A herd of cows has taken over the sandbanks that emerge around the piers of the Qonayev Bridge.

This bridge is the only one crossing the Ili along the more than 300 kilometers separating the Qapshigai Dam from its mouth in Lake Balkhash.

For years, the river’s flow has been decreasing, notably due to the growing irrigation needs of China, which lies upstream.

Credit : Gereon Wintz (Germany)

Find all of our photos of the day. You can buy some of these and receive them at home: here is the list! If you can't find your picture in the list, mail us to photo@novastan.org.

The post Cows on the Ili appeared first on Novastan English.

Relations between Kazakhstan and China are deepening fast. As a linchpin in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, Astana hopes to pluck the fruits of this global infrastructure development strategy, which aims to boost overland trade connections between East and West. However, China’s treatment of ethnic Kazakhs in the Xinjiang province, the region’s second-largest Turkic community after the Uyghurs, remains a sensitive subject that is complicating further rapprochement between the two countries.

This text was originally published on 20 October 2025 by our partner media outlet Lossi 36.

On a cold winter’s day in February 1997, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of the city of Yining, known to locals as Ghulja, in China’s Xinjiang province to protest against growing ethnic discrimination and religious repression. As the demonstration grew in strength, people started chanting “God is great!” and “Independence for Xinjiang!”. Chinese security forces soon mobilised and cracked down on the crowd, killing dozens and arresting hundreds. The exact casualty figures of the massacre remain unknown. The 1997 Ghulja incident is now looked upon as a precursor to the brutality against the predominantly Muslim population in China’s westernmost region.

Nearly three decades later, tensions are still palpable in Yining. Travelling through the city, there is a distinct presence of CCTV cameras and police patrols on the streets. Important intersections in the downtown area are overseen by well-equipped Chinese soldiers next to armoured vehicles with mounted machine guns. They appear suspicious of people taking pictures of the local street life and seem uncomfortable with foreigners freely roaming about a region where, according to most observers, China is perpetrating grave crimes against humanity. Several countries have also accused Beijing of committing genocide, though some human rights groups contend that there is insufficient evidence to support this qualification.

One of the targeted communities are the Xinjiang Kazakhs, the region’s second-largest ethnic minority after the Uyghurs. Because of their mostly Turkic-Muslim background, the Chinese authorities see them as a threat to the state ideal of creating a homogeneous nation, united under the red banner of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In accordance with a policy of “preventative repression”, Beijing has sought to dilute the province’s demographic makeup through the state-sponsored in-migration of Han Chinese and has invested heavily in surveillance technology and infrastructure while building an enormous network of so-called re-education camps. 

Want more Central Asia in your inbox? Subscribe to our newsletter here.

A short history of repression

After the takeover of Xinjiang by the CCP in the waning days of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the position of the Kazakhs in the region steadily grew worse. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Mao Zedong implemented his Great Leap Forward, which caused tens of thousands of local Uyghurs and Kazakhs to defect to Soviet Central Asia. 

The exodus coincided with a gradual deterioration of relations between Moscow and Beijing. The Soviets launched a propaganda offensive against China, promoting the migration of minority groups while trying to destabilise Chinese authority over Xinjiang by appealing to separatist movements. The local Soviet consulate enabled the emigration of ethnic minorities by issuing passports. 

When Beijing found out, they stopped distributing exit visas, which sparked fears among local Kazakhs and other minorities of being cut off from their kin in the USSR. A resulting demonstration was brutally put down, encouraging thousands of others to flee as well. Eventually, in 1962, the Sino-Soviet border was closed after between 60 and 100 thousand had left, and remained so for most of the Cold War.

Read more on Novastan: 70 years of Xinjiang: Beijing celebrates and enacts new political doctrine

Isolated from the outside world, the economic situation in Xinjiang worsened, while elsewhere the “Chinese economic miracle” was just gaining steam. Uneven regional development, combined with interethnic tensions due to the continued inflow of Han Chinese settlers, eventually resulted in a wave of separatist terrorism in the 1990s and 2000s, followed by a ruthless clampdown on the region by Chinese authorities. This eventually culminated in the ongoing Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism, which started in 2014.

Atajurt Eriktileri (Homeland Volunteers), a Kazakhstan-based human rights organisation in the forefront of advocating for the release of ethnic kin in Xinjiang, has documented thousands of cases of ethnic Kazakhs who have been incarcerated in China without a trial. Although the number of imprisoned Kazakhs is much smaller than the several hundred thousand Uyghurs currently detained in prison camps, Atajurt has done most to highlight the plight of all ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.

Yet, as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) brings a surge of investment into Kazakhstan, deepening ties between the two countries place Astana in a delicate position amid domestic concerns over the repression of the Xinjiang Kazakhs.

Crossroads Khorgos

About a hundred kilometres by road to the northwest of Yining, on the Chinese side of the Sino-Kazakh border, lies Khorgos. This newly planned town with a skyline that, from a distance, rivals that of any major European city, is part of a recently created special economic zone. It includes a massive area full of highways, warehouses, manufacturing sites, residential areas for workers and their families, and a duty-free shopping zone.

Khorgos is key to Beijing’s BRI. This multi-billion infrastructure development strategy, colloquially known as the New Silk Road, aims to expand China’s economic and political influence around the globe by boosting trade connections between East and West. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as well as heightened instability in the wider Middle East, the route passing through Khorgos – the shortest overland transport route to Europe – has rapidly grown in importance. 

That strategic relevance is also visible on the Kazakh side of the border. Here, Khorgos transforms from a geopolitical pivot into a logistical hub. The importance of Khorgos lies in the fact that the Chinese operate with a different track gauge, so any rail transport making its way to Europe has to change trains here. This happens just inside Kazakhstan, on a vast asphalted harbour-like complex, surrounded by barbed wire fence and dense with brightly-coloured shipping containers, towering cranes, and a warren of railway tracks. 

