In August 2022, the French historian and writer Stéphane Dudoignon published “Hymnes de sang” (or “Hymns of Blood”) – a collection of short stories by Tajik writers from the Perestroika era translated into French. He is using this opportunity to tell of a time of optimism and intellectual upheaval in Dushanbe before the civil war.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 21 September 2022.

It is a collection of short stories about a Tajikistan which is no longer recognisable. “Hymnes de sang,” which appeared this summer from publisher Les Indes Savantes, contains short stories by various Tajik authors.  Each of them questions the governance of the USSR in Central Asia in its own way. Through their works Janibek Akabir, Muhammad-Zaman Saleh, Bahmanyar, Qadir Rustam and Rahim Saidar ask what the future of an independent Tajikistan could look like. The eight short stories in the collection were selected and translated by Stéphane Dudoignon about 20 years ago, when he met with Tajik authors in a writers’ collective in Dushanbe. Those authors eventually became his friends.  “I loved it, landing there, playing billiards, drinking vodka, and discussing literature with people who had lived there continually,” he says. Read more on Novastan: Who is Manizha, the Tajik-born singer representing Russia at the Eurovision? Dudoignon travelled regularly throughout Central Asia during the late Soviet era to further his research into reformed Islam.  He also worked as a film importer for French businesses and therefore came into contact with the “creative intelligentsia,” that is, members of the intellectual circles in the USSR.

Reckoning with Dominance

The historian decided to honour his friends with the publication of these short stories, but they also possess a “thematic unity around the culture of political domination.”  In lyrical, symbolic, or even grotesque registers, the writers probe their inheritance from Russian and Soviet rulers.  What unites them is a certain “reckoning with these rulers, who were particularly bloody in Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s,” as Dudoignon states. In the short story “Hymns of Blood,” which gave the collection its name, the writer Muhammad-Zaman Saleh tells of the rule and forced Arabisation of Baghdad over the remote Khorasan Province by the Abbasid Caliphate between the 8^th and 9^th centuries. This, according to the historian, is a clear metaphor for Moscow’s rule over Central Asian societies.  On the other hand, the short story “Genghis Khan” by Qadir Rustam tells of villagers contemplating to overthrow a tyrant, denouncing the burden of Soviet “little bosses” who dominated Tajikistan in the 20^th century. Such topics are approached with surprising optimism as the authors attempt to portray paths to emancipation, especially through culture. Persian-Central Asian identity, which is being resurrected by many, is seen as a tool which can help to rebuild a modern and independent Tajik nation.

A lost freedom

The time from 1987 to 1992 “was a very special time in Tajikistan, especially with literary magazines such as ‘The Way of the East’ in Dushanbe, in which writers regularly published for a large readership.” While censorship in the collapsing USSR steadily decreased, the then-numerous bookshops and kiosks in Tajikistan overflowed with new ideas and trends, and were the scene of literary experimentation. “This is difficult to imagine today in Tajikistan,” laments Stéphane Dudoignon, as the country suffers under the dictatorship of President Emomali Rahmon, who blocks any deviating artistic expression. Many of the authors featured in “Hymnes de sang” left Tajikistan or Dushanbe during the civil war.  Some died in exile, such as Rahim Saidar, who passed away in Moscow.  As a result of their departure, the intellectual and cultural activity in Dushanbe vanished.  

Written by Emma Collet 

Translated from French to German by Florian Coppenrath 

Translated from German to English by Mari Paine 

Edited by Maya Ivanova

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The post “Hymns of Blood” – Tajik short stories from Perestroika appeared first on Novastan English.

Since the invasion, Kazakhstan has taken a position of neutrality towards Russia’s war in Ukraine. Yet, Astana has not hindered volunteers from organising humanitarian aid to send to Ukraine. Furious remarks from Russia about this ambiguity have placed Kazakhstan at the epicentre of a targeted (dis)information campaign. The following article appeared 20 August, 2022 in Fergana News. We have translated it with friendly permission from the editors. Recently three ambulances arrived in Ukraine from Kazakhstan. The Telegram channel “Ateo Breaking” reported that the vehicles were sent by authorities from the Central Asian country to help Ukraine, where Russia is conducting a “special military operation.” But in fact, the Kazakh government had nothing to do with this aid package. The vehicles were financed by Kazakh businesspeople, according to information shared by the Ukrainian Ministry of Health and the Ukrainian Embassy in Kazakhstan. Transport to Ukraine was organised by the NGOs “Ukrainian American House,” “Initiative E+,” and the Victor Pinchuk Foundation.

