As Kazakhstan officially starts the construction of its new nuclear plant, the region is overwhelmed with an extreme heat wave. The climate change is especially noticeable in the continental climate: in the land where summer temperature peak at 49 degrees Celcius is even the slightest upgrade dangerous. But the efforts to become climate neutral country prove to meet some complications. 

The temperatures in Kazakhstan – as anywhere in the world – are rising. The winter of 2024/2025 has been classified as ‘anomalously’ warm, as temperatures exceeded the norm by 2 to 6 degrees. Spring and summer have been way too hot as well: monthly reports show temperature records. Over the last 75 years, the average yearly temperature in Kazakhstan has risen by 6 degrees.

The efforts to counteract climate change, or at least to slow it down, are extremely relevant in this context. But the current starting point makes the green future look rather distant.

Fuel dependence in the background 

In 2023, Kazakhstan’s president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed the ambitious Strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Achieving Carbon Neutrality by 2060. Nevertheless, in a country where the economy is deeply reliant on the fossil fuel industry, the shift toward renewable energy poses considerable difficulties.

Since Kazakhstan’s independence (now well over three decades ago), subsequent governments were betting on the extraction of fuel for continued economic growth, as well as securing investments through selling the exploration and recovery rights to fossil giants like British Petroleum, Exxon and Shell. Petroleum currently makes up 52,5% of Kazakhstan’s export, which earns the country up to 34,8 billion GBP annually. Whilst Russia is subjected to sanctions as a result of its war against Ukraine, western countries are looking for alternative suppliers. And Kazakhstan has proven to be an interesting partner in that regard – a fact reflected in the signing of new contracts, primarily for oil exports to Europe.

The fossil fuel industry remains far too profitable to scale back, let alone to significantly reduce oil production. Yet such a decline seems inevitable: if not driven by environmental imperatives, then by sheer necessity. Current forecasts suggest that known oil reserves could be exhausted within just 30 years at present production rates. While this projection may align with broader climate objectives, governments continue to pursue new exploration efforts in regions considered geologically promising.

The main problem: coal

Oil is only part of the problem. The energy sector in general is Kazakhstan’s number one source of greenhouse gas emissions. Although energy demand from industry accounts for just over a fifth of final energy consumption, more than a third is spent on the building sector. This is where coal processing comes in.

Kazakhstan possesses vast coal reserves, though extraction remains costly. The country’s largest deposits are relatively shallow but consist of exceptionally thick seams, making mining operations less efficient. In 2023, a tonne of coal could be purchased directly from mines for around 9,000 tenge – approximately £15.75 at the prevailing exchange rate – well below global market prices. For domestic consumers, transportation costs can nearly double that price, yet coal remains the most affordable source of energy production. However, its widespread use is responsible for more than half of Kazakhstan’s greenhouse gas emissions.

Most of Kazakhstan’s coal is consumed domestically, primarily to supply the country’s thermal power plants. Coal accounts for 99% of heat generation and more than half of total electricity production. However, many of these power stations are outdated and, in some cases, in disrepair. Most were built during the Soviet era and have long exceeded their intended operational lifespan.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan stops investment agreement with ArcelorMittal after deadly explosion in Kostenko mine takes 46 lives

The government does not seem particularly willing to completely abandon coal. News outlet zakon.kz cites Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy Yerlan Akkenzhenov: ‘We live on wealth. Coal-fired power generation is considered the cheapest option. In addition, the construction of combined heat and power plants also allows us to control the heat supply. As you know, all our cities are supplied by combined heat and power plants and a central heat supply. We must continue to pursue this approach […]’

As an alternative, the minister has proposed equipping the power plants with modern boilers that enable coal to be burned ‘without residue’. By 2035, ‘every combined heat and power plant will be gradually converted exactly to clean coal technology’.

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In a country with very cold winters, less than half of households are connected to a central heating network. In single-family detached homes, coal is frequently used as the main energy source for heating, which in turn contributes to the already high levels of smog produced by thermal power plants in big cities like Almaty. Taking into consideration the state of Kazakhstan’s housing stock, a considerable amount of energy gets wasted due to insufficient insulation or outdated heating systems. Ironically, even with the energy wasted, heating is still cheaper in the long term than investing in renovations.

Read more on Novastan: Breathing space: air quality and energy transition in Kazakhstan

Slow decarbonization in transport

A similar situation can be observed in the transport sector, the country’s second-largest energy consumer. The UN, in its roadmap for achieving the 7th sustainable development goal (‘Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’), recommends that Kazakhstan decarbonize 15% of its passenger cars by 2050. Currently there are 6.17 million cars registered in the country, of which electric cars account for only 0.003%.

A quarter of a century is a long time – after all, 25 years ago, electric cars as we know them today did not even exist. However, the timeframe proposed by the UN seems optimistic for Kazakhstan: almost half of the cars in the country are at least 20 years old, and a significant proportion of these are cars would no longer pass vehicle safety tests, or would be banned from towns and cities for not meeting environmental standards. Although the government is planning to impose fines on car owners whose vehicles exceed emission standards, there are no plans to use the revenue to directly fund environmental initiatives. Many drivers only replace their cars when they are no longer roadworthy, and even then, they tend to turn to secondary and tertiary markets when looking for a replacement.

Switching to an electric car is not easy in Kazakhstan: all charging stations are located within the three largest cities – Astana, Almaty and Shymkent – and even there, their availability is limited. Due to the risk of fire, for example, it is prohibited to install charging stations in apartment parking areas. Electric car owners are hence dependent on public charging stations in large car parks and near shopping centres – which often do not supply green electricity.

According to internal research of a car manufacturer in the region, more than half of car owners do not consider electric cars as a purchase option when thinking about their next buy. After the boom in 2022/2023, when cheap electric cars were imported en masse from China, excitement has subsided. The urban population with above-average incomes who wanted and could afford an electric car, have already purchased it; for the rest these cars are just too expensive, far too impractical, far too unfamiliar. Car dealers are now focusing on hybrid models instead, which could serve as a transitional solution. Yet even these are no option for the majority of the population, given the current state of infrastructure in Kazakhstan.

Clean energy: only a fraction in the market

It is not that Kazakhstan produces no clean energy at all.

Hydroelectric power plants, however, play only a minor role in the country’s energy mix — for understandable reasons. Most of them were built in the same era as the aging thermal power plants. Moreover, water resources are steadily dwindling, raising doubts about whether there will be enough water to sustain hydroelectric production in the coming years.

Read more on Novastan: Kazakhstan: Residents suffer from lack of water

Despite Kazakhstan’s favorable geographic conditions, solar and wind energy remain surprisingly underused. As of 2024, the country operated just 59 wind farms and 46 solar parks — a modest number given its vast, sparsely populated steppes that are ideally suited for renewable energy generation. The southern regions enjoy between 2,200 and 3,000 hours of sunshine per year — two to three times more than the United Kingdom. Kazakhstan also has excellent wind potential: average wind speeds of 5–6 m/s are common across most of the country, reaching up to 8.27 m/s in certain areas. Experts estimate Kazakhstan’s total wind energy potential at around 920 billion kWh per year.

