Mongolia occupies an unusual position between Russia and China while maintaining a democratic political system and cultivating partnerships with countries far beyond its immediate neighbourhood. In recent years, Ulaanbaatar has also intensified its relations with Central Asia, raising new questions about Mongolia’s place between Northeast and Central Asia.

Novastan Editor-in-Chief Mathieu Lemoine spoke with Dr. Mendee Jargalsaikhan of Global Nomads of Mongolia  about the country’s democracy, political instability, mineral wealth, relations with China and Russia, its cautious approach to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and its growing connections with Central Asian states.

Novastan: When people outside Mongolia think about the country today, what do you think they most often misunderstand? What developments deserve considerably more international attention?

Dr. Mendee Jargalsaikhan of Global Nomads of Mongolia: In today’s world, Mongolia is no longer at the end of the world. Because of its open society and extensive global interactions, Mongolia is relatively well known, both for its positive and negative developments.

Although Mongolia has a small population and vast territory, there are always many interesting developments. Beyond its nomadic social structures, culture and lifestyle, Mongolia experienced several decades of socialist development from the 1920s to the 1980s, followed by democratisation and the transition to a free-market economy beginning in 1989.

You can recognise the effects of these different layers – nomadic, socialist and capitalist – in almost every aspect of society. When you are in Mongolia, you feel as though you are at the crossroads of three major cultures: Chinese, Soviet/Russian and Inner Asian nomadic culture. Different historical periods also intersect here: nomadic dominance, the spread of Tibetan Buddhism, communist ideology, democracy and globalisation.

These factors all need to be considered to understand developments in Mongolia. If you look at Mongolia through only one lens – whether democracy, mining or its nomadic legacy – you can easily misunderstand what is happening. Fortunately, there are now many sources available to people outside Mongolia.

Mongolia went through another period of political turbulence in 2025, including protests and the resignation of Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene. What did that episode reveal about Mongolian politics and society? Did it point to deeper frustrations over inequality, corruption and the distribution of mineral wealth?

At the simplest level, this episode was a typical outcome of the political system we have chosen. Our system generates “too much politics” and can threaten political stability, particularly when politicians and political-economic factions compete for authority, political prominence and parochial interests.

Unfortunately, inequality is widening, corruption has not been tamed, and political leaders are not delivering on their electoral promises. We often see politicians, parties and factions operating according to election-cycle thinking, which is of course normal in any democracy. But they are also competing for state resources – whether state-owned enterprises, bonds, loans, tenders or large and small construction projects.

In any society, whether democratic, socialist or monarchical, if the state fails to enforce the rule of law and penalise corrupt officials, it loses public trust and support.

So yes, the current political turbulence indicates growing frustration with politicians and political parties, particularly concerning corruption and the mismanagement of state funds, whether taxes, loans or aid. We know that this is one of the factors contributing to political instability and populist politics.

Ultimately, if this situation continues, the political system could gradually evolve into a kleptocratic one. This episode should therefore be seen as another strong warning to our political leaders.

Internationally, Mongolia is often presented as an unusual democratic success story in its neighbourhood. From inside the country, which aspects of Mongolian democracy are genuinely resilient, and where do you see its main vulnerabilities?

I don’t think our democratic success is as unusual as many people argue. It was triggered by the same crisis that affected communist states around the world, and Mongolia’s democracy evolved along paths similar to those followed by Central and Eastern European countries. Other non-European communist states, by contrast, generally did not permit political pluralism and repressed political dissidents.

Fortunately, both of our neighbours have respected our choice of democratic governance from the beginning and have continued their bilateral relations with Mongolia at all levels without interfering with our unique political process, including our elections. This is an important fact.

Three aspects of our democracy could be considered particularly resilient.

First, Mongolia has institutionalised protections for political and economic rights. People can practise religious freedom, possess private property and enjoy freedom of movement both within and outside the country, in addition to political rights.

Second, when the nation faces a political crisis, there is generally both the will and the space to reach consensus. If I define democracy as a process through which people can arrive at peaceful decisions without harming one another, this has been one of the strongest features of Mongolian democracy from the beginning.

Third, in my view, Mongolian political leaders care about their domestic and international image as supporters of democratic values. They understand that abandoning that image would cost them support domestically and complicate Mongolia’s relations with developed democracies.