This infrastructure, together with additional roads and railways for onward transport, has been financed with Chinese loans. Critics of the BRI have voiced concerns about what they call “debt-trap diplomacy”. This alleged strategy, however, has been repeatedly disproven by experts. In the case of Kazakhstan, Nargiza Muratalieva, associate professor at the American University of Central Asia, states that “[s]trong institutions, public understanding, a diversified loan portfolio, and sustainable projects” allow Kazakhstan to effectively manage its debt.

That is not to say there are no risks to deepening economic ties with China. China is facing considerable economic challenges, as it struggles with deflation and an ageing population. These internal problems could easily spillover into BRI countries. Should Kazakhstan continue to take on BRI-related investments in the long term, infrastructure projects like Khorgos might become a liability. 

Views on China

China has come to recognise growing unease over its expanding economic footprint in Kazakhstan. Beijing has responded by promoting soft power initiatives, especially through boosting educational and cultural exchanges and increasing the production of Kazakh language content through Chinese media outlets. These efforts are aimed at moving beyond the elite-level political and economic ties China previously depended upon.

So far, this strategy has not been very successful. Apart from economic concerns, the (mis)treatment of ethnic kin in Xinjiang continues to influence public opinion on China in Kazakhstan. Over the past few years, several demonstrations have been organised to protest against China’s Xinjiang policy.

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s government under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has been mostly silent on this issue. Although the resettlement of several thousand ethnic kin from China has given the impression that Astana is trying to address the situation with Beijing, the country’s political leadership carefully avoids direct criticism. Tragic but true, the pursuit of economic interests undercuts any meaningful response to human rights abuses on the other side of the border. 

Read more on Novastan: China in Central Asia: Fact-checking and myth-busting

The awarded reportage Kazakhstan-Xinjiang, the Border of Tears describes how many Kazakh survivors, upon their return to Kazakhstan, face indifference with regard to their experiences in China: “All the violence they have endured is not recognised, and seems to exist only in their private lives: denied by the Kazakh authorities, generally ignored by civil society, invisible to the medical community.”

In recent years, Astana has tried to actively thwart activists and grassroots organisations concerned with the suffering of Xinjiang Kazakhs. Most notably, in 2019, Atajurt Eriktileri’s founder and frontman Serikzhan Bilash was charged for inciting inter-ethnic hatred and arrested. When he was released after seven months of detention, he was forced to leave Kazakhstan. Attempts by his organisation to enter national politics were obstructed by the authorities, and little has been heard about these efforts. 

The BRI paradox

To pre-empt domestic unrest linked to China’s Xinjiang policy, Kazakhstan’s government is committed to making the BRI work. The latest Central Asia Barometer shows a correlation between the current boom in trade between China and Kazakhstan and more favourable views on China, especially among the youth. This finding reveals a striking paradox. Kazakhstan’s growing economic dependence on China could be softening Sinophobic sentiment – even as the BRI facilitates the repression of Muslims in Xinjiang, a cause that has provoked outrage among Kazakhs. 

In China, BRI projects have gone hand-in-hand with a sharpening of security measures. The new highway connecting Khorgos with Yining, for example, is strewn with police checkpoints, and at airports and train stations throughout Xinjiang security controls are strict and time-consuming. The Chinese government has long perceived the expression of minority identity as an obstacle to regional development and worked to pacify separatist resistance.

Scholars have argued that the economic benefits of BRI-related infrastructure development befall disproportionately upon the non-local Han Chinese population, while the ethnic minorities of Xinjiang have played a significant role in the workforce behind BRI projects — possibly under conditions that amount to forced labour. If true, these findings would suggest that the promise of the BRI would sooner increase than diminish regional inequalities. 

Ultimately, managing the fine line between fostering economic development and addressing human rights issues leaves Kazakhstan in a tricky situation. The ongoing struggles of ethnic Kazakhs in China highlight the significant tensions that form a major obstacle for further rapprochement between Kazakhstan and China.

Julian Postulart for Lossi 36

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post The story of the Xinjiang Kazakhs: silent suffering along the Belt and Road appeared first on Novastan English.

The 70th anniversary of Xinjiang, China’s Uyghur region, was celebrated with great fanfare in Ürümqi. The ceremony was marked by the presence of Xi Jinping, the first Chinese president to attend this event.

From September 23 to 25, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region celebrated its 70th anniversary with a gala. Among those present were Chinese President Xi Jinping and members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, Wang Huning and Cai Qi. Officially established in 1955, this region, which is central to the development of China’s “New Silk Road,” has been the focus of tensions between Beijing and the Uyghur minority for decades.

The gala, titled “Beautiful Xinjiang,” served as a tool for internal and external communication, conveying political themes and thus going beyond the purely artistic. Xi Jinping gave a short speech in which he repeatedly addressed the issues of security and stability in Xinjiang.

Want more Central Asia in your inbox? Subscribe to our newsletter here.

“Ensuring social stability and lasting peace”

Xi’s speech to local authorities focused on social control as well as security. The president emphasized the comprehensive efforts to maintain social stability in Xinjiang and to raise public awareness of the fight against terrorism. According to the official Xinhua news agency, Xi said it was imperative to promote a strong awareness of the Chinese nation as a community in Xinjiang and to advance the development of this community.

The emphasis on security serves to justify the continued existence of an extensive security apparatus. It accompanies the publication of the “Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Guidelines for Governing Xinjiang in the New Era: Practices and Achievements” by the State Council Information Office, the CCP’s new doctrine for the future of the region.

