A hippie camp hidden inbetween the trees right next to a Russian military base on Lake Issyk-Kul in Kyrgyzstan.

Credits: Lisa Moeckel (Germany)

Find all of our photos of the day. You can buy some of these and receive them at home: here is the list! If you can't find your picture in the list, mail us to photo@novastan.org.

The post Magical Place appeared first on Novastan English.

Similar to last year, May 9 in Kazakhstan is overshadowed by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Military parades have been cancelled, once again. Instead, this year’s Victory Day will mainly be a day to remember Kazakhstan’s own participation in the Second World War. 

For the fifth year in a row, there will be no military parade in May – neither on Defender of the Fatherland Day on 7 May, nor on Victory Day on 9 May, when the end of the Second World War is commemorated in parts of the former Soviet Union. Official sources cite budget cuts as the main reason.

However, May 9 remains a public holiday. Instead of a parade, the Kazakh Ministry of Defence plans to hold “military-patriotic events” to honour individual members of the armed forces. Kazakh soldiers killed in the war will be commemorated in the media and at public events.

In the context of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, Victory Day has become increasingly politicised, as the memory of the Second World War is heavily instrumentalised by the Kremlin. As a result, attention has shifted to Kazakhstan’s own commemoration of its participation in the war.

Friend, foe, or neighbour?

Last April, when the Kazakh Ministry of Defence announced that there would be no military parades in May, Russian TV host and propagandist Tigran Keosayan condemned the “Kazakh brothers” for being “ungrateful”.

“We understand that this is not about money. Right now, celebrating Victory Day is a ‘friend-foe’ recognition sign,” Keosayan said in a video on his YouTube channel. He reminded his viewers of Russia’s “gratuitous help” to “save your power in Kazakhstan and end your chaos”, referring to the deployment of Collective Security Treaty Organisation troops in Kazakhstan to quell the protests of January 2022. In response to his thinly veiled threats, Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry declared Keosayan an undesirable person.

Read more on Novastan: “An escalating manifestation of Russophobia” – Kazakhstan at the epicentre of an information war

Many Kazakhstanis, including politicians, supported this decision. “We side with countries that believe that Russia is an aggressor against Ukraine. We are not your little brother, not a brotherly nation. We are neighbours. Neighbours should respect each other. If you don’t respect us, we won’t respect you,” replied blogger and activist Togzhan Qoyaliyeva in a video message.

Saving money or ones image?

In fact, Kazakhstan has held only two military parades in 32 years of independence, in 2013 and 2018. “The cost savings are a formal excuse that does not generate additional controversy,” political scientist Gaziz Abishev tells Novastan. In relation to the overall budget, he says, the savings are not all that significant. As Defence Minister Ruslan Jaqsylyqov told the local branch of the Russian medium Sputnik, one parade costs about 4 billion tenge, or just over 8 million euros.

“We believe that in this situation […] it is best to deal with combat readiness and training of the armed forces,” he said. A statement that, according to Abishev, does not, however, indicate the preparation of actual military actions. 

“Kazakhstan can rightfully call itself the victorious country of the Great Patriotic War and World War II. In 2023 (as well as in 2022), a military parade on May 9 […] against the backdrop of a bloody war between the two largest ethnic groups that won the war on the side of the Soviet Union can be considered inappropriate sabre-rattling,” Abishev explained on his Telegram channel. “The cancellation of the military parade is a kind of gesture of pacifism, a sign of protest against the war between [two of] the victorious nations.”

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia

At the same time, he added that the cancellation of the military parades does not mean that the holiday itself will be cancelled. Kazakhstan continues to cooperate with Moscow within the frameworks of the Eurasian Union and CSTO. In doing so, Astana strives towards breaking down trade barriers while aiding Russian businesses to circumvent sanctions. However, Kazakhstan is well aware of the risk of secondary sanctions by the West. That is why at the same time, the authorities try to distance themselves from the Kremlin, Abishev explained when asked by Novastan.