Solidarity with Ukraine from below

From the beginning of the “special operation,” Kazakh authorities distanced themselves from any involvement in the conflict. The acting Minister of Defence Sultan Kamaletdinov made clear remarks in this regard: “We do not support any side. There can be no questions about this.” However, not all Kazakhs agree with his point of view. Since the beginning of the war, hundreds of volunteers and those sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause have sent humanitarian aid to areas in need via the Ukrainian Embassy in Kazakhstan and collected donations for victims. What is important to emphasise is that these are citizens’ initiatives that are not supported by the government. Reception centres for Ukrainian refugees are currently active in 11 cities: Karaganda, Oral, Semei,Oskemen, Aktau, Turkistan, Atyrau, Ekibastuz, Aktobe, Almaty and Astana.

At the beginning of June, Kazakhs sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine via several planes and 11 trucks. The total volume of this delivery was over 200 tons and included toiletries, food, medicine, and more. Within Kazakhstan itself, charity concerts in support of Ukraine have been organised. But since these have unsettled local authorities, gaining permission for such initiatives is difficult. During a charity run on 24 August 2022, money was collected to rebuild schools in Chernihiv Oblast. Officially, Astana has not involved itself in such activities. In spring last year, the Kazakh authorities only sent three cargo planes to Ukraine with medicine, food, and bedding. So far, the government’s policy of neutrality has resulted in a ban on rallies in support of Ukraine, while prosecuting people who display Z or V stickers (letters which are signs of support for the “special operation”). Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia The longer the “special operation” continues, the harder maintaining such balance will be. The “big neighbour” is making it increasingly clear that it expects a different, preferably more supportive stance from Kazakhstan with regard to the military conflict. In spring 2022, well-known media personalities accused Astana of Russophobic policies and treason. Now dozens of popular Telegram channels have become involved in fuelling anti-Russian sentiment by publishing either outright lies or distorted information on the daily, that are picked up by Russian media without any fact-checking. For example, the story about the ambulances mentioned above was run by the state-run online newspaper Gazeta.ru. They even stated on Twitter that the vehicles were sent by Kazakh authorities for use by the Ukrainian armed forces.

Purported weapons’ sales

Another news article claimed that Kazakhstan was selling weapons to the United Kingdom, for them to be subsequently shipped to Ukraine. Documents related to this story were published at the beginning of August by the pro-Russian hacker group Beregini. The deal was supposedly carried out thanks to the mediation of the company “Technoexport”. First this “news” was picked up by Russian Telegram channels, after which mainstream media started publishing about it. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry and Development of Infrastructure denied the accusations immediately and shared that neither “Technoexport” nor any other company had been licensed for the export of weapons to the UK. The permit necessary for the re-export of weapons was also not issued by the ministry. The Russian Telegram channel “Rybar”, however, described the ministry’s statement as “unfounded” and after “digging” through the Technoexport documents, discovered that the company – contrary to the Kazakh rebuttal – was indeed in the possession of the licenses and permits required for export to the UK. Read more on Novastan: The war in Ukraine and its consequences for Central Asia“It does not matter if the official representatives of the Kazakh government are defending themselves by saying that they could not export Soviet weapons without the producer’s – that is, Russia’s – permission. They are doing it all behind closed doors,” wrote the authors of the Telegram channel, which boasts over a million followers. In other words, the Kazakh authorities were being accused of lying not by Russian law enforcement agencies, neither by government leaders, nor by popular media, but instead by a Telegram channel whose anonymous editors know that they will not be prosecuted for their allegations.

“Wild Mambets”

A painful story of child abuse in Kazakhstan developed along similar lines. A group of teenagers in Almaty abused two brothers, aged four and nine, by forcing them to perform oral sex. The mother of the boys turned to the foundation NeMolchi.kz and journalists to receive help, in addition to filing a report with the police. Later, however, a video of the mother appeared on the Telegram channel “Mnogonational” under the title “In Kazakhstan wild Mambets [editor’s note: Mambet is derogatory slang for an uncultivated, uneducated person of Central Asian heritage] forced small Russian children […] to perform oral sex on the playground and recorded it with a camera.”  The story was taken up by Russian TV station Tsargrad, which announced it was “another case of the escalating manifestation of Russophobia in Kazakhstan. This time Russia-haters took their dirty deeds to the limit – Russian children have suffered.” The twisted story was broadcasted on the station and later similarly referenced to by other Russian media outlets. Read more on Novastan: Mambet – The Central Asian N-word: Where it comes from and what it means Then the mother of the victims stepped forward with a counterstatement. The woman called the publication and broadcast a provocation. “All of those involved in the incident were of European ethnicity, but you cannot give this any interethnic stain. I have lived in Kazakhstan since birth and have many friends of other ethnicities. We all live in peace,” she said. Who is responsible for the provocation remains unclear, since the Telegram channel “Mnogonational,” which first spoke of “wild Mambets,” is anonymous. The authors of the channel claimed multiple times that the mother of the children was forced to make a counterstatement. Of course, they did not provide any proof for this claim.