Yet, this immense potential remains largely untapped. The main reason is economic. At current price levels, the clean energy sector is unattractive to private investors. Equipment must be imported at high cost, while the electricity produced can be sold for no more than seven pence per kilowatt hour, VAT included. For most households, retail prices are roughly half that. As a result, revenues barely cover maintenance, and the payback period for new projects is so long that, by the time investors see a return, much of the infrastructure is already outdated and in need of further investment.

It has long been evident that energy prices in Kazakhstan will have to rise to finance sector modernization and accelerate the shift toward green energy. The controversial new nuclear power plant will not be profitable otherwise: experts estimate that the price of nuclear power will be 12.5 pence per kilowatt hour in the first 15 years. Ultimately, however, it is sustainable energy that must take the lead. Sergei Agafonov, chairman of the Kazakh Association of Energy Suppliers, envisions an optimal energy mix in which renewables provide at least half of the demand, while nuclear power accounts for roughly the global average – projected to reach 12% by 2040. ‘Yes, renewable energies will have to dominate our energy balance over all other types of energy generation. The main thing is that we carry out this change carefully [..]’, said Agafonov in an interview with Orda.kz.

New turning point

The strategy for achieving carbon neutrality in 2060 contains neither an implementation plan, nor success indicators, nor any sanctions for failing to achieve the set targets. In 2017, it was already announced at the EXPO in Astana that the share of renewables should increase to 30% by 2030. As things stand, the quota is only 6.2%. This still shows a 4% increase over the last seven years, but the growth estimate was clearly far too optimistic. Just four years after the EXPO, the target value has been halved.

A scenario in which Kazakhstan fails to meet its 2060 targets remains entirely plausible. The Climate Action Tracker has voiced similar concerns, rating the country’s climate policies as ‘insufficient,’ noting that ‘emissions will continue to rise until at least 2035 under current policies.‘ The lack of genuine political will to tackle the issue is perhaps best illustrated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s abrupt change of stance. Speaking at a forum of the National Council for Science and Technology on September 26, Tokayev underscored the continued importance of coal and made a striking remark about climate change:

‘frankly, everything that is happening looks like a large-scale fraud.’

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The post Carbon neutral by 2060? Kazakhstan’s green pledge faces a reality check appeared first on Novastan English.

Temirlan Yensebek, creator and author of “Qaznews24,” an agency of satirical news, has been detained on Saturday in Almaty. He is expected to stand trial under accusations of incitement of hatred. The court placed Yensebek in custody for the duration of the preliminary investigation. If convicted, he is facing up to 7 years in prison.

Civil activist and blogger Temirlan Yensebek, author of satirical media account Qaznews24, which masks as a news agency, was apprehended on Saturday afternoon at this home during a search. The same evening he stood a preliminary hearing and left the courthouse in handcuffs. The activist remains in custody for the next two months, until the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

Yensebek’s lawyer Zhanar Balgabaeva told journalists that the reason for the arrest was the comic song “Yo, orystar” (“Yo, Russians”), which Yensebek added to a satirical post about Russian TV presenter Tina Kandelaki. A representative of the public prosecutor’s office filed a complaint about the post, which set events in motion.

Read more on Novastan: Pressure from Russia increases on Central Asian media outlets

Satire under scrutiny

Qaznews24 can be seen as a Kazakh analog of “The Onion” – a popular instagram page which publishes satirical pieces and perky comments on current affairs and social issues. Since its founding in 2021, Qaznews24 has featured dozens of posts about poverty, corruption, nepotism, and idolization of the powerful, laughing out conspiracy theorists, moralising hypocrits and sycophants in politics.

Although the page openly states its satirical orientation in every post, its content frequently causes confusion as the reports are being mistaken for real news. In 2021, Yensebek was accused of spreading misinformation and, after a search in his house, brought to the police office for questioning. Police issued a statement that Qaznews24 content was “disinforming the population and misleading the citizens,” labeling Yensebek as a fake news creator.

Yensebek’s colleagues then started a campaign called “Satire is not a crime,” demanding to stop the prosecution and ensure freedom of speech, which is guaranteed in the Kazakhstan Constitution. The campaign was supported by international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch. After linguistic experts showed that humoristic content cannot be qualified as knowingly false information, the case was closed.

However, as recent events have shown, the authorities were not finished with Qaznews24 just yet.

“New Kazakhstan,” old methods

On Saturday, 18 January 2025, Yensebek’s house was searched again – this time under the pretext of Temirlan “inciting ethnic hatred.” He was then brought to the police station and faced a short evening trial. The judge mandated his detention for two months pending completion of a preliminary investigation. This is the harshest option provided by law.

After two months of investigation, Yesenbek will likely await another trial. If found guilty, he could be facing a penalty varying from a fine to restriction of freedom for a period of 2 to 7 years, to imprisonment for the same period.

Sunday, January 19, saw a new development to the story. Journalist and ex-editor-in-chief of art and culture web-portal Art of Her, Rus Biketov, went out on a solitary picket in support of Yensebek in Almaty. He was immediately apprehended by the police. On the same day, Biketov was sentenced to 15 days detention for violating the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the procedure for organizing and holding peaceful assemblies.

No laughing matter

Historically, Kazakhstan has never scored high on ratings measuring freedom of expression and freedom of the press. According to Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net report, Kazakhstan has a score of 34 out of 100, placing it in the “not free” category. RSF World Press Freedom Index puts Kazakhstan on place 142 out of 180, falling from place 134 in 2023. Global Expression Report defines Kazakhstan as “highly restricted.”

A slight improvement on the Freedom of Expression index from V-Dem Project does not really change the overall picture. This index shows the “[b]est estimate of the extent to which people can discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, the press, and media are free and can present different political perspectives, and the freedom of academic and cultural expression,” and Kazakhstan’s score of 0,43/1 can be described as mediocre at best.

Read more on Novastan: In Central Asia, the Freedom of Press is in Decline

The prosecution of dissidents is not new either. Indeed, Kazakh authorities have shown a considerable lack of humor – and mostly, inability to take valid criticism – on various occasions already. One might wonder how in a country where police uses torture against protesters and organized crime is on the rise, a satirical account poses the greatest threat. Yet, in reality, this crackdown on satire is all but inconsequential. The idea is not to fight the greatest evil, but to target those who dared to speak up about it.

While the situation with Temirlan Yensebek might look absurd, his detention illustrates a concerning development in restricting freedom of the speech. More importantly, it aims to send a clear warning to civil society. As Factcheck.kz editor Adil Jalilov writes in his column, “the expected result of the arrest and criminal case against QazNews24 author Temirlan Yensebek . . . [is], [o]bviously, an increased self-censorship in the entire media community.”

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The post When Freedom of Speech Is a Joke: Author of a Satirical News Outlet Detained in Kazakhstan appeared first on Novastan English.

Snow leopards – an exclusively Asian species of large mammals of the cat family – live on the territory of 12 countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, Russia, Nepal, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bhutan, India, China. With the help of modern technologies, scientists are monitoring snow leopards’ behaviour and lifestyle to increase knowledge about this rare species to guarantee their survival.

“It’s not that simple” – so begins the answer to any question about the protection and preservation of snow leopards as a species. Are snow leopards categorised as vulnerable or endangered species? What is the biggest threat to their survival and reproduction? What is the best and most effective way to protect them? It’s not that simple, experts invariably answer.

