Citizens from Central Asia now represent the largest group of foreign nationals fighting in the Russian army. Novastan spoke with several of them after their capture by Ukrainian forces. Their accounts reveal how Central Asian migrants have become an especially vulnerable recruitment pool for Moscow.

In the yard of a military prison in Lviv region, West Ukraine, dozens of prisonners silently head towards the dining hall. The walls surrounding them are filled with portraits of Ukrainian prominent nationalist figures such as Daniel of Galicia or Stepan Bandera. In the largest prisoner camp in the whole country, everything is in Ukrainian, from the inscriptions to orders given to prisoners.

“There is no trouble here, they are pretty calm and do not brawl much” says a prison guard. In front of him, prisonners start entering the lunchroom, their faces blank. Some of them have already been detained for four years. Many prisonners clearly appear to have Asian features. Among them, some Russian citizens from Siberian republics of Buryatia and Yakutia, where mobilisation rates are particularly high.

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Many others come from the five former Soviet republics in Central Asia. “From what I saw, a majority of foreigners in the Russian army come from this region”, explains Khushbakht Peruzaliev. In spring 2024, the 47-year old Tajikistani citizen signed a contract to serve the Russian Army : “I was told that I would not have to go to the front or anything of this kind. They said I would only be working in a warehouse, so I accepted”, he remembers. But soon, these promises revealed to be lies. Few weeks later, the man was captured by Ukrainian forces after being injured in a frontal assault in Donetsk oblast.

Far beyond the 1,400 Africans or 200 Indian citizens that the Russian army recruited since the beginning of the war, more than 12,000 soldiers from Central Asia have already participated in the “special military operation”, according to public data published in April 2026 by the Ukrainian war prisoners coordination. More than half of foreign soldiers serving Russia are originally from Central Asia.

Passport promises amid raids and deportations

In Mykolaiv penitentiary, all Central Asian soldiers that Novastan met were already in Russia before 2022. “Recruitment efforts towards foreigners were targeting on both migrant workers and people who were in jail”, according to an officer of the Ukrainian coordination of war prisonners.

Ilyas, a 40-year old Kyrgyz citizen, worked as a drink retailer in Moscow since 2007. He signed his contract in April 2025. “During the hiring process, they didn’t directly promise me citizenship, but I knew I would have the possibility to obtain it after” he says.

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Indeed, in January 2024, a decree was signed by Vladimir Putin, allowing certain foreigners to obtain Russian citizenship under the condition that they served the army, especially during the “special military operation”. The number of foreigners who benefited from this process remains unknown.

In Ukraine, most prisoners from Central Asia mention that they were sent to the front only after a short training, which caused heavy casualties. “We were moving to a village, when on the road, drones already started appearing and targeting us”, Ilyas remembers. He barely escaped, only to be taken prisoner shortly after.

Khushbakht Peruzaliev, a prisoner whose wife and children still live in Ryazan, 200 kilometers south east of Moscow, was harmed during an intense artillery bombing, while he was moving towards Ukrainian lines. “Half of the group was killed immediately, all 200 [Russian military code for death, Editor’s note]”. 

He describes a general climate of fear that began to appear “right after the Crocus City Hall attack”. This terrorist attack committed by Tajikistani citizens was claimed by the Islamic State of Khorasan, and killed 149 people. Following this tragedy, living conditions of Central Asian migrants in Russia got tougher. “Raids against Tajiks” became frequent, during which migrants were “barred from Russian territory”, according to Khushbakht Peruzaliev.

The Tajik migrant abandoned plans to renew his expired passport, for fear of being arrested on his way to the embassy in Moscow. “Eventually, special police forces started checking the construction site where I was working”, he explains. During police controls, he was promised to obtain citizenship if he accepted to join the army.

Caress Schenck, a political science professor at Nazarbayev University in Astana, acknowledges that “Tajiks were indeed more targeted than other ethnic groups from Central Asia, after the Crocus City Hall attack”. According to the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners, Tajiks represent the second most represented nationality in the Russian army, with more than 3,400 recruits, while 4,800 Uzbeks and 2,400 Kazakhs also joined the army.

Caress Schenck reminds that, however, in Russia “migration control policies, raids and pressure to join the army are still highly influenced by the news cycle”.

Other ethnic groups have also been targeted since the beginning of the war, depending on the context : “Sometimes, anyone with Asian features can be perceived as suspicious”, according to the researcher.

Since November 2025, some foreigners in Russia are required to present a commitment contract in the army to obtain Russian citizenship or a residency permit. People from Central Asia are particularly impacted by these policies, as they make up more than 40% migrants living in Russia in 2020.

