Two years into the war in Gaza – which has killed over 68,000 Palestinians – Kazakhstan has volunteered to join Trump’s Abraham Accords initiative to forge closer ties with Israel. While Tokayev’s gamble is far from groundbreaking due to the country’s pre-existing relations with Israel, the manoeuvre does signal a new, American direction emerging for Kazakhstan’s international orientation.

Ahead of the much anticipated C5+1 Summit in Washington D.C., US President Donald Trump announced on 7 November that Kazakhstan would soon join the US-led Abraham Accords, an initiative spearheaded by Trump to encourage resistant Muslim-majority nations to forge closer ties with Israel. With Kazakhstan’s entry, the Central Asian state will become the first country to join the accords since war in Gaza began in 2023. 

Unlike all past Abraham Accords members who had refused to recognise Israel before joining the agreement, Kazakhstan has maintained formal relations with Israel since 1992. Experts have been quick to describe Kazakh President Qassym-Jomart Tokayev’s move as a symbolic gesture aimed at currying favor with Washington, doubting that it will significantly alter Kazakhstan’s existing relations with Israel.

Kazakhstan’s Geopolitical Pivot

To Tokayev, the move is clearly a signal to Washington it is open to further strategic cooperation. Just hours before Kazakhstan’s Abraham Accords announcement, Kazakhstan and the United States signed a lucrative cooperation deal over rare earth minerals the United States deems as critical to its national security.  By the time Tokayev had left Washington, he had signed 29 deals with the United States amounting to $17 billion in new investments, per the Astana Times. 

Read more on Novastan: China in Central Asia: Fact-checking and myth-busting

Beyond minerals, the United States sees political potential to draw Kazakhstan out of China’s orbit and into its own, severing a key link in China’s emerging Belt and Road Initiative trade corridor across the Asian continent. Kazakhstan, hoping to balance its international agreements among the global heavyweights, hopes close partnership with the United States will limit the state’s dependence on China and Russia.

A Much Needed Win for the Trump Administration

With the country’s proposed accession to the Abraham Accords, Kazakhstan offered Trump a diplomatic victory he greatly desired: a Muslim-majority country willing to forge close ties with post-war Israel. In his first term, Trump surprised the world by successfully negotiating for four Arab, Muslim-majority states—Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco, and Sudan— to establish formal relations with Israel through the framework of the Abraham Accords. In 2023, Saudi Arabia was set to become the next and most influential state to formally recognise Israel, a move the United States hoped would inspire a number of other Arab states to follow. However, largely due to public pressure once Israel began its ground invasion of Gaza in October of 2023, Saudi Arabia halted all momentum towards the recognition of an Israeli state. 

When Trump returned to office in January 2025, he conceded that Israel, a key regional ally of the United States, was becoming increasingly isolated on the world stage. Backlash stemmed from global outrage over alleged war crimes committed by its army in Gaza. On September 16, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory issued a report concluding that Israel “has committed genocide” in the Gaza Strip. Due to overwhelming condemnation of Israel’s actions in war across the Arab and Muslim world, no state in the region since the beginning of the war in Gaza has moved to recognise Israel. 

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Trump still believes in the Abraham Accords as the solution to break the regional isolation of post-war Israel. With Kazakhstan’s participation, Trump claims the gesture is a pivotal revitalisation of the Abraham Accords, spurring future membership from more consequential regional powers. Notably, Kazakhstan’s announcement came twelve days before Saudi prince Mohammed bin Salman is planned to visit Washington D.C.. Trump is expected to use Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords to put political pressure on Saudi Arabia to restart efforts to normalise ties with Israel.

The Future of Kazakh-American Cooperation

During the November 2025 C5+1 summit, Trump hinted he may soon make a presidential visit to Astana. All indications suggest Trump has grown fond of Tokayev’s government. Its readiness to secure US access to critical minerals and to breathe life into Trump’s stalled Middle East peace project has not gone unnoticed in Washington. While Tokayev believes he is able to maintain Kazakh sovereignty by juggling agreements between Russia, China and the United States, it is unclear if further cooperation with Trump’s America will bring Kazakhstan the independence it so desires. 

Read more on Novastan: Central Asia and Russia: an ever-changing relationship

Qatar, a regional neighbor long eager to balance diplomacy and defense, found itself punished for its alignment with Washington and peace efforts. In the past year alone, it was bombed twice – once by Iran and once by Israel, America’s closest regional ally. Not too far away from Kazakhstan in the Caucasus, Trump recently showed the world with his Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Deal his administration’s eagerness to use diplomacy to cement America’s own economic hegemony in far away regions.

Time will tell if Tokayev’s gamble for further integration with the United States will yield the result his government desires. By joining the Abraham Accords at a critical moment for the initiative’s survival, Kazakhstan has successfully proven its diplomatic usefulness to Washington. However, as Trump aims to expand American influence over the Asian continent, Kazakhstan now risks becoming a pawn in America’s mounting competition for dominance with China engulfing the Central Asian region.

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Joseph Fisher for Novastan

The post Kazakhstan to become an Unusual Addition to the Abraham Accords: Will this Diplomatic Gesture for Washington Pay Off? appeared first on Novastan English.

Doctors’ low salaries in Kyrgyzstan have been considered a chronic problem for years and explain certain deficiencies in the health system. Health Minister Alymkadyr Beishenaliev seems to have taken a step towards reform, but not everyone shares this hope, with doctors accusing a politicised and timid ministry of incompetency.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 25 January 2022. On 8 January, the Kyrgyz media Novye Litsa posted an interview given by Minister of Health Alymkadyr Beishenaliev. Beishenaliev addressed various subjects, discussing the country’s health status and defending his actions. He heavily criticised reforms undertaken since the end of the Soviet Union, stating that some of them “have destroyed the healthcare system, which existed for 70 years during the Soviet Union and worked very well.”

The details of the proposal include raising doctors’ monthly salary to a minimum of $1000 (£863.97), according to the Kyrgyz media site Kloop. The minister mentioned during the interview that he already decreed increasing the income of medical professionals, the first increase of its kind in fifteen years.