Alongside these resilient features, however, corruption and populist politics remain our main vulnerabilities. They threaten the efficiency and effectiveness of government as well as public trust in the democratic political system.

Mining has transformed Mongolia economically but has repeatedly become a source of political controversy. What has Mongolia learned from three decades of managing its mineral wealth, and what problems remain unresolved? Do projects such as Oyu Tolgoi and the French-Mongolian uranium partnership indicate a new phase in Mongolia’s resource development?

I am not an expert on this subject, but I think we have learned several things.

First, the country needs to develop and retain its own professional and politically independent experts who can handle investment negotiations with large multinational mining companies.

Second, major investment agreements need to be insulated and protected from domestic politics and the political process, particularly elections.

Third, state-owned enterprises should be managed more transparently and professionally, as they are in countries such as Singapore or Sweden.

Looking back, virtually all major corruption cases and allegations have revolved around major state-owned enterprises. In the late 1990s, this concerned the Erdenet copper factory or the railway. Today, controversies revolve around the Tavan Tolgoi coal mines, while some cases have also involved the Oyu Tolgoi copper mine.

This problem therefore remains unresolved. We still cannot sufficiently restrain the involvement of politicians, parties and factions in Tavan Tolgoi. Political actors use corruption allegations to marginalise their opponents and increase their influence over state-owned enterprises, but we rarely see these allegations resolved through the legal system.

As for the second part of the question, these major projects take a long time to develop. The Erdenet copper deposit was explored by Czechoslovak geologists in 1963, the investment agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded in 1973, and production began in 1978.

Oyu Tolgoi was discovered in the late 1990s, the investment agreement was signed in 2009, open-pit production began in 2013, and underground production followed in 2023.

Looking at these two copper projects alone, I would expect the French-Mongolian uranium project to have to overcome many hurdles before reaching its full potential. We also have to consider commodity cycles and opportunities for economic diversification, both of which are often beyond Mongolia’s control.

China dominates Mongolia’s trade, while Russia remains strategically important and Mongolia simultaneously seeks deeper relations with its “third neighbours”. Where does Mongolia still have room for manoeuvre, and where does geography impose unavoidable constraints? How does public opinion towards China compare with the economic reality of the relationship?

In our foreign-policy concepts and statements, we prioritise relations with our two neighbours. These relationships go back more than two thousand years. Stable and prosperous neighbours are in Mongolia’s interest, just as a peaceful and stable Mongolia is in the interests of our two neighbours.

Mongolia shares long land borders with both countries and is historically, culturally and even ethnically connected with neighbouring regions of China and Russia.

The principal concern for Moscow and Beijing is that Mongolia should not welcome the security or military interests of their strategic competitors. I think this red line is clear both to our third neighbours and to our own political leaders.

Mongolia is therefore keen to develop closer and broader cooperation with its third neighbours in politics, economics and culture. Cooperation in security and defence is generally limited to education and training exchanges, peacekeeping and the development of disaster-response capabilities.

The most difficult periods for Mongolia come when the great powers – our two neighbours and the Western powers – engage in geopolitical and geoeconomic competition. We are entering such a period now. What we don’t know is the dynamics, duration and intensity of this competition. In fact, this challenge applies to many middle and small powers.

Anti-Chinese attitudes in Mongolia are an interesting phenomenon. They wax and wane, as other forms of negative attitudes do. After three decades of peaceful, friendly and good-neighbourly bilateral relations, I would argue that most Mongolians now have a relatively balanced view of China.

A person can simultaneously hold positive, neutral and negative attitudes towards different aspects of China – its culture, government, people or economy. Someone might have positive views of Chinese culture and economic development while holding very different opinions about Chinese nationals or businesses operating in Mongolia.

We should therefore be careful not to overgeneralise. Many Mongolians have mixed views of China, but everyone understands that economically China remains indispensable to Mongolia.

Nevertheless, there is a trust deficit between our two nations because of historical memories, the asymmetry of power and persistent or emerging geopolitical narratives. Unfortunately, negative comments and narratives in the Chinese and Mongolian blogospheres can easily contribute to mistrust and reinforce negative attitudes on both sides.

