Every year, the recruitment of Tajik soldiers, young people of age to perform their compulsory two-year military service, is a real problem for the authorities. In addition to the obsolete and corrupt recruitment campaign, there is a growing reluctance among young men to serve their country, even if it means emigrating to avoid it.

“Deserting” military service means fleeing the bad treatment in the ranks of the army: hazing, deplorable sanitary conditions, violent recruitment, and bribery to be declared unfit. We analyse the structural problems of the Tajik army, itself to blame for its lack of manpower.

It usually starts in the first days of spring and autumn. Conscript soldiers are called to register with the offices of the authorities to undertake their military service, which is mandatory for men aged 18 to 27 in Tajikistan, and will last two years. According to official data for 2019, there are about 600.000 young men of conscription age, of whom 150.000 are unfit for service and 100.000 are out of the country, according to Tajik media outlet Asia-Plus. Each year, only 15.000 to 16.000 recruits are actually called up for the needs of Tajikistan’s armed forces.

But the process never goes as planned. On April 1, local media reported problems with the way the young men are recruited. Radio Ozodi, the Tajik service of the American media outlet Radio Free Europe, explains, for example, that in the Vakhsh region a random “lottery” was held to select those who were to go into the army. The provinces of Sughd, Khatlon and the regions of the Rasht Valley also report pressure on the parents of young people of military age.

A resident of the Khorog region was sentenced to a year in prison on April 1 for running away from his obligation to serve, the Central Asian media outlet Kokshetau reported. “Having received a summons from the military commissariat and repeated invitations from the relevant administrations, he deliberately evaded conscription for fixed-term military service,” the prosecutor’s office said.

Every year, such problems occur, causing a wave of panic among young Tajiks of military age. Recruitment campaigns are conducted quietly and often arbitrarily, and never treat all citizens equally, which has a serious impact on the country’s military forces.

Fear of hazing and poor conditions

The reluctance of Tajik citizens to go and serve in the army is based on the poor living conditions that await them, such as lack of food, problems with military uniforms, poor quality clothes from which it is difficult to choose a size. But the most serious problem repeatedly pointed out by NGOs, especially by the Tajik organisation No Torture, is the practice of hazing.

The NGO has documented 59 cases of torture against military personnel between 2014 and 2016. 11 of them succumbed to the injuries, according to an article by Radio Ozodi, and there are also significant numbers of suicides among conscripts during their service.

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The Tajik government itself said in a report sent to the UN Human Rights Committee that more than 100 soldiers were killed between 2019 and 2021, mainly due to hazing in the army, the report says.

Faced with violence in the ranks of the army, however, the Tajik state does not compensate the victims or their relatives. For example, in 2014, a 22-year-old soldier was mistreated by his comrades, leaving him disabled. His lawyer then demanded that the army pay about 278.000 somoni (about 23.000 euros), but less than one-fifth of that sum was received by the victim, Russian media outlet Sputnik reported.

Violent recruitment methods

The violent recruitment for Tajik military service culminates in the organisation of raids by the authorities, suddenly taking young men away to their place of service. Eurasianet confirms this, describing young citizens who have just left school being taken away by cars waiting for them. Cabar Asia reports that the cars in which the young men are crammed often have no signs of belonging to the military registration and enlistment office or other state institutions.

Read more on Novastan: How Russia is recruiting Central Asian soldiers for its war in Ukraine

The authorities sometimes go even further, asking the families of young people who have left for Russia to bring them back to Tajikistan to serve in the army, or face sanctions. Tajik migrants represent a numerous diaspora in Russia, reaching 2 million in 2021.

According to the Tajikistan Prosecutor General’s Office, cited by Radio Ozodi, in 2022 alone, 108 young men were prosecuted for evading military service. Radio Free Europe reports that, late last year, Tajikistan’s military call-up season reignited discontent following power cuts and mosque closures by local authorities to force families to let their sons enlist in the military.

Legal uncertainty and administrative corruption

The call to the army in Tajikistan highlights each year the problems that plague the Tajik Republic, namely corruption and inequality. Indeed, the authorities in charge of recruiting young men are suspected of demanding bribes to declare them unfit.