In the 42-page document, Beijing proclaims a “historic success” in the fight against terrorism and points out that there have been no violent attacks for several years; the last one dates back to May 22, 2014. To justify maintaining the reinforced security apparatus, Beijing denounces “Panturkism” and “Pan-Islamism” as existential threats and implicitly cites the Al Qaeda-affiliated “Islamic Party of Turkestan” (IPT), which now cooperates with the Syrian Ministry of Defense.

Read also on Novastan: Total surveillance, segregation, and internment in Xinjiang: a discreet report on the daily life of the Uyghurs

The text also justifies surveillance, re-education, and religious control policies as legal and preventive measures, while rejecting Western accusations of “genocide” and “forced labor.”

The CCP also welcomes the region’s economic development: regional GDP is expected to grow from 750 billion yuan (€90.8 billion) in 2012 to more than 2 trillion yuan (€242.1 billion) in 2024. Beijing highlights poverty reduction, rapid urbanization, and the creation of the Xinjiang pilot free trade zone in 2023, which is part of the Eurasian “New Silk Roads” corridor, an international logistics and transport infrastructure network announced in 2013.

Erasure and appropriation of Uyghur culture

No explicit mention was made of the repression and internment camps imposed on the Uyghur population since 2014, which have been regularly denounced by the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP). A UHRP report dated April 25, 2024, states that one in 26 individuals in Xinjiang, mainly Uyghurs or non-Han Chinese, were imprisoned in 2024, representing nearly one-third of China’s total prison population. Yet these same populations represent only 1% of the national population.

Although there are no comprehensive official data on the exact number of internment camps in the Xinjiang region, NGOs such as the UHRP estimate that at least 578,500 people were incarcerated between 2017 and 2022, not counting those still detained in the camps. The Uyghur region has the highest incarceration rate in the world, with 2,234 prisoners per 100,000 individuals. A study by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) think tank has identified approximately 380 detention centers in operation since 2017 using satellite imagery.

Read also on Novastan: Escape from Xinjiang – Stories of those who escaped the camps

But current Chinese doctrine now emphasizes the concept of the “Chinese nation community.” This involves actively promoting standard Mandarin in education, encouraging cultural and urban fusion, and strengthening control over religious institutions so that Islam and other religions are “compatible with socialism.”

In addition, the CCP promotes selective preservation of local heritage (sites in Kucha, Turfan, Kashi, and Kashgar), integrated into a Chinese historical narrative, as well as the predominance of Han culture in education and public life.

Rewriting history

The document presents Xinjiang’s policy as a model of national governance, combining security, cultural assimilation, economic development, and ideological control. It seeks to legitimize the CCP’s actions in the face of international criticism by framing the region’s governance within the logic of “Chinese-style modernization,” similar to the situation in Tibet, where Beijing has exercised military domination and implemented policies of assimilation of the population for 75 years.

Between the CCP’s centralizing tendencies and persistent jihadist threats, Xinjiang remains a flashpoint for tensions, caught between security and repression.

Lenny Cabrol Noto for Novastan

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post 70 years of Xinjiang: Beijing celebrates and enacts new political doctrine appeared first on Novastan English.

Since the official launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, much has been said and speculated about China’s growing presence on the global stage – some offering nuanced insights, others fearmongering. Novastan sat down with leading researchers Agnieszka Joniak-Lüthi and Alessandro Rippa to unpack some of these fears and frictions surrounding China’s mode of engagement abroad, and in Central Asia more specifically. Unveiled at the Nazarbayev University Campus in Astana, Kazakhstan, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an unprecedented mega-infrastructural undertaking by China that aims to connect places and people in Asia with Europe and Africa. In recent years, China’s ever-palpable presence, within and beyond the BRI label – along roads and corridors, at mine sites, at logistics hubs and in free economic zones – has triggered fears of China grabbing sovereign territories and locking cooperating countries into debt spirals. This is also the case in Central Asia where “anti-Chinese protests” have even become a standalone category in protest trackers over time.

Agnieszka Joniak-Lüthi: I could add two more aspects. The first one relates to maintenance. What we see in many BRI projects is that maintenance is completely neglected. This is an oft-forgotten aspect; it is not enough to build something, you also need to be able to maintain it, which costs more than the construction itself over the years. Thus, when we assess the power of the BRI, we should remember that infrastructure decays and needs maintenance to function. What will be the developmental outcomes of the infrastructure currently being built? This is difficult to say because we do not know whether they will be maintained and whether funds for them will be available. The second myth or assumption which circulates among policymakers is that infrastructure automatically creates development, progress, wealth, or an increase in gender equality. Our research shows that infrastructure, especially large-scale infrastructure and mega-projects, can also increase inequality; it can discriminate and exclude if not supported by other measures. Infrastructure is not a magical object and has to be planned and implemented in specific ways to generate positive change for those beyond the already privileged. There is so much attention to the BRI from both policymakers and scholars. Why do these myths still prevail? AJL: I guess many myths come from the fact that there is still very little research on the ground. A lot of the analyses, especially in the first 5-7 years of the BRI, were conducted by policy and geopolitical analysts, who looked at things from a large-scale perspective without doing ethnographic or detailed, long-term research. Many myths were born during that period, and it is very difficult to fight them now because they are already very well established. Both of our projects were born out of this idea that there was so little ethnographic research on the BRI. Our factsheets, we hope, will contribute to dismantling some of these myths. I guess these myths also live on because they are catchy. It is easier to think of the world in polarised, black-and-white terms than to get into the nitty-gritty complexities of the everyday.