A challenge for the future of medicine

Raising salaries is perceived as a key solution to address the shortage of skilled caregivers in Kyrgyzstan. As reported by the American media Current Times, many young doctors have been emigrating to Russia in recent years. Paid a derisory salary while forced to do overtime, they fled “miserable conditions in hospitals.” Doctors practising in the capital Bishkek have explained to Novastan that “since the arrival of Alymkadyr Beishenaliev, there has been an increase in salaries. But despite everything, the income of doctors remains very low. A university graduate will receive a basic salary of 10 000 som (£105.45). It’s outrageous, it’s impossible to survive with this amount,” they describe, wishing to remain anonymous. According to official Kyrgyz statistics, the average salary in 2020 was 18 940 som (£199.71). Young doctors are therefore less well paid today than the average Kyrgyz. Read more on Novastan: In Kyrgyzstan, one in four families lives below the poverty line The minister also announced his intention to develop incentive measures to encourage entering the medical field and to “give doctors the intention, not only to stay, but also to come back”, a goal he mentioned during the interview with Novye Litsa. Among other things, the granting of housing and various material benefits would be offered to those who settle outside the capital after graduation.

A Minister plagued by criticism

These promises, however, conflict with Beishenaliev’s political liabilities. The minister is one of the prominent figures in the entourage of President Sadyr Japarov. He has led the Ministry of Health since October 2020, after the start of the third Kyrgyz revolution, and has maintained his position despite three cabinet reshuffles. Kloop explains that he has not been able to achieve sufficient consensus for his reforms and has repeatedly attracted criticism from the medical world and civil society. During the pandemic he recommended the use of aconite, a toxic root used in traditional medicine, to treat coronavirus. He even drank a concoction in front of the press, which accused him of endangering his fellow citizens by promoting the consumption of a poison, describes Kloop. Read more on Novastan: Coronavirus in Central Asia: An Opportunity for China? Since December 2021, the ministry has been criticised for the dismissal of hospital directors, in particular that of a famous cardiology centre, reports the Kyrgyz media Kaktus. In the capital, employees at Hospital No. 15 describe the departure of their director as a political choice. They exhort the ministry “not to divide doctors into supporters and non-supporters. It is not time to separate those who supported Sadyr Japarov and those who were not present at his meetings,”reports Kaktus.

An unexciting salary increase

In light of this, it is certainly possible to suspect that Beishenaliev’s announcement is a political manoeuvre to appease the discontent of the medical world. The latter, plagued by a lack of means, personnel, training, and left struggling due to the pandemic, calls for more profound reforms. “Our opinion of the minister is generally negative. The salary increase looks like a pittance. The minister is not protecting our interests. Many elderly doctors do not know how to use a computer, no one shows them, but with the computerisation of data, they are required to do so,” a pair of doctors explains to Novastan. “This salary does not correspond in any way to the workload, between the large number of administrative documents and the diversity of illnesses. For example, in a polyclinic a general practitioner examines pregnant women as well as patients with tuberculosis. A doctor doesn’t have a hundred hands,” they conclude.  

Written by Tiago da Cunha

Translated from French by Matthew Devereux

Edited by Mari Paine

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The effects of sanctions against Russia are being strongly felt in Tajikistan. The Central Asian post-Soviet republic’s economy has been stagnant for years and many had left to find work in Russia. The instability in reaction to Russia’s activities in Ukraine is affecting almost every aspect of daily life. In Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital city, life is getting expensive. As American media Eurasianet remarks, Tajikistan is highly dependent on Russia economically, and many families count on remittances from relatives working there. According to World Bank data, remittances consisted of 26.7 % of Tajikistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020, which makes it the third most dependent country in the world. With the increasing sanctions being placed on Russia following the on-going conflict in Ukraine, and the subsequent boast to the dollar, almost everything has become more expensive in the past weeks. Feruza, a teacher working at a private university, spoke to Novastan of the impact the changing dollar price has had on her family. “I had to pay the fees for my son’s school a few days ago. Now the somoni is so weak against the dollar; it’s like I’m paying an extra 100 dollars in the previous rate”, she explains.

The fees for international schools can generally be paid in dollars or somoni, but the price is, like most expenses, set by the dollar. “I wanted to pay in dollars but when I went to the bank, they told me that they are not allowed to pay out dollars. I explained it was to pay for my son’s school fees but they said, ‘No, we can only give you dollars with permission from the bank manager, and only if your account is in dollars.’ There were others there with a similar problem”, describes Feruza.

Sending money home becomes more expensive

Generally, people often opt to exchange money on the black market, rather than go to the bank. “You can find a better rate if you shop around, but it’s very dangerous,” Nagina, an office worker from Gorno-Badakhshan, in eastern Tajikistan, explained to Novastan. “My children are living in Moscow and we don’t usually need them to send money home. But if it’s needed, right now it is better to find someone travelling from Russia to Tajikistan, rather than using the bank”, she says. When payments are sent from Russia, they are paid in ruble and received in somoni. Due to the ruble’s depreciation following the sanctions, people working in Russia need to pay extra to reflect the changing price and secure the needed amount of somoni. It is therefore easier and more cost-effective to send dollars in cash with someone making the journey. This current instability is nothing new, as Nagina highlights. “We are experienced. During the financial crisis, it was the same so we know how to prepare. We buy food to store, things like oil or flour which last for a long time. We don’t know when the prices will change again, so we have to be prepared”, she describes. Food insecurity is already a major issue in Tajikistan with up to 27 % of the population living on 1.90 dollars (£1.44) or less per day, according to USAID. While many families received a one-time payment of 500 somoni (£29.16) during the Covid-19 pandemic, it is yet to be announced how the Tajik government will respond to current price hikes.