This vague formulation is due to two peculiarities of the snow leopards’ lifestyle that complicate the possibility of observation: they live in high-mountainous and hard-to-reach places for humans, and they regularly traverse an impressive territory in search of prey. Snow leopards are strictly territorial animals, with males maintaining and regularly making rounds of their hunting territories, which can reach up to 1000 km² in area. Cases when leopards encroached on the territory of another representative of the species of the same sex are very rare.

Although these animals need a large territory, a scientific report published in 2016 by the Swedish Institute of Agricultural Sciences confirmed that almost 40% of all protected areas in the snow leopard’s range are too small to support even one breeding pair of these endangered cats. Specialists are convinced that for the species to survive in the wild, it needs a range sufficient for free movement of at least 50 breeding females.

Surveillance methods

The availability of such data and its accuracy have become possible in the last few years thanks to the developing technologies of animal observation. Wildlife cameras produce fascinating videos and photographs of animals, as well as documenting every single individual captured in a photo. Previously, in addition to camera shots, scientists have collected animal faeces to study the DNA of snow leopards. But both types of observing and studying had their significant limitations: it was impossible to trace the range of the animal’s hunting area, to find out what and when snow leopards eat, and how long they nurture and raise their offspring.

This is where a revolutionary development – collars with GPS trackers – comes to the rescue. Several non-profit organisations and foundations have begun implementing this technology in stages. One of them, Snow Leopard Trust, with the help of partner organisations and specialists, has managed to put the collars on several snow leopards in Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia. They track some of the animals since 2006.

“With the help of information from the collars, we learnt in which territories the animals move. One female with a collar travelled a distance of 2,000 kilometres during the time we monitored her. We would never have been able to capture that kind of information with cameras alone. We can also see how long [snow leopard] stays in one area and how often it changes its den,” said Kuban Jumabai Uulu, Director of the Snow Leopard Trust in Kyrgyzstan.

How collars with GPS trackers work

“For us, the process of fixing a collar on an animal is a combination of skill and art,” notes Koustubh Sharma, Science and Conservation Director at the Snow Leopard Trust.

Snow Leopard Trust Senior Scientist, Dr. Örjan Johansson, is the undisputed leader among researchers involved in the implementation and development of this technology. At the origin of this ambitious research project to study the living conditions and survival of snow leopards, he has managed to collar more than 30 snow leopards in Mongolia since 2006. So far, it is the southern part of the Gobi Desert, located in Mongolia, that serves as the main area of the scientific study involving collared wild cats.

To collar the leopards, experts study the routes of a particular animal and place a trap in its path. Once the trap is triggered, a team of scientists travel to the location and sedate the animal with a safe sedative. During the time the leopard is unconscious, the scientists carefully check the animal for any injuries, put a collar on it, and collect DNA samples – blood and hair – for further study. If an animal is trapped with any injuries, it is released without a collar.

Read more on Novastan: Still under threat – snow leopards in Kyrgyzstan

The Snow Leopard Trust is particularly proud of the latest advances in collar design – the current version of the device has an automatic release system. 18-20 months after the collar is attached, it falls off the animal’s neck automatically without human intervention. While the collar is active, scientists receive new data about the animal’s location every five hours. This information allows them not only to trace the routes of movement but also to better study the behaviour and habits of the animal. For example, if scientists notice that the animal spends a significant amount of time in one place, it is likely that it has found prey and is dealing with it. As soon as the snow leopard leaves a given location, scientists examine the remains of the feast and determine by the bones which animal became the victim of the predator.

The researchers had to make sure that such an invasive approach to animal studies did not have a lasting negative impact on the wild cats themselves. To that end, before launching the tracker collar programme in the wild, the experts put the collars on snow leopards at Seattle’s Woodland Zoo. Careful assessment of the animals’ behaviour before, during and after the experiment showed that the collars did not affect the leopards. The same results were obtained after removing the collars from free-ranging snow leopards.

Captivity vs. Freedom

At the moment, about 3000 snow leopards are kept in zoos around the world. They are scientists’ last hope in the most tragic scenario.

“It is important to realise that despite loud claims that snow leopards are no longer an endangered species, such claims cannot be made with 100 per cent certainty. We still have no way of stating the exact number of snow leopards living in the wild. The interval between our estimates is considerable. We should also keep in mind that the number of snow leopards in the wild continues to decline,” explains Koustubh Sharma.

The situation is ambiguous with keeping animals in captivity as well. These are not ideal conditions, and in the history of the species, there has never been a single case when a snow leopard born in captivity was able to integrate into its intended life in the wild. But if the number of free-living individuals continues to fall and the population of wild snow leopards wanes, all hope will fall on captive-born animals. They are the key to the preservation of the species and a guarantee of its survival.

The main threats and the fight against them

The situation is not getting simpler in this matter. Snow leopards have many enemies: global warming and climate change, poachers, reducing numbers of prey, but also the local population sometimes can kill or seriously injure wild cats while defending their territory and livestock. There are also known cases when snow leopards have become collateral damage in the fight against rodents and wolves with pesticides in the predator’s habitat.

Read more on Novastan: Climate change could lead to ever more fluctuated temperatures in Central Asia

The Global Programme for the Conservation of Snow Leopards and their Ecosystems in Kazakhstan estimates that snow leopards are exposed to all the above threats. The biggest threat comes from poachers, revengeful shepherds and lawbreaking hunters. Also, despite the existing numerous international and national laws and environmental acts, snow leopards are globally threatened with extinction due to insufficient implementation of these legal documents. Human activities that encroach on snow leopards’ habitat, as well as contributing to climate change, are increasingly reducing the territory already insufficient for the species’ prolific survival.

Nevertheless, foundations and NGOs are not despairing. Depending on the most widespread threats to the species’ survival in a particular country, organisations are developing programmes to address them. For example, in remote regions of India and Pakistan, where herders often kill snow leopards to protect their livestock, the Snow Leopard Trust offers financial compensation for lost farm animals. In Kyrgyzstan, Kuban Jumabai Uuly’s team rewards park rangers for every poacher caught, and conducts information classes about snow leopards for children and families living next door to the animal’s habitat.

All countries participating in the Global Programme for the Conservation of Snow Leopards and their Ecosystems, and more than 20 animal rights organisations supported an initiative called PAWS (Population Assessment of Snow Leopards in the World). The project was presented during the International Forum on the Protection of Snow Leopards and its Ecosystems in Bishkek in 2017; its main goal is to gain the most accurate estimation of the population of snow leopards in the wild.

In the meantime, every person interested in the conservation of the species can contribute in one simple way: familiarising themselves with the realities of snow leopards’ lives. Lack of knowledge among the local population and those authorised by the authorities is also one of the serious factors negatively affecting the living conditions of snow leopards.

Photos: Snow Leopard Trust

Preview collage: Perizat Suleiman

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The post Saving Snow Leopards: how scientists fight for the survival of a species appeared first on Novastan English.

On the evening of Saturday October 28^th, a fire broke out in the Kostenko mine at a depth of 700 metres, followed by an explosion of a methane-air mixture. 201 of 252 miners on shift were able to exit on their own, 24 of whom had injuries and needed medical help. The rescue operation continued till Tuesday, October 31^st, when the last body was discovered. All 46 of the missing miners have been found dead.