AR: Nuance is very difficult to get across and there is still a lack of generalised understanding among Western publics about how China “works.” In China, as in every other country, there is a very striking difference between how the government says it works and how the country actually works. This is true for domestic policy, and this is true for foreign policy and global investments. Be it for lack of knowledge, be it because a lot of the analyses at the level of discourse do not really engage with how this is turned into practice, we still have this notion that Chinese leaders think in decades. Whereas when you look at how policy is designed and put into practice, you realise that it is contingent on very specific political quotidian matters. In Western press and publics, there is this sense that there must be a grand strategy behind the BRI that we do not see and that we don’t know about, which we need to somehow both fear and be inspired by. Obviously, there is strong Orientalism at the core of these ideas, where China is both mystical and to be feared. Do you see development following infrastructure? Where and how does China and the BRI come in? How Chinese are “Chinese” infrastructure projects?AJL: It all depends how we define development. What I see in my research site, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is that when a road is built or upgraded, a lot of things change. Whether we can call it development, and thus value it positively, is a complex question. The new road does bring benefits to, for example, restaurant owners who have their restaurants at the roadside. Truck drivers are very happy to have an asphalt road they can drive on. This shortens travel time, so they can spend more time with their families; their journeys are less arduous. There will always be actors who benefit from a road, be it individuals or groups, more powerful actors such as investors, or the people who live along and with the new infrastructure. But there is always another side to the coin. A new highway will exclude those who can’t afford a car to drive on it. Others will be excluded because of their ethnicity, like in Xinjiang. Being Uyghur in Xinjiang makes travelling very difficult, as all the police checkpoints along the new, beautifully asphalted expressways, provincial roads, and even village roads make travelling for them nearly impossible. Your ethnicity, your gender, and your economic status all influence whether you can benefit from a road or other infrastructure, or whether you will instead be living with its negative consequences such as pollution, habitat fragmentation, noise, animal death or even limited access to your fields across the road.

AR: The second factsheet on China’s global development goes into detail about what is uniquely Chinese about Chinese development projects. Usually, they are completed faster, they are cheaper, and they come with a different set of strings attached. Chinese policymakers like to say that their projects come with no strings attached as compared to North American and European donors, who may ask for particular changes in economic management or democratic reforms. The recognition of China’s policy on Taiwan and territorial claims in other parts of the South China Sea are some of these Chinese strings. Yet ultimately, Chinese infrastructure remains trapped within very similar financial mechanisms and developmental challenges as infrastructure projects financed by the West. The ramifications and effects on development are also contingent on the political-economic circumstances of the host countries. Read more on Novastan: Russia commits to railroad corridor China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan If infrastructure is built in a country where most resources are concentrated in fewer hands, such as in authoritarian countries like Tajikistan or Myanmar, then most of the revenue produced from that project will reinforce a particular system and will not challenge it – regardless of whether it is a Chinese project or a World Bank-funded project. I am obviously oversimplifying here. To give an example, if you look at the Karakoram highway or at the roads connecting Western China with Kyrgyzstan, built in the early 2000s, these were instrumental in thriving cross-border economies. Uyghur traders, mostly in the Kashgar region, benefited from better road conditions. Everybody was very keen on having new and better roads. But they only benefited from new roads as long as the political situation allowed for it. Once it became more complicated, and then impossible, for many Uyghurs to get passports and travel abroad, the good roads and asphalt were not conducive to commercial exchange anymore. We cannot think of infrastructure outside of the broader political setting in which they are embedded. How do other infrastructure initiatives perform in your opinion – are they more equitable and just? I am thinking about the existing projects funded by the EU but also the new global initiatives such as the EU Global Gateway or G7 infrastructural initiative.AJL: It is good that we have a few large infrastructural initiatives now. I am quite surprised that Europe and North America waited so long to launch their own initiatives. Variety and diversity are always better than having just one initiative, especially one which has such extreme media coverage – in fact, the BRI might not be as huge as the media would like to think. It was high time for Europe and North America to react with their own initiatives concerning what infrastructural development might look like, which is also key for public relations. But these plans are not very concrete yet. They are still just initiatives. It is good to have alternatives, but let’s see what the details are going to be. I hope they will offer a good alternative to the funding coming from China and that they will not become bogged down in bureaucratic procedures. The speed of project funding and realisation will be the key. Read more on Novastan:In Central Asia, China is taking advantage of Russia’s isolation at warAR: It is too early to say but I do hope, particularly with the G7 initiative, two things. One is that it is not just an anti-China, anti-BRI initiative to counter Chinese influence and power. We really need to rethink global development, and this could be an occasion to do so rather than an occasion to restate a particular anti-China global alliance. Secondly, I hope that, unlike the BRI, the focus will be less on large-scale flagship projects. If history tells us one thing, it is that large-scale infrastructure projects tend to be mired in corruption and environmental issues. Rather, I hope that the resources will be used for smaller-scale projects, driven by local initiatives that respond to actual needs of the population. Because I hardly see the point in having a train that runs from Kazakhstan to Spain or Portugal if it traverses countries which lack basic infrastructure like electricity, heating, and water. I hope that we can move past these types of flagship projects around connectivity and focus on what matters most at the local level. What else should Novastan readers know and watch regarding China’s presence in Central Asia within and beyond the BRI label?AJL: I would encourage civil society in Central Asia not to give up on training Chinese companies to include more local people in the decision-making around infrastructure projects. We have successful examples of such processes in Mongolia in its mining industry. Even if the scale of China and Chinese activities is huge and intimidating, it is important to push for civil involvement in all those infrastructure projects. Though China is this giant right across the border, it is still individual companies realising these projects. These companies do not have the opportunity to learn to dialogue with civil society when operating within China. It is a new skill they must acquire when operating abroad. The role of the countries where the BRI is active is to train Chinese companies to have more dialogue with the public, and to have more engagement with the local needs and the opposition. Thus, I hope that civil society in Central Asia will remain strong and try to put leverage on Chinese companies, or on any company for that matter. AR: We should understand China as very diverse. There is not one single actor, there are multiple actors involved, often with different agendas and goals, from local governments to the central government with different foreign policies, and from private companies to state-owned enterprises. These can have conflicting agendas and there is room for civil societies in Central Asia to leverage these differences to their advantage. Also, readers of Novastan, always keep in mind: what are we thinking about when we think about China? Are we thinking about central government or local government policy? Certainly, one of the singularities of the Chinese model of development is that private and state-owned enterprises align closer to government aims than their European or North American counterparts. But that does not mean that they are always fully aligned. There is often a difference between what is being said and what is being done. In China as everywhere else, we should always keep that in mind.