Despite that, all prisoners met by Novastan explain that they signed the contract by their own will to obtain a Russian passport, Caress Schenck mentions a strong administrative pressure on migrants that “reduces their ability to act and make their own decisions, rather than offering them a real choice”

The ideological vulnerability of migrants

In addition to the precarious administrative status of Central Asian migrants, the Russian army bases its mobilization stategy on shared ideological patterns. “As for me, I wanted to live in Russia. I considered that I had the right to obtain citizenship, so to earn it, I had to serve the homeland” says Jasur Islamov with a detached voice. After a year and a half in the army, in March 2025, the 38-year old man was promised he would obtain citizenship if he continued serving. A few weeks later, Jasur Islamov was captured, after being wounded by a drone strike.

Ilyas, Islamov and Khushbakht never tried to surrender on purpose, unlike accounts from other foreign prisoners of war fighting for Russia, such as African recruits. This behaviour at war could be explained by the fact that parts of migrant populations in Russia are already “Russian speakers, born in the 1970s or 1980s, under the Soviet Union”, according to the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners.

Prisoners met by Novastan also state that they wish to go back to Russia, hoping to be included in a prisoner exchange. “We have nothing against an exchange of prisoners from Central Asia”, says the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners. However, among the 7,000 Russian soldiers already exchanged, those originally from Central Asia remain a small minority. 

When Novastan asked them about their experience with racism in Russia, before or after serving, all assert that they “never” faced it. They are confident in their ability to rejoin Russian society after their detention, once they obtain a passport. “Could you imagine that I risked my life to obtain citizenship, and they would send me back to my country, when I have nothing left there ? It would be a huge betrayal” says Jasur Islamov, bitterly.

However, it would not be the first time that these war prisoners face disappointments related to their migrant experience in Russia. Despite being married to a Russian woman for years, Ilyas failed to obtain a passport : “I submitted all documents to apply for citizenship, a long time ago, but it was refused”. Jasur Islamov admits that he “did not even receive any money from the contract”, with only two months paid out of the eighteen months he spent in the army.

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“I believe it would take years to dismantle internalized discriminations” Caress Schenk explains. The researcher reminds that in the Soviet imagery, racism was seen as inherent to capitalism and the Western bloc.

Citing the Geneva convention, the Ukrainian coordination of war prisoners explains that Central Asian citizens are treated the same as other prisoners. In the courtyard, on the weight training benches, Central Asian prisoners exercise alongside their Russian cellmates.

“We never thought we would end up here”, says Jasur Islamov. When he is reminded that he signed consciously and was aware of risks, the Uzbek detainee bristles : “You are talking as if I specifically signed to kill people… I only needed a place to live, a passport, to work and feed my family”. After a silence, he adds, regretfully : “I’m not saying we made the right decision. Everyone makes mistakes. Everyone”.

Driss Rejichi,
Contributor for Novastan France

Translated by Elea Muresan

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The post “I only needed a passport” : In Ukraine, Central Asian prisoners of wars caught between loyalty and regret appeared first on Novastan English.

Russian authorities have charged four Tajiks for their involvement in the deadly terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow on March 22 that cost the lives of at least 140 people. The men were allegedly recruited by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional branch of Islamic State. The events in Moscow have highlighted Tajikistan’s struggle with radicalisation.

On the evening of 22 March, gunmen attacked the Crocus City concert hall near Moscow, killing at least 140 people. The following day, TASS reported that 11 people were arrested for their involvement in the attack. Among them were four citizens of Tajikistan, who later appeared in court with signs of torture. Although many details about the attacks are still unclear, experts suggest the involvement of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional branch of Islamic State that is actively recruiting among Tajiks.

The events at the Crocus City Hall have spurred a xenophobic backlash in Russia. Eurasianet reported about a 35-year old Tajik who was summarily evicted from his home in Moscow following the attack. According to the independent Russian media outlet Meduza, Russians have started refusing taxis with Tajik drivers. Moreover, security services are increasingly profiling people based on ‘Asian features’. Not only Tajiks are affected by the current wave of xenophobia in Russia. Kyrgzystan has urged its citizens not to travel to Russia and 24.KG writes that forty Kyrgyz were denied entry into the country at a Moscow airport.

ISKP and Tajikistan

Hours after the attack, Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack through its central communication channels on Telegram. Later, the terrorist group published photos of the perpetrators and first-person footage of the attack on Telegram to substantiate their claim. However, analysts point to Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) as the main suspect. This regional affiliate of IS was founded back in 2015 in Afghanistan and initially recruited dissenters from the Taliban.

Khorasan refers to the idea of Greater Khorasan, the historical region that extends from eastern Iran to Badakhshan in Tajikistan, and from Tashkent to southern Afghanistan. ISKP hopes to establish a caliphate there, with the ultimate goal of expanding it beyond the region. After the fall of Kabul in 2021, the Taliban is engaged in a counterinsurgency against ISKP. Regularly, ISKP carries out terrorist attacks in Kabul and elsewhere in the country. The Diplomat writes that these attacks are primarily executed by ethnic Tajiks.

Read more on Novastan: The Taliban at the gates of Central Asia: what are the consequences?