Read more on Novastan: Central Asia scores badly in latest corruption index

The Cabar Asia article shows that it is people struggling against poverty who find themselves massively recruited into the Tajik army, unlike men from the elite who escape more easily. The author points out that: “If the conscription season were truly fair, i.e., if it included all young men without exception, the country’s elite would solve the problem in a matter of weeks. But too great a gap between the elite and young men from ordinary families only exacerbates the problem of poor communication and resentment.”

Numbers of military personnel in Tajikistan are the lowest in Central Asia

Among of the weak points of Tajikistan’s military are the deplorable conditions for pre-call-up and conscripts. The country seems to be paying a price for this, with the lowest number of personnel among Central Asian countries, according to the Global Fire power indicator. Indeed, in 2023, the number of military personnel was only 15,000, while its Kyrgyz neighbor, although less populated, posts a much higher number, with a total of 25,000.

Read more on Novastan: What are the underlying reasons for the deadly Kyrgyz-Tajik border clashes?

The more intense flaring-up of conflicts with Kyrgyzstan in recent years is also deterring more and more Tajik citizens from serving in the military, for fear of being mobilised to defend sensitive borders. Border clashes between the two countries have indeed become more frequent since 2021, due to the militarisation of the borders on both sides. In May 2021, a 19-year-old Tajik border guard was injured, and the latest clashes between the two countries in September 2022 were the deadliest so far, with more than 100 deaths on both sides.

Although Tajikistan is part of the regional military organisation of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO). together with Armenia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, this set-up has proved to be ineffective with the recent resumption of conflicts on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. Finally, proximity to Afghanistan and the Islamic threat on Tajikistan’s borders heightens tensions, which does not increase the enthusiasm of citizens to join the army.

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Written by Emma Collet, editor for Novastan

Translated by Robert Willams from French

The post Recruitment in the Tajik army: a headache for the authorities and hell for the recruits appeared first on Novastan English.

The Matraimov corruption scandal has had a significant resonance across Kyrgyz society and has been a driver of ongoing protests in Kyrgyzstan. But the question of whether Raimbek Matraimov, a former customs official implicated in a corruption scheme, will face justice is yet to be answered.

The former deputy head of Kyrgyzstan’s customs service Raimbek Matraimov will spend two months in custody, a Bishkek court ruled. He was taken in for questioning by the Kyrgyz State Committee for National Security (GKNB in Russian) on 18 February 2021.

It comes after a first sentence for corruption on 11 February, resulting in a fine. On 14 February 2021, the protesters at a weekly march against corruption and changes to the constitution also expressed outrage about the sentence, which they consider too lenient. In response, in a segment since deleted, state television broadcasts attacked these protestors as law-breakers and destabilisers.

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Raimbek Matraimov is at the heart of a corruption scandal after journalistic investigations in 2019 and 2020 revealed his role in a money laundering scheme.

The 0.00043%

Raimbek Matraimov pleaded guilty to corruption charges on 11 February. Instead of the decade-long sentence possible under the “Corruption” article, Matraimov was fined 260,000 som (£2,200) on account of having already paid back 2 billion som (£16.9 million) in damages to Kyrgyz authorities. 

This figure represents 0.00043% of the approximate £500 million that his network is estimated to have illegally funnelled out of the country. The Kyrgyz news outlet Kloop reports that Matraimov and his lawyers refused to comment on the proceedings and the sentence after the session. Furthermore, frozen bank accounts and confiscated property was returned to him and his family, the Kyrgyz news agency 24.kg reports.

Questions remain: why was he originally only tried under the “corruption” article, and not also under the “illegal enrichening” article? His wife Uulkan Turgunova’s luxurious holidays, taste for designer fashion, and numerous stays and links to property in Dubai, all shared on social media, exceed Matraimov’s stated income of $1,000 (£700) per month during his tenure, the investigations show.

In an interview with Novastan, Asel Doolotkeldieva, a Bishkek-based researcher on electoral politics and the sociology of protests, said that such a lenient fine was a “slap in the face to the Kyrgyz people”. She evoked two notorious cases of ordinary citizens being charged and sentenced more heavily for much smaller offences: one to five years of prison for stealing medication because they couldn’t afford medical treatment for their family, and another sent to prison for stealing a chicken because he had nothing to eat. 

Doolotkeldieva suggests that, in this light, Matraimov’s sentencing is “scandalous”, and that the speed of the hearing reflects a “lack of due investigation”. The decision itself, she said, shows that the “court system is not independent and participates in the political machine of the rulers.”