Interview by Dr. Beril Ocakli, Researcher at ZOiS Berlin, where she leads the project China, the EU, and Economic Development in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

Edited by Mari Paine

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post China in Central Asia: Fact-checking and myth-busting appeared first on Novastan English.

View on the Kunlun mountain range, where they intersect with the Pamir mountain from the city of Kashgar in the Uyghur region of western China, administratively called Xinjiang. The Kunlun Mountains border the Taklamakan desert on more than 3000 kilometers, forming the northern edge of the Tibetan plateau.Credit: The Editorial

Find all of our photos of the day. You can buy some of these and receive them at home: here is the list! If you can't find your picture in the list, mail us to photo@novastan.org.

The post Kunlun mountains appeared first on Novastan English.

A street partly covered by a mosque in the old town of Kashgar in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, which has been left untouched by the heavy restauration of the past decade. Credit: The Editorial Find all of our photos of the day here.

The post Old town appeared first on Novastan English.

This eagle is the symbol of the Tajik people leaving in the city of Tashkurgan, which is situated in the Xinjiang province of China. Tashkurgan is not far from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan where tajik people are spread. Credit: The editorial

Find all of our photos of the day. You can buy some of these and receive them at home: here is the list! If you can't find your picture in the list, mail us to photo@novastan.org.

The post Tajik people appeared first on Novastan English.

Some men buying spices at a shop in the old town of Kashgar, in the Xinjiang province of China. Credit: The editorial 

Find all of our photos of the day. You can buy some of these and receive them at home: here is the list! If you can't find your picture in the list, mail us to photo@novastan.org.

The post Spices in Kashgar appeared first on Novastan English.

Several American media outlets have reported that China is building a second military base in Tajikistan. This development would further China’s presence in the country, making it more than merely economic. However, the actual presence of China in Tajikistan is denied by some sources. Officially, China is only building a joint-use police station and the presence of even the first military base has been categorically denied. This article attempts to decipher the situation.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 1 November 2021. The question of China’s potential second military base in Tajikistan has generated a heated debate among observers of both countries, without a clear answer. According to Radio Free Europe and The Diplomat, China is funding the construction of a second military base in the Wakhan Valley, bordering Afghanistan. The Tajik Parliament seems to have given its approval on October 27.

Radio Free Europe also reported that Tajikistan has offered its Chinese neighbour full control over the first base located south of Murghob, in the southeast of the country. The Chinese embassy in Tajikistan has allegedly published a declaration on that matter. According to these claims, China could soon have two full-fledged military bases in a neighbouring country, which is unprecedented. The existence of the first base was revealed by the Washington Post in the early 2019 investigation.

A Base Financed by Beijing

Things might be slightly more complicated. “The complete handover has not been confirmed by the Tajik government, and the original declaration is nowhere to be found”, says Tajik political scientist Parviz Mullojonov in a statement to Novastan. The Tajik media outlet Asia Plus reports that this base is intended for use by the “rapid response unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Anti-Organized Crime Department”. Furthermore, while the funding would indeed be Chinese – amounting to 100 million somoni (£5.1 million) – the base is not going to be used by the Chinese military. “This military building is Tajik – not Chinese. Tajikistan has certain obligations made with its allies, particularly from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, Russian-dominated – ed.)”, says Guzel Majtdinova, a professor of international relations at the Russian-Tajik Slavic University. “Without the agreement of its partners, Dushanbe does not have the right to create military bases for foreign states. Tajikistan abides by this rule.”Sputnik, a Russian media source, offers another perspective on China’s presence in Tajikistan. Since this base is Chinese-funded, it is “quite unlikely that the ‘red dragon’ will not seize the opportunity to send a small contingent of military specialists, or at least a few observers and scouts wearing coveralls”.

The Lack of Transparency in Chinese Decision-making

Tajik authorities have maintained their claims that China does not have a permanent military base on Tajik soil. China is reluctant to divulge any information. “Whenever Tajikistan signs military agreements with Russia or other Western countries, some details are always disclosed. But the Chinese are totally opaque”, laments Parvis Mullojonov, a Tajik political scientist. He assumes that both armies are going to use both bases, although the exact division remains unknown.

Afghanistan as the Sole Common Denominator

In fact, the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan is under scrutiny by Beijing. “Not only is China strengthening its military presence on Xinjiang’s borders, but it also has made sure, through direct conversation with the Taliban, that both countries can directly discuss regional security issues”, says Hashim Ali, a researcher in journalism and communication at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. “Central Asia’s security depends largely on Afghanistan’s stability. Its central position could make it a rapid communication channel between post-Soviet states and South Asia”, Guzel Majtdinova asserts. “For China, Afghan natural resources are also important. Afghanistan could become a potential route for the New Silk Roads”, she adds. “China has a strategic vision. The possibility that it could use these bases for its army in the future cannot be ruled out. For the time being, however, these border posts are there for Afghanistan”, Parvis Mullojonov concludes. “China’s political interests in neighbouring countries are the reason why it strives to secure its investments”, adds the Tajik political scientist. In fact, China is involved in every sector of the Tajik economy.