Mongolia has remained outside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation while maintaining close relations with most of its members. What choices does Mongolia now face regarding the organisation?

If you read the SCO’s key statements carefully, the organisation’s core area of interest remains Central Asia, rather than Eurasia or South Asia. Mongolia may sometimes appear to be a regionless country in Inner Asia, but it is very closely connected with Northeast Asia.

There are multiple daily flights connecting Ulaanbaatar with Seoul, Tokyo and cities across China. There is only one direct air connection with Central Asia, between Almaty and Ulaanbaatar. Mongolia’s key strategic and economic partners are in Northeast Asia, including China’s northeastern and southern provinces.

Most Mongolians therefore see the SCO primarily as a regional organisation for Central Asia, a region with which many Mongolians still have relatively limited knowledge and interaction. If the SCO were to expand its membership into Northeast Asia – for example, to include the two Koreas – that could affect Mongolia’s perception of the organisation.

Another important reason for Mongolia’s reluctance to join is concern that the SCO could develop into a political and security alignment against the West.

This would create two challenges for Mongolia. First, it could threaten the country’s principled position of non-alignment and its desire to avoid becoming caught up in great-power politics. Second, Mongolia could find itself under pressure from Beijing and Moscow to pursue similar foreign-policy positions.

Given Mongolia’s historical experience of being caught in two overlapping Cold Wars – one between China and the Soviet Union and another between the Soviet Union and the West – non-alignment and an independent foreign policy are highly valued.

Because of these complexities, Mongolia will probably prefer to retain its observer status rather than pursue full membership.

The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue has existed for more than a decade. What can a relatively small state such as Mongolia realistically achieve by creating a diplomatic platform involving much larger powers?

The spirit behind the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue goes back to the 1960s and 1980s, when a small state sought to pursue proactive multilateral diplomacy to increase its international profile and, frankly, to find friends.

There were many difficulties, from geopolitics to Mongolia’s physical isolation. Getting around the world often meant travelling through Moscow, either spending five or six days on the Trans-Siberian Railway or taking long flights through Sheremetyevo Airport. Moreover, Mongolian political leaders had to align the country’s foreign-policy efforts with the Kremlin’s wishes.

An early version of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue concept was promoted by the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia in 2008, with the idea of making Ulaanbaatar a “new Helsinki” for Northeast Asia. Then, in 2014, political leaders, senior diplomats and foreign-policy experts launched the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, bringing together policy experts and academics from Northeast Asia and specialists interested in the region.

With the exception of a two-year interruption during the pandemic, Mongolia has organised the Dialogue ever since, and it has become one of our successful foreign-policy initiatives.

It should be understood as one element of a broader series of Mongolian diplomatic initiatives directed towards Northeast Asia and beyond.

There is also the Ulaanbaatar Process, organised with civil society organisations to bring together experts working on nuclear-weapon-free zones and denuclearisation. Mongolia is the world’s only single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone, recognised by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The conference helps keep denuclearisation and nuclear risks on the agenda, particularly in Northeast Asia.

Then there is Khaan Quest, a multinational peacekeeping exercise that began in 2004. It brings Chinese People’s Liberation Army personnel together with participants from countries that are otherwise geostrategic competitors, including the United States, Japan, South Korea and India, as well as Central Asian countries and Turkey.

Mongolia has also chaired the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace since 1970. You can add the Northeast Asian Mayors’ Forum, the Northeast Asian Parliamentary Roundtable and sporting events in which conflicting parties from across the region participate.

Of course, regularly organising international events requires significant effort and expenditure and is scrutinised by taxpayers. Nevertheless, Mongolia may be the only country in the region that maintains friendly relations with all the others without significant unresolved disputes.

Even though the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue is relatively small compared with major multilateral forums, it provides a relaxed atmosphere for discussion. Scholars from China, Russia, the United States, Japan and elsewhere appreciate the opportunity to meet one another precisely because current geopolitical tensions have severely restricted these interactions – much as they did during the Cold War.

This year’s Ulaanbaatar Dialogue included discussions on connectivity between Northeast and Central Asia and the idea of a “green power corridor” connecting the two regions. Why is this connection attracting more attention now?

