of the Ural over the rivers of the south of the European Plain (Don, Dnepr, Dniester, Volga) was the low number of water reservoirs and dams in the lower and middle reaches.”

Deepening the riverbed is one of the most often suggested projects to save the Ural. But scientists disagree with this idea and view it as a risky venture.

Serik Hairov, head of a scientific and technical laboratory studying water resources in the Ural-Caspian Basin, says: “The amount of water will not change no matter how deep we make the riverbed. At the same time, there is the problem of pollution– tree trunks creating congestion, algae and mud. In nature, in a natural environment, various processes are at work. For example, a natural spring flood would wash away fallen trees and erode sand islands and shallows. Having a large number of blue-green algae, which we, people, dislike seeing in our rivers, is actually a good way to purify water from industrial pollution.”

Think globally, act locally

Galidolla Azidullin, head of the Ural-Caspian Water Inspection, is also sceptical about artificially clearing the riverbed. In his opinion, it is unthinkably expensive and meaningless.

“In fact, it is the canals and tributaries that flow into the Ural River that need to be cleared,” Azidullin says. “We have inspected the Ural-Kushum Canal and what we have seen is very depressing because dams and reservoirs have virtually stopped the flow of water. As a result, the canal is overgrown with reeds and algae. The water doesn’t flow.“

“The same is happening to small rivers in the Ural Basin – the Barbastau, the Derkul, the Big Uzen and the Little Uzen. So half of these small rivers no longer bring water to the Ural. It’s no surprise that the Ural’s water level is going down,” he adds.

Alexander Chibilev thinks it wrong to attribute the shallowing of the Ural solely to the presence of water reservoirs. Data from many years of observation show that even before the construction of the reservoirs the river had high-water and low-water years. These periods are cyclical and closely related to climate change.

Another climate issue also affects the Ural River: the melting of the ice caps. According to several scientists, icebergs breaking off from polar glaciers can cool the warm ocean currents of the Atlantic Ocean, impacting the weather in Eurasia. Chibilev also draws attention to the fact that global climate change affects every river in central Eurasia.

Read more: Talas and its people: life by a Central Asian river affected by climate change

“It is necessary to recognise that the true causes and extent of climate change, despite a large amount of data and predictions, are poorly understood. One thing is for sure: these changes are particularly sensitive in the central regions of Eurasia, where the Ural River basin is located,” he says. “The Don, Kuban, Terek, Volga, and Ural suffer from low water. And in the Altai and farther east, including the Amur river basin, there are catastrophic floods. Climate change is not sufficiently studied, partly because most of the surface of our planet is occupied by the ocean, which isn’t studied as much as inhabited land”

The human factor

The changes happening to the Ural have attracted the attention of the public because they are visible to the naked eye. More than four million people live on the banks of the river, anywhere along its course from the spurs of the Ural Mountains in Bashkiria, to its mouth in a tree-like delta in the Caspian Sea in Kazakhstan. They not only see what is happening to the river but are themselves the main cause of these changes. They use the river and consume its water. In official documents the influence of people on the Ural is denoted by the words “water use” and “water consumption”.

There’s also industrial water use. Factories take water from the Ural and discharge polluted water back into it.

“Because of this, we must take into account low water availability in our management of natural resources, give up high water consumption and be prepared for critically low water periods in the future,” Alexander Chibilev says.

He notes that there were extremely low water periods in the 1920s and in 1954-1955. And that, in contrast, in 1942 and in 1957, the Ural River overflowed and its violent currents even tore down railway bridges.

Sturgeons

Until recently, the Ural River was considered the world’s main supplier of caviar and sturgeon. In the 1970s, caviar from the Ural accounted for 40% of all black (sturgeon) caviar on the market. But in the 1990s, scientists warned that the sturgeon population was 40 times lower than twenty years previously. Nowadays there are generally no sturgeons upstream of Atyrau, a city by the Caspian Sea in Kazakhstan.

In the 70s, Chibilev compiled an atlas of sturgeon spawning habitats in the Ural River. He admits it is now hopelessly outdated but suggests the return of sturgeon could become a measure of the river’s rehabilitation.