The hot topic of language

The government-friendly Russian public has seized upon yet another hot topic in the relationship between the two countries: language. Messages started circulating on social media stating that Russian-language instruction in Kazakhstan’s schools would disappear in the next six to seven years. Media outlets such as Glas.ru and Tsargrad reported about this as well. As it turned out, these messages were based on a wrong interpretation of a two-year-old report from the Kazakh Channel 31. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Education denounced the fake news, but several days later the problem of Russian language in schools resurfaced. After a statement from Minister of Education Ashat Aimagambetov on 16 August, social media and Telegram channels spread the news that starting in 2022, Kazakh pupils in first grade would not be taught Russian, while learning Kazakh remained obligatory. In fact, the minister only referred to schools with Kazakh as the language of instruction. This important detail was deliberately left out by a number of media outlets. Large Russian media agencies, such as TASS, published about the correct version of the announcement, but the fake story had already received considerable media attention. Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s slow yet determined transition to the Latin alphabet Furthermore, in an interview with Nur.kz in early June, Minister Aimagambetov reemphasized that starting with trilingual classes in the first grade might be too difficult for pupils. Therefore, he added, was decided to introduce the different languages at Kazakh-language primary schools one at a time. “We made a decision on this issue and are already working to ensure that a child in a school with Kazakh as the language of instruction is only learning one language in first grade: Kazakh. That means they learn to read and write in their native language. In second grade, Russian is introduced, and in third grade, English,” explained the minister. This important nuance was omitted in Russian media.

A (dis)information campaign

There are many more examples of Russian disinformation in Kazakhstan, but these stories stand out with regard to the amount of media attention they have received. There was also a deleted post on the social media site Vkontakte by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who currently is deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia. In this post, he claimed that Kazakhstan was an “artificial state,” whose authorities pursue a policy of “Russian genocide.” (The post was deleted 10 minutes after publication and was said to be the result of a hack, as stated by the press service of Vkontakte and Medvedev himself.) There is a lot of disinformation floating on Telegram channels and Russian news websites, such as the story about the alleged murder of a Russian boy in Astana by Kazakh children. The article was accompanied by a video of a fight from last year in which no one was killed. The amount of fake news has grown exponentially in recent months. Hence, it is best to speak of a planned (dis)information campaign. Russian officials reject such accusations outright. President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly referred to Kazakhstan as a “strategic partner” and his press secretary called the country a “friendly state.” On 19 August, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met Vladimir Putin in Sochi. At the meeting, the two presidents hugged. Later Tokayev said that he was satisfied with the development of cooperation between the two countries. Tokayev was quoted saying: “We are bound by the entire border – the longest fully demarcated land border in the world.We cannot allow any pessimistic prognoses over the future of our cooperation! As President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, I am personally dedicated to giving additional impetus to our bilateral cooperation in all areas.”

Fergana News

 Translated from Russian into German by Robin Roth

 Translated from German into English by Mari Paine

 Edited by Julian Postulart

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The post “An escalating manifestation of Russophobia” – Kazakhstan at the epicentre of an information war appeared first on Novastan English.

Ever since February 24, 2022, coverage of the war in Ukraine has been complicated for Central Asia.  Between voluntary omission by official media and pressure on those who dare call the “special operation” a war and invasion, the independent press in Central Asia is being tested by the Kremlin and its restrictive federal agency Roskomnadzor.With significant dependence on Russian network infrastructure, as well as the dominance of Russian content in information distribution, what kind of space do Central Asian media agencies have to exercise digital sovereignty?  An analysis of the Central Asian media landscape under persistent Russian influence.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 14 October 2022. It is a turnaround of events that speaks volumes about the freedom of speech in Kazakhstan. Beeline, the main Kazakh operator, had announced the withdrawal of certain Russian channels broadcasting on national territory, including Channel One Russia and NTV, Kremlin propaganda machines. However, the group went back on their decision on 3 October, says Kazakh media outlet Vlast, following an interview with the Russian Ministry of Digital Development. “In Astana, the interruption of Russian television channels broadcasting is keenly discussed, and the majority is in favour. But the thing is that nothing changes,” explains Kazakh political commentator Dimash Alzhanov to Novastan. Despite pressure from civil society, Kazakh television remains under Russian influence, something which is also true of written press media.

Indeed, an investigation by MediaZona revealed that Moscow blocked certain independent Central Asian media websites by means of the federal agency Roskomnadzor. The state censorship agency sent warning letters to Russian-speaking Kazakh and Kyrgyz press services, demanding that they remove various articles related to the war in Ukraine. This specifically affected Kloop in Kyrgyzstan, in addition to Katel and NewTimes in Kazakhstan.