Raim Million 

On 9 December 2020, Matraimov was placed on the US Magnitsky Sanctions list for his role in the funneling of hundreds of millions of dollars abroad. The sanctions followed comprehensive investigations published in 2019/2020 by Radio Azattyk (the Kyrgyz-language branch of Radio Free Europe), Kloop, Bellingcat and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) revealing this money laundering. The reports outlined how Matraimov, over a five year period (2011-2016) had enabled and benefitted from a smuggling empire run by the Uyghur Chinese Abdukadyr family and their Abu Sahiy cargo empire. Kloop, 24.kg and RFE/RL were subsequently brought to trial for libel in January 2020 Kyrgyzstan by Matraimov.

The mysterious Abdukadyr family’s highly organised and highly profitable scheme revolved around bringing undeclared and falsely labeled goods from China to market in bazaars across Central Asia and Russia via Kyrgyzstan. According to the investigations, Matraimov was responsible for distributing the Abdukadyr bribes in exchange for ensuring that the goods would pass through northern and southern terminals in the country. His involvement in this network of patronage and corruption earned him notoriety and the nickname “Raim Million” for his wealth.

It was Aierken Saimaiti, a Uyghur Chinese-born businessman with Kazakh citizenship, responsible for smuggling £500 million out of Kyrgyzstan for the Abdukadyr family, who detailed the scheme and provided documentation to journalists. Having fled to Istanbul in 2017, Saimaiti was murdered in an internet cafe in Istanbul in October 2019.

The state of affairs

The lenient home arrest Matraimov faced after his original arrest, despite “huge resonance in Kyrgyz society and heavy suspicions regarding the possible damage he has done to the Kyrgyz state and economy,” and his lenient sentencing, shows the extent of his influence over the judiciary and the regime, Doolotkeldieva argues.

Read more: Kyrgyzstan: governing party wins “dirty” parliamentary elections

Indeed, the OCCRP investigations showed that the Matraimov clan was heavily involved in Kyrgyz politics. Notably, Raimbek Matraimov’s brother Iskender ran for parliament as a member of the Mekenim Kyrgyzstan party in October 2020’s annulled parliamentary election. Though Iskender Matraimov is the politician, Raimbek, the report states, “is widely assumed to exert heavy influence behind the scenes”. But the family also makes use of the economic, social and political influence of the charitable activities of the Ismail Matraimov Foundation to support the party’s electoral campaigning.

Kyrgyzstan’s recently elected president Sadyr Japarov initially promised to imprison Matraimov, but later reneged on this promise, reasoning that such a decision would be less beneficial to the state’s treasury than having him paying damages. He commented that this was “only one episode” and that inquiries had been sent to neighbouring countries and Dubai relating to the former official’s activities, bank accounts and property. If information is received, he concluded, then investigations will continue.

Doolotkeldieva expressed her opinion that “the way it has been dealt with so far leaves a lot of doubt as to whether the case will continue further or not”. However, she added that it is possible the investigations would continue due to Japarov’s as yet not fully consolidated rule, which may be challenged by “criticism and vocal opposition from society“.

The constitution and the case

This case and the resonance it has had in Kyrgyz society is happening in the background of an ongoing project of constitutional changes under Japarov. Critics such as the rights defense clinic Adilet argue it will significantly weaken Kyrgyzstan’s parliament by introducing a people’s council and concentrating power in the presidency, eroding checks and balances and thus endangering stability, the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

Read more: Rise and fall… and rise: the career of Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov

The clinic also highlighted the potential for infringements on the rights of free expression and media in the proposed measure against publications and public events contrary to the “generally recognised moral values of the Kyrgyz people”.

“Civil society will not leave this case alone. And hopefully civil society will be strong and robust enough to be able to exert continuous pressure on the authorities,” Doolotkeldieva said.  Perhaps it is this pressure that led to the events of 18 February, when Matraimov was taken in for questioning and arrested in relation to an ongoing probe into money laundering, though pro-Matraimov protests organised in Biskhek and Maitraimov’s home region of Kara-Suu are a reminder that his influence is still significant.

Whichever direction they take, the developments of the case may provide an indication of the direction of Kyrgyz politics under Japarov.

Cameron Evans
Writer and editor for Novastan

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The post Matraimov’s millions: the story of a Kyrgyz corruption scandal appeared first on Novastan English.