He explains: “The replenishing of the sturgeon stock is something like a milestone, perhaps a utopian goal. And the presence of sturgeon in the river is an indicator of its ecological state. If sturgeon appear in significant numbers in the river, it means that the river is ‘recovering’. Like, for example, in the Rhine, Europe’s most polluted river in the 1960s. The “Salmon 2000″ programme was launched and salmon reappeared, though numbers are not at all on a commercial scale yet.”

The academic suggests Russia and Kazakhstan take concrete steps to restore the Ural River now. “Both states spend huge amounts of money on the restoration of the Ural,” he says. “But a cursory review of what it is being spent on is enough to understand that this money won’t have an effect. We spend a lot on conferences, round tables, and forums, and very little on concrete action. In my opinion, state bodies should direct their efforts towards giving the Ural a special status.“

“The Ural River and its tributaries, which have unique fauna and flora, supply water, possess valuable recreational resources, and in the area from Uralsk to the Caspian Sea, in general, are almost the only source of life, need a special status of protected natural territory,” he adds. “At least some parts of the rivers: the upper reaches and their springs, gorges on mountain rivers and valley areas with abundant floodplain forests and lakes, places rare species live in or migrate to, where valuable fish species spawn, etc.“

Read more: Troubled waters: Turkmenistan’s environmental policy

“Some countries have enshrined the status of “protected river” into law, for example. In Soviet times, a section of the Ural going from the mouth of the Barbastau to the North Caspian Sea, was a “protected area”. In the 1980s, we planned for the extension of this status to the mouth of the Ilek River. The joint Russian-Kazakh commission should work on the special status of our river, otherwise what was it created for?,” he concludes.

Тhe project “Developing Journalism: Exposing Climate Change” aims to identify the challenges of progressive climate change through the development and strengthening of independent media in Central Asia under the mentorship of experts from Media Development Center in Kyrgyzstan, Anhor.uz in Uzbekistan, Asia Plus in Tajikistan and Vlast.kz in Kazakhstan. The project is implemented by n-ost (Germany) and MediaNet International Centre for Journalism (Kazakhstan) with the support of the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

Lukpan Akhmedyarov and Raul Uporov

Translated from Russian by Valentine Baldassari

The post A disappearing river: the fate of the Ural appeared first on Novastan English.

Regular direct flights from Russia to several countries including Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have officially resumed. Passengers will have to follow strict measures to minimise transmission of Covid-19.

A version of this article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 31 March 2021.

Russia continues to gradually reopen its borders. Regular flights to the capitals of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan from Moscow have officially resumed from 1 April 2021, as the Russian government announced on 25 March.

This further Russia’s gradual reopening to Central Asia. Weekly flights to and from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan officially resumed from 21 September 2020.  According to Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), during the pandemic airlines such as Tajikistan’s Somon Air have been operating charter flights to Russia instead of their regular service.

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The routes have been agreed on a reciprocal basis with the countries in question. Germany is also open to Russian travellers again, with flights between Frankfurt and Saint Petersburg three times a week and between Frankfurt and Moscow five times a week. In addition, the Russian government announced one flight a week from Russian international airports to the United Arab Emirates and Azerbaijan.

This marks the end of the 16 March 2020 government decision to temporarily ban foreign citizens from entering Russia to restrict the spread of Covid-19.

Health measures still in order

This partial reopening of Russia does not, however, translate into a relaxation of measures against the spread of the coronavirus. Foreign citizens wishing to travel to Russia must obtain a negative PCR test no earlier than 72 hours before the flight. Russian citizens returning to Russia are required to take the test within 72 hours of arrival.

Read more: Tajikistan’s tourism industry collapses in the wake of COVID

These sanitary measures have been in place since 7 July 2020 following a resolution by Russia’s chief sanitary doctor. In addition, the Russian government advises against travel wherever possible.

Russian president Vladimir Putin expressed Russia’s willingness to reopen its borders at his 2020 end-of-year press conference. “As soon as the doctors allow it, the borders will be opened immediately,” he said.