Censorship of the war in Ukraine

According to director of Kyrgyz media outlet Kloop, quoted in the MediaZona article, Roskomnadzor blocks Internet websites employing the word “war” and not “special operation,” the official term to designate the invasion of Ukrainian by the Kremlin. Although these “warnings” only apply to media within Russian borders and do not restrict Central Asian media agencies inside their own countries, Dimash Alzhanov stresses the fact that these gestures are implemented in order to “impose certain sanctions” and to silence them. The director of the Kazakh public foundation Legal Media Center, Diana Okremova, affirmed in an interview with MediaZona that “some of Roskomnadzor’s actions can be qualified as elements of information warfare.” Blocking Central Asian websites dates to before the beginning of the war in Ukraine. According to the MediaZona article, Roskomnadzor has been expanding control over Central Asian media for several years, forcing some to erase content mentioning citizen suicides, something prohibited under Russian law.  This was the case in 2017 with the Kazakh site Rika.tv, and the Tajik website Asia-Plus in 2019.

Central Asia: Russia’s “information space”

Consequently, Central Asia and its media have been commanding Russia’s attention for some time. “They have been influencing us for about ten years. Russia is trying to attract Central Asian countries into its own information space. The Russian Federation uses television channels as a means to disseminate its propaganda,” explains Dimash Alzhanov. In Kazakhstan, some Russian channels will still be broadcasted because both countries have signed an intergovernmental cooperation agreement on the airing of mass information. For Russia, “the idea is to mix information – even disinformation – and entertainment. These shows use Kazakhs in their programmes to make them ‘less Russian,’ and to ensure that society increasingly watches Moscow-made content,” analyses the political scientist.

Information consumption leans heavily towards Russian-language content

In an interview given to Vlast, political scientist Shalkar Nurseitov explains that the real issue in Central Asia is “the ease of access to Russian media. Most citizens have access to media spreading the Kremlin’s agenda, and those who lack critical thinking believe propaganda.” In 2019 and 2021, international organisation Internews led a study in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan about media consumption patterns of the population. The results, reported by Kazakh outlet Masa Media, showed that 30% of respondents receive their news via television in Kazakhstan, while the percentage is higher in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, the vast majority of viewers watch television in Russian, with only 11% watching in Kazakh. Furthermore, over half the respondents read newspapers, magazines, and websites in Russian, while only a little over 8% consumed written material in Kazakh.

Pressures from within

“If the broadcasting of Russian channels is limited, it does not mean that the problem of freedom of speech will be resolved in Kazakhstan,” said Dimash Alzhanov. “The issue of information manipulation by those in power remains, and therefore freedom of speech may only be guaranteed by a balanced political system.” In April 2022, NGO Reporters Without Borders published a report exposing the pressure that online Central Asian media agencies have been subjected to by national authorities since the beginning of the conflict. Official news websites and state channels in Central Asian republics have avoided using the words “war” or “invasion” since last February, or do not even mention it, as is the case in Tajikistan. This is also what happened in Kazakhstan at the start of the invasion in Ukraine, when, according to Dimash Alzhanov, state media purposely avoided mentioning the subject.  This matches the period in which President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev did not know how to position himself and whether he should support Vladimir Putin or not. RSF also points out that Central Asian countries are not well ranked in terms of freedom of the press.  Uzbekistan is ranked 157^th out of 180 countries on the Press Freedom Index, while Kyrgyzstan is 79^th.  Kazakhstan sits at 155^th, while Tajikistan at 162^nd, and Turkmenistan at 178^th. Dependence on Russian networks The media landscape in Central Asian countries can also be explained by their structural dependency on Russia. In Kazakhstan, for instance, “at least 95% of internet traffic goes through Russia,” explains Talgat Nourlybaiev to Kazakh media site 365.kz. According to Gregory Joubert, former student at the French Geopolitical Institute and specialist on Kazakh cyberspace, it is through data that Russia exerts control in Central Asia first and foremost.  This is done through “Russian Big Tech,” namely Mail.ru, Vkontakte, or Yandex. Therefore, telecommunications in Central Asia remain a major means of influence for Moscow, forming part of its information strategy. “Russia can theoretically interfere in the Central Asian informational sphere by restricting access to certain resources, given that telecommunication operators in Russia are legally bound to respond to demands.”  Thus, as the former student researcher explains, “if Russia had the ambition to attack Kazakhstan for instance, internet structure would be significant.”

Written by Emma Collet for Novastan’s French website.

Translated to English by Emma Bekrine.

Edited by Mari Paine.

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The post Pressure from Russia increases on Central Asian media outlets appeared first on Novastan English.

The border region of Kostanay has turned into a sanctuary for Russians wanting to flee mobilisation. The journalist Almas Qaısar traveled for Vlast to Kostanay to speak with Russian refugees and local residents about what’s happened in the city.  We have translated the article with permission from the editors.