Prices heavily rely on the dollar

“For me, it has affected my day-to-day costs of course, and my business a little,” import-middleman Alisher explained to Novastan. “People are shopping less. For example, see this iPhone case. Before it was maybe 10 somoni (£0.58), now it’s 16 (£0.93)”, he says. Around the capital, businesses have increased their prices to reflect the new cost of living. A small portion of oshi pilau, Tajikistan’s national dish, typically cost 16 somoni (£0.93) but has risen to as high as 20 somoni (£1.16). Most significantly, the price of petrol from the Russian supplier Gazprom has risen from 10.30 somoni (£0.60 per litre) to 12 somoni (£0.70). “Everything here is connected to the price of the dollar,” Alisher concluded. “The dollar is everything in Tajikistan.”

Fiona Katherine Smith Editor and writer for Novastan in Dushanbe

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At the end of April 2021, the Uzbek produce exporter Global Export shipped 44 tonnes of beans to the world leader in canned vegetables, French company Bonduelle. With this result of a new partnership between the two companies, Global Export’s director hopes to strengthen this collaboration.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 5 May 2021. According to Uzbek media UzNews, the Uzbek company Global Export exported the first batch of vegetables during the end of last April with the help of the Uzbek embassy in France and the Uzbek Export Promotion Agency. Supplying Bonduelle with ‘black eyed beans’, or black eyed peas, this partnership adds France to the list of Global Export’s twenty-six partners, according to its website.

In a comment to Novastan, the director of Uzbek company Global Export Abbos Botirov explained the intent to develop the Bonduelle partnership. “Receiving European partners’ recognition is absolute proof of the quality of our company’s products,” declares Abbos Botirov. “Our company already has strong partnerships with companies in eight European countries. This was also made possible through compliance with international food standards such as FSSC 22000”, he added.

Global Export aims to strengthen Bonduelle partnership in the coming months

“This recognition from the greatest worldwide vegetable can company shows that our business has started to gain status as a trusted partner in agricultural produce,” explains Abbos Botirov. Read More on Novastan: Uzbekistan asked France to be more involved in Central Asia As of May 2021, the agreement between the two companies has seen 180 tonnes of beans exported to France. Moreover, the Global Export director sees the partnership heading in a positive direction, adding “We expect to significantly increase the volume of exportation to 700 tons per year.” Bonduelle did not respond to Novastan’s request for comment.

Joanna Blain Editor for Novastan

Translated from French by Emma Bekrine

Edited by Fiona Katherine Smith

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Overexploited, even looted by poachers, Kazakh liquorice is in danger, Traffic International has warned. In a report published in April, the NGO describes a critical situation with the risk of depletion of this slow-to-harvest resource. This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 10 June 2021.On 7 April, the NGO Traffic International, in association with the Association for the Conservation of Biodiversity in Kazakhstan (ACBK), released a report highlighting the dangers posed to liquorice reserves in Kazakhstan.By exposing the methods of the intensive and disorderly cultivation of liquorice in Kazakhstan over several years, the authors of this report attempt to warn about the alarming decline in the quantity of wild liquorice and propose concrete solutions to remedy this environmental disaster.

Liquorice, a unique culture

Cultivated since the 19th century in Kazakhstan, liquorice has long thrived in the wild in much of the country. Dried and then processed, liquorice root is used in around 100 different medicines, medicinal preparations or teas. Today it is the subject of ever-increasing international demand.

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The cultivation of liquorice requires very specific conditions. For example, experts from the Kazakhstan Botanical Institute based in Almaty established that liquorice cultivation requires breaks of 6 to 8 years, during which the fields should remain untapped in order to regenerate. On the other hand, according to the same experts, only three-quarters of the liquorice roots should be removed so that the rest of the rhizomes can form new shoots.

Liquorice Poachers

According to the Traffic International report, however, a whole wild harvest economy has developed in Kazakhstan since 2011. There, collection has become uncontrolled and illegal. The biological protocols described by the Institute of Botany are no longer being observed. In the traditional liquorice harvesting areas, the situation now seems to repeat itself every year: wild cullenders are hired without an operating work permit. They raze entire areas and then leave the fields abandoned and looted.

Devastating extraction methods

These liquorice poachers use unsuitable tools that deeply affect the soil and leave little chance for root regeneration. Wild cullenders leave behind destroyed fields in which the immature roots for unsuitable liquorice remain exposed to the sun in immense furrows. Left exposed, the roots wither away when they are not capable of growing back.

These practices are associated with devastating effects on the ecosystem surrounding the liquorice growing areas. Fires are thus started regularly to weed the surroundings of the fields but, in doing so, they destroy neighbouring crops and deprive entire herds of pasture.

Exports and social consequences

The Traffic International report explains this overexploitation with the financial windfall that liquorice cultivation represents for local economies. Often, local cullenders are supporting whole villages.However, this illegal workforce remains largely underpaid: 34 tenges per kilogram of liquorice (£0.05) compared to several euros when exported, according to the United Nations data.According to the United Nation Commodity Trade (UNCT) database cited by Traffic International, the export volume of liquorice root has steadily increased in recent years in Kazakhstan. At its lowest in 2015 with less than 10 tonnes exported, exports reached nearly 90 tonnes in 2019. According to data from Tridge, a specialist on world trade in agri-food, Kazakhstan only holds 70th place among exporters with 2.9 million dollars (2.2 million pounds) of exports, or 0.09% of the total in 2020. The top three are China (27.5% of exports), India (11.4%) and Germany (7%).

A global environmental threat

In addition to the dangers posed by overexploitation of liquorice reserves, the authors of this report add the general deterioration of environmental conditions in the regions where it is cultivated. The construction of several hydraulic dams would thus profoundly modify the hydrological balance of many rivers, while the intensive ploughing of agricultural land and desertification would threaten the entire environment.

Towards more controls

To fight against these threats, Traffic International proposes a series of concrete measures addressed to the Kazakh government as well as to liquorice producers. In particular, it proposes to strengthen controls during illegal harvests, to strictly apply the recommendations of the Institute of Botany and phyto-introduction, or to geolocate precisely the geographical areas where the harvests take place so that the cultivation of liquorice will not be subject to annual overexploitation.More generally, the report by Traffic International underlines that the survival of liquorice reserves explicitly requires the establishment of a long-term sustainable development protocol. Specifically, it advocates for the use of certifications developed by the Fair Wild Foundation, the objective of which is to ensure more ecological, social, and economically viable business practices throughout the production chain.