Mutual dependence

Concretely, this decision could be crucial for Central Asian states, who were hard hit by the coronavirus crisis and the shutdown of air traffic. Above all, the reopening of airspace allows migrants from Central Asia to travel to Russia for work again.

Read more: More Russian passports, fewer labour migrants: Central Asian migration to Russia in 2020

The pandemic has had important economic consequences for both Russia and most Central Asian states. The number of migrants to Russia has halved, greatly reducing the budgets of certain states such as Tajikistan, where the share of migrant transfers is around 30% of gross domestic product (GDP).

As Radio Ozodi, the Tajik branch of RFE/RL, notes, remittances to Tajikistan from migrants in 2020 fell by 741 million dollars (630 million euros) in one year.

Léonard Dillies

The post Russia resumes flights to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan appeared first on Novastan English.

Russian television viewers have chosen Manizha, a Russian singer born in Tajikistan, to represent Russia in the Eurovision Song Contest.

A version of this article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 17 March 2021.

At the 2021 Eurovision Song Contest, Russia will be represented by the 29-year-old Manizha, a singer of Tajik origin. The singer will compete with a new feminist song, “Russian Woman”.

Manizha, who emigrated from Tajikistan in 1994, is an activist for women’s and refugee rights. The artist made herself known almost exclusively through social media, notably on Instagram where she regularly posts her new songs.

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Since her nomination, Manizha has seen her account grow by tens of thousands of followers. As of 22 March, she has more than 435,000 followers. On YouTube, her videos often attract several million views.

Music as a tool for advocacy

Born in 1991, Manizha Sanghin was three-years-old when her family arrived in Moscow from Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, then in the midst of a civil war (1992-1997). In an interview with Asia-Plus, she explains how it was difficult to build her career as a female immigrant in Russia. Today, she is inspired by her own experiences to contribute, thanks to her music and personal projects, to the fight for women’s and refugee rights.

On 14 December 2020, Manizha became the first goodwill ambassador for the UN Refugee Agency appointed to Russia, Radio Ozodi, the Tajik branch of the American media outlet Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, reported. “I promise to support those who are forced to flee their homes because of conflict and persecution, to use my voice to help those in need and to shine light upon the situation of refugees and stateless peoples,” she said in a statement.

The assertion and protection of women’s rights is also important to Manizha. In 2019, after the success of her video Mama denouncing domestic abuse, she created a mobile application, SILSILA. Developed with her mother’s help, SILSILA is a mobile alert system which allows victims of violence to call for help more easily.

Tajik: a little, a lot, too much or not enough

Despite 39.7% of Eurovision fans in Russia voting for her, criticism and insults stream forth concerning the origins and artistic style of the young woman.

Her Tajik origin is a particular focus of the hostility surrounding Manizha’s nomination. On social media, a number of people claim without evidence that the voting was rigged and that the artist does not hold Russian nationality. Others reject the feminist message of the song “Russian Women”. Its latest version, released 19 March, includes the English chorus “Every Russian woman needs to know / you’re strong you’re gonna break the wall”.

“I am a citizen of the world. I am Tajik, Slavic and a woman who speaks English. I’ve stopped worrying. I just want to live, in accordance with these traditions, in accordance with the culture that was formed within me,” Manizha told Radio Ozodi in December 2019.

Another song also evokes the discomfort caused by her dual nationality, her dual culture. The chorus of her song Nedoslavianka (“Not Slavic Enough”), for which the music video was filmed in Tajikistan, explains:

In my native land,
I am already foreign,
And in foreign lands
I am still not a native.

Beyond the feeling of not wholly belonging to either of her two communities, Manizha juggles with these influences with pride. Today she sports a unique identity. The artist repurposes folkloric rhymes and traditional Tajik clothing and in the same breath reclaims the societal concerns of the Russian people, as the America media outlet Eurasianet notes.

But some amongst the defenders of national Russian conservatism still protest, for example the leader of the Liberal-Democrat Party, Vladimir Zhirinovksy. “I don’t know if this is good for raising the authority of a Russian woman and of Russia in general. […] The song should boost moods […] Who needs a song like this?,” he told Russian journalists, the Russian media outlet Ria Novosti reports.