The closer you go to the city centre of Kostanay – where all the administrative buildings, shopping centres, restaurants, and public offices are found – the more people with suitcases and travel packs appear on the horizon. Aside from their conspicuous clothing and their neatly trimmed hair and beards, the Russians are distinguishable by their confused faces.  They congregate mostly around three places in the city centre: a shopping centre, a service centre, and a McDonald’s.  Even though they’ve already made it across the border, they continue to discuss the situation at the border checkpoint. Russians sit at a table in McDonald’s. Across from them is a group of ethnic Kyrgyz who arrived with them. “A Kalmyk acquaintance of mine was turned back at the border! And that coming from a Kazakh border agent,” says one young Russian in astonishment.  He just received access to the Internet. “He must have tried to cross the border at the wrong place. That or he had his papers messed up,” responds his conversation partner while eating a burger. “I’ll find out in a minute,” he says. Over the next half hour, he chats with his acquaintance over the phone to find out the details of the situation. Each of those who made it to Kostanay has a dozen acquaintances trying to cross the border.

Dostonbek

“We decided to flee from mobilisation and not to wait to be shipped off,” says Dostonbek (all names in this article have been changed), who originally comes from Kyrgystan. “I received Russian citizenship eight years ago. I worked there for more than 15 years in a shopping centre.  My family stayed there.” He explains that they originally wanted to fly from Moscow, but the tickets sold out quickly and the prices were very high. Now he is on his way to Bishkek. “But it is difficult to live there, the salaries are low, credit is unimaginable. Granted, we’re spending a lot of money here. That guy over there – he planned his wedding in 13 days,” he says, pointing to a younger man.  “He invited 300 people!  So much money will be wasted,” Dostonbek laughs.

Stepan

An increasing number of Russians gather in McDonald’s. Some have occupied the seats along the wall to charge their devices and try to work on their laptops. Others attempt to relax. Outside it is cold and dreary: Kostanay has become cold and a frosty wind is blowing. “I am 32 years old and I wasn’t affected by the first wave of mobilisation. They are taking everyone arbitrarily. Why am I here? We started a criminal war which I don’t want to take part in.  I am against this war.  I don’t want to kill any people.  That’s not the reason I studied, built my house, and raised my children,” says Stepan.  He was born in Kazan. Earlier he worked as a software developer at an IT company. As mobilisation was announced, his family stood by in shock. “No one knew what to do.  Many initially thought that it would pass us by. But there was less and less time to think about it. Four days after mobilisation was announced we decided to flee. We were afraid that we wouldn’t make it out in time. People were already being turned away at the border,” he adds. He and his family set off in their car and waited 18 hours at a border checkpoint. They had the possibility to drive through Orenburg but people stood there “for three days without water or food.”  They planned to drive through Georgia, but a military recruitment point had already been set up. Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia“There are people in their 50s and 60s. There are cars full of six young people. Three of them were turned back at border control. There are families with small children and babies. We don’t know why they send people back. Yesterday at the border someone who was recruited, who had served in the army, was let through. But one man who was categorized as disabled, who had never served, and who had no military experience, they didn’t let through,” explains Stepan. He says he made it through Kazakh border security in two hours. “There were no difficulties with them. They laugh and joke.”  Out of the 20 people in his division, 16 have already left Russia. Out of 10 close friends, seven have fled. The rest hope not to be recruited. Thanks to some acquaintances and volunteers, Stepan was able to find accommodation in a holiday camp about one and a half kilometres outside of the city. “It’s only a holiday camp with one oven. We paid 25 000 Tenge (£44.71) for the night. The whole camp is full of Russians. We still have a long way before us – we’re going to Almaty,” he says. Stepan wants to stay in Almaty because he has relatives there. He has his savings, but “no one is going to just sit around,” he says. “Money is always getting tighter. We will help to develop their country. If our country doesn’t need us,” he says with frustration. “Of course we want to return to Russia. Our home is there. My wife and I have discussed trying to move to Europe if the situation worsens – and in my opinion it won’t get better and it will continue for a while.” He adds: “It’s very difficult right now for my wife. I don’t have any time to reflect.”