Notorious employer

Kostenko mine, along with 7 other coal mines in Kazakhstan, belongs to ArcelorMittal Temirtau, a company notorious for its security negligence. Apart from mines it also has Central Asia’s largest metallurgical plant, a mining and processing plant, four iron ore enterprises, two heat and power plants, a pipe plant and several auxiliary enterprises in its portfolio, that were obtained with huge preferences during the privatisation campaign of the mid-1990s. Many of them had issues with safety and fatal accidents in the past.

The current mine explosion is the deadliest in recent history for Kazakhstan, but it is not the first. Since 2006, more than 150 people have lost their lives working for companies belonging to AMT JSC. In 2022 alone there have been six deadly occurrences in various companies and mines belonging to ArcelorMittal Temirtau – which resulted in 13 deaths. The most recent tragedy occurred in August 2023, when 5 workers died at the Kazakhstanskaya mine when conveyor belt caught fire. The governmental commission determined a “100% fault of the employer.”

In the company’s latest statement from October 29, 2023, following the last explosion in the Kostenko mine, ArcelorMittal Temirtau mentions that “the company has made significant efforts, which have been further strengthened since 2020, to improve safety performance at ArcelorMittal Temirtau’s operations.” But this seems a rather bleak attempt to restore the company image by blaming the “complex geology” of the mines that complicates their operation while the voices have been raised repeatedly about the emergency conditions over the last few years. Workers in the Karaganda region, where the mines are located, continuously tried to improve labour conditions and mentioned the company’s focus on profit with disregard to the miners safety in their appeals.

But mines are not the only dangerous enterprise. Emergency conditions at the factories are widely known, though the company itself never issued any statements mentioning it. In 2018, there were three cases of collapse of roofs and floor slabs at factories, a collapse of the walls of a closed coal storage facility, and a massive explosion at the gas pipeline – all owned by the ArcelorMittal Temirtau and its subsidiaries. In 2019 there was another accident with a deformation and collapsed roof at the metallurgic plant. In 2021, two floor slabs with a total area of 72 square metres collapsed in the forge and press shop of Kurylysmet LLP, a subsidiary of AMT. There were no casualties or injuries, but the conditions and company’s attitude towards workers’ safety have not improved.

ArcelorMittal was continuously fined and disciplined for negligence, failure to comply with safety regulations, failure to submit the mandatory tax declaration, and polluting the environment. In November 2022, after another catastrophe that took lives of 5 workers, the president of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, mentioned that the company has systemic problems, and “despite repeated warnings and instructions from state authorities, the situation is not getting better.”

A search for an inland investor

At the meeting with family members of the miners on October 28 the president of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, said that the government will withdraw from co-operation with ArcelorMittal Temirtau: “I have instructed to stop the investment co-operation with ArcelorMittal Temirtau. This company has turned out to be the worst in our history in terms of cooperation with the government and enterprise.” ArcelorMittal Temirtau issued a statement on October 28 to confirm that the company “recently signed a preliminary agreement for a transaction that will transfer ownership to the Republic of Kazakhstan.”

The government also stated that “subsequent transfer of AMT JSC to other foreign investors is not considered.” However, in a long-term, the state is not planning to invest into the development of the company. “We have no plans for the state to be the owner and invest budget money. We […] must attract a private investor, and they must invest at least 3 billion dollars in the next three years. Without such investments, the enterprise will not be able to develop normally,” prime minister Alikhan Smailov said at the briefing in Majilis. 1.3 billion dollars will have to be invested immediately to ensure “resolvement of industrial and labour safety issues, modernisation of all equipment and expansion of production.”

For now, the company will stay a state property. The president appointed Vadim Basin, Deputy head of Karaganda Region, as head the coal department of ArcelorMittal Temirtau.

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The post Kazakhstan stops investment agreement with ArcelorMittal after deadly explosion in Kostenko mine takes 46 lives appeared first on Novastan English.

On May 6, two activists of “Oyan, Qazaqstan” (kaz. for “Wake up, Kazakhstan!”) political movements were detained for protesting the election results. Both have been actively protesting in the past and were detained on the grounds of “violating the procedure for organising and holding peaceful assemblies” for solitary pickets in November 2022 and March this year.

Held a protest, detained, released, detained again

Vlada Yermolcheva has been demonstrating with a poster stating “We were robbed of elections” in the central pedestrian street in Almaty on March 26, a week after the parliamentary election. She was swiftly detained that day, but later released. On May 6, police officers approached her in a cafe and demanded she follow them to a police station. On the night to May 7, she was found guilty of a violation of Article 488(7) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Darkhan Sharipov has also been detained for a protest on November 20, 2022. On the day of the presidential election, a group of activists unfurled a banner reading “Will we live to (see) fair elections?” on the main square in Almaty. All were detained by the police in less than ten minutes and released the same day without charge. On May 7, the night court found Sharipov guilty of a violation of Article 488(6). 

Police and court violated the procedure

In his interview to The Village Kazakhstan Yermolcheva’s attorney, Talgat Miyermanov, pointed out numerous procedural violations. No document stating the time and date of Yermolcheva’s first detention in March has been provided in the court materials. The detention report is dated 27 March – a day after the initial detention – but includes information from 19 April. Moreover, possible penalties stated in the law include a fine, an arrest is imposed only in exceptional cases – for instance, when a person has a previous conviction. The court, however, chose the harshest punishment – arrest with the maximum term, despite the fact that Yermolcheva had no criminal record.

Penalties for peaceful assembly without permission

Kazakhstan’s law “On Peaceful Assemblies”  is heavily criticised by civil society for violating the right of peaceful assembly. While the Constitution grants the right to peacefully gather to all Kazakhstani citizens, and the Law states that it is sufficient to inform local authorities without obtaining explicit permission to organise a demonstration, in fact there is a very limited space where such gatherings could be held, and the organisers need to “book” them in advance by the same city council, who has the ability to veto the assembly. For the mobile demonstrations such as rallies, notification is not enough – one has to apply for a written approval of the authorities.

Read more on Novastan: Women’s Day in Kazakhstan: hundreds gather for rally in Almaty

Human rights defender Tatiana Chernobil, commented to Novastan on why the authorities acted so long after the pickets took place, says one can be held liable within one year after the peaceful assembly itself.

“This law prohibits the holding of peaceful assemblies without the so-called sanction of the Akimat (city council), – explains Chernobil. – Pickets under this law are considered to be peaceful assemblies, which means that holding them, the same as with other peaceful assemblies, without notification and, importantly, without obtaining the necessary reciprocal approval of the Akimat will be illegal.

Darkhan and Vlada held their actions without notifying the Akimat out of principle, rightfully believing that holding of solitary pickets should not require the approval of the authorities. Fair enough because these are international human rights standards. But our government and the law believe otherwise. Therefore, holding even single pickets without Akimat approval in Kazakhstan is fraught with penalties.

What is interesting is that, in general, the limitation period for administrative responsibility established by the Code of Administrative Offences is 2 months, but a special period of 1 year is established for violating the legislation on peaceful assemblies.