“Another star will rise in the sky from the stage and its name shall be Manizha”

Since her debut, Manizha has been collaborating with Russian and Tajik artists more and more. In the face of criticism, her contemporaries are keen to show their support of the young singer. “A girl of Tajik roots sings a resplendent Russian folklore, it is a cultural bridge in the relations between the states,” Iosif Prigozhin, a celebrated Russian producer, told Radio Ozodi.

In the same Radio Ozodi article, the Tajik musician Zafar Abdualimov, who shared the stage with Manizha during a singing competition in 2006, said he was proud of the young woman: “This event is a great achievement for us, for the people of Tajikistan”

Also of Tajik origin, the violinist Nohid Seinalpur takes pride in Manizha’s originality and personality setting her apart from other artists repurposing Tajik folklore. “Another star will rise in the sky from the stage and its name shall be Manizha,” she stated, lauding the fact that she “is unlike any other”.

For many, this nomination is symbolic of change in the mentality of Russians, though hate-filled reactions also bear witness to the society’s divisions. The Eurovision Song Contest is not officially political but choosing to put forth a woman whose ideas so oppose those of the Kremlin is unprecedented.

Such international visibility for an artist who uses traditional Tajik folklore, often unknown and underappreciated in the West, is also new. In this way, Manizha represents the hopes of a new emergence of Tajik culture.

As for hateful messages, Manizha hit back at them with humour. On 16 March, she published a short documentary spoof on YouTube in which an “expert” explains that, according to his research, “Manizha… is SALT!”. But she also explicitly reasserted her dual identity and how it informs her music: “I, Tajik by blood, will sing in Russian. Because I am representing Russia, a country I consider my homeland,” she told the Russian outlet Sputnik.

Caroline Deschamps
Novastan.org

Translated from French by Molly Arnold

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Who is Manizha, the Tajik-born singer representing Russia at the Eurovision? appeared first on Novastan English.

In 2020, Tajikistan overtook Kazakhstan on the list of countries whose citizens received Russian passports in 2020, coming second behind only Ukraine. Last year, a record number of Tajiks—more than 63,000—received citizenship of the country where many of them have been working for three decades.

This article first appeared on Voices on Central Asia on 18 February 2021.

2020 has seriously disrupted the mobility of people around the world, with knock-on effects for migration and the legalization thereof—that is, the receipt of documents regulating legal residence. The closure of borders, including between Russia and the Central Asian republics, meant that more than half of all labour migrants were unable to enter Russia, while those who lost their jobs had to return to their home countries. Fortunately for those who remained, the Russian authorities, facing a labour shortage, provided migration relief, extended the validity of documents, and also halted deportations.

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Thus, while the pandemic may have impacted the number of migrants in Russia, the fact remains that in 2020, the Russian Federation provided a record number of passports to new citizens—almost 660,000!

Here is a look at the official migration figures published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, which shows some interesting trends for Central Asians in Russia.

New Russians

Some 145,000 people from Central Asia became citizens of the Russian Federation in 2020. This is about 20,000 more than a year earlier. The growth came among Tajik citizens, who overtook citizens of Kazakhstan on the list of Central Asian countries whose citizens received the highest number of Russian passports in a year. On this peculiar ranking, Tajikistan is second only to Ukraine, hundreds of thousands of whose former and current citizens become Russians every year. In 2020, almost 410,000 Ukrainians received a Russian passport through a simplified process; they comprised 63% of all new Russians in 2020.

The former Soviet republics (excluding the Baltic states, Georgia, and Turkmenistan) retain their traditional interest in Russian citizenship, reflected in five-digit numbers of applications. Among the Central Asian republics, more citizens became new Russians in 2020 than in 2019 in all the republics other than Kazakhstan, which saw a decline of 7,000 compared to 2019. In Kazakhstan, it is ethnic Russians who most often apply for Russian citizenship.

If some simplified schemes for legal labor migration are created, it is possible that the number of Central Asians who wish to obtain Russian citizenship will decline. After all, the reason to apply for citizenship is to be able to work legally in the Russian Federation without any constraints or the need to pay for a costly patent (work authorisation). This may explain, for example, the comparatively lower numbers of Kyrgyzstanis applying for Russian citizenship, as they can already work in Russia on their own passports as part of the Eurasian Economic Union.