Etienne Combier Editor-in-Chief of Novastan

Translated from French by Andreï Fedorovsky

Edited by Grace Mitchell  

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post China’s Military Expansion in Tajikistan appeared first on Novastan English.

China’s involvement in the race for vaccinations in Central Asia confirms its aim to increase relations with neighbouring countries, primed for over a decade with the New Silk Road project. However, resistance among citizens continues to slow Chinese ambitions. This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 1st of March 2021. While the development of Coronavirus vaccinations takes a strategic turn, China plays its hand in Central Asia. According to the Chinese press agency Xinhue, Beijing pledged to provide doses of the Chinese Sinopharm vaccines to Kyrgyzstan on the 5^th of February 2021, the first case of such an offer worldwide. At the same time, Uzbekistan began testing of another Chinese vaccination, developed by Anhui Zhifei Longcom. The trials launched in November 2020 and are set to continue until May 2021. Radio Ozodlik, the Uzbek branch of the American media Radio Free Europe, confirmed that Tashkent could even share co-authorship of the Chinese vaccine as they plan to produce it. Read More on Novastan : Mass Vaccination Programme Starts in Uzbekistan Diplomacy surrounding vaccinations is particularly delicate in Central Asia, where Russia and China both try to promote their respective vaccinations as a part of their competition for regional dominance. The Russian vaccination Sputnik V has been chosen by the Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz authorities for their mass vaccination programs. Read More on Novastan: Covid-19: Kazakhstan Starts Rollout of its QazVac jab The race to deliver vaccinations is not, however, the only outcome of the current health crisis: the economic situation in Central Asian countries is rapidly deteriorating due to the shrinking global economy. This is particularly true for Turkmenistan, a country that depends almost entirely on oil exports, China being their main buyer. However, China’s decreased oil demand, which is linked to the pandemic, has destabilised this unique source of foreign income for Turkmenistan. The country’s difficulty of exporting oil has paradoxically led to closer relations between the two countries, as Ashgabat depends more than ever on Chinese imports.

The New Silk Road

The new strategy is only the latest in a long list. In an interview with French media Le Monde, researcher Niva Yau describes China’s strategy in Central Asia, which has long favoured importation of mineral and energy sources from Central Asian countries to meet the extremely high demands of the Chinese economic system. Certain Central Asian countries have therefore adapted their production to satisfy Chinese demand, especially oil production. Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are an example of this, two countries whose oil exportation is largely dependent on Chinese demand.

The New Silk Road project, launched in 2013 in Astana, aims to create rail links between China and Europe, as well as seeks to promote cooperation within Eurasia. According to Niva Yau, China intends to work towards strengthening oil infrastructure in Turkmenistan and gas infrastructure in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, China’s strategy is not limited to simply building new infrastructure. In 2013, China launched a program to outsource their industrial capacities, aiming to share industry expertise with the countries of Central Asia. What’s more, several Central Asian cities use Chinese ‘smart city’ technology, developed by Huawei, which aims to control populations with security cameras. In the Tajik capital Dushanbe, for example, there are over 800 of these cameras in operation. American media Eurasianet reported that other than outsourcing industrial expertise, China aims to gradually open its market to the countries of Central Asia, thus demonstrating new interest in this area. Indeed, since 2019, Beijing has signed numerous agreements relating to agrochemical standards, approving importation of food items, and even encouraging Central Asia businesses to enter the Chinese market. Kazakh media Astana Times reported that in September 2019, Kazakhstan’s president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev promised a three-time increase in wheat exports to China as a response to China’s gestures. Similarly, in September 2020, Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev promised a fivefold increase in food exports. However, two hurdles remain before entering the Chinese market, according to Eurasianet: while China is an ultra-competitive market, the Central Asian countries would have to improve their border infrastructure and logistical systems in order to transport their goods to China at a low cost.

China’s Presence in Central Asia is Highly Contested

Opinions in Central Asia remain divided when it comes to China’s increased presence. Researcher Niva Yau states that several anti-Chinese protests have taken place, particularly over the past few years. Le Monde reminds readers that Kyrgyzstan in particular has been the stage of anti-Chinese sentiment, exemplified by the cancellation of a project to create a Chinese logistical centre in At Bashy in February 2020. In February 2019, several demonstrations organized by Kyrk Shoro, a nationalist movement, undermined local Kyrgyz authorities. Sinophobia is equally present in Kazakhstan, a Central Asian country heavily implicated in the New Silk Road project with Khorgos, their free trade zone. These movements are obstacles to China’s strategy, which needs full cooperation and loyal allies in the long term. Niva Yau notes that Central Asians are generally opposed to Chinese projects on their territory because of the policies linked to Chinese investment. These policies benefit local governments but leave local communities behind because of the total absence of redistribution of wealth by the ruling elite. In this regard, the diplomatic push for vaccines is unlikely to have any effect.

Corentin Goupil Editor of Novastan

Translated from French by Alice Coveney

Edited by Dagmar Nared

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Coronavirus in Central Asia: An Opportunity for China? appeared first on Novastan English.

Being far ahead of the other regional gas suppliers, Turkmenistan became the first energy partner of China in late January 2021, ahead of Russia. In the context of generally rising gas prices at the beginning of 2021, the roles seem to be redistributed in the world of gas producers.

This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on the 29th of March 2021.

Turkmenistan, a country with gas wealth in no need to prove, is the leader in gas supply on the Chinese energy market since the beginning of 2021, according to the Turkmen media Orient. In January 2021, a total of 2,786 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas were delivered to China, out of the 4,685 billion cubic meters imported by the Chinese authorities. For the first months of the year, almost 60% of the Chinese gas is supplied by Turkmenistan, according to the Russian agency Interfax.