Supporting veterans

An integral part of Victory Day celebrations in many post-Soviet countries is honouring veterans. Between 1941 and 1945, more than 1.2 million Kazakhstanis were summoned to the front. Today there are only 222 war veterans alive, as well as 60 106 citizens who contributed to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, according to the news portal inform.kz.

Every year, the state increases veterans’ pensions and other social benefits, and pays a special allowance on Victory Day. This year, each war veteran is to receive no less than 1.5 million tenge (about 3 000 euros) from the state. Compared to other Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan offers the largest financial support for veterans.

In recent years, the so-called “Immortal Regiment” has become an integral part of Victory Day celebrations in Russia. This year, however, the event will be held in a different format because of security reasons, a co-organiser said. For instance, you can pin a veteran’s portrait on your car or on clothes. You could also change your avatar on your social networks, as well as tell friends and acquaintances about your heroes instead of bringing their photos on signboards to a march.

The Russian House in Almaty, one of the representative offices of the Russian International Cooperation Agency Rossotrudnichestvo, will also hold an “Immortal Regiment” rally online. Anyone can send information about “heroes” from their family to the Russian House email address by May 6, which will then publish the information via its social media on May 9.

Last year, the Kazakh government officially banned the “Immortal Regiment” march and proposed an online event instead. Representatives of veterans’ organisations proposed an analogous form of rally: “Batyrlarǵa taǵzym” (Kazakh for Bowing to the Heroes), carrying portraits of Kazakh war veterans. This initiative was immediately approved by the authorities.

This year, an online event called “Er esimi – el esinde” (Kazakh for: “The name of the hero in the nation’s memory”) was held. Kazakhstanis can share information about their ancestors who died in the Great Patriotic War and their heroic deeds on a specially created internet platform.

“Admittedly, the traditional form of the rally has always been fraught with certain risks for public safety,” said Murat Abdushkurov, chairman of the Almaty public association “Union of Veterans of the Afghanistan War”, at a press conference. In addition, street blockades in the centre of Almaty would cause inconvenience to residents.

A day of mourning and remembrance

Asem Zhapisheva, journalist and activist in the opposition movement “Oyan, Qazaqstan!” (Kazakh for: “Kazakhstan, wake up!”) is content with the government’s decision to scrap the parade for the fifth year in a row. “This is a very good decision, because the cult of militarism does not lead to anything good. Kazakhstan, with its multivectoral foreign policy, has no reason to show its teeth to the world, especially since we don’t have a big army either,” Zhapisheva said. “Victory Day should be celebrated as a day of mourning, a day of remembrance. War is not only about the dead soldiers, but also about the people who lost their loved ones and the people who lost their health on the labour front.”

Regarding the “Immortal Regiment”, the journalist commented that the Russian state had monopolised a seemingly good, private initiative and made it part of its propaganda machine in an endless war with the “West”. The “Batyrlarǵa taǵzym” action was also not unproblematic in that sense.

“Even when public associations act as organisers, it is still a state mandate, a lack of imagination. Our officials are constantly copying Russian decisions, from laws to public rallies. I believe that we should be independent of Russia. If it wasn’t copied by the Russian colleagues, I wouldn’t have any complaints,” Japisheva said.

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

Written by Aizere Mailaisarova
From Almaty for Novastan.org

Translated by Anna Wilhelmi

Edited by Julian Postulart

The post Kazakhstan: commemorating Victory Day without military parade appeared first on Novastan English.

In recent years, Turkish drones such as the Bayraktar TB2 have become household names, owing to their successful deployment in multiple conflicts around the globe, including Ukraine. The drones have also popped up in Central Asia, with Kyrgyzstan being one of the main customers of Turkish kit.

On April 6, Turkish media outlet Defence Turk reported that Kyrgyzstan had received a Turkish defence system to counter small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), more commonly known as drones. Two days later, the Kyrgyz media outlet Kloop explained that Kyrgyz operators were being trained in Turkey, along with their Azerbaijani counterparts, by Turkish drone producer Baykar. Yet, Turkey’s role in Central Asia with regard to military technology is not new.