It is also interesting to see what other administrative offences have such a long limitation period of 1 year. These are ‘corruption offences, unlawful interference of officials into entrepreneurial activity and also for offences in the sphere of inspections of private enterprise and other forms of control and supervision with visits to private enterprise, taxation, environment protection, protection of competition, customs, legislation on pension provision, on obligatory social insurance, on energy saving and improvement of energy efficiency, on state secrets, on natural monopolies, subsoil and subsoil use.’ This is the kind of company that peaceful assemblies find themselves in,” – concludes Chernobil.

Verdict upheld

On May 11, after Yermolcheva’s verdict was upheld in the court of appeal, she declared she is going on a hunger strike.

In his letter from detention center, Darkhan Sharipov sends warm greetings to his fellow activists: “You must not be ashamed for your civic position; the president and the state must be ashamed of imprisoning citizens for dissent. Until there is one person willing to fight for their rights and freedoms, I have no doubt about the future of this country.”

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Written by Anna Wilhelmi

Edited by Abby Scripka

The post Kazakhstan: two activists get 15-days detention for peaceful protests against “unfair” election appeared first on Novastan English.

On International Women’s Day in Almaty, feminist organisations rallied “for bodily autonomy and against sexual violence”. According to estimates, 700 to 1000 participants joined the rally to express their demands. After facing an initial ban by the city administration, the organisers only received limited permission to assemble on a distant location in the city’s outskirts.

The rally opened with a moment of silence in memory of those killed by domestic violence. The situation with violence against women in Kazakhstan is alarming: in 2021, 110 women were killed as a result of domestic violence. In 2022, there were 373 rapes registered in Kazakhstan; so far in 2023 72 cases of sexual violence have been reported. According to official sources, more than 100 000 domestic violence complaints are received by the authorities annually. Human Rights Watch has repeatedly insisted upon greater accountability for abusers. Recently, Human Rights Watch again called for Kazakhstan to “ensure that draft laws relating to domestic violence provide maximum protection for women from family violence, including by criminalising domestic violence as a stand-alone offense“. A draft law On Combating Domestic Violence, which would have strengthened protections for victims of family abuse, passed its first reading in parliament in 2020, but was withdrawn in 2021 as it was said to be in need of improvement. Activists also voiced a demand to pass a bill on sexual harassment and to join the Istanbul Convention. This international agreement was initiated by the Council of Europe to end violence against women and domestic violence. Since the withdrawal of the draft law, state officials have submitted several revisions; HRW claims the authorities proposed “at least two other pieces of legislation that include domestic violence-related provisions”, but the new draft is unavailable for public discussion.

Long way to a march in March

In 2017, the first feminist march took place in Almaty. Back then, the activists had not received a permit from the city administration. In 2019, for the first time, the authorities officially approved a feminist rally and then a feminist march. But in 2020, the organisations FemAgora, KazFem and Feminita were denied permission to organise a march on March 8. In 2021, the Almaty city council approved the largest feminist march in Kazakhstan to date. Between 500 and 1000 participants marched about five kilometres through the streets of the city. Last year, the Almaty Women’s March was only allowed at the last moment.

Read more on Novastan: 8 March in Almaty: “women belong in politics!”

Fariza Ospan, one of the organisers of the 2023 Almaty women’s march, says the organising committee applied for approval four times before permission was finally granted: the first time in December 2022. The municipality then banned the march because of an event of the League of Volunteers, a quasi-public organisation which became famous in 2018 as they campaigned in support of a controversial state project to build a ski resort in a national park (and won several questionable public contracts). Ospan says the organisers suspect that the city council had already decided to ban the march even before any application was submitted, as all demonstration sites were allegedly booked by the League of Volunteers.

During a Q&A with citizens in February, Almaty’s Mayor Erbolat Dosaev said “We’ll see what we give permission for and what we don’t,” when the activists asked him if the march was going to be approved, and added that “the 8th of March is a holiday that is important for men as well“. The same day, the organisers of the women’s march were notified that their rally would not receive municipal permission. As Ospan explains, this was anticipated: the organisers had planned to protest the ban every weekend until permission was granted. The first protest took place on 5 February, when more than 150 people gathered to voice their discontent with the administration’s decision.

The difficulty of organising demonstrations in Kazakhstan

In 2020, Kazakhstan’s Parliament passed the Law “On Peaceful Assemblies,” according to which it is sufficient to inform local authorities of a planned demonstration, without obtaining explicit permission to organise one. However, this law is heavily criticised by civil society for violating the right of peaceful assembly, as the procedure to notify the authorities is actually more complicated than it might seem. In Almaty, there are three locations where the citizens are allowed to peacefully assemble, with the capacity for 200, 500, and 1000 participants, and only one possible route for a march. The largest location is in the city centre, although it is rather far away from the city administration buildings. The other two are located in residential neighbourhoods on the city’s outskirts. But even the latter locations are often unavailable for various reasons, such as repair works or other events. In 2019, an activist was finally permitted to hold a rally, after his request had first been rejected 35 times. Although the law has been updated since, the grounds for the municipality to ban protests have not.

According to Kazakh law, an application to hold a demonstration is non-binding. It means that even if a rally is cancelled in advance, the city hall is not obliged to inform other potential applicants that the location has become available. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to keep the local government in check, while it allows the municipality to ban genuine initiatives. Even if organisers are notified that a location is vacant, this often happens with little time left to prepare. In Kazakhstan, those planning a demonstration are responsible for anything that could go wrong, creating yet another obstacle for activists to overcome. For example, if the number of participants specified in the application is exceeded or the agenda changes, organisers could be sanctioned.

Limited permission granted

As Fariza Ospan explains, in February, the city council communicated that the League is ready to “give up two locations“. The Women’s March organising committee hoped to secure a location next to Shoqan Walikhanov’s monument in downtown Almaty, where up to 1000 people could gather. But this could not be facilitated. The activists could choose between two distant locations and finally applied to organise a gathering at the Ghandi Park with a capacity of 200 people. On 21 February, the organising committee of the Almaty women’s march learned from an article by news outlet Orda.kz that their rally was finally allowed to take place. The official approval from the city administration came in the evening. Yet, the ban to march through the city was left in place and the organisers decided not to proceed with it to avoid putting the participants in danger. The turn-out exceeded expectations. Local news outlets have come with various estimates: from “up to 700″ to “at least 1000“. All difficulties aside, this year’s rally in Almaty once again showed that the 8th of March has become an annual tradition for the women’s movement in Kazakhstan − and it is likely here to stay.

Written by Anna Wilhelmi, Emma Collet

Edited by Julian Postulart

Photos by Toma Maratova

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The post Women’s Day in Kazakhstan: hundreds gather for rally in Almaty appeared first on Novastan English.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left Kazakhstan with the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world and little say in its fate. In her book Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb, nuclear expert Togzhan Kassenova reconstructs the 40-year history of nuclear testing in the Kazakh grasslands – and tells the story of how the newly-independent country became a nuclear-free state.

Novastan talked to Ms. Kassenova about her book, the USSR’s complicated legacy, Nazarbayev’s role in shutting down the infamous Semipalatinsk Polygon, and what Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine could mean for Kazakhstan.

Novastan: The history of nuclear testing is a highly sensitive topic, and it is obvious that it is difficult to find any information about it because most of the archives are still closed. How did you work on your book?