Since its formation, ISKP has forged alliances with militant Islamist groups in Central Asia and started recruiting volunteers there as well. Edward Lemon, a researcher specialising in Central Asia and president of the Oxus Society, claimed on X that “while the threat within the country has been minimal, Tajikistan had the third highest per capita recruitment to Syria in the world, it’s citizens took on key roles in IS and have been involved in attacks or foiled plots in Iran, Afghanistan, Germany and Turkey this past year.” There is little information on the number of Tajiks recruited into its regional affiliate, ISKP.

Indeed, on July 6 last year, German news website Tagesschau reported that seven men from Central Asia were arrested in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia for alleged membership of ISKP, as well as for preparing a terrorist attack in Europe. They included five Tajiks, one Kyrgyz and one Turkmen. The arrests were the result of a joint investigation by the German and Dutch authorities. In the Netherlands, a further two suspects were apprehended: a man from Tajikistan and a woman from Kyrgyzstan.

Radicalisation in Tajikistan

Research has shown that Tajik militants are being recruited among Central Asian migrant workers in Russia, as well as in impoverished communities in Tajikistan itself. Tajikistan is highly dependent on the money that is being sent home by the migrant workers abroad. The World Bank estimated that 51 per cent of the country’s GDP consists of remittances. But faced with xenophobia, racism and marginalisation in Russia, Islamic fundamentalism makes for an appealing alternative.

Mélanie Sadozaï, a researcher specialising in the Tajik-Afghan border, explained to Novastan: “There are many reasons why these individuals are recruited: search for a better life, rejection of the state and its institutions, desire to practise Islam without discrimination, financial motivations, denunciation of Russian involvement in Syria, where IS itself is based, etc.” According to Sadozaï, “the decision to join IS is often more complex than a deepfelt belief in the radical Islam advocated by the terrorist group.“

That said, radicalisation can also be a reaction to Tajikistan’s ultra-secular politics. Dushanbe is currently implementing a “National Strategy for Combating Extremism and Terrorism.” As part of this strategy, the government has adopted 35 laws aimed at restricting activities described as “terrorist”. This legislation has led to restrictions on individual and religious freedoms and freedom of association. The documents are rooted in the Tajik government’s desire to combat the practice of Islam in general, not Islamic extremism alone.

The politicisation of extremism

The problem of radicalisation is exploited by the Tajik government to push through its secular political agenda and silence opposition. As reported by the Institute for War and Peace, women and minors in Tajikistan are not allowed to pray in mosques. Similarly, the wearing of hijabs by women and beards by men is often considered extremist. The fight against terrorism therefore has a major impact on the role of Islam in society.

Practising Muslims are under greater scrutiny. Since the repression of a series of demonstrations in May 2022 in Gorno-Badakhshan, an autonomous region that makes up the eastern half of Tajikistan, the local Shiite minority has been further affected by restrictions on freedom, particularly in religious matters.

Read more on Novastan: In Tajikistan, repression continues

According to Roustam Azizi, a member of the Islamic Council of the Presidency, the definition of the terms ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ is vague. This makes it possible to classify various opponents of the regime, such as political dissidents, but also journalists and lawyers, as ‘terrorists’. In 2023, for example, the independent news outlet Pamir Daily News was declared ‘extremist’.

Considering the repressive policies of the Tajik government, terrorist activities involving Tajik nationals are primarily diffuse and delocalised. In other words, they take place abroad. However, the authorities’ harsh approach feeds into religious and political extremism. According to Mélanie Sadozaï, Dushanbe is “tightening constraints and security measures against religious practices and potential rivals or destabilisers of the current regime, which only serves to fuel frustrations that can take the form of terrorist attacks“.

Tajik-Afghan security cooperation

The border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan is sometimes mentioned as a potential corridor for jihadists. Sadozaï, however, states that there is no evidence for this. On the contrary, Dushanbe seems not very concerned about the situation along the border. For example, the researcher points to the fact that in September 2023, cross-border markets were reopened for commercial activities.

Yet, since the Taliban takeover in 2021, there are no formal diplomatic relations between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The Tajik government remains the Taliban’s fiercest critic. This has to do with the Taliban’s support for Jamaat Ansarullah, a Tajik Islamist militant group operating from Afghan Badakhshan, just across the border with Tajikistan.

At the same time, the Tajik government cooperates with the Taliban authorities in Kabul on certain security issues. For both Dushanbe and Kabul, ISKP is a common enemy. Mélanie Sadozaï states that the terrorist group “undermines the credibility of these regimes in terms of their ability to maintain the security of the countries they govern“. Yet, ISKP is no cross-border organisation, but a transnational terrorist group. Most Tajik militants that join ISKP do so via Russia, Sadozaï concludes.

Julian Postulart, Judith Robert

Editors of Novastan English & Novastan French

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The post Moscow attacks highlight Tajikistan’s radicalisation problem appeared first on Novastan English.