Emmanuel Purguy Writer for Novastan

Translated from French by Maïté Saïzonou

Edited by Fiona Katherine Smith

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Dr Jade McGlynn has published an article for The Diplomat discussing the modernisation of Britain’s Central Asian Trade Strategy, based on her report for the Henry Jackson Society, entitled ‘A Steppe Change: Should Britain Be Bolder In Central Asia?’. In it, she states the UK “needs to think more ambitiously and coherently about its business aims with Central Asia”. In developing relations with the Central Asian states, the UK could balance trade with human rights and developmental assistance. So far, the UK has failed to develop such a strategy, and efforts remain focused on trading opportunities. McGlynn wants the UK to take head of the political realities of these states and ensure it champions and actively encourages democracy and greater human rights while simultaneously organising and developing trade agreements. Novastan spoke to Dr McGlynn to find out more about her strategy. An example of where the UK has failed to do as much is their increasing arms deals with Turkmenistan, considered by human rights groups as one of the world’s most repressive and authoritarian regimes. In comparison, the UK’s assistance to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has benefitted both nations and given the UK considerable soft power through showing commitment to the region beyond trade. The emerging signs of democratisation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s two largest economies and nations, show the region to be making a gradual change from what has long been considered an authoritarian area of the world. The landslide election of Sadyr Japarov in Kyrgyzstan should be cautiously championed for implementing democracy. By providing vocal support for Kyrgyzstan, the UK reminds the other nations that its trade, investment and support are connection to Kyrgyzstan’s continued democratic style of governance. This in turn could increase the likelihood for democratisation in the neighbouring states. The UK should take inspiration from the Obama administration’s C5+1 initiative and build on its positive reputation gained from development work in the region. This would then allow the UK to maintain channels with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and shows they are open to trade should they ever move towards democratisation. The UK has not paid enough attention to Central Asia. When it has, only specific countries or aspects, for example trade with Kazakhstan, have been made the point of focus. A region-focused approach instead would benefit both Britain and countries where regional cooperation has not always been strong. Human rights must remain a priority As much as increased trade negotiations with these countries should be encouraged, she maintains that the UK cannot sign deals at the expense of human rights and jeopardization of a free and fair society. The UK’s current arms deals with Turkmenistan are a shocking example of sacrificing ethics in order to bolster trade. The lack of pressure on the UK to halter these deals is due to a lack of knowledge and media coverage of the area. Too often the mainstream, generalised media focuses on the bizarre rules put in place by President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, shining the country in a comedic, ridiculous light. The reality of the brutal human rights abuses and widespread poverty despite the wealth of natural resources in the country is forgotten. Larger organisations rather than just specialised areas should give the country more attention in order to increase knowledge of Turkmenistan, something which would elevate pressure to stop these morally and ethically entirely unacceptable arms deals. These deals undermine the UK’s pronounced championship of human rights and should be stopped. Elsewhere, little has been done to improve the state of human rights for the citizens of Central Asia: despite claims by the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as to the development of human rights, little evidence of this has yet been shown. Recent human rights abuses include censorship of journalists and oppression of the LGBTQ+ community. While democratic, the election of Sadyr Japarov in Kyrgyzstan and imprisonment of the most outspoken critic and presidential hopeful, Omurbek Tekebayev, puts the country as risk of returning to the populist authoritarianism overturned in 2010. It would be hypocritical of the UK to adopt a trade policy with such countries after public anti-authoritarian efforts in China and Russia and could demoralise activists in these countries who need the UK’s support. Implementing a human rights checklist backed up by independent NGOs from the region in order to assess milestones in terms of achieving greater democracy and freedom could encourage increased democratisation. This would enable the UK to measure economic engagement against human rights and democratisation milestones. Goals could be set for countries like Uzbekistan that claim to be installing more democratic milestones such as free access for election observers, the establishment of NGOs and funds to support independent media. Once reached, the country could continue to the next stage in economic relations. Putting a permanent representative in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, would symbolise the UK’s commitment to supporting the democratic potential of the region. Kyrgyzstan is currently the most democratic country and would demonstrate the UK’s hope that they should stay on this path. It would also reward and prioritise the most democratic country and encourage Sadyr Japarov, President of Kyrgyzstan, to continue this work. The UK alone would have enough power to rely on their influence to speed up democratisation in Central Asia. However, the European interest, particularly from countries who keep human rights as a core component of their foreign policy, namely Scandinavian countries, and desires in Washington for the Biden administration to continue with Obama’s policy, allow for a combined effort which ups the pressure for Central Asian nations. Background of Central Asia The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and subsequent independence for Central Asian countries led to a long-term struggle for democracy. Many of these countries contain deeply embedded ethnic tensions dating back to Stalin’s policies, for example in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan. These countries have had to deal with civil wars, widespread humans rights abuses and as a result their economies have struggled to achieve their full potential. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan still rely heavily on remittances. However, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have seen a near doubling in per capita income in purchasing power parity since independence and political conflicts have not deterred interest from abroad in trade and investment. These countries are rich in natural resources, which constitute 65 per cent of exports in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as over 90 per cent in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The UK has now left the EU and thus has the freedom to pursue its own trade deal. Economic, security and geopolitical considerations make Central Asia a good trade partner, including the appetite for British goods in countries such as Kazakhstan and the pre-established trade and diplomatic presence of the UK in each of the nations. The Department of International Trade has put in effort to build on existing standing especially in Kazakhstan, where UK cultural, service and educational exports are popular. For example, 4,000 Kazakh students are currently studying in the UK and more visas are issues to Kazakh students than Australians. With two established UK trade offices in Kazakhstan, a comparatively large economy and a consistently open approach to free trade, McGlynn deems the country a promising contender for UK export growth. In comparison, Uzbekistan also has potential since the United Kingdom-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 2019 enabled the two to grant each other the most favoured nation (MFN) treatment. This is important because Uzbekistan does not belong in the World Trade Organisation. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have less ample economic opportunities due to widespread poverty, a relatively low GDP of $8.09 and $7.52 billion respectively, although it is still important to include them. The UK accounts for almost half of all Kyrgyzstan’s export, mainly gold, which provides leverage to promote democratisation. Trade between the UK and Turkmenistan has flourished under the auspices of the Turkmen-British Trade and Economic Council, even if it allows for a growth in controversial arms deals. The UK is not alone in the rush to take advantage of such lucrative deals: Italy has established a business forum with Central Asian countries, signing arms deals with Turkmenistan. The USA has just launched the Central Asia Investment Partnership and the Scandinavian nations have recently held the Kazakhstan Northern European Investment Forum. McGlynn advises the UK to hurry in these countries’ footsteps but paying heed not to lose sight of their moral and democratic values. Impact on other countries