Togzhan Kassenova: I gathered information through archival research and by interviewing witnesses of the events I was describing. I did not have issues with archives in Kazakhstan or the United States. The presidential archive in Almaty was the most helpful. There is also a wonderful archive in Semey – the Center for Modern History Documentation. These archives are open to researchers, and I could easily use them. However, I faced limitations. I could read anything that was declassified and open for research, but I could tell certain chunks of documents were missing. For example, there was nothing I could find from the 1970s. I had documents on the 60s, I had some documents on the 80s and beyond, but nothing on the 70s. In the US, presidential archives are excellent, but there are also some limitations. Most US governmental documents become available after about 25 years. As I was interested in the 90s, a lot was already available. There is a system called mandatory declassification review – you put in a request [to see classified documents], and it goes to the relevant agency which decides if they can declassify the requested document. It takes years but it works. In Russia I had no issues working in regular archives, but the archives that I needed the most, such as the archives of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) or the Ministry of Defense, are inaccessible to researchers. I submitted formal requests, and all of them were denied. In short, I worked with what was available in the archives, but I will be the first to say that there were many black holes. I hope with time, we will learn more and more. I interviewed former policymakers and diplomats in decision-making roles, but it was even more important to me to interview people from the Semipalatinsk region. That was challenging, but in a different way. It was hard emotionally and ethically, because those were personal family histories, and it was very important not to present the people merely as victims. I wanted to show their resilience and love for the native land.

Novastan: When reading your book, I could not shake the feeling that the first tests were conducted in complete darkness.  Nowadays, it is hard to believe that someone could be so reckless. Several years had passed after Hiroshima, so the scientists should have had at least some data on the toll of nuclear explosions on human life. So I wonder if those sacrifices were deliberate and cold-hearted? Did the project managers not care about human casualties, or was it rather this banality of evil with people “just trying to do their jobs”?

T.K.: You are absolutely correct that the first tests were conducted, as you described, in complete darkness – in an information void.  The civilians were not informed, and no one considered the local community. I cannot speak on behalf [of the project leaders], I cannot look inside their heads, but this is how I view what transpired. Soviet military leaders were rushing to stay on equal footing with the US. Hiroshima and Nagasaki had already happened, so it was obvious that nuclear explosions caused severe damage. Obviously, Soviet planners understood that it was bad, [but] maybe they didn’t understand the details. I don’t think they understood the consequences of long-term exposure to low-level doses of ionizing radiation. I don’t think they operated with the objective, “Let’s test the weapons to see the impact on people.” It was more like, “We need nuclear weapons, and we don’t care about the locals. We accept the collateral damage, but we don’t know yet fully what the damage will be.” I think this nuance is important, especially for the discourse within Kazakhstan. I am against painting it as though the site was chosen because they wanted to experiment on ethnic minorities or on Kazakhs [in particular]. I think it was more a lack of thought, lack of care, and complete dismissal that local communities would suffer. But as the tests continued, the harmful impact of the tests could not be denied, and that was when it should have become an ethical question of responsibility, but the Soviet military leadership didn’t care. They monitored people’s health for military purposes to understand how a nuclear war would impact humans. While collecting data for military research, they didn’t provide any medical treatment to local people.

Novastan: And the very first test was conducted in rainy and windy weather, which dispersed radioactive contamination for miles around the test site – like there was zero thought given to the whole operation.

T.K.: They could have waited for better weather. [There is] something that I don’t mention in the book because I cannot prove it – but in general, [there is a belief] that the military would often wait for the wind to go toward the steppe [instead of towards the military settlements]. I don’t want to give you incorrect information. In the official military description, it sounded as though [the wind would blow] towards the uninhabited steppe. But if you speak to locals in the region, there is a widely accepted belief that the military waited for the wind not to blow towards their military settlements, but they did not care about other directions. But I could not prove it.

Novastan: Another weird, illogical point to me was that with all that secrecy surrounding the Polygon, with all the attempts to suppress the information, there were some major breaches of security, and they were not acted on, and they were not even foreseen. As you mentioned, the Semipalatinsk region was the major supplier of meat, they were selling meat products across the whole Soviet Union, and then at some point, the meat became radioactive because the livestock had been feeding on contaminated grass. How can one keep that a secret? How could this scenario not come to mind when planning to build a Polygon? And even if it was not obvious during the planning stage, when one can argue that the region is isolated and there are no big cities nearby, how can one not acknowledge the risk and keep testing when it is already happening?

T.K.: That is such a good point, and it makes me think that no Soviet life had much value, but some lives had even less value. The site was chosen for practical reasons. For the Soviet military planners, it was logical: the site was remote (they even called it uninhabited, though it was completely untrue) and there was access to the construction material. So for them, it was a rational decision. But you are right: it would be difficult to control radioactive contamination, to keep it within one specific region.

I will give you another telling example. There was significant radioactive contamination after one of the tests. The Soviet military authorities knew that the grain from the region was highly contaminated. So, what did they do? They made sure that the grain was distributed across the Soviet Union and not sent for export. They cared about the international community not getting the grain and finding out it was radioactive. They did not care that their own citizens would be consuming it. Another thing I mention in my book is how during the more powerful tests, the authorities would advise people to come outside, which made no sense. I think they did not want to people to suffer injuries from [breaking] glass if they stayed inside the house. For Soviet authorities, it was better if people were outside of the house, to avoid any visible injuries. Obviously, locals were getting a higher dose of exposure because they were outside. But that did not bother the military authorities.

I do not want to present the Soviet Union as an evil empire, but I think a complete lack of respect for human life is pretty evident. And some lives, in this case, the lives of people of Semipalatinsk region, were respected even less.

Novastan: The Polygon was closed in 1991, and I would like to ask you about Nazarbayev’s role in this process. I got the impression that he was a bit hesitant in the end – he always promoted the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, talked about the Polygon being harmful, pushed for action, and gave that speech about not having enough information on the consequences. But at the end of the story, when you just need to sign a decree to close the Polygon, it took him quite some time to do that. Is it only my impression, and in reality, he was just a busy person who did not have time or was he not ready to make that big step?

T.K.: The reason why I do not have much detail [is because] there is only one account of that specific day [when the decree to close the Polygon was signed]. If we look at Nazarbayev’s letters to Gorbachev over the period of 1989-1991, you will notice changed tonality. I don’t know if you picked it up in the book – Nazarbayev, as any other Soviet Moscow-appointed functionary, was dependent on the “Center.” Initially, in the early 1989, Nazarbayev made sure that requests from Almaty came in a Soviet bureaucratic way. The requests from the Kazakh government sounded timid: “There is this Nevada-Semipalatinsk, and they are protesting against testing, and we feel that we have done everything we could as a republic.” Towards 1991, his language became strong. I think he was ready to shut it down. Speaking about the specific day, we should remember that it was just a few days after the attempted coup d’état in Moscow. Many other things were happening: maybe the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement was more determined and pushing, maybe the Kazakh political establishment was going through its motions. I do believe Nazarbayev was ready. While I do not have enough information on that specific day, I believe it was probably more for symbolism that they wanted to make sure that the decree [to close the Semipalatinsk Polygon] was signed on August 29, the day of the first Soviet atomic test. Here I want to underscore something. Very often, the narrative within Kazakhstan is very personalized and Nazarbayev-centered. I think, especially on the closure of the Polygon, it is so important to give credit to the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement and all the people who rallied. It is important to tell the story and give credit to all actors. Kazakhstan’s society and establishment worked together at different levels, so it is not the story of only one person signing the decree.