The first Bayraktar TB2 drones, manufactured by Turkish Baykar, already entered service with the Kyrgyz Air Force in 2021. Ever since, other Turkish defence contractors have also started operating in Kyrgyzstan. For example, after the clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in September 2022, Bishkek not only ordered TB2 drones, but also Aksungur and Anka drones that are produced by Turkish Aerospace Industries. Although it is safe to say that Turkish drones are gaining ground in Kyrgyzstan, other countries in the region have shown interest in this equipment as well. The question is if this trend will continue.

Deployment in regional conflicts

Border tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan escalated in September 2022. Following an exchange of fire between border guards, the conflict spread along the entire border and spilled over into Kyrgyzstan proper. The intensity of the clashes was unprecedented and the Tajik government soon accused the Kyrgyz army of using Turkish drones, according to Reuters.

Tajik media Asia-Plus reported that prior to this escalation, Baykar had also offered Tajikistan its drones during the visit of a Turkish delegation in early 2022. Kyrgyzstan was quick to express discontent with the looming deal. The Turkish company replied that the offer was business as usual, as per 24.kg news.

Read more on Novastan: Can relations between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan improve?

Soon after, Dushanbe signed an agreement with Iran instead, that would allow Tajikistan to build a drone factory for the production of Iranian drones, including the Ababil 2. For Tehran, this project is an attempt to expand the market share of Iranian drones in Central Asia and compete with Turkish drones.

Turkish drones seem superior

The global drone market has been growing rapidly since the 2010s and Central Asia too has become an increasingly important sales market, Forbes reports. According to Global Voices, China and the United States are clearly ahead of the curve in market penetration, while Russia lags behind.

The reason for this is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has cast doubt on Moscow’s intentions in Central Asia. According to researcher Suleyman Ozeren, the war was an important consideration for Astana to purchase drones from Turkey instead.

Turkish drone technology also was rather effective during the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020. Moreover, Chinese drones are faulty, which is why the Turks have come out as a clear winner in the battle for Central Asian defence contracts.

Different geopolitical strategies

In 2020, Turkmenistan was the first country in the region to buy drones from Baykar. Lately, other regional players have also demonstrated interest in purchasing Turkish systems. The Diplomat reported that Kazakhstan, like Kyrgyzstan, has opted for other Turkish brands, as well as Russian and Israeli drones. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have bought American drones, in addition to Chinese and Russian machinery.

Read more on Novastan: Turkey’s new push into Central Asia

Aside from diversifying their respective inventories, Central Asian republics are seeking more autonomy in drone production as well. Some have decided to invest in domestic production, signing agreements with drone-producing countries such as Tajikistan did with Iran. Kazakhstan has negotiated a similar deal with Turkey about the production of the Anka combat drones, as reported by Turkish media TRT World.

Others seek to strengthen their own military industry, such as Uzbekistan. According to Uzbek media Kun.uz, Tashkent has shown interest in designing drones of their own, rather than being dependent on foreign manufacturers.

Future Turkish moves in the region

Drone diplomacy runs parallel to other Turkish initiatives in the region, such as the Organisation of Turkic States, as well as other cooperation in certain areas. In some circles, the seeming effectiveness of Turkish drones in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war reinvigorated ideas about some sort of pan-Turkic military alliance, as Turkish researcher Can Kasapoğlu explains.

Read more on Novastan: the Great Turkestan – myth or prospect

However, the military culture of post-Soviet Central Asian republics remains largely unchanged, despite Ankara’s proven willingness to provide state-of-the-art military equipment to countries in the region.

Most importantly, the case of Kyrgyzstan shows that despite previous claims by Turkish drone producer Baykar, political considerations matter when it comes to defence procurements. Indeed, when Kyrgyzstan expressed dissatisfaction with the Turkish drone deal with Tajikistan, Ankara’s Central Asia policy was thrown out of balance.

That is because the current situation undermines Turkey’s position as a mediator in regional affairs, especially since Kyrgyzstan used Turkish drones against Tajikistan during the 2022 clashes. Ankara will hence likely seek to strengthen its ties with Dushanbe, so as to remain one of the region’s primary and most respected interlocutors.