Economic investment can also improve security interests, namely in helping to stabilise the countries. With a combined population of 75million, the average age of a Central Asian citizen is 27.6, highlighting the need for economic opportunities for young people. Without such opportunities, the likelihood for young people to become radicalised or turn to extremist groups is far greater. The UK’s trade influence can be used as a positive counter example to major geopolitical players in that region- Russia and China. The UK has condemned China’s campaign against the Uyghur people in Xinjiang, a campaign which has also targeted ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, the Kazakhs being the second largest Turkic-speaking indigenous community in the region after the Uyghurs. It also contains many ethnic Kyrgyz. The UK’s economic approach must take into account these people, support them and help refugees.

 Lily Shanagher Edited by Tommy Hodgson

The post How can Britain develop trade in Central Asia? appeared first on Novastan English.

On 6 February 2021, a delegation from the Taliban visited the Turkmen capital, Ashgabat. The meeting, held with Turkmenistan’s foreign affairs minister Raşit Meredow, related to the construction of the TAPI pipeline, which aims to connect several countries within the region. 

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 24 February 2021.

Visits of this kind don’t happen every day: on 6 February, Taliban leaders held talks with Turkmenistan’s minister of foreign affairs Raşit Meredow. During the talks, both parties emphasised the importance of ensuring stability and peace in Afghanistan. In addition, they discussed the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline.

Turkmenistan has never ceased to support this initiative, which dates back to a memorandum signed in 1995. This pipeline would allow Turkmenistan to be less dependent on the Chinese market and diversify gas exportation routes to reach South-Asia countries. The TAPI pipeline project would pass through Afghanistan, Pakistan then India, a route which seems to attract endless complications. 

The Taliban (once again) vouches for the security of the pipeline

Following this meeting, the Taliban declared their support for the pipeline project, which they believe would contribute to development and prosperity in Afghanistan. In this respect, they reiterated intentions they had already expressed in 2016. The declaration included a pledge not to jeopardise the constructions of facilities and infrastructure that could benefit their country. The statement came not long after an attack on regional electric power infrastructure, connecting various Central Asia countries to the Afghan territory. 

Read more: Agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan paves the way for Trans-Caspian Pipeline

This declaration was made after negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, which had started in September 2020 in Qatar, resumed in January. Their objective is finding a compromise to ensure the country’s stability. This northward expansion is an opportunity to gain legitimacy from the rest of the world and to be seen as consistent and essential contributors to the peace-making process. However, even if peace were achieved, it may not guarantee the construction of the pipeline. 

As the American media Eurasianet notes, given the dominant role that the Taliban play in the region’s security, Turkmenistan is directly affected by events that take place in Afghanistan.

In a RFE/RL analysis relating to the visit, the journalist and regional specialist Bruce Pannier evokes many details, including the Taliban’s practices over the past months. Contrary to what they had promised at the end of 2016, the Taliban destroyed strategic regional infrastructure, including electrical. So with this precedent of going back on pledges, it is difficult to see the Taliban as a partner reliable and consistent enough to ensure the success of the pipeline project. 

No US facilitation

One year after signing an agreement with the Taliban, the USA decided not to interfere in the talks between Turkmenistan and the Taliban. In a statement to the American magazine Newsweek on 19 February, the Department of State denied facilitating the recent meeting: “The United States played no role in the Taliban’s visit to Turkmenistan and has no position to share on those discussions.”

“The United States has long supported efforts by Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors to strengthen their connectivity, boost economic coordination, and improve regional transportation infrastructure, including energy infrastructure,” the statement added. Similarly, in October 2020, in a joint statement with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, the American government said it continued to support energy infrastructure in the region. 

It is possible that this meeting between the Taliban and Turkmenistan will succeed in pushing forward a project that has been stopped and started so many times. The decision to welcome the Afghan Taliban allows Turkmenistan to pursue a stable project and to reassure investors, including private Afghan, Pakistani and Indian companies, as well as the Islamic Development Bank. 

TAPI’s phantom construction

In effect, for practical reasons, construction has not progressed quickly, if at all. During the meeting on 6 February, Turkmenistan did not release an official date or any information regarding the financing of the project. The Afghan news outlet Tolonews explained that, as of January 2020, construction had not started in Afghanistan. The Diplomat reported that this was enough to curb the optimism of certain countries who, in 2016, hoped for completion by 2018.

In 2015, Turkmenistan organised a ceremony lavishly celebrating the start of construction of the Turkmen section of the pipeline. Now, many experts question whether this section has actually been completed, when it was supposed to be ready by 2019. Endlessly pushed back, the TAPI project could quite possibly never reach completion. 

Many factors cast doubt on the viability of this project, making former optimism seem outdated. In an April 2019 article, RFE/RL noted that Turkmenistan had ordered additional pipes to construction sites despite stating construction on its territory had already been completed. This led the American media to conclude that, taking into account the volume of material purchased, the installation was far from being finished. In this context, it is difficult to imagine how the Afghan construction could have started, as no prior preparation had been completed. 