The relatively small number of Uzbeks among those receiving Russian citizenship (there are fewer of them than, for example, Armenians, and almost as many as Moldovans and Azerbaijanis) may be explained by Uzbekistan’s strict prohibition on dual citizenship—which comes with a requirement that the decree renouncing Uzbek citizenship be signed by the president himself. Moreover, those Uzbeks and Turkmens who apply for foreign citizenship usually do so in non-CIS countries. Some Turkmens held dual citizenship with the Russian Federation until 2003, but now they cannot even enter the country without a visa.

Russians-to-Be

In Russia, a prospective citizen must get a residence permit before attaining Russian citizenship. In 2020, almost 225,000 foreign citizens received their first Russian residence permit (Vid na Zhitelstvo), which is 40,000 more than the previous year. This growth was mainly due to Central Asians, in particular citizens of Tajikistan, who led the pack with almost 50,000 residence permits. Ukrainians received fewer than 37,000, followed by Kazakhstanis and Uzbekistanis at about 25,000 each.

Counting those who were living in Russia on a valid residence permit by the end of the year, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan ranked second and third, respectively, behind Ukraine. By the New Year, less than 125,000 Ukrainians had a residence permit in Russia (this is 30,000 fewer than last year). Azerbaijanis (60,000) and Armenians (56,000) rounded out the top five. More Kazakhstanis have a Russian residence permit than Belarusians (35,000), though fewer Turkmens hold these permits than Vietnamese (11,000).

Since the end of 2019, the Russian residence permit has been issued with no expiration date (previously, this document had to be renewed every five years). If there is no strong imperative to do so, the holders of this document no longer need to spend time and energy on the stressful process of obtaining citizenship, which was probably the intent of the new rule.

The same is true of the temporary residence permit (Razreshenie na vremennoe prozhivanie, RVP). Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are ahead of Ukraine in terms of the number of their citizens who received RVP last year. But if we take into account the total number of foreign citizens who were living on temporary residence permits in the Russian Federation by the end of 2020, all the Central Asian republics are lagging behind Ukraine.

In 2021, Russia lowered the quotas for the number of foreign citizens who could receive an RVP by 35%. Whereas in 2020 there were more than 60,000 such permits available, in 2021 there will be just 40,000. That being said, there is also a category of foreign citizens who can apply for RVP without being limited by the quota.

Working in Russia…

… was difficult last year. Borders were closed; businesses and enterprises were on lockdown. The borders of the Russian Federation remain closed to citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, and it is not yet known when they will reopen.

Accordingly, the number of legal labour migrants from Central Asian countries to Russia decreased by more than half—by 58% in Kyrgyzstan, 57% in Tajikistan, 56% in Kazakhstan, and 52% in Uzbekistan.

Nevertheless, more than 2.3 million people—many of them Central Asians—managed to enter Russia in 2020, whether before the borders were closed in the spring of 2020 or after their opening.

In 2020, 145,000 Central Asian residents of Russia received Russian passports. Almost 400,000 more live in Russia on residence permits and can potentially apply for Russian citizenship in the future. Millions of young workers are looking for work in Russia.

What do these numbers suggest? Does it look like a mass migration from the Central Asian region? Yes. Will Central Asia lose its population? No.

Demographics in Central Asia are still coping with massive population outflows due to the high birth rate in the region, but it is obvious that more massive diasporas of immigrants from Central Asia are already appearing in Russia, given the number of those who work in Russia legally and illegally. We will learn about the total number of Russians of Central Asian origin next year, when the results of the census, which is scheduled for this fall, will be made available.

Voices on Central Asia

The post More Russian passports, fewer labour migrants: Central Asian migration to Russia in 2020 appeared first on Novastan English.

Fergana News, the biggest Russian news site dedicated to Central Asia, is experiencing major financial difficulties and is at risk of closing down.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 9 October 2020.  Since then, not much has changed for Fergana News.“We still haven’t received the wages we are owed (up to 4 months’ salary for some of us),” Nicholas Lewis, a former employee, told Novastan in March 2021. Former staff members have decided to go directly to the company’s investor.