Written by Lucas Morvan 

Translated from French by Julian Postulart

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Turkey continues exporting drones to Central Asia appeared first on Novastan English.

On April 27 of this year, the Russian Minister of Defence announced the creation of a joint aerial defence system between Russia and Tajikistan. This decision is driven by the deterioration of the situation of its neighbouring countries, such as Afghanistan.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 4 May 2021. The military cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan is growing stronger. Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s Minister of Defence, announced on April 27 that an aerial defence system shared between Russia and Tajikistan is in the making. The decision was taken in Dushanbe, on the occasion of meetings with his Tajik counterpart, Sherali Mirzo.

As TASS, the Russian press agency reported, Sergei Shoigu elucidated on the aims and reasons of such an endeavour. He declared: “In order to increase the reliability of the protection of our state’s airspace, we came up with an agreement regarding the creation of a regional joint aerial defence system between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan”, before putting forward the signature of this agreement at the end of the meeting.

A security issue for Tajikistan

The growing threat of the situation in Afghanistan pushed to the realisation of such a project. The Russian Minister of Defence explained that “In the midst of the degradation of Afghanistan’s condition, we plan on repelling any possible threats”. He then added, “We pay increased attention to a bilateral communication regarding defence, as well as to the functioning of the Russian 201st military base.”. The 201st military base is the main Russian installation on Tajik’s soil. Read more: Hardening Positions on Afghanistan following Summit in Dushanbe Tajikistan should not only be worried about the Afghan threat, since the country also has thorny relations with Kyrgyzstan. Deadly struggles between Tajiks and Kyrgyz groups are all too common, the latest, dating from the 28th of April, claimed over 30 Kyrgyz and 10 Tajik lives. This is a twofold challenge for Tajikistan: the country has everything to gain by reinforcing its security. The Russian Minister of Defence also stated that Russia and Tajikistan are working on the “questions of practical interactions during exercises”. Indeed, from April 19 to 23, Russian and Tajik troops carried out a large-scale, joint military exercise, as reported by the TASS. In total, 50,000 soldiers have been mobilized, and administrative heads of the Khatlon region (south-east of Tajikistan) took part in the operation. The latter aimed at reproducing the collapse of a border where a hypothetical enemy would invade Tajikistan, hence reflecting the country’s concerns regarding its security.

Russian-Tajik military cooperation

Sergei Shoigu has also declared that Russia is ready to increase the number of Tajik soldiers within Russian Military Universities and is expecting the participation of Tajik’s military contingent during strategic manoeuvres West-2021. The name of the operation, coined by Russian general Valery Gerasimov, designates the large-scale Russian-Belarusian military exercises scheduled for September 2021, as reported by the Russian journal Rossiskaya Gazeta. In keeping with the military partnership with Tajikistan, Russia provides the latter with weapons and equipment as well as free training for the students enrolled in Russian military universities, as detailed by Sergueï Choïgou. “Over 5% of Tajik soldiers are currently being trained in Russia, and up to a thousand are being trained each year at the 20th Russian military base. We are expecting to increase the number of recruits”.

An old-established Russian involvement

This is actually not the first proposal for a military partnership between Russia and Tajikistan. On September 12, 2020, a decree enacting the creation of a joint military aerial defence system had already been agreed upon by Emomali Rahmon, President of Tajikistan, as reported by Asia Plus, an independent Tajik media. Unlike the agreement announced on the 27th of April, this one is part of the unified air defence system of the Commonwealth of Independent States, of which all Central Asian countries are members. Read more: Central Asia and Russia: an ever-changing relationship Russia’s involvement in Central Asia’s military sector is expanding. On 26 May 2020, Russia offered Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan the role of a mediator to resolve the frontier dispute. Russia also signed an “unprecedented” military cooperation agreement with Kazakhstan in October 2020. Yet, Russia is competing with China in the development of Tajikistan. The Middle Empire operates several gold mines on Tajik’s soil, which benefits both countries, although the ledge is running out. Besides this, the construction of a Chinese airport on Tajik’ border was initiated in April 2020. It was also revealed, in 2019, that China has a secret military base in the country.  