Novastan: From the book, I felt it was a grassroots initiative, and Nazarbayev joined it at the very last moment when he saw that you could not just sit it out and wait.

T.K.: It was definitely grassroots, all those thousands of people protesting sincerely on their own goodwill, but I think the movement was also beneficial for the political establishment. The anti-nuclear movement and the Kazakh government were not entirely separate. For example, in the book, I describe how the participants of international marches were welcomed in Kazakhstan, provided with food and helped with sleeping arrangements, how local authorities helped them. It makes me realize that there were, what we would call in Russian, “administrative resources” present. Protests and rallies were not prohibited but supported by local authorities. And this is something we still don’t know in detail, but I would not separate the movement from the government because I think all parts of Kazakh society – the political establishment and the citizens – worked together.

Novastan: The survivors of nuclear tests get regular compensation from the state. Yet you describe a situation with Kazakh soldiers deployed at the Polygon next to the Russian ones, and those ex-soldiers are excluded from these payments, despite also being exposed. How so?

T.K.: This is a question of who bears responsibility for nuclear tests. It was a Soviet program. When it came to useful things from the Soviet Union, Russia wanted to inherit them. For example, Russia inherited the Soviet Union’s seat on the UN Security Council.

But when it comes to the impact of the Soviet nuclear testing program and its impact on the people around the Polygon, then suddenly it is: “That was done by the government of a country, which doesn’t exist anymore.”

I believe Russia, as the inheritor of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, bears responsibility for the entire Soviet nuclear program, and it would be logical if atomic soldiers and veterans of the Soviet nuclear program were covered by Russian legislation on assistance for “atomic soldiers,” but that legislation applies only to the Russian citizens.

Kazakhstan’s law on assistance for victims of Soviet nuclear tests was adopted in 1992. The focus was on the civilian population, and the narrative was more along the lines of: “It was the Soviet military versus local population.” The law did not apply to “atomic soldiers.” Some of the stories are heartbreaking. Many of those soldiers are not alive anymore. There was an association of the atomic veterans of Kazakhstan, and I don’t even know if they have any people left now.

Novastan: Let’s talk about how Kazakhstan actually “gave up the bomb.” Kazakhstan signed the Budapest Memorandum, which gave assurances that Russia will not threaten Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine with nuclear weapons in exchange for their denuclearization and would respect their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet last year, Russia did exactly that: threatened Ukraine with using its nuclear arsenal. Where does that put Kazakhstan in the current situation? 

T.K.: Kazakhstan and Ukraine sought security assurances in return for giving up their nuclear arsenal. For Kazakhstan and Ukraine, receiving security assurances from nuclear powers was fundamental to their decision, and they invested a lot of effort into negotiations on that matter. Kazakhstan signed an important bilateral document with the US – the US-Kazakhstan Charter on Democratic Partnership, in which Washington reiterated its security assurances to Kazakhstan. The Budapest Memorandum, as you mention, committed the three nuclear powers to exactly that: respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. The leaders of Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom signed the memorandum, so it should carry a lot of weight.

But if you look into the wording, there is no enforcement mechanism. There is no “what happens if…” I think there is regret within Ukraine now that it was not spelled out what would happen if one of the parties goes against its own promises. […]

Russia’s violation of the UN Charter and its commitments under the Budapest Memorandum will carry long-term consequences because the more countries disregard their promises, the harder it will be to believe in them, which is very troubling. It is relevant for Kazakhstan because we signed the same document, Kazakhstan received the same promises. What is happening now makes everyone more worried.

Novastan: So after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new republics landed in a kind of a stalemate situation: you are not allowed to be a nuclear state, but you also do not get any security guarantees if you promise not to seek a bomb. That does not seem fair.

T.K.: Global nuclear order is unjust and unfair. There are nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots. In the 1960s, five countries had nuclear weapons and wanted to freeze that state of affairs. They came up with a bargain under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): five countries were recognized as nuclear powers and promised to disarm eventually and other countries agreed to never develop nuclear weapons in return to access to peaceful nuclear technology. Why is it considered a norm that five countries have nuclear weapons? Why is it somehow acceptable for them to keep nuclear weapons with no signs of disarmament while for everybody else the choice is: you are either a non-nuclear weapon state or a pariah state? The NPT reflects the global world order, but the global world order has been changing, right? Countries like Brazil, India, and other nations of the Global South have been challenging where they stand in the world hierarchy and the kind of power they carry, and that’s why I think the global nuclear order will be forced to change too. Countries are not quietly accepting this unjust order; shifts will happen. It is the core of what we are dealing with in the nuclear field at the moment. You have a fundamentally unfair system, but at the same time, you need to keep the norms, and you need to promote these norms because otherwise, it will be chaos. That is the tension we exist in.

Novastan: Did the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) change after the Soviet collapse? What happens if a nuclear power falls apart and more than a dozen new countries emerge?

T.K.: That was exactly the point of negotiations between the Soviet “nuclear” republics (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), the United States, and the international community for more than two years. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan signed political documents in which they promised to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. From the start, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine didn’t have the option to keep nuclear weapons if they wanted to avoid a pariah status within the international community. As far as the NPT was concerned, new states could only join it as non-nuclear weapon states. At the same time, those Soviet nuclear weapons were not “automatically” Russian. Resources from Kazakhstan and Ukraine were used to build those weapons. Plus, property remaining on the territory of each newly independent state at the time of the Soviet collapse belonged to each republic.

Read more on Novastan:Central Asia and Russia: an ever-changing relationship

Nothing should happen by default, everything requires negotiations. Ukraine now questions why Russia inherited the Soviet seat at the UN Security Council, why Russia got to keep Soviet nuclear weapons, and so on. There was no precedent in history when a nuclear power disintegrated, and several independent states found themselves with parts of the nuclear arsenal.

Novastan: You describe a situation in which newly independent Kazakhstan is left with the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world, with no ability to use them or stop your neighbor with the red button to use them on your behalf. It is only natural to want to get rid of them as soon as possible, but what I noticed from your book is that Russia seemed not interested in these weapons or nuclear material during the negotiations. How so? And why was it mostly the US involved in these negotiations and not other nuclear powers? Were they not interested either?

T.K.: There was a difference. Russia and the US agreed that Russia should be the sole inheritor of all Soviet weapons. Russia was not interested in Belarus, Ukraine, or Kazakhstan keeping any nuclear weapons. It’s not that Russia needed those weapons because, as you know, they had thousands of them. Besides, under US-Russian arms control process, there has been gradual reduction in the number of warheads. Many of the warheads moved back to Russia had to be dismantled anyway.

But it was important to Russia that it was considered the inheritor of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and while such a premise shouldn’t be accepted by default, that was how Russia perceived itself. Russian leadership believed there could be only one post-Soviet nuclear power, and that it should be Russia.

Politically Russia was on the same page with the US. Washington did not want any other former Soviet republic to become a new nuclear power.