Although Mongolia is geographically close to Central Asia, Soviet geopolitics separated Mongolia and Central Asia for many decades. Mongolia was one of the early supporters of the independence and sovereignty of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

However, the newly independent states initially had different foreign-policy priorities. Mongolia looked primarily towards Northeast Asia, while Central Asian states looked towards Europe.

The pandemic and the changing geopolitical environment have required us, particularly on the Mongolian side, to reassess our foreign policy and reach out more proactively to Central Asian states.

Within this framework, the organisers of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue began welcoming participants from Central Asia in 2022. It quickly became clear that both Central Asian and Northeast Asian participants wanted greater connectivity and interaction. This is particularly true among policy experts and researchers because they have lacked a platform specifically dedicated to discussing connections between the two regions.

UNESCAP is also important here. It co-organises a panel on sustainable economic development with a strong focus on energy, power corridors and connectivity. We therefore decided to dedicate panels specifically to connectivity between Central and Northeast Asia, including the concept of a “green power corridor”.

Despite all the C5+ bilateral formats involving China, Japan, South Korea and Europe, there is no comparable venue bringing policy experts and academics from Central and Northeast Asia together.

Mongolia’s relations with Central Asian states appear to have accelerated significantly in recent years. What is driving this rapprochement, and which areas of cooperation should we watch over the next few years?

Mongolia and Kazakhstan have historic and cultural links. Around 90,000 Mongolian Kazakhs now live in Kazakhstan. This is Mongolia’s largest diaspora community concentrated in a single country; South Korea comes next, with around 60,000 Mongolians.

For centuries, Mongols and Kazakhs have lived around the Altai mountain range, which connects Russia, China, Mongolia and Kazakhstan. All four countries are now promoting initiatives to increase economic and cultural connectivity across the Altai.

The Kyrgyz Republic is quite similar to Mongolia in terms of economic scale and population size, as well as having an open society. Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan have maintained close political and cultural interactions in the past.

Mongolia’s relationship with Uzbekistan is historic, but its contemporary development is relatively new and remains at an early stage.

One strong driver of renewed attention, particularly from our side, is that all these states operate in similar geopolitical circumstances. They all have to balance their relations within the larger strategic triangle involving Beijing, Moscow and Washington.

They reach out to the West for investment, trade and a degree of soft balancing vis-à-vis China and Russia. At the same time, they need to accommodate Russia’s geostrategic and economic interests while relying heavily on Chinese investment, markets and infrastructure.

In simple geopolitical terms, they all need to pay close attention to the Sino-Russian balance of power. Mongolia and the Central Asian states therefore share an interest in pursuing multilateral foreign policies and finding ways to increase their economic connectivity.

Beyond Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon also made an official visit to Mongolia in July.

Over the next few years, we could see closer cooperation in international forums as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan promote forms of middle-power foreign policy. China’s infrastructure, including its rail network and ports, could help Mongolia and Central Asian states increase trade flows, even if these remain relatively small.

We could also see more direct flights linking Mongolia with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Mongolia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan could cooperate more closely in promoting the nomadic cultures of greater Central Asia.

Looking ahead five to ten years, what is one development in Mongolia that you think foreign observers are currently underestimating?

Over the next five to ten years, Mongolia could become a more egalitarian and progressively liberal society than other states in the region.

First, our distinctive combination of democracy and an open society has become more firmly established over the past three decades, particularly in comparison with our two neighbours. I expect this to continue.

Second, Mongolia is becoming increasingly urban and digitally connected. We have a younger generation that is increasingly well educated and internationally exposed. Mongolia also has a growing population and relatively high birth rates compared with much of the region.

Finally, Mongolians are relatively tolerant of different views and cultures. Mongolia could become one of the more peaceful and attractive places to visit as climate change increasingly affects Europe, North America and other parts of Asia. Its continental climate, particularly its moderate summers and autumns, could become an advantage.

It is already interesting to see increasing numbers of people from South and Southeast Asia looking for employment opportunities in Mongolia’s education and service sectors.

Interview by Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan English.

The post “Mongolia cannot be understood through one lens”: Dr. Mendee Jargalsaikhan on democracy, China and Central Asia appeared first on Novastan English.