Other obstacles

Even presuming that the Turkmen section has been completed, that doesn’t at all guarantee the certainty of the project on the other side of the border. From a political standpoint, the support coming from Pakistan and India has been dependent on Turkmenistan’s pledge to decrease the price of the natural gas it exports. 

Accordingly, Pakistan has explicitly said that its participation in this project depended on a reduction in gas prices. Last June, Islamabad expressed its intent to revise certain terms of the contract that tied it to Turkmenistan, especially the clauses concerning the responsibility of repair in the case of an accident that might take part on the Afghan territory. The German news source Deutsche Welle published an in-depth analysis on this subject, which suggested that Pakistan’s demands have not been observed for the moment and remain an obstacle, delaying completion of the pipeline. Many of the experts interviewed in the piece asserted that the meeting on 6 February could be used as leverage by the Pakistani government in upcoming negotiations.

Read more: Uzbekistan: towards greater cooperation with Iran?

Finally, from a legal standpoint, The Diplomat reported that an Afghan law, voted into effect in 2019, delayed the start of construction. Whether the problems arise for security, legal or political reasons, the project seems to remain uncertain, facing both internal and external hurdles. While the meeting between Turkmenistan and the Taliban remained an attempt to prove commitment towards the project, the project is substantial in serving Turkmenistan’s interests. 

A crucial project for Turkmenistan 

The country, boasting some of the greatest natural gas reserves in the world, depends almost entirely on the sale of this commodity to uphold its economy. This situation becomes all the more problematic for Ashgabat which has, for the moment, only one major client, China. According to the American Trade Administration, in 2019, an overwhelming percentage of Turkmen oil was exported to the Chinese market via the Central Asian pipeline, shared with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The price of this oil was particularly low in 2016, after China negotiated a lower rate in exchange for investments in pipeline construction.  

Read more: Russia commits to railroad corridor China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan

Even though Turkmenistan relaunched oil exportation to the Russian market in 2019, Gazprom remains just a minor contributor to the Turkmen economy. 

As such, the Turkmen government has every interest in ensuring greater security for its Afghan neighbour. For the Central Asian state, it would ensure that construction go ahead unhindered and, in the long term, secure the two countries’ shared energy infrastructure. This project has become even more critical as China has decreased Turkmen oil importation to favour their neighbours, as the Foreign Policy Institute, a US-based think tank, analyses in a 2020 report.

Zenon Bekdouche
Novastan.org

Translated from French by Alice Coveney

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The Uzbek government has announced an action plan to develop the country’s tourism industry. The new measures, targeting transport, visa requirements and taxes, are in effect since the end of February. Uzbekistan hopes to promote its tourism industry despite the COVID-19 pandemic.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 16 February 2021.

On 3 February, the Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed a decree aiming at developing Uzbekistan’s tourism industry, as reported by the media Spot.uz. With these new measures, the most populated country in Central Asia seeks to promote domestic and international tourism by attracting both local and neighbouring visitors, all in spite of the coronavirus pandemic.

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Transport, tourist taxes, business incentives and extra days off work are among the six initiatives covered by the decree. The objective is to create an attractive environment for tourists and to strengthen the country’s image. Tourism represented 3,4% of the country’s GDP in 2020, according to the economic database Knoema.

New air and rail connections

One of the priorities is to increase the frequency and availability of transport throughout the country. Flights linking Farg’ona (Fergana) and Urgench, Termiz and Urgench, and Qarshi and Urgench were set to be launched by the end of February 2021.

The frequency of rail services between Andijon and Khiva, located respectively in the east and west of the country, will be increased. At the same time, regular services will be launched between Termiz, Qarshi and Khiva; Khiva, Urgench and Nukus; and Termiz, Qarshi and Samarkand, all set to be completed by 1 April. These new rail connections will be subsidised by the state.

Extended financial incentives

Financial incentives, introduced at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, are extended until 31 December 2021 to support the transport measures. Accordingly, the 50% reduction on income tax rate continues for travel agencies and accommodation facilities. Airline and rail ticket fees are subsidised at a rate of 30% for trips taken to Uzbekistan by groups of foreign tourists of at least 10 people, for a minimum stay of five nights in accommodation facilities.

Read more: Russia commits to railroad corridor China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan

Travel agencies and registered tourist accommodation facilities now benefit from an exoneration of property tax as well as a lower social tax, at a reduced rate of 1%. The application of penalties for unpaid taxes on foreign business relating to travellers, travel agencies and accommodation providers is also suspended until the end of 2021. However, to support infrastructure, the tourist tax will now apply to all tourists, not just foreign ones. This last measure was implemented from 1 March.

Extended visas

From 1 March, Uzbekistan has allowed citizens of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and China to spend up to 10 days in the country without a visa. Previously, the visa-free stay was limited to 5 days. British citizens can stay in Uzbekistan for up to 30 days without a visa.

With the introduction of this new set of measures, Uzbekistan intends to improve the quality of services and to promote its tourism sector both locally and internationally. Grants and funds to improve networks, community services, quality of roads and touristic services will be made available to achieve this goal. All that’s left to do is to wait and see if these measures will have the desired effect.

Adèle Brière
Novastan.org

Translated by Alice Coveney

Edited by Joana da Silva Pina

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Uzbekistan to develop international and domestic tourism appeared first on Novastan English.

Iran and Uzbekistan’s joint infrastructure projects are picking up steam despite the pandemic. A first working meeting between India, Iran and Uzbekistan in mid-December 2020 once again underlined the commitment of all parties. Above all, the deep-water port in Chabahar in southern Iran stands as a potential gateway to world trade for the Uzbek economy.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s German website on 19 January 2021.

The port of Chabahar, in southern Iran, is at the heart of a new Eurasian infrastructure initiative. Rail and transport links to and from the port are intended to better connect Central Asia and especially Uzbekistan and Afghanistan to international freight traffic. The new routes would significantly reduce previous transport times as well as costs and could contribute to an economic upswing in the Central Asian republics.