Moscow’s position on nuclear material was different. Russia did not need that extra material because it was a headache. They had more than enough [of HEU], and moving nuclear material across borders was a complicated and a very expensive process. The US was the leading negotiator in Kazakhstan’s overall denuclearization process because they had the power and because they had something to offer in return. The focus of my book is on the US because it represented the international community; the US was the most invested party in all of this. Other powers assisted too. There were various multilateral programs, especially in the field of nuclear security, but the role and involvement of the United States cannot be compared to any other country.

Novastan: How did American public perceive this involvement? You mention this huge operation, Project Sapphire, when nuclear material sitting in an unguarded nuclear facility in Kazakhstan was transported to American soil to ensure that it would not get into the wrong hands. You cannot hide an operation of this scale; I imagine not everyone was happy about that nuclear material.

T.K.: Initially, when policymakers in the United States discussed what to do with Kazakh highly enriched uranium, some officials wanted Russia to take it back, precisely for the reason you identified. They worried about environmental organizations, but I am unaware of any protests or public outcry in response to this specific operation. Speaking about secrecy, someone within the US media found out about the operation before the material reached the Oak Ridge facility in the United States. The White House asked the press to hold the story for 24 hours, and the journalists complied. The story hit the US newspapers once material entered the facility, but from what I have seen, there was no splash in the public space. Again, I would underscore that it wasn’t nuclear waste: it was nuclear material.

Novastan: Kazakhstan has two nuclear powers as neighbors, and one of them is engaged in military aggression right now. The US supports Ukraine in this war. Are we heading towards a new arms race?

T.K.: Russia and the United States have more than enough nuclear weapons to kill the planet many times over. Not that we should ignore the numbers, but in existential terms, these two countries have so much that they have no military or strategic incentive to increase their arsenals. Simply because they already have an overkill capacity. Currently, one remaining arms control agreement between the US and Russia keeps the number of their warheads under specific limitations. I do not think the US or Russia will try to increase their arsenal in terms of numbers, but it is another question of what they can do in terms of quality. We can expect calls for further modernization of nuclear arsenals, which is also bad news for the international community.

Read more on Novastan:Kazakhstan’s gradual divorce from Russia

The fundamental issue is the instability of the international system. You have a major conflict involving a country with nuclear weapons, so there are many risks. We cannot comprehend the consequences of what is happening now, which is the scary part –  knowing they are going to be consequences but not knowing their extent or direction. This just underscores the insanity: as long as nuclear weapons exist, we face the risk that a conventional conflict will escalate into a nuclear war. This is the fundamental danger we are constantly facing.

Novastan: Is it likely that all countries will be nuclear-free in the near future? Will we be able to live to see that?

(long pause)

T.K.:  At some point in the future – yes. Otherwise, I wouldn’t be in the profession I am in. The arc of history is bending in the right direction in global terms, despite what I just said about the current war. It’s impressive that recently the majority of countries were able to come together and sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and that more and more nations are reclaiming agency in the conversation about nuclear issues. Before, it was more of “We are nuclear powers, and we are deciding [the matter] among ourselves, and you have no voice, and no one cares what you say.” There is a change in the dynamic. But I would be lying if I said I’ll see a nuclear-free world. It will not be my generation.   This interview has been edited for clarity.

Interview by Anna Wilhelmi, Novastan English editor

Edited by Mari Paine

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The post “I would be lying if I said I’ll see a nuclear-free world.” An interview with Togzhan Kassenova appeared first on Novastan English.

The counting is over: the final results of Sunday’s snap election were announced on Tuesday. According to the Central Election Commission, the current President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has won 81.31% of votes and therefore stays in office for the next seven years. The inauguration is planned for the 26 November. The final election results are fully in line with the preliminary results announced the day before. As many as 460 484 voters – or 5.8% – voted “against all” candidates. The rest were divided between the bleak alternatives: 3.42% voted for Zhiguli Dairabayev, 2.6% for Karakat Abden, 2.53% for Meiram Kazhiken, 2.22% for Nurlan Auesbayev, and 2.12% for Saltanat Tursynbekova. The voter turnout was 69.44%.

The data from Central Asia Barometer, a regional non-profit centre for applied social research, supports the numbers. The spring Survey shows the majority of citizens having a positive general attitude towards Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

Zhas Sailaushilar Ligasi (The League of Young Voters), a grassroot initiative that conducts election observation, also provides similar numbers. Although the data from their 83 polling stations cannot be extrapolated on the whole population, the observed tendency is similar: according to their counting, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev won 86.33% of votes. The election turnout, however, is different: ZSL data shows only 44%. However, the elections themselves can hardly be called flawless: the ODIHR’s Election Observation Mission (EOM) assessed counting negatively in more than half of the polling stations observed “due to substantial procedural errors and omissions, raising serious questions about whether ballots were counted and reported honestly.” In addition, the EOM stated that “the eligibility requirements for presidential candidates are overly restrictive, unreasonably limiting the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizens to stand for elections.” Irina Mednikova, the coordinatior of Zhas Sailaushilar Ligasi (ZSL), supports this notion. “This observation was no different from previous ones: observers faced restrictions on their movement around the polling station, refusals to provide data, and psychological pressure. – explains Mednikova. – Five observers were removed from polling stations by commissions by the end of the day, and four more stopped responding. One of our observers in Astana was removed from the station by the police.” ZSL started with 100 polling stations in 16 cities, mostly in Almaty, and at the end of the day had 83 people counting the ballots. “For the sake of fairness it should be noted that every year we have some model polling stations, where the commissions know the law, consult with the observer and also correct deficiencies after observer’s notions. – continues Mednikova. – But there are also those where the chairman openly bullies the observer, turns other observers against him, calls the police or the prosecutor’s office and asks to deal with the observer – there are usually 3-5 such stations. This year we had a situation when to the phrase: ‘There is law’ the chairman replied: ‘I am the law’.” The snap election was announced earlier this autumn. During the State-of-the-Nation Address on 1 September, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed several constitutional changes, including the extension of the presidential term from 5 to 7 years with no right of re-election. This is a part of Tokayev’s “New Kazakhstan”, a reform package which was announced after the events of Bloody January. These reforms included renaming the capital city back to Astana and stripping Tokayev’s predecessor Nursultan Nazarbayev of lifetime benefits and key positions. “New Kazakhstan” was widely criticized as a governmental attempt to shift the focus from the January unrest that left at least 238 people dead (including 6 tortured to death) and around 70 missing. Back then Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stated that the city of Almaty was being attacked by 20,000 well-trained terrorists, allowed special forces to use lethal weapons without warning, and requested help from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). So far, the “New Kazakhstan” suspiciously resembles the old one – with no freedom of assembly, attacks on free press, and pressuring activists and opposition leaders. On the day of the elections, activists from the “Oyan, Qazaqstan!” (Wake Up, Kazakhstan!) movement were detained by the police. Several people went out to the main square with a banner that read “Will we live to see fair elections?” They were taken away in under ten minutes and released a few hours later. Youth Information Service of Kazakhstan, an NGO with a focus on human rights, reported on several cases of pressure and hacking attempts against independent journalists before the elections. Meanwhile, Zhanbolat Mamay, the leader of an unregistered opposition party, the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, has been under arrest for eight months, during which the charges against him have changed several times.  

Written by Anna Wilhelmi

Edited by Emma Bain

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The post Tokayev’s new term: Central Election Commission announces final results of Kazakh presidential election appeared first on Novastan English.