Turkmenistan is thus ahead of Russia, which supplied only 916 million cubic meters of gas to China through the “Power of Siberia” pipeline. Apart from Russia and Turkmenistan, China gets its resources from other Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which export 319 million cubic meters and 307 million cubic meters accordingly.

Turkmen gas prices at their highest

The official figures of Turkmenistan’s exportations are difficult to find: president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov is usually very discreet about the country’s economic performance, so it is hard to obtain them.

Yet the data of the General Administration of Customs (GAC) of China reveals the price of Turkmen gas which appears to be one of the most expensive on the Chinese energy market. Indeed, the price of a thousand cubic meters comes to 187 dollars (£138), whereas Kazakh price is up to 162 dollars (£119.5), and Uzbek price is up to 151 dollars (£111).

Blue gold prices on the rise

The high price of Turkmen gas can be explained by the rise of gas prices on international markets. Indeed, in North-East Asia, a cold wave led to the high demand for liquefied gas. The cooling in the region had for consequences a rapid increase of gas prices on the international market: the maximum value of JKM Platts, which measures the price of liquefied gas in Asia, jumped to 1 160 dollars (£856) for a thousand cubic meters at the beginning of January 2021, according to Interfax.

The rise of energy’s value is also to be seen in Europe where the average price of gas is up to 257 dollars (£190) for a thousand cubic meters in late January, according to the Interfax agency.

Turkmenistan’s dependence on gas exportations

The fourth exporter of gas in the world strengthens its commercial relationship with China, which remains the first trade partner for Turkmenistan. In 2019, according to data furnished by the Observatory of Economic Complexity, China accounted for 82% of Turkmen exports, far ahead of Uzbekistan (4%). Regarding importations, China is second with 14,3% behind Turkey (24,7%).

This new position also strengthens Turkmenistan’s dependence on exportation. Close to being a windfall economy, the state’s incomes are based on hydrocarbon sales. According to the specialized website Oilcapital.ru, 15% of consumed gas in China was Turkmen in 2020. Although economic repercussions are satisfactory nowadays, as soon as the price and foreign demand will decrease, the Turkmen economy will drop as was the case at the beginning of the pandemic. Indeed, while China’s gas suppliers are diversified, Turkmenistan’s customers are not: the country mainly exports to China and Russia.

Read more on Novastan: Agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan paves the way for Trans-Caspian Pipeline

Nevertheless, some projects are underway to diversify exportations: the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (TAPI), which has been stalled since 2015, should be relaunched soon. Besides, with the rapprochement of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, the project of the Trans-Caspian pipeline is about to become reality, which means Turkmen gas will reach the European market.

Emma Collet Writer for Novastan

Translated from French by Flavie Deschamps

Edited by Anna Wilhelmi

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Turkmenistan became China’s number one gas supplier appeared first on Novastan English.

The old streets of Turpan have lots of these tall brick-build building on the second floor, used to dry the raisins which is one of the best known specialty of the Uyghur city for centuries, now situated in the Xinjiang region of China. Credit: The editorial staff

Find all of our photos of the day. You can buy some of these and receive them at home: here is the list! If you can't find your picture in the list, mail us to photo@novastan.org.

The post Turpan old streets appeared first on Novastan English.

Held on 17 September in Dushanbe, the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) clarified member countries’ positions on Afghanistan. Bringing together China, Russia, and four of five Central Asian countries, the SCO meeting seems to have been a particularly popular occasion for making statements about neighbouring Afghanistan. This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 20 September 2021.In Dushanbe, Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries were able to establish what had been unclear since the Taliban’s seizure of power. On 17 September, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), founded in Beijing in 2001, organised its annual meeting in the capital of Tajikistan. At the table were the majority of the institution’s members: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan. Joining the meeting remotely were China, Russia, and India.Aside from statements vaunting cooperation among the eight member countries, the Dushanbe Summit made possible an in-depth discussion about Afghanistan. Three of the organisation’s countries sharpened their differences concerning Afghanistan, at the same time presenting a superficial impression of being in accord.

The Push for an Inclusive Government

These three members expressed their desire to see an inclusive government in Afghanistan, according to Tajik media outletAsia-Plus. On 21 September, only a few days after that statement was made, the Taliban announced the new members of their government: only one Uzbek and two Tajiks. These new members are essentially in lower-level positions, or are ethnic Hazaras, as reported by Afghan media Tolonews and the American news agency AP.

The humanitarian situation of refugees was also raised, with SCO members expressing a desire for their long-term accommodation, and for the facilitating of a “dignified, safe, and permanent return to their country,” the communal statement declared.

Uzbekistan: the Most Pro-Taliban Country

But that statement did not erase the differences among the heads of state. True to his role as mediator, Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev suggested that business discussions with Afghanistan were more relevant than ever, according to Russian press agency TASS. The leader of the most populous Central Asian country hoped that high-level meetings between the SCO and Afghanistan would be held regularly, which would amount to official recognition of the Taliban government. Shavkat Mirziyoyev also asserted that Afghan assets in foreign banks should be unfrozen.Unfreezing these assets was also supported by Vladimir Putin via video-conference, reported TASS. The Russian president expressed his desire for international aid to be set up, with most of the cost carried by the United States, who he judged as responsible for the Taliban’s seizure of power. In addition, the Kyrgyz and Kazakh presidents affirmed that a security barrier should be set up around Afghanistan to combat drugs trafficking and terrorism, according to Kazakh media site Tengrinews.Sadyr Japarov and Kassym-Jomart Tokaev have also suggested that humanitarian aid be provided to Afghanistan, and said they are prepared to participate but without providing specific details, Russian media site Sputnik reported.