On 14 December 2020, a first trilateral working meeting took place between Uzbekistan, Iran and India. Prior to this, Iran and Uzbekistan had already held several bilateral meetings and visits. The latest meeting was co-chaired by India’s shipping minister Sanjeev Ranjan, Uzbekistan’s deputy minister for transport Davron Dehkanov and Iran’s deputy transport minister Shahram Adamnejad. The focus was on the three countries’ relations under the Ashgabat Agreement, which came into force in 2016, and on the Chabahar infrastructure project.

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According to Adamnejad, Uzbekistan, as the most populous country in Central Asia, has an interest in expanding its logistics and transport capacity and creating additional links to drive its economy forward. The Ashgabat Agreement provides for cooperation in the transport sector between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Oman and, since February 2018, India. It also connects with International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a transport route stretching from Russia to India. From the Uzbek side, rail links are already in place in the direction of northern Afghanistan’s Mazar-e Sharif, testifying to Tashkent’s ambitions. Tajikistan is also connected to this link, which would run towards Mashhad in north-western Iran and from there on to the Persian Gulf.

Iran’s Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reports that Uzbekistan’s Dehkanov praised the facilities of the port of Chabahar, pointing out that in view of the operational capabilities, equipment and strategic position of the port, the formation of a joint working group would be pushed forward as soon as possible.

Iran as a future hub for trade with Uzbekistan and Central Asia

In early May 2019, Iran’s special envoy Kamal Kharazi visited the Uzbek capital for bilateral talks. Joint and regional issues were discussed, such as the construction of the rail link between the Afghan cities of Mazar-e Sharif and Herat, as well as other aspects of the Chabahar project. Both sides agreed to increase the container transport volume on this route.

Tashkent sees the connection via Iran as the economically most profitable and shortest link to the world markets. Conversely, Tehran sees the connection via Uzbekistan as the strategically most important and shortest transit route to China and East Asia. However, the overall trade volume has been manageable so far, not least because of Iran’s economic situation and the coronavirus pandemic.

Another possible train route is from Chabahar to resource-rich central Afghanistan, which would also enable a connection to Kabul. The project, financed and driven mainly by India, is partly in competition with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. With INSTC, India is trying to bypass the overland route via Pakistan and at the same time create an alternative to China’s Belt and Road network for the Central Asian states. China’s increasing dominance and market strength in Central Asia is prompting New Delhi to create alternatives and to dig deeper into its pockets. The expansions of water, rail and road networks planned within the framework of INSTC and by the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative would almost halve the transport routes to the countries of Central Asia and make Iran a future hub for trade with the region.

Bilateral relations and regional goals

At the end of July 2020, a virtual conference was held between the Uzbek minister of investment and foreign trade, Sardar Omar Zagov, and the Iranian vice president for economic affairs, Mohammad Nahavandian, as reported by the Tehran Times. The Iranian side announced that the trade volume between Uzbekistan and Iran had increased by 40 per cent in 2019. Sardar Omar Zagov underlined Iran’s important role as a trade partner for Uzbekistan, stressing the ties between the countries: “We believe that geographical proximity and spiritual commonalities are a good opportunity that can be used to increase the level of economic relations between the two countries“

Tashkent said it welcomed the presence of Iranian investors and engineering companies in economic and development projects in the country. It is also interested in expanding scientific and technological relations. Shortly after the conference, the chairman of the Chabahar Free Trade-Industrial Zone Organisation announced an agreement with Uzbekistan: the country will trade agricultural products and minerals with India via Chahabar.

Both Iran and Uzbekistan are located in strategically important positions in the region and pursue geopolitical goals and interests in this regard. Uzbekistan strives for good neighbourly relations and tries to ensure stability and security in the entire Central Asian region. In doing so, it insists on neutrality in the conflict between Tehran and Washington. At the same time, the Uzbek government is trying to work towards strengthening relations between Iran and important regional actors such as Russia, China, Turkey and India.

Read more on Novastan: Russia commits to railroad corridor China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan

Iran is striving to address the situation in Afghanistan in cooperation with neighbouring countries and to transform it to its own advantage. Through joint projects, it is ensuring it will continue to play the role of a gateway to Central Asia, including as a transit corridor for oil, gas and other goods.

Although the US State Department plans to exempt the port in Chabahar from sanctions, the project has recently developed more slowly than planned due to the coronavirus pandemic and the American sanctions strategy of “maximum pressure”. The exemption is granted because of the project’s potential economic benefits in Afghanistan and India. The slowdown of the region’s economic plans is consequently also hampering the further development of the Uzbek economy.

A good relationship between Iran and the Central Asian countries is becoming increasingly important for Tehran in view of the continuing American sanctions. With a new president of the United States and a possible relaunch of the so-called nuclear deal of the 5+1 group, it will become clear whether Iran’s political position will once again move closer to the West. If future negotiations do not work out, Iran’s eastern ties, which have been strengthened since the collapse of the nuclear negotiations due to US withdrawal from the treaty, could develop further.

Progress also depends on future US policy

What is certain is that Iran is in any case becoming increasingly connected to its eastern neighbours. Uzbekistan in particular is counting on future cooperation to gain access to the Indian Ocean. Trade relations and points of contact already exist between the two countries in multilateral formats such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, in which Iran has observer status.

The biggest obstacle to economic traffic between Uzbekistan and Iran continues to be the American sanctions, which both paralyse the Iranian economy and indirectly slow down infrastructure projects such as Chabahar. A serious conflict between Tehran and Washington would also partially affect the transit routes for Uzbek goods. Thus, a reopening of the nuclear negotiations would be in the interest of the government in Tashkent. With Joe Biden becoming president of the United States on 20 January, expectations are rising both in Tehran and Tashkent. If they are fulfilled, economic and political relations between Iran and Uzbekistan could reach a new level of cooperation.

Darius Regenhardt
Novastan Deutsch

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Uzbekistan: towards greater cooperation with Iran? appeared first on Novastan English.