Igor

A stream of people weaves through the centre. Suddenly a megaphone at the crosswalk announces that Beeline (a TV and internet provider) will be cutting access to Russian television stations. Nearby, between suitcases and bags, stands Igor. He speaks with a friend from Kostanay. “Here there’s a collapse of arriving Russians,” he jokes.  Igor didn’t take it very seriously at the beginning of mobilisation. But as rumours began to spread in Russia about the borders being shut, he decided to flee. In the span of a couple of days, he and his friends thought through the options and decided on Kazakhstan. Before mobilisation he lived in Vologda and worked, like many other Russians, as an IT specialist. In his opinion, the popularity of the profession lies in the fact that they can work from anywhere in the world. The most important thing is to have internet, electricity, and a laptop. “Even as I sat in traffic in Chelyabinsk Oblast along the border, I worked,” says Igor. First he had taken a high-speed train to Moscow, then a flight to Chelyabinsk. His daughter and wife remain in Vologda. “We had a certain amount of luck. We met a Kazakh citizen who, for a relatively high amount of money, helped us to cross the border. On the 27^th he queued on the Russian side. We were in Chelyabinsk and he stood in the queue. When we arrived at the border, he was already close to the checkpoint. Instead of waiting 15 hours, we only waited seven. We halved our waiting time,” Igor says. He’s sitting with his things and is searching for accommodation. There were problems with his Russian bank cards, which don’t work here. Now Igor is on the hunt for an employer abroad, especially in Europe or the USA. “Depending on the offer, you can either stay in Kazakhstan, make yourself legal, and bring your family here, or, if your employer offers a relocation programme, then you go where you’re moved.  There’s also an option in Poland – I have a job interview on Monday,” he said. Igor would enjoy staying in Kostanay, but he can see that the city’s economy can’t handle the influx. “It’s going to get even bigger. And it will become more difficult,” he says with certainty.  He’s going to go to Almaty, as some of his friends from Vologda already fled there and are looking for a large flat. “To be honest, I hope that things improve for the better in Russia. It’s all so sad. I didn’t want to leave. I want things to change. We hope for the best, but are preparing ourselves for the worst,” he concludes.

David

When Russians talk about their country, you can sense their internal conflict. But many of them are also confident that they can come to terms with life outside Russia’s borders. Part of this is due to the fact that mainly people with savings have come to Kostanay. David met the requirements for mobilisation and therefore decided to flee the country. “I’m not going to go there and solve someone else’s problems in another country under the pretext that someone attacked us. Everyone understands that no one attacked us,” he said. David lived in Yekaterinburg and was self-employed. He had a management position and saved his money. His wife and child stayed in Russia. His path is leading him to Almaty, where he has friends. He intends to stay in Kazakhstan, but must first acquire legal status. He says that he’s felt welcome wherever he’s gone. He has heard from various people how they handed out fruit to those stuck in traffic at the Kazakh border, and how patrolling police officers approached them and asked if they had food and lodging. “We couldn’t imagine something like that in Russia,” he adds. “My family is there. I hope that there will be some improvement. It’s difficult to talk about. The situation in Russia wasn’t particularly rosy. Overnight they announced it. People are leaving everything and going abroad. At the border with Kazakhstan there’s a huge influx. I understand the strain on Kazakhstan. I hope that there won’t be any conflicts between Russians and Kazakhs. It’s important to be understood. And that our people remain conscientious about everything,” David concludes.

Vasily

Vasily is a musician who studied computer science, and he was about to begin his first job. Prior to mobilisation, he participated in various protests and was active as an observer at voting stations. “I fought as hard as I could. When mobilisation was announced, it was clear to me that I had a choice: prison or moving. I don’t want to kill anyone in Ukraine,” says Vasily. He bought tickets on the first day of mobilisation. Together with a friend, they walked through the traffic to the border control point. There they spent an hour in the rain. Out of 300 people, only 10 got through. Then they paid money to someone driving a car who was already close to the border, and they drove with him. “As we arrived in Kazakhstan, we were welcomed with open arms. The taxi driver was a very nice man. He told us how to move forward and what we should do. Then my friend was able to contact an acquaintance who helped us to find a flat for the night. Now we’ve found a place that we can stay at for longer. Originally I thought I had money for six months. I had saved up for years and years. I had other plans for the money, but what’s a person to do?  My wife stayed behind to work, so maybe she’ll chip in if something happens. I’ll probably stay in Kostanay for four months – if the hustle and bustle settles and it’s not so expensive,” he adds. Afterwards he doesn’t plan on staying in Kazakhstan longer. He believes that the political situation in Russia has entered a critical phase: “Either it’s going to come to a worst-case scenario or something will solve itself.”