On the homepage of the English version of the news website Fergana, a banner immediately grabs the reader’s attention: “Support Fergana!” This Russian media platform, one of the first to focus on Central Asia and its migrants living in Russia, is on the brink of closure due to a lack of funding. In early October 2020, only two employees remained, including the site’s founder Daniil Kislov. Freelancers have been working without pay in order to keep the website alive, with several articles still being published every day.

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Requesting donations from readers can only be a temporary solution. In an interview with Novastan, Daniil Kislov reported that the website raised around “2,000 or 3,000 dollars”, which was enough to pay two employees’ salaries for the month of June. “It’s not bad but I was hoping for a higher amount,” he added. He explained that only a minority of readers are able to support the website financially. The majority are Central Asian migrant workers living in Russia who don’t have the means to pay for news.

False hopes

The financial difficulties, according to Daniil Kislov, started when the majority shareholder withdrew funding. At one point, the investor simply stopped answering the organisation’s phone calls, explained Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta in an article covering the history of Fergana. Without warning, he withdrew all financial support and Fergana employees were forced to take unpaid leave for nearly six months.

The relationship between the investor and the news source had, however, started on good terms. Daniil Kislov explained to Novastan that Fergana.ru is a limited liability company (LLC) whose “main share [had been sold to] one of the famous oligarchs” two years ago. He did not reveal the oligarch’s identity but mentioned he was a Kazakh businessman who had “business interests in Russia, in Uzbekistan and internationally.”

“For the first time in the history of Fergana.ru, I had a team of 20 in Moscow alone,” the journalist recalls. “We had an Uzbek, a Tajik, a Turkmen, and a Kyrgyz department. In each department we had 2-3 editors, a main editor and a deputy, a correspondent, SEO managers, and so on.” The website was prospering: “For example, in 2016, the year when Karimov died, we had 5 million unique visitors. In 2019, we had more than 8 million unique visitors,” explained Daniil Kislov.

Blocked, unblocked, blocked again

After the relationship with the main shareholder ended, the situation was made worse when the Russian authorities blocked access to the website. In fact, the website Fergana.ru has been blocked in Russia by Roskomnadzor, the federal body responsible for media in Russia, since the end of 2019. It was a tough blow as the majority of readers, and therefore of advertisers, are located in Russia.

Throughout Central Asia, accessing the website also proved difficult. Uzbekistan blocked it after the Andijan ‘events’, the violent suppression of a protest leading to hundreds of deaths in May 2005, and only restored access in 2018. The website has been blocked and unblocked several times in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Accessing the website from Turkmenistan remains impossible “probably for good”, according to Daniil Kislov.

Read more: In Tajikistan, government control still slows down internet

To get around this obstacle, the news outlet set up several ‘mirror sites’, which are copies of the site using different URLs : fergana.ru, fergana.agency, fergana.site, fergana.plus and fergana.media. Some, but not all of these addresses are blocked in certain countries.

Unclear future

As of October 2020, the news outlet, or what was left of it, still didn’t have a new source of funding. “Are we going to keep on working?” Daniil Kislov wondered. “Maybe we should stop and close everything. Maybe we should work with a reduced budget. I don’t know.”

For now, the editor in chief still works as much as possible, asking journalists to publish their work without payment. He mentioned the example of a Tajik journalist who accepts to work for Fergana for free because it’s a platform where they can write anonymous articles that would not otherwise be published in Tajikistan. The website is kept alive by the desire to share information, but for how long?

Valentine Baldassari
Novastan.org

Translated from French by Alice Coveney

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Fergana News at risk of closing down appeared first on Novastan English.

Russia wants to intensify cooperation with Central Asia. During a video conference on 15 October, the foreign ministers of Russia and the Central Asian states adopted a declaration on cooperation. The main innovation is the establishment of the joint dialogue format “Central Asia + Russia”.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s German version.

The foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation met for a video conference on 15 October 2020. Although this was only the third meeting in the “Central Asia + Russia” format, the foreign ministers published the joint statement “On strategic directions for cooperation”. It states, among others, that this dialogue format should be continued and intensified.

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This is a true innovation for Russia’s Central Asia politics. While the USA and European Union have long maintained their “C5+1 format”, Russia had so far limited itself to bilateral cooperation or cooperation within the framework of international alliances. These include the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). EAEU members are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while Uzbekistan has observer status. The CSTO comprises the five EAEU members and Tajikistan.

Cooperation on COVID-19, but not only

According to the press release of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the meeting focused on cooperation in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. While this is also reflected in the joint statement of the foreign ministers, this issue is included in a wide range of other fields of cooperation. These include security policy, economy, transport, migration, environment and the energy sector.

Yet, in many areas, the concrete form of cooperation remains vague. For example, the section on migration states that “it seems important to take concrete steps to create the most favourable conditions for the life and work of migrant workers from individual Central Asian countries”, but does not specify these steps in detail.

With regard to the environment, problems such as water pollution and glacier melt are mentioned by name. Yet the document does not specify to what extent Russia, which has recently barely been unable to cope with environmental disasters on its own territory, may help with these problems.

Concerning economics, the document highlights several successes to date. Russia is already one of the most important investors in Central Asian economies and the trade balance impresses with its volume of more than 30 billion US-Dollars in 2019. It is roughly the same as the trade balance between Central Asia and the European Union. The partners intend to intensify this cooperation. Joint projects are also planned in the energy sector by exchanging scientific findings and improving technologies. In addition, cooperation is planned for the training of specialists.

There is a clear common interest in the section on transport, as both Russia and the Central Asian countries are transit countries for goods between Europe and Asia. “We note that we are willing to work together to address the structural and institutional challenges … to reduce transit and trade costs, increase competitiveness and improve market access for other countries”, the declaration states. Russia’s willingness to cooperate in this field was demonstrated most recently in September when it became known that Moscow wants to be involved in the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway corridor.

Cooperation on security policy is of particular interest. As the Russian daily newspaper Kommersant points out, the countries promise not to take any steps that could endanger the partners’ interests and cause confrontation. Yet such a conflict of interests could arise if, for example, Central Asian countries made their airspace available for the military needs of other powers. The USA, in particular, recently discussed with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan the possibility of transit flights through their airspace. In addition, Russia is offering assistance to counter threats emanating from Afghan territory, such as terrorism, drug trafficking and arms smuggling.

A strike against the USA?

Kommersant reported that although the declaration was drafted in Moscow, it was subsequently discussed and revised with all states involved. “The result is a document that meets the interests of all parties involved, not just an external player, which distinguishes it from American or European strategy”, the Russian media notes, pointing out that a similar American document mentions “democracy” five times and “human rights” four times.

In February, the United States presented its diplomatic programme for Central Asia for the years 2019-2025. The document, entitled “Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity”, sets out the US government’s priorities in the region. These include support for the independence and sovereignty of the region’s states, respect for human rights, the fight against terrorism, but also US investments in the Central Asian economies.

At the time, Russia sharply criticised the American strategy. “Unfortunately, our American colleagues believe that they can do anything they want and at the same time make their partners turn away from Russia and probably also from China”, Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov told the Russian agency TASS. Western commentators, on the other hand, criticised the lack of innovation in the American strategy and the lack of resources for its implementation.

The new approaches in Russia’s Central Asia policy and the agreements made in the joint declaration could well contribute to consolidating Russia’s role in Central Asia. Russia would however have to follow up the declaration with concrete action. “It is clear that the declaratory strategy is just a document, and that reality is much more complex”, Kommersant concludes.

Whether the new strategy will allow Russia to push back other global political actors in the region remains an open question, especially as the Central Asian states have refrained from binding themselves to one partner. Aside from that, the USA is certainly not Russia’s main competitor for hegemony in Central Asia, but rather China is.

Robin Roth
Editor of Novastan Deutsch

Translated from German by Nora Heinonen

The post Russia tries new diplomatic approach with “Central Asia + Russia” format appeared first on Novastan English.