Tajikistan: Leader of the Anti-Taliban

These fairly amicable positions towards the Taliban were largely eclipsed by bombastic statements by the Tajiki president. According to Emomali Rahmon, the Taliban movement intends to establish autocracy in Afghanistan by installing an “Islamic emirate based on harsh medieval Sharia law,”asreported by Radio Ozodi, the Tajik branch of the American media Radio Free Europe. In line with earlier statements, Tajikistan’s head of state asserted that the Taliban must allow humanitarian aid to be delivered toPanjshir, a province fighting Afghanistan’s new rulers which has been cut off from the world since late July, reported Radio Ozodi. However, the Tajik president’s assertions were most virulent on the eve of the SCO summit, with Dushanbe hosting a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a militaristic organisation directed by Moscow. “The composition of the interim government announced by the Taliban fails to take into consideration political, ethnic, and linguistic diversity, and equality of the sexes. This means that over the course of the next two or three years the propagation of extreme ideology in Afghanistan will increase, and the likelihood that these destructive ideas will spread into adjacent areas will be multiplied,”stated Emomali Rahmon, as reported by Radio Ozodi.Despite expected tensions in the SCO due to the presence of Pakistan, a strong supporter of the Taliban, no conflict arose when the Tajik head of state met with the Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan away from the main stage of the summit, Asia-Plusreported. The two heads of state expressed their shared readiness to facilitate talks between the Taliban and the Tajiks of Afghanistan, and signedeight agreements. 

Afghanistan, a Double-edged Sword for the SCO

More broadly, disagreements among members seem damaging to the idea that the SCO, under the leadership of China and Russia, can take the upper hand in Afghanistan. “The SCO is a very great organisation with numerous unsolved problems among its members, which makes it imperfect,”Konstantin Kourylev, a professor of international relations at Moscow’s Peoples’ Friendship University, told Novastan. In fact, the 2017 admission of Pakistan and India increased dissent, whereas the SCO officially admitted Iran as a separate full member during the Dushanbe Summit, Asia-Plus reported. “So the SCO ought not to be considered a force capable of influencing the situation in Afghanistan. The [member] states alone can be influential, but they are poorly organised and therefore ineffective,” suggested the Russian researcher.That position is not shared by the director of the Institute for European Perspective and Security, Emmanuel Dupuy. “Afghanistan will be a unifying subject for the SCO, since nearly all of its neighbouring countries are members, except for Turkmenistan. The formal admission of Iran as the ninth member confirms this,” he believes in an interview with Novastan. “Furthermore, the flagship countries of the SCO, like Russia and China, are in the process of taking advantage of the American absence in Central and South Asia. Witness the deployment of Russian troops to Tajikistan, the Rubezh-2021 military exercises in Kyrgyzstan, and the planning of the first communal naval manoeuvres by Iran, China, and Russia,” he added.Expanding on this theme, Emmanuel Dupuy suggests that “the strengthening of the SCO is only the first stage of a rocket that will see the strengthening of the CSTO, and no doubt the removal of obstacles to membership for Central Asian countries that up until now have hesitated to join—for instance, Uzbekistan. All this will occur in a context in which Russia will seem to be the lesser evil to Central Asian countries after the American retreat.”Taking a middle path, Ding Xiaoxing, director of the Institute of Eurasian Studies, published an opinion on theSCO site apparently shared by that organisation. “The SCO is an ideal platform for resolving the Afghanistan problem. The organisation can play a part in coordinating members’ differing positions on Afghanistan and their shared encouragement of the goals of internal peace and stability in that country,”he suggested. It remains to be seen how the Taliban will react to the attempts of the SCO to play humanitarian, protective, and diplomatic roles simultaneously, while at the same time being noticeably divided on how to accomplish these goals.

Etienne Combier Editor-in-chief of Novastan

Translated from French by Judy Harter

Edited by Fiona Katherine Smith

For more news and analysis from Central Asia, follow us on Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, Linkedin or Instagram.

The post Hardening Positions on Afghanistan following Summit in Dushanbe appeared first on Novastan English.

On the main bazaar of Kashgar, with the colors of the traditional Uyghur duppi (hat) and the masks in these times of pandemic. Credit: The editorial

Find all of our photos of the day. You can buy some of these and receive them at home: here is the list! If you can't find your picture in the list, mail us to photo@novastan.org.

The post Duppi and masks appeared first on Novastan English.

This statue of Mao Zedong in Kashgar, Xinjiang, is the second largest in the world. Credit: The editorial

Find all of our photos of the day. You can buy some of these and receive them at home: here is the list! If you can't find your picture in the list, mail us to photo@novastan.org.

The post Statue in Kashgar appeared first on Novastan English.

The modern skyline of the largest city of Central Asia, Urumqi, with more than 3.5 million inhabitants, the city is the administrative center of the largest Chinese province of Xinjiang. Credit: The Editorial Staff Find all of our photos of the day here.

The post Central Asian skyline appeared first on Novastan English.

The colorful door to the garden of the Id Kah Mosque in the center of Kashgar in China. Credit: Editorial staff Find all of our photos of the day here.

The post Colorful door appeared first on Novastan English.

Kashgar, the capital of the south of Xinjiang in China seen from the sky. The old traditional clay buildings are being replaced by modern Chinese made multi-story building, radically changing the landscape of the ancient city. Credit: The editorial staffFind all of our photos of the day here.

The post From the sky appeared first on Novastan English.

Kids playing in one of the old streets of Kashgar in the Uyghur region of western China. Credit: The editorial staffFind all of our photos of the day here.

The post Kids playing appeared first on Novastan English.

A young driver at the Kashgar bazaar in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Credit: Ryad Hitouche (France)

Find all of our photos of the day here.

The post Mr. Driver appeared first on Novastan English.