The locals’ opinion

The local residents have greeted the new arrivals in various ways. Companies have begun to advertise for their offices and businesses to draw in Russians. In shopping centres, signs have gone up advertising shops where you can buy SIM cards and exchange currency. Volunteer initiatives help people to find flats or accommodation in shelters. However, all of them declined to comment. For others, Russians have become synonymous with “cool cars,” traffic, and increasing rent prices. “Yes, they’re coming and coming. Nothing has changed for me. The only thing that’s changed is that the Russians are here now. But that doesn’t make a difference,” say some residents. Others have more understanding for the newcomers. Toktasyn is a pensioner. He lives a couple of kilometres away from Kostanay in an aul, or a type of traditional village. He came to the city for a visit and has noticed the influx of Russians. He believes they need help. “Let them come. They’ve come before. Into the new country [editors’ note: this is a reference to forced resettlement of Russian farmers during Soviet times]. Where else could they go? If they go there, they’ll die. We have to help, it’s getting colder now. Where are they going to go?  They left everything behind and came here,” he says. Andrei, who works as a taxi driver, is also of the opinion that “they’re doing the right thing by fleeing mobilisation.”“No one wants to die and kill. I only drive Russians now. There were guys from Ulan-Ude with us. That means they’re coming from so far away. Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg. Very young guys. 18 to 22 years old. There were also guys who were basically kids. Why should kids die in this war? Better to come over here,” he says. Azamat weaves through the bus station, surrounded by the purple of twilight. There, at a covered bus stop, stand people with suitcases. After a while they make their way to a group of taxi drivers advertising trips to Karaganda, Astana, and Almaty. Azamat doesn’t work as a taxi driver. He merely walks around and helps people. “Look at that girl over there,” he says, pointing at a young girl in a pink coat. “She’s so young, she could be my daughter. So young and what a challenge all this is for her. These are innocent people. Who wants to walk away and leave behind brothers, sisters, parents, and children? No one wants to kill people.” He says that every day about 200 people arrive. According to him, the city benefits from the newcomers. “Everyday necessities, rent, taxis – that’s all profit. They don’t make things worse for Kostanay” he says. A flock of migrating birds cuts through the sky behind the departing Russians.

Originally written in Russian by Almas Qaısar for Vlast

Translated from Russian into German by Amina Akhrorkulova for Novastan

Translated from German into English by Mari Paine

Edited by Maya Ivanova

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The post Destination Kazakhstan – A report from Kostanay, where hundreds of Russians have been taken in appeared first on Novastan English.

Many Central Asian migrants have joined the Russian army since partial mobilisation was announced in Russia.  They are being pulled into Russia’s war in Ukraine against the advice of their countries’ consular organs.This article was oroginally published on Novastan’s French website on 19 October 2022.

On 21 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the mobilisation of 300 000 reservists, called up from a pool of 25 million potential fighters.  Some of these are seasonal workers and precariously employed migrants from Central Asia. Russia amended their federal law “On Conscription and Military Service” in 2013 so that every young person with Russian citizenship is required to perform mandatory military service, even when they have already served it in their land of origin.  According to reports by the Kyrgyz news portal Kaktus, recruitment of Central Asian migrants has taken place in the Sakharovo migration center in Moscow since 21 September. This marks a turning point in the war, as the government is no longer hiding their desire to recruit foreigners to expand the ranks of their army. There are no official figures for how many Central Asian citizens have been recruited to fight in Ukraine.  According to Radio Azattyq, the Kazakh branch of Radio Free Europe, the overwhelming majority of Central Asian migrants come from three countries: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

High salaries and Russian passports as bait

Russian recruitment authorities want to mobilise migrants from Central Asia and do so by promising high salaries and Russian citizenship.  In some cases, the authorities use subterfuge.  “They told us that there was a lot of construction happening in Kherson and that we have to go there.  And that we could expect salaries of 220 000 rubles (£3065.94),” one witness told Eurasianet.  “Some from our group went but it turned out they had been taken along to fight.” The lure of profit and citizenship is an effective mode of manipulation. The use of migrants and refugees in war is, according to an article in the American journal Foreign Affairs, a widespread phenomenon. Their lives are used like chess pieces in the game of war. The Russian human rights activist Valentina Chupik spoke with Central Asian media agency CABAR about her experiences with Tajik migrants in an interview. According to Chupik, many have said that they have received anonymous calls from law enforcement officials with offers to join the Russian army and receive Russian citizenship within three months. Furthermore, one of the Tajik migrants questioned said that some of his friends and relatives had decided to serve in the army in order to earn more money to send home to their families. Even before partial mobilisation was announced, people with a Central Asian background or nationality were recruited. In fact, an investigation by MediaHub discovered that in Uzbekistan, certain online platforms advertising security-related jobs in Russia actually sent workers directly to a military base controlled by the private Wagner Group.  This Russian mercenary group is used in wars worldwide, including in Ukraine.  Ukrainian intelligence agencies say that “Central Asian recruitment campaigns for mercenaries” have been in operation since the beginning of the war.

The embassies react

The embassies from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have called on their citizens not to involve themselves in the war in Ukraine. They claim that involvement is a criminal offense according to the domestic laws of their respective countries. The risk of being sucked into the war is particularly high for young men from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan who have already acquired Russian citizenship. With a diaspora of 650 000 Kazakhstanis, 1.9 million Uzbekistanis, and 104 000 Kyrgyzstanis (numbers from 2002), able-bodied men from these groups could be subjected to forced recruitment. For Turkmen, Tajik, and Uzbek citizens, participation in a foreign conflict can lead to imprisonment upon returning home.  Particularly affected by this are the 1.2 million Tajik migrant workers (number from 2021) in Russia.  