Prior to his resignation as president of Kyrgyzstan on 15 October, Sooronbay Jeenbekov had announced an agreement with Russia on the railroad project between China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website.

In an interview with the radio station “Birinchi Radio” on 19 September, barely a month before his resignation, President Jeenbekov had confirmed Russia’s participation in the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad project. “We have reached an agreement at the highest level with Russia on its participation in this project. Active negotiations are currently underway between China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Russia, in the format of three plus one,” the then president said.

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Accordingly, Russia is to be part of any further negotiations on the railroad corridor. This could advance the 25-year-old project, especially as the coronavirus pandemic seems to be giving it new momentum. The corridor would allow for goods to be transported from China to Europe more quickly.

On 25 November 2019, the Russian news agency Regnum had already reported that Russia was politically interested in the project and had already invested the equivalent of three million US dollars. Russia is even considering direct financing of, for example, the construction of the necessary infrastructure.

No agreement over Kyrgyz route

The railroad corridor China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan aims to connect Chinese railways with the Uzbek capital Tashkent. This rail link would also be an opportunity for greater connection to the rest of the world for Central Asian networks.

The route has varied considerably over the years but now seems at least partially settled, as reported on the former website of Kyrgyzstan’s national railway service. It begins in Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang, the Uyghur Autonomous Region, and runs for about 165 km to the Torugart Pass. This part of the line is already in place but goods arriving in Kyrgyzstan then cross the country in lorries, as there is no railway on the Kyrgyz side of the pass.

A section of about 250 km to the west to the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan has not yet been built. Kyrgyzstan and China are having difficulties agreeing on the exact route over the Kyrgyz territory. According to current plans, the route would pass through the cities of Ösgön and Kara-Suu, north of Osh, before finally reaching Uzbekistan.

China seeks access to Uzbekistan’s oil fields

China, the initiator of the project, seeks to expand the Central Asian railway infrastructure to Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Europe in the long term. In the short term, the construction of the line would also give China better access to the Mingbuloq oild field in Uzbekistan.

As Bruce Pannier reported in 2017 in an article for Radio Free Europe, the Mingbuloq production site was only opened when the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed an agreement to develop the oil field in October 2008. CNPC estimates that there are more than 30 million tons of oil in the region and that Mingbuloq could produce around 4000 barrels per day in the long run. Although this is far below China’s daily consumption, it could be extracted very close to China’s territory.

A much-delayed project

The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad project was originally launched 25 years ago, a few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it was not implemented until October 2020. The reasons for this are manifold.

The first technical problem lies in the gauge of the tracks. The railroads in Kyrgyzstan uses a gauge of 1.52 metres, against 1.435 metres in China. Failure to reach agreement would require expensive re-gauging during the journey.

Kyrgyzstan has delayed the project several times, too. As Bruce Pannier points out in another article for Radio Free Europe, Kyrgyzstan is reluctant to do its part of the work for financial and geographical reasons. In 2017, Kyrgyzstan’s then President Almazbek Atambayev declared that there was no need for a railroad line that did not stop in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, he instead proposed a longer route that would connect smaller cities in the north of the country. Including tunnels and bridges, this connection would increase the overall costs by 1.5 billion US dollars (£1.1 billion), an unreasonable sum given the current budget of 1.3 billion dollars (£990 million), mainly paid for by China. Russia’s entry could enable renegotiations in favour of Kyrgyzstan.

As the Kyrgyz news portal Times of Central Asia points out, despite all efforts to ensure cooperation between governments, the various border conflicts since 2017 have also been a further obstacle to development.

Uncertain Russian interests

In view of the disagreement among the three partners, it is not clear to what extent the entry of a fourth country can revive the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad project.

Above all, one question remains: why would Russia contribute its expertise and resources if it does not seem to derive any direct economic benefit from the project? As an alternative route to Beijing, the project could provide strong competition to Russia’s current monopoly for transit traffic of Chinese freight towards Europe.

Clément Clerc-Dubois
Novastan.org

Translated by Magnus Obermann

The post Russia commits to railroad corridor China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan appeared first on Novastan English.