Leonard Dillies Editor of Novastan

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Common aerial defence between Russia and Tajikistan appeared first on Novastan English.

Several American media outlets have reported that China is building a second military base in Tajikistan. This development would further China’s presence in the country, making it more than merely economic. However, the actual presence of China in Tajikistan is denied by some sources. Officially, China is only building a joint-use police station and the presence of even the first military base has been categorically denied. This article attempts to decipher the situation.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 1 November 2021. The question of China’s potential second military base in Tajikistan has generated a heated debate among observers of both countries, without a clear answer. According to Radio Free Europe and The Diplomat, China is funding the construction of a second military base in the Wakhan Valley, bordering Afghanistan. The Tajik Parliament seems to have given its approval on October 27.

Radio Free Europe also reported that Tajikistan has offered its Chinese neighbour full control over the first base located south of Murghob, in the southeast of the country. The Chinese embassy in Tajikistan has allegedly published a declaration on that matter. According to these claims, China could soon have two full-fledged military bases in a neighbouring country, which is unprecedented. The existence of the first base was revealed by the Washington Post in the early 2019 investigation.

A Base Financed by Beijing

Things might be slightly more complicated. “The complete handover has not been confirmed by the Tajik government, and the original declaration is nowhere to be found”, says Tajik political scientist Parviz Mullojonov in a statement to Novastan. The Tajik media outlet Asia Plus reports that this base is intended for use by the “rapid response unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Anti-Organized Crime Department”. Furthermore, while the funding would indeed be Chinese – amounting to 100 million somoni (£5.1 million) – the base is not going to be used by the Chinese military. “This military building is Tajik – not Chinese. Tajikistan has certain obligations made with its allies, particularly from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, Russian-dominated – ed.)”, says Guzel Majtdinova, a professor of international relations at the Russian-Tajik Slavic University. “Without the agreement of its partners, Dushanbe does not have the right to create military bases for foreign states. Tajikistan abides by this rule.”Sputnik, a Russian media source, offers another perspective on China’s presence in Tajikistan. Since this base is Chinese-funded, it is “quite unlikely that the ‘red dragon’ will not seize the opportunity to send a small contingent of military specialists, or at least a few observers and scouts wearing coveralls”.

The Lack of Transparency in Chinese Decision-making

Tajik authorities have maintained their claims that China does not have a permanent military base on Tajik soil. China is reluctant to divulge any information. “Whenever Tajikistan signs military agreements with Russia or other Western countries, some details are always disclosed. But the Chinese are totally opaque”, laments Parvis Mullojonov, a Tajik political scientist. He assumes that both armies are going to use both bases, although the exact division remains unknown.

Afghanistan as the Sole Common Denominator

In fact, the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan is under scrutiny by Beijing. “Not only is China strengthening its military presence on Xinjiang’s borders, but it also has made sure, through direct conversation with the Taliban, that both countries can directly discuss regional security issues”, says Hashim Ali, a researcher in journalism and communication at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. “Central Asia’s security depends largely on Afghanistan’s stability. Its central position could make it a rapid communication channel between post-Soviet states and South Asia”, Guzel Majtdinova asserts. “For China, Afghan natural resources are also important. Afghanistan could become a potential route for the New Silk Roads”, she adds. “China has a strategic vision. The possibility that it could use these bases for its army in the future cannot be ruled out. For the time being, however, these border posts are there for Afghanistan”, Parvis Mullojonov concludes. “China’s political interests in neighbouring countries are the reason why it strives to secure its investments”, adds the Tajik political scientist. In fact, China is involved in every sector of the Tajik economy.

Etienne Combier Editor-in-Chief of Novastan

Translated from French by Andreï Fedorovsky

Edited by Grace Mitchell  

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post China’s Military Expansion in Tajikistan appeared first on Novastan English.