ANALYSIS. Since early November, temperatures in Uzbekistan have been 2-5 degrees lower than average. Electricity consumption has increased by over 17%, reaching a new all-time high on 25 November according to the country’s ministry of energy, who cut off electricity for many consumers due to high demand. Similarly, according to the gas supplier Hududgazta’minot, quoted by the Uzbek media Podrobno.uz, gas consumption rose by over 50%. At the same time, the ministry of energy shut off gas for many businesses, including glasshouses producing fruits and vegetables. The disconnections led to important losses for many farmers, who had to turn to coal for their energy needs.

Some even called for Alisher Sultanov, the minister of energy, to resign. He replied that the circumstances were exceptional. In fact, Uzbekistan’s energy industry has been facing issue after issue for over 30 years, with little investment resulting in a largely loss-making system.

This article was originally published by Novastan France for its subscribers on 30 November. Novastan English has translated it exceptionally.

Since early November, Uzbek households have been feeling the cold. With temperatures 2-5 degrees colder than the seasonal average, gas consumption has exploded. On 22 November, the state-owned company in charge of gas supply, Hududgazta’minot, estimated gas use had gone from 46 to 70 million cubic metres in a few days. Demand soon overwhelmed Hududgazta’minot, currently understaffed, causing shutoffs.

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This was a blow for Uzbek agriculture. As Gazeta.uz reports, glasshouses in the Samarqand region lost the equivalent of $35,000 (£26,000) because of the gas shutoffs. In Qashqadaryo Region, south of Samarkand, lack of gas resulted in the death of over 5,000 chickens, according to the Russian news website Fergana. The ministry of energy responded, as quoted by Kun.uz, that such shutoffs were part of the seasonal restrictions mentioned in the contracts between farms and gas companies, as supplying households and critical facilities is a priority.           

Less gas, less electricity

The lack of natural gas pushed Uzbekistan’s population towards other means of heating their homes, notably coal or electricity. The subsequent spike in electricity consumption led in its turn to electricity outages. Some households have been left without any heating at all.

This pushed citizens to put pressure on the ministry of energy, with some urging the minister, Alisher Sultanov, to resign. “If everyone resigns, who will do the work?” he replied.

The deputy minister Sherzod Kho’jaev told Kun.uz that electricity production would increase to keep up with Uzbekistan’s growing demand. He also announced an increase in gas production, which has been declining for several years.

Soviet-era infrastucture

More generally, the advanced age of Uzbekistan’s energy infrastructure is a factor in its current troubles. Built during Soviet times, it was only maintained as needed, and never truly modernised. “The main issue is the inefficiency of the gas supply system,” explains Shukhrat Bobokhujaev, senior professor at the economy of oil and gas department of Gubkin University’s Tashkent branch.

In an interview with the Uzbek Youtube channel Alter Ego, Alisher Sultanov stated that this inaction was “forced, that is, no funds were allocated.” Avoiding criticisms about lack of action in the past four years (corresponding to when the current president Shavkat Mizoyev came to power), the minister said it was important not to panic but also promised to find “who is to blame”.

Alisher Sultanov also pointed out that the energy sector had become one of the country’s priorities during Shavkat Mirzoyeyev’s presidency, from December 2016, but that it would take time before results materialised. He used the example of an electric power station, which takes three years to build.

The minister added that reconstruction and modernisation were in progress and that the industry was starting to attract private capital, for him a “revolutionary idea”. “This industry was a “sacred cow”, which could not be entered with private money,” he told Alter Ego. “And today the construction of a huge private power plant in Uzbekistan begins. The Saudi Arabian company Aqua Power is already starting work on the site.”

Administrative woes

Another explanation for the sector’s current issues comes from its administrative structure. Uzbekistan’s gas production is managed by two entities, O’zbekneftgas, which extracts gas, and Hududgazta’minot, which supplies it to consumers and maintains the pipelines. Hududgazta’minot was created in July 2019 to ease the privatisation of O’ztransgas, the company formerly in charge of the pipelines. Today, O’ztransgas is only responsible for exporting gas. All these structures are under the control of the ministry of energy.  

Separating production from supply has made adjusting to emergency situations more difficult. Indeed, even Hududgazta’minot distributing an additional 26,000 gas cylinders was not enough to meet demand. “The problem of providing the population with natural gas is not due to insufficient production, but to an ineffective gas supply system, with large losses as well as disruptions of the gas pipeline system due to obsolete equipment,” Shukhrat Bobokhujaev explains.

The senator Kutbiddin Burkhonov also criticised the state of the country’s pipelines, pointing out that 48% of them had been in use for 25-30 years, sometimes even longer.

The customer is not always right  

In response, Hududgazta’minot chose to highlight illegal gas consumption. This is also the line chosen by the chairman of the company in charge of regional electrical networks Ulugbek Mustafoiev. In an article published by the state news agency Uza.uz, he contends that the sector’s problems are due to consumers not paying their electricity bills and not facing consequences, causing huge losses for electricity companies. In his view, the creation of an automatic system to check payments will help regulate electricity supply and prevent the sort of energy issues the country faced in November.

Alisher Sultanov expressed a similar point of view on the Alter Ego Youtube channel, blaming unpaid bills on “people who consider themselves businessmen”, not “common people, who do not use much gas.”

The situation remains delicate. The Uzbek authorities have already announced that electricity and gas prices will not increase in 2021, Gazeta.uz reports. For its part, the Russian producer Lukoil said on 27 November that it was nearly once again reaching its planned gas production level in Uzbekistan. Production had fallen by 40% due to the coronavirus pandemic and declining demand from China.

“To solve the accumulated problems, complex decisions such as completely replacing industry managers and updating human resources policies are necessary,” Shukhrat Bobokhujaev asserts. He also suggests “suspending funding for ineffective investment projects, revising how funding is given and attracting foreign specialists to this process” and “establishing appropriate controls on natural gas supply to residents and businesses”.

Etienne Combier
Co-founder of Novastan France

Translated by Valentine Baldassari

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

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