Originally written in French by Matthieu Petrov 

Translated into German from French by Robin Roth 

Translated from German into English by Mari Paine 

Edited by Maya Ivanova

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The post How Russia is recruiting Central Asian soldiers for its war in Ukraine appeared first on Novastan English.

The Kyrgyz parliament approved the outline for an agreement of a new border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.  The outline includes handing over the Kempir-Abad water reservoir to their Uzbek neighbours.  The news has caused a stir in the country.This article was originally published on Novastan’s French website on 27 October 2022.

On 10 October the Kyrgyz Supreme Council’s Committee on International Affairs and Defense gathered to vote on the outline for an agreement to hand over a debated region to Uzbekistan. Particularly debated in this project is the Kempir-Abad water reservoir bordering Uzbekistan in the Osh Region.  According to the Kyrgyz news agency 24.kg, the reservoir is 4400 hectares and holds almost 1.9 cubic kilometers of water.  It is of great importance to the inhabitants in the region as a source of water for both human consumption and agriculture.  According to the agreement’s outline, the reservoir would be handed over to Uzbekistan. If the agreement is signed, then Kyrgyzstan would receive 19 700 hectares of land in return.  However, considering how dependent the local population is on the water reservoir, the handover is proving very difficult.

A secret vote

The vote on 10 October on the outline of the agreement occurred behind closed doors.  According to reports from Kyrgyz media Kaktus, the details of the project were not shared with the public in order to prevent any uproar.  Furthermore, only 10 out of the 15 representatives of the committee were present. Only a portion of the agreement’s text was shared with them on the day of the vote – actions that are unconstitutional according to the American media agency Eurasianet.  The agreement was approved with six “yes” and four “no” votes. The delegates who voted against the agreement illuminated the details of the affair on the very same day.  Delegate Chingiz Aidarbekov reported to 24.kg that he had not seen the document.  “I said that I couldn’t vote for the agreement before I read it.  So I voted against it,” he said.

A failed cover-up

This situation has led to criticism towards the Kyrgyz government.  After the procedural errors were made public, the parliament declared that the agreement could be voted upon only after a plenary session with the representatives and the president, as required by pre-defined protocols. The controversy is particularly strong in the Osh Region and the border city Özgön, where, after becoming aware of the affair, a committee for the protection of the Kempir-Abad reservoir was established.  The committee, which considers itself to be defending Kyrgyz sovereignty over the reservoir and representing the affected community, is made up of politicians, activists, and civil actors.  Numerous demonstrations have been organized, which have been attended by several dozen people.

Repression against protests

The government of President Sadyr Japarov reacted to the oppositionist protests with repressive measures. On 23 October the houses of about a dozen oppositionists and activists were searched, according to Eurasianet.  Some of them were imprisoned. The authorities claim that the arrests occurred due to attempted organizing of mass unrest, but did not give an exact number of how many were arrested.  The president later explained that these oppositionists were “provocateurs” who would try to build the foundation for his overthrow. These statements were immediately condemned by the opposition, who pointed out the authoritarian nature of the authorities vis-à-vis a non-violent civil movement.

A touchy subject

Prior to his election in 2021, Japarov based his campaign on the defense of Kyrgyz sovereignty.  The outline of the agreement is therefore seen as him going back on promises made almost two years ago. The government is engaging in risky two-faced behaviour on the national level.  To justify the agreement, Japarov claims that joint management of the reservoir is planned.  The Russian daily Kommersant reports that Japarov considers this an improvement over the previous administration of the dam.

Media in Kyrgyzstan increasingly threatened

According to Eurasianet, the arrests on 23 October have occurred in the broader context of attempts to control the opposition and the media.  The government has imprisoned activists and journalists regularly in the past several months, and now wants to pass a law which would lead to greater control over independent media to reduce its influence. None of the parties which have taken a stance against this law were present during the drafting of the law’s text. Read more on Novastan: Kyrgyzstan: Journalists complain about attempts to hack their accounts The Kyrgyz news portal Kloop discovered that Radio Azattyk, the Kyrgyz branch of Radio Free Europe and one of the most important critical media voices in the country, was blocked for two months in a decision made by the Ministry of Culture on 26 October. Radio Azattyk supposedly spread false information about the conflict with Tajikistan and therefore had their site blocked in accordance with the law “On protection from incorrect information,” signed in August 2021.  This law allows the government to block websites which are viewed as brokers of fake information without a court order.  

Written by the editors of Novastan’s French website

Translated from French to German by Michèle Häfliger

Translated from German to English by Mari Paine

Edited by Maya Ivanova

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The post Kyrgyzstan: Handover of water reservoir to Uzbekistan leads to protests appeared first on Novastan English.